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Hatem A. El-Karanshawy
Founding Dean, Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies, Hamad bin Khalifa University, Qatar Foundation, Doha
The International Conference on Islamic Economics and 
Finance (ICIEF) is the leading academic conference in the 
discipline organized by the International Association for 
Islamic Economics (IAIE) in collaboration with other key 
stakeholders, including the Islamic Research and Training 
Institute, Islamic Development Bank. It is the pioneering 
international conference on Islamic economics organized 
first in Makkah Al Mukaramah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
in 1976 under the auspices of King Abdulaziz University 
and has since been held in numerous locations around the 
world. The conference as such has contributed immensely 
to the promotion of Islamic economics and finance. Since 
2011, the Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies (QFIS), of 
Hamad bin Khalifa University, Qatar Foundation, has also 
become a key partner in organizing the conference. 
The global economy continues to face the perennial 
problems of poverty, persistent youth unemployment, 
excessive inequalities of income and wealth, high levels of 
inflation, large macroeconomic and budgetary imbalances, 
exorbitant debt-servicing burdens, inadequate and aging 
public utilities and infrastructure, skyrocketing energy 
prices, and growing food insecurity. The reoccurring 
regional and global financial crises further intensify 
and magnify these problems, particularly for the 
underprivileged segments of the world population. As a 
result, many countries are at the risk of failing to achieve 
by 2015 the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
set by the United Nations. Hence the achievement of an 
inclusive and sustainable economic and financial system 
has remained highly illusive.
The ICIEF presents an excellent opportunity for those 
interested in Islamic economics and finance to present their 
research and contribute to the development of an inclusive 
and sustainable global economic and financial system. It is 
through such a setting that thoughts can be debated with 
the objective of advancing knowledge creation, facilitating 
policymaking and promoting genuine innovation for 
the industry and the markets. Disseminating research 
presented at ICIEF to the greatest number of researchers 
interested in the topic is important. It not only advances 
the discourse, but also grants those who did not have the 
privilege of attending the conference to partake in the 
discussion.
To this end, this series of five volumes (two in Arabic to 
follow) presents the proceedings of 8th and 9th conferences, 
which were held in Doha and Istanbul respectively in 2011 
and 2013. Each volume focuses on a particular sub-theme 
within the broader theme of Developing Inclusive and 
Sustainable Economic and Financial Systems.
The volumes are as follows:
Volume 1:  Access to Finance – Essays on Zakah, Awqaf and 
Microfinance
Volume 2:  Islamic Economics and Social Justice – Essays 
on Theory and Policy
Volume 3:  Islamic Banking and Finance – Essays on 
Corporate Finance, Efficiency, and Product 
Development
Volume 4:  Ethics, Governance, and Regulation in Islamic 
Finance
Volume 5:  Financial Stability and Risk Management in 
Islamic Financial Institutions
We hope that this academic endeavor in partnership with 
the Bloomsbury Qatar Foundation Publishing will benefit 
the Islamic economics and finance community and policy 
makers and that it will promote further academic study of 
the discipline.
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The primary objective of the conferences is to further the 
frontiers of knowledge in the area of Islamic economics 
and finance. Without the hard work and creativity of the 
researchers who shared their work with us, the pool of 
knowledge generated in the form of the conference papers 
and presentations would not have been possible. We thank 
all the authors who submitted their abstracts and papers to 
the two conferences.
The IAIE has always endeavored to publish most of the 
significant research papers contributed to its conferences. 
Currently the selected papers of the 8th and 9th conference 
are being published in five volumes under the common 
theme of Developing Inclusive and Sustainable Economic 
and Financial Systems. On behalf of the Editorial Board we 
acknowledge that the partnership with the Bloomsbury 
Qatar Foundation Publishing in this regard will be 
highly beneficial in disseminating research output and in 
promoting the academic cause.
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Dr. Moh’d Azmi Omar
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Islamic economics and finance holds great potential 
and appeal for achievement of economic growth with 
social justice. Particularly, in the present time when 
countries across the world are growing but their financial 
and economic progress has been uneven and achieved 
at the cost of moral and social decline. Moreover, the 
repercussions of the moral, social, economic and financial 
rise and fall of regions is no longer isolated but can be felt 
globally. In this scenario, the need for developing inclusive 
and sustainable Islamic economic and financial systems 
become much more important.
The early opinion building as well as the later technical 
literature on the subject of Islamic economics has greatly 
contributed to the promotion of this line of inquiry. 
However, Islamic economics has not yet achieved a level 
to become a discipline that is able to create a paradigm 
shift in the way of thinking and policymaking. The need 
is therefore not only to develop the theory but also to 
link the theory with policymaking. This transition would 
also require yardsticks and measuring devices to gauge 
the social, economic, and financial progress defined 
in congruence with Islam. With this perspective, the 
present volume focuses on: (i) further articulation of the 
fundamental concepts and methods of Islamic economics, 
(ii) analysis of the workings of fiscal and monetary policies 
in Islamic context, and (iii) measurement and analysis of 
socio-economic development. 
The fifteen papers collected in this volume attempt to 
cover the three aspects mentioned above. These papers 
are selected from the 8th International Conference on 
Islamic Economics and Finance held in Doha during 19-21 
December 2011 and from the 9th International Conference 
on Islamic Economics and Finance held in Istanbul during 
9-11 September 2013. They are presented here in their 
original form, with changes limited to copyediting and 
correcting typographical errors. These conferences were 
organized by the Center for Islamic Economics and Finance, 
Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies (QFIS), Hamad bin Khalifa 
University ; Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI), 
Islamic Development Bank (IDB); International Association 
for Islamic Economics and Finance (IAIE); and Statistical, 
Economic, and Social Research and Training Centre for 
Islamic Countries (SESRIC). 
We hope that the papers presented in this volume will 
provide further insights into the issues and contribute in 
generating fundamental and policy-oriented research on 
the subject that can take the discipline forward in creating 
a paradigm shift in socio-economic development.
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theory and policy
Salman Syed Ali
Islamic Research and Training Institute, Jeddah, KSA 
Economic thinking from Islamic perspective is not a 
new phenomenon. Even before the birth of the formal 
conventional economics discipline, several Muslim scholars 
have written on the economic and social issues of their time 
and provided policy advice to the rulers and guidance to 
the masses. Among the fourteenth century academicians 
and policy advisors Ibn Khaldun’s name (1332–1406 AD) 
appear prominently, for he not only explained many of 
the economic phenomenon that present-day economists 
discuss but also put forward a complete theory of dynastical 
and social change in which social and economic factors 
interact to explain the dynamics of the rise and fall of 
nations, dynasties, cities, societies and businesses.
These early strides in the development of economics have 
been eclipsed by the rise of the West in knowledge and power 
and eventual colonization of many parts of the Muslim 
world. This dominance was complete by the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries but insistently challenged in many 
places in various forms. A revival of thought and movement for 
addressing the social, economic and political issues from the 
Islamic perspective started at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, and it contributed towards many countries gaining 
freedom from colonial rule. The momentum of writings and 
contributions to the field of Islamic economics and finance 
has increased since the end of the colonial era. However, 
these ideas and thoughts were not put into practice after 
independence of Muslim lands due to a variety of reasons 
including the local politics and the mindset of the political 
leadership that replace the colonial rulers. Economic ideas 
and theories have a different nature compared to physical 
sciences in that unless they are formulated into policies and 
implemented they cannot be refined and perfected. Absent 
this, the writings on Islamic economics grew, but they did 
not get mature enough to generate some critical level of 
consensus around various theories and ways of thinking to 
become an independent discipline.
The intellectual effort is now directed at turning theory 
into actionable policies and practice wherever possible. 
This would also result in refinement of ideas and hence the 
development of Islamic economics as a discipline distinct 
from conventional economics. The strategy requires 
building of a mind-set that can think out of the box of 
conventional economics and also development of a political 
will and the courage to experiment with new things. This 
approach would require many things, but some important 
dimensions would be:
•	 Regular, evaluation of the progress of the theory and 
models of Islamic economics
•	 Translating the theory into policies and evaluating 
the channels through which the policies are creating 
or likely to create an impact
•	 Developing a benchmark to evaluate socio-economic 
progress and impact of the policies in line with 
Islamic teachings
The fifteen papers collected in this volume attempt to do 
just that. They are divided into three parts.
1. Part 1 Islamic Economics as a Discipline
There are six papers in Part 1, all dealing with evaluation 
or advocacy for Islamic economics as a discipline. These 
papers also provide food for thought on how to move 
forward from the current position.
In the first paper, “Crisis in Islamic economics: Diagnosis 
and prescriptions,” Asad Zaman points out that most 
Muslim economists have uncritically accepted many of the 
ideas of conventional economics. Since the methodological 
framework and the underlying assumptions of conventional 
economics are different and in conflict with Islamic views, 
the attempt to combine contradictory bodies of knowledge 
has not been successful in providing any new theory or 
practical policy wisdom. He attempts to provide alternative 
foundations, upon which a genuine Islamic economic 
theory could be constructed.
The paper points out four maxims of conventional economic 
philosophy that are taken for granted but are not necessarily 
true. These are: 1. Economic theories are universal laws, 2. 
Economic theories are best framed in mathematical form, 
3. Only materialistic economic propositions are important, 
4. Economic theories are positive (or factual). He then 
presents Islamic alternative principles that should be 
present in any potential Islamic economics theory. These 
Islamic alternatives call for focusing on 1. Transforming 
human beings, which requires attention to spiritual 
aspects, moral training, and engagement and struggle 
towards transformation as, in-itself, a means of knowledge. 
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It also requires focusing on 2. Generosity versus greed, and 
3. Cooperation versus competition.
The paper invites the Islamic world to build Islamic 
economics theory on new foundations free from the burden 
carried by conventional and neoclassical economics. 
Muslim economists have to be prepared to abandon a lot 
that they try to carryover from the conventional economics. 
Fortunately, they have a source of guidance from the Quran 
and access to practical wisdom in the form of Sunnah that 
can help them to manage economic affairs of a society.
The second paper “First vs. second generation Islamic 
economists: Deviations and differences in thoughts,” by 
Abdul Azim Islahi, analyzes the thoughts of the first vs. 
second generation Islamic economists during the past 
forty years and investigates deviations that occurred in 
thought and practice in this period. This is done based on 
a differentiation between the two generations and their 
distinguishing features. It takes as the first generation 
those scholars who started writing on the subject of Islamic 
economics between 1950 and 1975. This was a period 
very unfriendly to the idea of economics with an Islamic 
perspective. The second generation of scholars is defined 
as consisting of those who came into the field after the 
organization of the First International Conference on 
Islamic Economics, held in Makkah Mukarramah in 1976. 
That conference is taken as a cutoff because a new era started 
after it, in terms of the following: establishment of research 
and study centers, issue of specialized journals, enrollment 
in PhD courses, foundation of study departments, set up 
of financial institutions, organization of conferences and 
seminars, awarding of prizes, and creation of employment 
opportunities. It also attracted attention of some non-
Muslim economists. The paper finds significant differences 
in the thoughts of the two generations of Islamic economists 
and suggests certain steps that could be taken to bridge the 
gaps, minimize the difference, and train the new emerging 
generation.
The third paper, “Methodology of Islamic economics: 
Typology of current practices, evaluation and way 
forward,” by Hafas Furqani and Mohamed Aslam Haneef, 
takes the position that the methodological development 
of Islamic economics is necessary for the sustainable 
development of this subject. It studies the methodology 
of Islamic economics by surveying what has been written 
on this particular topic as well as by content analysis of 
the writings on Islamic economics, banking and finance. 
The paper found three categories of writings, namely: 
(1) the usul al-fiqh methodology applied in economics, 
(2) methodological pluralism that tries to utilize various 
methodologies developed in both Western and Islamic 
tradition, and (3) conventional mainstream positive 
economic methodology applied in Islamic cases.
The fourth paper, “Islamic economics: Still in search of 
an identity,” by Abdulkader Cassim Mahomedy, argues 
that despite the concerted efforts by the proponents of 
Islamic economics to shape it as a distinctive paradigm, no 
substantial success has been achieved beyond arguing that 
Islamic economics is based on strong moral ethics. So far, 
the epistemological roots of this discipline have remained 
within the framework of rationalism and methodological 
individualism, hence it has not been able to shed itself of its 
neoclassical moorings, the very paradigm it originally set 
out to replace. It needs to clarify its purpose and develop its 
content and method appropriate to its worldview.
The fifth paper, “Islamic Economics as a New Economic 
Paradigm,” by Necati Aydin, attempts to make a case for 
Islamic economics as an alternative paradigm to deal with 
the crises of capitalism. It draws  attention to western 
worldview in which free market capitalism emerged 
and flourished. Then, it redefines Islamic economics 
based on distinctive worldview of Islam particularly 
from anthropological, epistemological, and teleological 
perspectives. The paper discusses some distinguishing 
features of Islamic economics pertaining to happiness. 
It also suggests a strategy to build Islamic economics 
as separate paradigm by first focusing to construct a 
microeconomic theory that can explain consumer and 
producer behavior. It should also focus on empirical 
content and experimentation.
The sixth paper in this part, “The effect of scarcity thinking 
on human wants among Muslims: Exploring the ideological 
orientation of the concept of scarcity,” by Amir Wahbalbari, 
Zakaria Bahari and Norzarina Mohd-Zaharim, tackles 
interesting concepts of “scarcity” and “scarcity thinking” 
that are at the heart of conventional economics. The paper 
empirically examines the effect of scarcity thinking on 
human wants and also explores the ideological basis of the 
concept from conventional and Islamic perspectives. For 
empirical analysis it collected data through a questionnaire 
administered to 345 Muslim individuals working within the 
Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The analysis 
concluded that scarcity thinking significantly intensifies 
human wants and works contrary to Islamic religiosity, 
thus it causes a dissonance between Islamic religiosity of 
moderation in expenditure. In this sense, scarcity thinking 
contradicts the Islamic worldview of cooperation and 
obedience.
2. Part 2 Fiscal and Monetary Policies from 
an Islamic Perspective
The first paper in this section, “The transmission of 
monetary policy through conventional and Islamic banks,” 
by Sajjad Zaheer, Steven Ongena, and Sweder J.G. van 
Wijnbergen, empirically compares the response of a 
monetary contraction to loan/financing growth of Islamic 
banks with conventional banks. It finds that a contractionary 
monetary policy stance indeed reduces the growth of 
bank financing, but its magnitude varies depending on 
the size of the bank, its liquidity situation, and the type 
of bank. Using banking data of Pakistan between 2002:III 
and 2010:I, the authors find that following a monetary 
contraction; small banks with liquid balance sheets cut 
their lending less than other small banks. In contrast, large 
banks maintain their lending irrespective of their liquidity 
positions. Islamic banks, though similar in size to small 
banks, respond to monetary policy shocks as large banks in 
cutting their financing. This may be due to several facts: (i) 
as Islamic banks were expanding during the sample period, 
their deposit growth may have been less affected by tight 
monetary policy, (ii) the proportion of fixed deposit in their 
total deposits was higher, and (iii) the proportion of liquid 
assets in total assets was larger than other small banks, 
hence they were able to maintain their financing growth. 
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Though the authors have concluded that “ceteris paribus 
the credit channel of monetary policy may weaken when 
Islamic banking grows in relative importance,” the fact 
of the matter is that when Islamic banks grow in relative 
importance, the ceteris paribus assumption will not remain 
in place. Deposit composition as well as liquidity situations 
will change due to availability of more kinds of investable 
assets and due to facing the pool of all depositors with all 
types of characteristics rather than only the loyal type. Will 
there still be a different response to monetary contraction? 
And what would be the channels of monetary transmission? 
Both are open questions for further research.
The second paper, “The importance of the Islamic banks 
in the monetary transmission mechanism in Malaysia,” 
by Zamrah Hasin and M. Shabri Abd Majid, complements 
the above paper by focusing on Malaysia and empirically 
exploring the relevance of Islamic banks’ financing 
in channeling the monetary policy effects to the real 
economy. The paper uses autoregressive distributed lag 
(ARDL) bound testing approach and innovation accounting 
approach, with quarterly data spanning from 1991:Q1 
to 2010:Q4. The study finds that monetary policy indeed 
affects Islamic banking channels in Malaysia as it influences 
the distribution of financing to various economic sectors. 
The third paper, “Economic sectors sensitivity to Islamic 
and conventional monetary instrument: Case study of 
Indonesia,” by Raditya Sukmana, focuses on Indonesia 
with monthly data from May 2006 to February 2011. 
Using unit root test, the co-integration test, and impulse 
response functions, the paper finds that Islamic banks 
play important roles in the monetary transmission 
process in the Indonesian economy. In particular, specific 
economic sectors react differently to both Islamic monetary 
instruments as well as conventional monetary instruments.
The fourth paper,“Public sector funding and debt 
management: A case for GDP-linked Sukuk,” by Abdou Diaw, 
Obiyathulla Ismath Bacha, and Ahcene Lahsasna, advances 
the idea of Sukuk for infrastructure and development 
projects whose returns are linked to GDP growth of the 
country rather than the returns from the specific projects. 
The concept is highly relevant for financing of non-revenue 
generating public sector projects. The paper examines the 
potential benefits and obstacles of the GDP-linked Sukuk 
(GLS) model, which is based on Forward Ija¯rah, as well 
as its risk-return profile. Furthermore, a framework for 
pricing GLS is put forth. Based on a sample of countries 
from five regions of the Muslim world, the theoretical 
properties of the GLS are validated through back-testing 
method. The model is shown to be a new asset class 
between the traditional debt and equity instruments and 
offers interesting diversification opportunities. Besides its 
theoretical contribution, the model proposed in this paper 
addresses in an effective way the issue of debt management, 
in an interest-free context, and the issue of benchmarking 
sovereign Sukuk against the interest rate.
The fifth and final paper in this section,“Economic and 
financial crises in fifteenth-century Egypt: Lessons from 
history,” by Abdul Azim Islahi, studies the economic and 
financial crises of fifteenth-century Egypt, which was 
then ruled by the Mamluk dynasty. During this period 
Egypt faced several economic crises caused by natural 
calamities such as the overflowing of the Nile as well as 
ill governance and corruption by the rulers. The financial 
crisis that occurred during the period mainly emanated 
from monetary mismanagement. Two social thinkers of the 
time—al-Maqrizi at the beginning of the century and al-
Asadi at the middle—addressed the situation. This paper 
describes the thinking of these two scholars, and reviews 
the remedies suggested by them. Al-Maqrizi diagnosed 
the cause as deterioration of the monetary system of the 
country and recommended as remedy a return back to 
gold and silver standard coins. Al-Asadi on the other hand 
highlighted both the monetary and socio-economic factors 
behind the crisis and recommended an overall reform 
and strict management of the whole economy, monetary 
aspect being one of them. The episode provides a learning 
experience for us to see how similar or contrasting the 
debate was compared to crises debates we witness in the 
present century.
3. Part 3: Economic Development, Social 
Justice and Sustainability
The first paper, “Post-crisis economic recovery in OIC 
member states: Is it sustainable?” by Zafar Iqbal, analyzes 
the macroeconomic performance of OIC member countries 
in pre- and post- global financial crisis periods. It shows that 
economic performance of OIC member states was adversely 
affected in 2009 in terms of decelerating economic growth 
and deteriorating current account balances. However, in the 
post-crisis period, the OIC member states have recovered 
rapidly. The recovery is visible at the regional level as well 
as at the level of individual countries. However, the major 
global factors that have affected economic performance 
during the financial crisis period are still major threats 
to sustainable economic growth. The OIC countries need 
to focus more on addressing youth unemployment, weak 
economic integration and weaknesses in macroeconomic 
policies. The paper also highlights the efforts that the 
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Group is making for the 
development of its member countries.
The second paper, “The integrated development index 
(I-Dex): A new comprehensive approach to measuring 
human development,” by Ruzita Mohd Amin, Selamah 
Abdullah Yusof, Mohamed Aslam Haneef, and Mustafa 
Omar Muhammad, focuses on an important subject of 
integrated economic development that simultaneously 
caters to the material, intellectual and spiritual dimensions 
of human beings. This study proposes to develop an 
integrated Islamic development framework and an index 
that is based on the Maqasid al-Shari‘ah for OIC and non-
OIC countries. The paper does not develop the index but 
it is a step in that direction. In future this program hopes 
to build a Maqasid-based Integrated Development Index 
(I-Dex) that can better represent holistic development and 
well-being according to Islamic benchmarks to measure 
progress.
This is an important area in which not only more research 
is needed but active participation among the governments, 
academia and data collection bodies is essential. We 
needed to come up with methods and indexes that not only 
provide a comparative index but also provide opportunity 
to disaggregate the various dimensions for their usefulness 
in policy making and impact evaluation. 
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The third paper, “Islamic finance and economic growth: 
The malaysian case,” by Néjib Hachicha and Amine Ben 
Amar, raises the question: does Islamic finance influence 
growth? The aim of their paper is to empirically investigate 
the impact of Islamic bank financing on Malaysia’s 
economic growth over the period from 2000Q1 to 2011Q4. 
The implicit hypothesis is that Islamic finance encourages 
productive activities that are growth enhancing and poverty 
reducing. At the same time, Islamic finance principles allow 
for better risk sharing, again contributing to stability and 
economic efficiency. Thus the presence of Islamic finance 
should be pro-growth. To investigate this, the paper uses 
the approach familiarized my Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 
to assess financial sector impact. The distinction is that a 
neoclassical production function has been augmented 
by some indicators of the Islamic bank financing. The 
estimation shows a positive impact of Islamic finance on 
production. The estimation of an error-correction model of 
the GDP growth in Malaysia shows the short-run economic 
growth elasticity with respect to various Islamic finance 
indicators is higher than in the long run. This may be due 
to wide use of murabaha financing by Islamic banks, which 
is short-term in nature.
The fourth paper, “Distributional and poverty consequences 
of globalization: Are OIC countries different?” by M Tariq 
Majeed, brings out some macro stylized facts by examining 
the impact of globalization on cross-country inequality 
and poverty of OIC and Non-OIC developing countries. 
It uses a panel data of developing countries over a long 
period from 1970 to 2008. Several findings come out of this 
analysis: First, it finds that a non-monotonic relationship 
between income distribution and level of economic 
development holds in both samples of countries. However, 
this relationship is comparatively strong in the case of 
Non-OIC countries. Second, globalization causes adverse 
consequences on income inequalities in OIC countries 
while it does not exert adverse effects in non-OIC countries. 
Third, in terms of the poverty model, openness to trade 
accentuates, rather than ameliorates, poverty in both sets 
of countries, while FDI hurts only the poor of non-OIC 
countries. Fourth, financial liberalization exerts a negative 
and significant influence on income distribution only in 
OIC countries. Fifth, inflation distorts income distribution 
and poverty in both sets of countries. Finally, the role of 
government is robustly significant in reducing inequalities 
and poverty in non-OIC countries, while the role of 
government is insignificant in the OIC world. The overall 
results of this study show that globalization exerts adverse 
distributional and poverty consequences, and comparatively 
OIC countries suffer more from adverse consequences of 
globalization. This study concludes that OIC countries 
are different from non-OIC countries in their exposure 
to globalization. Further investigation is needed to find 
the causes of these differences and how Islamic economic 
and finance principles can be used towards improvement. 
However, it seems that OIC countries need to focus more on 
growth and increase spending on helping the poor to reduce 
poverty if they are to face the challenges of globalization.
4. Future Direction
While the present volume covers only some issues in 
theory, policy and measurement, there is a pressing need 
to focus on some neglected areas as well. One important 
area in Islamic economics that was well recognized in the 
early literature as one of the strong hallmarks of Islam is 
the concept of social justice. This aspect has slipped out of 
focus in recent active research. An articulate theory and 
corresponding policies to put the ideas of Islamic social 
justice into practice need renewed attention.
Concerns for social justice are very old in human history; 
it is likely that this concern may have existed even in the 
period before the beginning of our recorded history. Given 
the contrast inherent in human nature between human 
affinity for having everything for himself and a strong 
concern around fairness, this may have given rise to the 
tension between the two objectives and hence the evolution 
of concepts of social justice. 
Justice is fundamental to human life, we use the phrase 
“social justice” when it is applied to resolve the tension 
between self-interest and fairness to others in social 
issues, particularly those that are related to economic 
dealings, opportunities and freedoms in social choices, and 
redistribution. This also includes ways of organizing the 
informal and formal mutual support systems to overcome 
the bad consequence of human decisions or uncontrollable 
fate. The question of social justice becomes relevant in 
all these circumstances. It determines what ought to 
be ensured, and how it is to be ensured—that everyone 
get at least some minimum level of those things that are 
important for their life in this world and in preparation 
for the next world. The Islamic concept of social justice is 
derived from divine foundations (divine knowledge) as 
well as from introspection by uncorrupted human nature 
that itself is also a reflection of divine will. In the future, 
we hope to see enough research in this area to compose a 
dedicated volume on the issue.
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1. The Islamization of knowledge
The project of “Islamization of Knowledge” continues to be 
of vital importance to the Ummah of Muslims. The future of 
any community is strongly linked to the education received 
by the children in that community. Today, the vast majority 
of Muslim children receive a secular Western education. 
Built into such an education are assumptions that contradict 
basic Islamic teachings; for example, the separation of state 
and religion, based on the idea that religion is a private 
and personal matter and should not be brought into the 
public domain. Because of these conflicts, many Muslim 
intellectuals have argued for the necessity of assimilating 
Western knowledge into an Islamic framework. At the 
dawn of the fifteenth century Hijrah, the Organization 
of Islamic Conference (OIC), created two universities – 
the International Islamic Universities of Islamabad and 
Malaysia – for this explicit purpose. All across the Islamic 
world, a large number of diverse initiatives have been 
launched for this purpose of integrating our traditional 
corpus of Islamic knowledge with modern Western 
knowledge.
Because of its vital importance, large amounts of individual 
and collective efforts of Muslims have gone into achieving 
this goal. While partial success on certain limited fronts has 
been achieved, it would be fair to assess the overall outcome 
as a failure. Many of the leading scholars who have spent 
their lifetimes on this goal have acknowledged this failure, 
as we will shortly document. Corresponding to this failure, 
many diagnoses have been offered as to the reasons. In this 
paper, our goal is to provide a new diagnosis of the reason 
for the failure. A correct diagnosis is essential to providing a 
proper remedy; existing misdiagnoses have not allowed for 
application of the correct curatives. To summarize briefly, 
we will argue that there are strong conflicts between Islamic 
views on the nature and purpose of human existence and 
Western views. The full extent of this conflict has not been 
realized by most who have worked on the Islamization 
of knowledge project. As a result, they have attempted to 
integrate two conflicting bodies of knowledge, which is 
an impossible task. This is what accounts for the failure of 
these attempts.
To keep the discussion sharply focused, in this paper we 
confine our attention to ‘Islamic Economics’ or the project 
of Islamizing the Western discipline of economics. The 
broad principles underlying social sciences as developed in 
the West, and their conflict with Islam, has been discussed 
separately in Zaman (2009) “Origins of Western Social 
Sciences.”
2. Islamic economics is in crisis
There are many signs of failure of the project of coming 
up with an Islamic alternative to Capitalist Economics. 
Leading figures in the field of Islamic Economics have 
expressed disappointment with the current state of affairs.
Umer Chapra (2000, p 375) writes: “… Islamic economics 
has been unable to come to grips with … the problems 
faced by Muslim countries.”
Nejatullah Siddiqi (2008) writes that “All is not well with 
Islamic economic(s) … The grand idea of providing an 
alternative to capitalism and socialism … has yielded to a 
desire to join the flock.”
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Monzer Kahf (n.d.) in “Islamic Economics: What Went 
Wrong” writes:
Besides, Islamic economists did not provide any agenda 
for political economics founded or derived from their 
branch of human knowledge in spite of the need for 
such an agenda.
It seems to me that the present generation of Islamic 
economists is exhausted and already consumed in the 
activities of Islamic banking and finance that the best it 
can do is to hand over the torch to a second generation 
that may carry deeper theoretical analysis and fill the 
gaps left by our generation.
These are the pioneers of the field, who have invested 
their lives in its development. Critics have been much 
harsher. For example, Sohrab Behdad (1994) talking about 
attempts to implement Islamic Economics in Iran under 
Ayatullah Khomeini writes that “It has become apparent 
that Islamic Economics is not capable of presenting a viable 
social alternative.”
Similarly, Timur Kuran (1997) writes that “Islamic 
economics did not emerge from a drive to correct 
economic imbalances, injustices, or inequalities …(but 
to) restore Islamic community’s self-respect. Because 
Islamic economics was developed to serve cultural and 
political ends, it did not have to meet scientific standards of 
coherence, precision, or realism.” In simpler words, Kuran 
says that Islamic Economics has no substance or content. It 
is simply a part of an effort to create a differentiated Islamic 
identity.
There is no textbook of Islamic Economics, despite 
numerous efforts to create one. The diversity of opinions 
among Muslim economists is extreme. We do not have any 
agreement on even the definition of “Islamic Economics,” 
and no clear model of what an ideal Islamic economic 
system would look like in concrete and practical terms. 
Aware of these problems, leading scholars have argued 
that Islamic Economics is in an embryonic state. They 
have argued that it has taken centuries for Western 
economics to achieve its current polished form, and 
similarly, some time will be required for the development 
of an Islamic alternative. Such counsel for patience is of 
course also an admission of current failure. We will argue 
below that the problem is more fundamental, and current 
approaches to the development of Islamic Economics 
are bound to fail. We will try to sketch more promising 
alternatives.
3. Four fundamental flaws in economic 
theories
There are four background assumptions of economic 
theory as currently presented in textbooks used in 
Economics departments in USA and Europe. All of these 
four assumptions are wrong. Because Islamic teachings 
are in conformity with the realities of human existence, 
acceptance of these assumptions leads to contradictions 
that cannot be resolved. The only solution to this problem 
is to reject conventional economic theories as well as 
methodology, and start from the background assumptions 
furnished by Islam. The object of this section is to define, 
discuss and refute these background assumptions of 
modern Western economic theories.
Economic theories are universal laws
It is assumed, without explicit statement, that the best 
way to study economics is via universal laws of economic 
behavior, which are invariant in time and space. Thus 
economic theory is the same in Great Britain in 1800, 
Argentina in 1900, and Somalia in 2000. More accurately, 
economists see their discipline as being engaged in 
studying those features of the economic environment and 
behavior, which are independent of history. This is why 
some prominent economists were bewildered at being 
blamed for the failure to predict the global financial crisis 
of 2008. They thought naively that this historical event has 
nothing to do with their discipline. Looking through the 
entire corpus of textbooks in use in orthodox Economics 
departments in the USA and Europe, we will not find 
particular historical explanations of economic events. Such 
explanations, even where available, are not considered part 
of economic theory, because they cannot be generalized 
across time and space.
Consider, for an illustrative example, a study of the 
economy of Germany between the two world wars. Because 
they lost World War I, a punishment in the form of heavy 
reparations payments to the victors was imposed on the 
German economy. Keynes predicted that this injustice 
would lead Germany to revolt against these terms and lead 
to another war within twenty years. A modern economist 
studying the inter-war economy of Germany would create a 
macro model in which a foreign tax is imposed on the GDP. 
The methodological mindset of modern economic theory 
blinds us to most important fact about this economy, which 
was the resentment and anger of the population against the 
heavy and unjust economic burden placed upon them. It 
was this which led to the rise of Hitler and World War II, and 
drastically changed the economic landscape of the world.
The lack of attention to historical factors led the Nobel 
Prize winning economist Douglass North to state that: 
“We live in an uncertain and ever-changing world that is 
continually evolving in new and novel ways. Standard 
theories are of little help in this context. Attempting to 
understand economic, political and social change requires 
a fundamental recasting of the way we think.” By adopting 
the framework assumptions of modern economic theories, 
Islamic economists have crippled themselves, accepting 
the idea that we must not invoke historical explanations 
for economic events, since these can never have the status 
of universal laws. However, the Quran uses both particular 
historical explanations and universal laws. Thus there 
is no need for Islamic economists to forego this type of 
explanation as a methodological principle.
Economic theories are best framed in 
mathematical form
Due to peculiarities of European history which cannot 
be detailed here (see Kung 1980), science arose in conflict 
with, and as a rival to, Christianity. This had two important 
consequences. One was an exaggerated importance 
attached to science as the sole source of valid knowledge 
about the world; this has been called the “Deification 
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of Science,” by Olson (1990). The second was the rise to 
central prominence of Physics as the ideal model for all 
scientific thought. Since physics is naturally concerned 
with measurement and quantification, Lord Kelvin was 
led to proclaim that when you cannot measure, you do 
not really know what you are talking about, and when 
you can, you do. The history of this idea of the central 
importance of measurement, sometimes called the 
“quantitative imperative,” has been traced by Michell 
(2003). Furthermore, mathematical models have played a 
crucial role in key advances in physics. Mirowski (1990) has 
documented how economic theories have been developed 
in direct imitation of models borrowed from physics: 
“neoclassicals did not imitate physics in a … superficial 
manner; no, they copied their models mostly term for 
term, symbol for symbol.” This imitation has created a 
situation where economic theories are admired more for 
mathematical elegance, without any regard for practical 
relevance.
Nobel Prize winning economist Paul Krugman has said that 
the entire field of economics went astray because it mistook 
the beauty of the mathematics for truth. A discussion of 
the state of economics organized by the AEA concluded 
that “Economics as taught in graduate schools has become 
increasingly preoccupied with formal technique to the 
exclusion of studying real-world problems and issues.” 
Blaug (1998, Disturbing Currents in Modern Economics) 
thinks that modern economics suffers from “formalism” 
which is the overuse of mathematical models with more 
attention to rigor than content. We examine below a single 
case to illustrate the dominance of mathematical reasoning 
over economic reasoning.
The Arrow-Debreu model of General Equilibrium is 
extremely well developed mathematically; however, its 
economic assumptions of complete markets, zero costs of 
transactions and information, price taking behavior by all 
agents, etc. are highly unrealistic. Instead of being criticized 
for its extreme deficiencies on the economic front, Arrow & 
Debreu went on to receive Nobel Prizes for the mathematical 
precision of the model. An intellectual grandchild of 
Arrow-Debru is the DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium) model, which has been blamed for the global 
financial crisis of 2008. The failure of mathematically 
sophisticated economic theories has become so glaringly 
obvious that a Congressional Committee was set up to 
investigate the role of deficient economic theories in the 
global financial crisis of 2008. In testimony before this 
committee, Solow (2008) commented on the extreme lack 
of realism in the DSGE model: “A thoughtful person, faced 
with the thought that economic policy was being pursued 
on this basis (i.e. DSGE models), might reasonably wonder 
what planet he or she is on.”
It is worth noting that Umar R.A. carried out censuses 
to determine how to justly and equitably distribute 
revenues generated from Muslim conquests. Also, Muslim 
contributions to mathematical knowledge are substantial. 
There are no objections to appropriate use of mathematics 
and statistics, where relevant and useful. However, as 
McCloskey (1998, p. 36) points out via detailed argument, 
“Samuelson’s skill at mathematics … is itself persuasive 
… (even though) … the mathematics itself is pointless.” It 
is the use of mathematics in cases where it adds nothing, 
or even distracts from key relevant issues, which led 
Milton Friedman to state that “… economics has become 
increasingly an arcane branch of mathematics rather than 
dealing with real economic problems.”
Economic theories are materialistic
Karl Marx believed in material determinism; that is the 
theory that all cultural and social movements and ideas 
are brought about by changes in economic and other 
material conditions. The forces that drive historical change 
are material in nature. This is why his doctrine is called 
“material determinism.” While not explicitly mentioned, 
these views are also built into foundations of modern 
Western economic theory. These have two important 
consequences which conflict with Islamic ideas:
One is that there is no room for God. Those in the West who 
believe in God subscribe to the clockmaker model: God 
created the universe and the causal mechanisms, and no 
longer interferes with it. The Quran is full of stories of how 
God intervened in the past, and also conditions required for 
receiving help from God, or interventions in the present.
Two is that there is no room for human beings. That is, 
visions, ambition, and ideologies are all constrained by 
material means. Indeed, Marx went so far as to say that 
even philosophies developed by men were determined by 
their economic circumstances. It is a delicious irony that 
his vision of a classless egalitarian society, where needs 
of everyone would be met, inspired millions of people in 
Russia and China. His ideas changed the world without any 
material means, contrary to his theories that hold material 
causes to be primary. This development was also contrary 
to his theories that held that agrarian societies would 
transition to capitalistic ones, prior to being led inexorably 
to the communist form.
Modern economic theory treats human beings as an input 
into a production function – they are a means for the 
creation of wealth. As consumers, they are solely driven by 
selfish utility maximization. The possibility that inspired 
leaders can change the destiny and fortunes of a nation, as 
was accomplished by our Prophet Mohammad S.A.W., does 
not exist in these theories. The Quran states that:
8:63  And (moreover) He hath put affection between 
their hearts: not if thou hadst spent all that is in the 
earth, couldst thou have produced that affection, but 
Allah hath done it: for He is Exalted in might …
The most valuable treasures of Allah, the community or 
Ummah created by the efforts of our Prophet Mohammad 
S.A.W., cannot be obtained by material means. Again this 
is in conflict with the methodological bases of Western 
economic theories. Major failures of economic theories 
in the recent past have led some economists to consider 
invisible and immaterial causes for material progress. 
For example, Zak and Knack’s (2001. Trust and Growth. 
Economic Journal. 111:295–321) is a seminal study on 
trust and economic growth. Because it ignores the role 
of invisibles such as the quality of institutions, property 
rights, social norms, etc., “Existing economics … bears 
little relation to what happens in the real world,” according 
to Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase. However, these critiques 
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are tentative and hesitant beginnings, which have not been 
widely accepted by mainstream economists. In fact, Islamic 
teachings offer us solid information far more advanced 
than that currently available to these dissenters from the 
mainstream, as we will discuss later.
Economic theories are positive (or Factual)
A dichotomy is made between positive and normative 
theories. Positive theories are factual and objective, while 
normative theories contains value judgements which 
cannot be empirically tested or verified. The claim is made 
that Western economic theories are positive. For example, 
Samuelson and Nordhaus write [Economics 17th Ed. Page 
8]: “Positive economics describes the facts of an economy, 
while normative economics involves value judgements.” 
Similar claims can be found in most conventional 
economics textbooks. As we discuss below, this claim is 
false. Predictions of economic theories are contradicted by 
observed behavior of firms and consumers.
Consumer behavior: Theory versus observation
The field of behavioral economics has emerged as a 
result of observing actual behavior of consumers, and 
comparing it with predictions of economic theories. The 
list of systematic discrepancies between the two is so large 
that several book length treatments have been presented. 
Daniel Ariely in “Predictably Irrational” and Thaler in 
“Quasi-Rational Economics” have given large categories of 
examples where consumer behavior does not conform to 
utility maximization hypothesis.
Proven substantive conflicts between human behavior 
and economic theory cannot be covered in a few short 
paragraphs. One line of investigation shows that it 
is necessary to take into account human drives for 
understanding, achievement, and feelings of reciprocity, 
trust, etc. in order to account for behavior in different 
types of economic environments; Mahmood (2011) 
provides a guide to this literature in context of the labor 
market. Another line of research shows the importance 
of social norms in determining human conduct; see for 
example, Biccieri (2006). Nobel Prize Laureate Herbert 
Simon showed replacing “maximization” by “satisficing” 
and “bounded rationality” leads to better descriptions of 
observed behavior of humans. We give a few examples 
to show that consumer behavior does not correspond to 
economic models.
1. Chapter  2 of Ariely entitled “The Fallacy of Supply 
and Demand,” illustrates the phenomenon of 
“anchoring.” Initial decisions regarding the value 
of new products are often arbitrary and made on 
the basis of context. Subsequently, these decisions 
are not revised in light of new information. Ariely 
provides many illustrations of how people make 
arbitrary decisions about price and value, and how 
these can be exploited by savvy marketeers to obtain 
high prices.
2. Consumer choices at cafeterias are systematically 
influenced by factors like the sequence in which 
choices are listed, contrary to predictions of 
economic theory. This can be used to “nudge” 
consumers towards healthy choices; see Thaler and 
Sunnstein for a detailed discussion.
3. Empirical studies of the Vickrey 2nd price auctions 
show that people frequently bid over their private 
values. As Vickrey showed, bids exactly equal to the 
private value is the unique optimizing strategy, and 
overbids have the potential to result in losses. This 
observed behavior is due to a cognitive error, and has 
been demonstrated in many experimental studies of 
auctions, as reported in Kagel and Roth (1995).
Initial research in the field of behavioral economics was 
concerned with establishing contradictions between 
theoretical predictions and observed behavior. These have 
been firmly established, and now the attention has turned 
to developing realistic theories that help explain actual 
behavior. See Koehler and Harvey (2004) for many surveys 
of the diverse areas within this field.
Firm behavior
Simple-minded theories of profit maximization by firms fail 
to describe actual behavior of firms in the real world. There 
are many areas of failure.
1. Efficiency wage theories show that firms often pay 
laborers higher wages than the marginal product. 
See Mahmood (2011) and Abbas (2006) for detailed 
discussion and guide to the extensive literature.
2. Theories of internal organization of the firm find 
that firms cannot be treated as a homogenous entity 
devoted to a single goal. Owners would like to 
maximize profits, but managers want to maximize 
their salaries and employees have other goals. The 
Principal/Agent literature is based on recognition of 
these conflicts. See Laffont and Mortimort (2001), 
who write that “the problems were so serious that 
a whole generation of … theorists gave up the 
grandiose framework of General Equilibrium Theory 
.. to build a theory of incentives.”
3. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990) have developed 
a theory of firms which takes into account 
informational asymmetry. Their theory corresponds 
to observed behavior of firms but differs markedly 
from neoclassical theory.
4. Fundamental findings of the theory of Industrial 
Organization show that firms rarely behave in the 
way assumed in the theory of competitive markets as 
exposited in economics textbooks. A survey of ways 
in which observed behaviors differ from theoretical 
predictions is given in Kagel and Roth (1996, 
Chapter).
Commenting on the unrealistic theories, and complete lack 
of attention to empirical accuracy or validation, Bergmann 
(2007) writes that “The material about business behavior 
that students read about in economics textbooks, and 
almost all of the new theoretical material developed by 
mainstream professionals and published in the profession’s 
leading journals was composed by economists who sat 
down in some comfortable chair and … simply made it up.”
Prices are determined by equilibrium of supply and 
demand
The Great Depression showed that labor markets could stay 
out of equilibrium for a long time. Keynes explained this 
by saying that wages are rigid downwards, but offered no 
explanation for why this should be – but this is equivalent to 
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saying that the standard demand and supply model breaks 
down in the labor market. Therefore the government must 
intervene to bring about equilibrium. Long and persistent 
bouts of unemployment have been observed in many 
different countries, showing that labor markets do not clear 
at the supply and demand equilibrium. Many different 
types of explanations have been offered for this market 
failure; for a survey see Mehmood (2011).
More recently, Card and Krueger (1997) showed that 
contrary to predictions of the supply demand model, raising 
minimum wages may actually increase employment. In an 
interview about this finding, Card stated that:
To what extent does the simplest model of supply and 
demand actually describe how employers operate in the 
labor market? [Not very well. Alternatives to supply and 
demand theory explain] a lot of things that don’t seem to 
make sense, at least to me, in a simple demand and supply 
model.
These created such a controversy that Card stopped doing 
research on this issue:
I’ve subsequently stayed away from the minimum 
wage literature for a number of reasons. First, it cost 
me a lot of friends. People that I had known for many 
years, for instance, some of the ones I met at my first 
job at the University of Chicago, became very angry or 
disappointed. They thought that in publishing our work 
we were being traitors to the cause of economics as a 
whole.
Zaman and Saglam (2010) have shown that the 
Marshallian theory of supply and demand as a mechanism 
for price formation in a single market, conflicts with 
general equilibrium theory. This means that the two could 
not be right at the same time. Since GET is a generalization 
to multiple markets of the principles by which the single 
market theory is derived, this shows that these principles 
lead to contradictory outcomes.
The foundations of economic theory, both micro and 
macro, are built upon supply and demand and the concept 
of equilibrium. We have shown that the consumer theory 
on which demand is built is not observed in actual behavior. 
Similarly, observed firm behavior does not conform to 
theoretical specifications. Finally determination of prices 
via equilibrium also does not hold empirically. Thus 
economic theory is not a positive theory, conforming 
to observations; rather it is an a priori, axiomatic, and 
mathematical theory directly in conflict with many 
observations about actual behavior. In recognition of the 
stark differences between observed behavior and economic 
theories, Stiglitz remarked that the theoretical “models 
(used) in America’s graduate schools … bear testimony to 
the triumph of ideology over science.”
4. An Islamic alternative
As we have shown, methodological foundations of Western 
economic theory are fundamentally flawed. Mostly, 
Muslim economists have uncritically accepted claims that 
economic theory is “positive,” or factual, and many other 
methodological assumptions. Attempts to combine these 
with insights from the Islamic tradition have failed, because 
the two are in conflict. In my paper, “Islamic Economics: A 
Survey of Literature,” I have described at length the many 
many places where Islamic conceptions of economics differ 
radically from conventional ones. This paper is complex and 
lengthy. A somewhat simpler exposition, focusing directly 
on a point-by-point comparison of issues where there is 
a conflict between Islamic teachings and conventional 
Economics is given in my paper “An Islamic Critique of 
Neoclassical Economics.”
It is impossible to discuss all the differences between a 
genuine Islamic approach to economic issues and modern 
Western conceptions within the space limitations of a 
short paper. Below, I will outline what I believe are three 
fundamental issues which would form the foundations of 
any Islamic approach to economic issues.
Transforming human beings
All actions of a Muslim, including the study of economics, 
are directed towards a single goal:
6:162 Say: “Truly, my prayer and my sacrifice (all my 
struggles and efforts), my life and my death, are (all) for 
Allah, the Cherisher of the Worlds:
The training given to the Companions by the Prophet 
Mohammad S.A.W. brought about a spiritual 
transformation, causing them to focus on the purpose and 
meaning of our existence as defined by the Quran. As Allah 
T’aala has stated:
95:4 Verily, We create man in the best conformation;
95:5 and thereafter We reduce him to the lowest of low
This means that there exists potential within human beings 
to rise above the angels, and also to become baser than 
the beasts. All of Islamic teachings, including those in 
the economic domain, are concerned with realizing this 
potential within man. The work of our Prophet Mohammad 
S.A.W. was to change men, who then changed the world, in 
accordance with the promise of the Quran:
13:11 Verily, God does not change men’s condition 
unless they change their inner selves
This is the exact opposite of materialistic teachings, which 
hold that we must change material conditions to produce 
human welfare. Many practical people have come to this 
insight after having applied Western recipes for economic 
development. For example, Mahbub-ul-Haq implemented 
policies for economic growth designed by experts from 
Harvard in Pakistan. The failure of these policies led 
Mabubul-Haq to the conclusion that “We were told to take 
of our GNP as this would take care of poverty. Let us reverse 
this and take care of poverty as this will take care of GNP.” 
That is, we must reverse priorities to emphasize human 
beings over materials. Martha Nussbaum, Amartya Sen, 
and many other thinkers have come to similar conclusions 
–providing capabilities to human beings is the central goal 
of development and also leads to economic development as 
a peripheral matter.
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The area of human development is one where Islamic 
teachings offer us substantially more than what is currently 
available from the best Western thinkers. The prophet 
Mohammad S.A.W. was the best of human beings, a 
perfect role model, and was also the best of teachers. The 
effect of his teachings was to create excellence in human 
beings. Secular thinkers can propose the idea of human 
development, but cannot agree on what it means. It has 
been correctly argued that normative propositions cannot 
be derived from observations and logic, which is all that is 
available to secular thinkers. Thus Sen is reduced to the idea 
of “Development as Freedom,” even though it is obvious that 
freedom is merely a means to an end, and not an end in itself. 
The idea that the best use of freedom is to surrender and 
become a slave of Allah cannot be found in secular thought.
It is impossible to summarize all the consequences of 
focusing on the development of human beings within the 
Islamic tradition. We will summarize three major contrasts 
with conventional economic thought below:
The spiritual focus
All of our acquisition of knowledge and our struggle to 
change the world occurs for the sole purpose of pleasing 
Allah Subhanuhu wa T’aala. This explicit spiritual focus 
characterizes the efforts of our Prophet Mohammad S.A.W. 
and differentiates Islamlic Economics from any other 
existing approach. As the Quran states:
73:7 Lo! [the struggle to establish the Deen] keeps you 
very busy in the daytime.
73:8 So remember the name of thy Lord and devote 
thyself with a complete devotion.
That is, even being busy with the struggle to establish the 
Deen during the daytime should not distract you from 
the remembrance of Allah, and some significant portion of 
the nights should be fully devoted to Allah.
The strong spiritual focus of Islam contrasts favorably with 
conventional materialistic approaches to economics. For 
example the currently fashionable idea of “Corporate Social 
Responsibility,” is sold on the basis that social behavior 
will generate more profits. But this leads to documentable 
emphasis on images and advertising, not a genuine concern 
with social problems. Similarly, many authors have argued 
that the audit failures which led to the Enron scandal are 
not unique, but an unavoidable part of a system where 
auditors are paid by firms being audited. Only a spiritual 
focus can ensure the existence of people who cannot be 
purchased at any price.
Moral leadership and training
The Prophet Mohammad S.A.W. was sent to the world as a 
teacher. Islamic economists must be concerned with moral 
training; being exemplars and teaching students to actively 
engage in the process of changing the world for the better. 
Not only must we urge the feeding of the poor, but we must 
teach our students to spread this message. Not just the 
outward action, but the inner dimensions, which consist of 
intentions and the feelings with which the action is done, 
are essential components of Islamic teachings.
21:107  We sent thee not, but as a Mercy for all the 
Creation.
We must seek to develop this characteristic of mercy and 
compassion for all human beings within ourselves and our 
students.
Explicit concern with moral training, developing 
compassion and sympathy for others, contrasts with 
Western abandonment of the moral mission of education. 
Reuben (1996) has described how conflicts between 
religion and science, as well as changing ideas about the 
nature of science, led to the abandonment of the moral 
mission of building character in American universities in 
the early twentieth century. Failure to instil morals has led 
to a “terrible failure,” as the following quote from Harvard 
Professor Zuboff (2009) indicates:
“I spent a quarter-century as a professor at the Harvard 
Business School, including 15 years teaching in the 
MBA program. I have come to believe that much of what 
my colleagues and I taught has caused real suffering, 
suppressed wealth creation, destabilized the world 
economy, and accelerated the demise of the 20th 
century capitalism in which the U.S. played the leading 
role.
We weren’t stupid and we weren’t evil. Nevertheless 
we managed to produce a generation of managers and 
business professionals that is deeply mistrusted and 
despised by a majority of people in our society and 
around the world. This is a terrible failure.”
Engagement and struggle as a means to knowledge
According to many sayings of the Prophet Mohammad 
S.A.W., we cannot remain detached and neutral; when we 
see oppression, injustice or other social evils, we must act 
to change them. Furthermore, it is in the process of this 
struggle that we will be given the required knowledge:
29:69  And those who strive in Our (cause) – we will 
certainly guide them to our Paths: For verily Allah is 
with those who do right.
Thus Islamic Economists must seek to change the world 
to bring about economic justice, to urge the feeding of 
the poor, and to implement orders of Allah relevant to the 
economic realm in our own lives and in the lives of our 
students. It is essential for moral training and leadership 
to engage with the world in ways prescribed by Islam; 
this is how the Prophet Mohammad S.A.W. trained the 
Companions. Thus, Islamic Economics is neither positive, 
nor normative, but it is transformative. We do not seek 
to study the world (positive), nor do we seek to describe 
an ideal state of affairs (normative). We struggle with the 
world we see in the ways prescribed by Islam, to generate 
the same type of radical changes created by the struggle 
launched by our Prophet Mohammad S.A.W. and his 
Companions.
This is in sharp contrast to Western methodology, which 
advocates the stance of a detached observer. In their 
capacity as scientists, Western economists seeks to discover 
universal laws, and have nothing to say about policy 
matters, which involve normative decisions. Reuben (1996) 
has described how conflicts between religion and science, 
as well as changing ideas about the nature of science 
led social scientists to abandon the role of activists and 
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reformers working to bring about a better world in favour 
of the detached observer role of the Baconian scientist.
The process of transforming men from lower than the beasts 
to higher than the angels has many dimensions, which 
cannot be covered or even mentioned here. From these, 
we pick two that are central to economics, and contrast 
maximally with conventional economics. The contrast 
can be summarized by saying that Western economic 
theory is founded on “selfishness and competition” while 
Islamic economic systems are based on “generosity and 
cooperation.” The reason for focusing on these two is that 
one is the basis for individual behavior while the second is 
the basis for social behavior. Together, the two provide the 
foundations for Islamic views on economic affairs.
Greed versus generosity
The Quran is full of verses exhorting people to spend for the 
sake of Allah. Kahf (undated) writes that there are many 
more verses on this topic than on the famous five pillars of 
Islam. A few are cited below:
16:90 BEHOLD, God enjoins justice, and the doing of 
good, and generosity towards [one’s] fellow-men
2:274 Those who (in charity) spend of their goods by 
night and by day, in secret and in public, have their 
reward with their Lord: on them shall be no fear, nor 
shall they grieve.
Muslims are commanded to spend money in excess of our 
needs for the sake of Allah.
Q2: 219 They ask thee how much they are to spend; 
Say: “What is beyond your needs.”
The generosity of our Prophet Mohammad S.A.W., who 
is the perfect role model for us, is well known. He never 
turned away anyone who sought his help. After observing 
how much he gave out of the wealth that accrued to the 
Muslims after the conquest of Mecca, Safvan bin Umayyah 
remarked that “(the prophet) was as generous as the rain.”
This is in sharp contrast with Western economic 
methodology that attempts to explain all economic 
behavior as a consequence of selfishness and greed. Many 
papers have been written attempting to explain charity and 
generosity as being a manifestation of long-run selfishness. 
However, the Islamic act of charity is motivated by the love 
of God alone, and also Muslims expect compensation from 
Him alone:
[Q76:8,9] and who give food – however great be their 
own want of it – unto the needy, and the orphan, and 
the captive,[saying, in their hearts,] “We feed you for 
the sake of God alone: we desire no recompense from 
you, nor thanks.”
Genuine Islamic teachings in the economic domain must 
have the effect of creating generosity and spending on 
others. This requires that teachers model this behavior 
and also teach it to students. This can be done by engaging 
in projects to help the poor and disadvantaged. Such 
practical experience must be an important part of any 
Islamic curriculum of studies. This contrasts with Western 
economic teachings that promote selfishness. Many studies 
have documented that economists tend to be more selfish 
than others; see for example Kirchgässner (2005).
Cooperation versus competition
As a broad general principle, Islamic systems in all spheres 
are built with the goal of promoting community feeling and 
cooperation among all members of society:
Q3:103  And hold fast, all together, by the rope which 
Allah (stretches out for you), and be not divided among 
yourselves; and remember with gratitude Allah’s favour 
on you; for ye were enemies and He joined your hearts 
in love, so that by His Grace, ye became brethren;
Q2:5 Help ye one another in righteousness and piety, 
but help ye not one another in sin and rancour
People are urged to cooperate with each in doing good; to 
look after needs of others like they would their own. The 
whole Ummah is one body and pain in one part is felt by 
the whole. The brotherhood and love between the hearts 
of the Mohajereen and Ansar is more valuable than all the 
treasure in the world.
Q8:62,63 He it is who has strengthened thee with His 
succour, and by giving thee believing followers whose 
hearts He has brought together: [for,] if thou hadst 
expended all that is on earth, thou couldst not have 
brought their hearts together [by thyself]: but God did 
bring them together. Verily, He is almighty, wise.
A cooperative attitude has very different consequences from 
a competitive one. In particular the market for insurance 
under cooperation will not suffer from the problems of 
moral hazard and adverse selection; see Zaman (2011) for 
details.
If selfish profit maximization is the norm, then cooperation 
between firms will have adverse consequences as they 
will collude against the consumers. This why guilds were 
eventually banned, and laws exist preventing firms from 
collusive behavior even today. If Islamic ideals of service 
prevail, then firms will cooperate to provide the best 
possible service to the society, being oriented towards the 
spiritual and the rewards of the Akhira. This is not just a 
pie-in-sky vision, but an ideal that was achieved in Islamic 
societies through the institutions of Awqaf. This has been 
documented in many different sources.
Modern economic theory has been strongly influenced 
by (and also influenced) the theories of evolution. 
Competition among individuals leads to weeding out the 
unfit, and survival of the fittest brings benefit to the race as a 
whole. This is taken as the natural state of affairs. Profitable 
firms will survive, and this will improve efficiency of the 
economy. The laws of the jungle do not apply to a society 
where human beings are spiritually developed, as occurred 
in Islamic history through the training of the Prophet 
Mohammad S.A.W. The Quran bears testimony to the fact 
that the Companions fed others while being themselves 
hungry, and also acted in ways to earn the pleasure of Allah 
even while in this world. They transmitted these teachings 
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to their followers and these visionary ideals served as the 
standards of excellence in Islamic societies for a long time.
5. Answers to common objections
The ideas proposed as the foundations for an Islamic 
Economics run into several common objections which we 
will raise and answer here.
Normative ideals cannot be compared with a 
positive theory
The objection is that our descriptions of Islamic Economics 
refer to an ideal state of affairs, a normative idea. 
Conventional theory is positive; it describes the ground 
realities. The two cannot really be compared, and it is 
unfair to contrast a theory that describes ground realities 
of human existence with some visionary ideals. If we look 
at actual Muslim behavior in Islamic countries, we will find 
that it corresponds far better with theories of economic 
texts and not much (if at all) with the Quranic ideals 
described above.
This objection can be answered in two different ways.
The first answer is that Islam does not seek to describe the 
world; it seeks to change the world. The Message of the 
Prophet S.A.W. did not present a detailed critical analysis 
of the Jahilliyah, but only focused on describing those 
elements which required changing to conform with Islam. 
The methodology of Western science prizes descriptive 
accuracy, but Islam is concerned with creating change, 
and describes the most effective techniques to bring about 
changes in human beings. One of these techniques to 
describe a high set of ideals and persuade people to work 
to achieve excellence. The goal of the normative ideals to 
set the direction for the struggle, even though the ideals 
are themselves unachievable. This is exactly as the North 
Star sets the direction for the journey, even though one will 
never reach the star.
The second answer is that economic theory is itself not a 
positive theory. In fact, it also creates a vision of an ideal 
market society, where there is “perfect” competition, firms 
and consumers are price takers and do not seek to collude 
or monopolize, there are no transaction costs, information 
failures, or externalities, etc. It is freely acknowledged that 
the idealized conditions of perfect competition have never 
actually been realized in any real world economy, but it 
is nonetheless proposed as an ideal to strive for, due to 
its wonderful theoretical properties. Viewed in this light, 
there is not much difference methodologically between the 
two approaches. However the imagined ideal of cutthroat 
competition, and survival of the fittest in a jungle conflicts 
strongly with Islamic ideals.
One must use material means to bring about 
changes
Acknowledging the excellence of Islamic ideals still does 
not give us a clue as to how these could be achieved in 
the real world. Any line of action undertaken must work 
through the practical reality; that is, it must be embodied 
in real world institutions and real world economic policies. 
Based on these ideas, an objection can be phrased as 
follows. Political and economic realities constrain and 
determine the path of motion of societies. The gap between 
lofty ideals and ground realities is too large to have any real 
effects. Thus one must study material means and causal 
laws of motion of politico-economic systems, like a Western 
scientist, in order to bring about change.
To answer this objection, we must argue that the 
materialistic theory of how the world works is wrong. It is 
not true that ideals and visions do not affect the material 
world. If we look at the trajectory of the rise of Islam, we 
cannot find any material cause for it. The Bedouin Arabs 
were backwards in all ways. The Prophet S.A.W. did not 
teach them any new martial skills, or equip them with 
technical knowledge, or provide them with industry which 
would furnish a material basis for their advance. Rather he 
inspired them with a vision and Islamic ideals, and they 
went on to change the world.
We offer several pieces of evidence to show how abstract 
and immaterial ideals and visions influence the course of 
history, without material means. The case of Karl Marx 
is especially interesting. His visions of a classless society 
where people would receive “according to their needs,” 
with justice, equality and brotherhood, inspired millions 
and changed the course of history. His own deterministic 
analysis of how the mechanical and material forces would 
shape economic trajectories proved to be completely 
wrong. On a more pedestrian level, Karen Pfeifer (2001) 
has analyzed the wage-profit shares for different firms 
in Egypt. She finds that Islamic firms in Egypt offer 
significantly higher wages (and have lower profits) than 
comparable non-Islamic firms, which have higher profits 
and lower wage shares. Similarly Najam (2007) studies 
philanthropy among immigrant Pakistanis in the USA. He 
finds that they contribute substantially more to charity than 
other communities with comparable income. Furthermore, 
these contributions are the effect of Islamic injunctions. 
Studies of recent earthquakes in Pakistan showed huge 
public response, overwhelming the official government 
response. Furthermore, this response was much larger 
than the public response to comparable catastrophes in 
non-Islamic countries (i.e. New Orleans). All of this shows 
that, contrary to materialist views, visions and ideals do 
affect the real world, even when they are very imperfectly 
practiced.
Islamic ideals are not realistic and practical
The objection is that the ideals described above are not in 
tune with human realities. Even the Quran describes how 
human beings can be greedy and selfish, love luxuries and 
chase after idle desires. The lofty ideals simply cannot be 
achieved. A realistic theory must be more concretely tied to 
the ground realities of Islamic societies that we observe in 
the world around us.
To answer this objection, we must look at the descriptions 
of Jahilliya, the age of ignorance that prevailed prior 
to the advent of Islam. This closely resembles modern 
society; both are characterized by massive oppression 
and injustice, and the exploitation of the weak by the 
strong. The Quran explicitly forbids the concentration 
of wealth in the hands of a few, which is an important 
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cause of this outcome. Today, as Stiglitz (2011) writes, 
‘the top 1% in the USA own 40% of the assets in the 
country.” Referring to trillion dollar wars and trillion 
dollar bailouts of wealthy firms, Carter (2011) writes “In 
America, the top 1 percent led the country into war and 
economic devastation, leaving the less fortunate to fight 
for one and pay for both.” Bankers threw millions out of 
their homes for nonpayment of interest after the financial 
crisis of 2008. Loose sexual mores, alcohol and drugs, and 
many other social evils associated with modern societies 
are characteristics of the Jahilliya. Strikingly, even the 
practice of burying daughters alive finds parallels in the 
modern age. In order to prevent death of thousands of 
babies abandoned in trashcans, “safe haven” laws have 
been enacted in many states in the USA. These allow 
mothers to abandon children at specially designated 
hospitals, without being asked any questions.
Islam brought the light of knowledge, and revolutionized 
the world. History bears testimony that the ignorant, 
illiterate and semi-barbaric Arabs created a civilization 
which dominated the world for a thousand years. It was 
prophesied that ‘Islam came as a stranger and will soon 
become a stranger.” So it is today, when we look at the 
lives of the Muslims and find in them every evil that Islam 
prohibits. Islam has become a stranger to Muslims, and that 
is precisely what gives rise to the question and objection 
under discussion in this section.
Answering this objection requires faith in Islam. Islam has 
the same power to revolutionize the world today as it did 
fourteen centuries ago. The message of Allah, in the shape 
of Islam, is the greatest gift to Mankind:
Q5:3 This day have I perfected your religion for you, 
completed My favour upon you, and have chosen for you 
Islam as your religion.
Not only has Islam become a stranger to the Muslims, but 
the Muslims have stopped believing that their religion 
contains complete and perfect guidance for our problems 
of today. The vast majority believe that the solution of our 
problems today lies in acquiring science and technology, 
and social and political institutions of the West. In fact, 
as was the case fourteen centuries ago, the basic lesson of 
Islam in terms of spirituality, Taqwa Tawakkul, Tabattul, as 
well as the excellence in conduct modeled by our prophet 
is sufficient to solve our problems of today. The problems of 
the Islamic world will not be solved by Foreign Investment, 
IMF, democracy, and institutional reform. Rather, if 
individuals strive for achieving the potential within them, 
and create a society based on the concept of the Ummah 
as one body, replicating the efforts of the Prophet S.A.W., 
then we can also replicate his success.
6. The challenge and the opportunity
The spectacular failure of economic theory in the recent 
global financial crisis of 2008 is open for all to see. 
Responding to questions about this failure, former United 
States Treasury Secretary Larry Summers implicitly agreed 
that academic “economists did not understand what was 
going on.” Testifying before a Congressional Committee 
setup to investigate this failure, many prominent economists 
blamed dominant economic theories. Despite the fact that 
many Nobel caliber economists have written devastating 
critiques, the economics profession has not responded by 
making changes to the conventional syllabus and hiring 
practices. This is because about 5000 Ph.D.’s produced 
each year, and mechanisms for evaluations, tenure and 
publications, carry a huge momentum which cannot 
easily change direction. When the Japanese invented the 
fourth generation steel furnaces, the US Steel Industry was 
unable to follow suit, because they could not scrap their 
huge investment in obsolete technology. A similar situation 
currently obtains in economics.
This gives us in the Islamic world a tremendous opportunity 
to build an Islamic economics on new foundations. In 
the East, we do not have heavy investments in obsolete 
knowledge forcing us to stay on the dead-end treadmill of 
neoclassical economics. The message of this paper cannot 
be heard by Western economists because it destroys all 
their intellectual capital. Muslim economists also have to 
be prepared to abandon a lot, but they have a platform to 
which they can jump for safety. The Quran gives us deep 
wisdom about how to manage economic affairs of a society. 
While many new and radical schools of thought have 
become prominent after financial crisis of 2008, nearly all 
look at partial remedies to the problem, because no one has 
an alternative foundation, a coherent worldview radically 
different from that fostered by the failed methodologies 
of materialism and logical positivism. This is what Islam 
and Islamic teaching in the economic realm provide us 
today: an opportunity to lead the world out of the morass 
it currently is in. As it was fourteen hundred years ago, so it 
is true today that the Quran provides us with complete and 
perfect guidance.
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Abstract - The present paper studies differences in thoughts of first vs. second generation Islamic 
economists, during the past forty years. It also investigates deviations that occurred in thought 
and practice in this period. But first it attempts to determine the basis of differentiation between 
the two generations and their distinguishing features. For our study purpose, we regard as the 
first generation those scholars who started writing on the subject of Islamic economics between 
1950 to 1975, a period highly unfriendly if not hostile to the idea of economics with Islamic 
perspective. This phase culminated at the organization of the first international conference on 
Islamic economics by King Abdulaziz University in the Holy city of Islam – Makkah Mukarramah. 
A new era started after the conference, in terms of the establishment of research and study centers, 
issue of specialized journals, enrolment to Ph. D. courses, foundation of study departments, set up 
of financial institutions, organization of conferences and seminars, award of prizes, and creation of 
employment opportunities. It also attracted attention of some non-Muslim economists. Thus, those 
who joined the movement of Islamic economics after this conference are considered as the second 
generation. In its concluding remarks, the paper suggests certain steps that could be taken to bridge 
the gaps, minimize the difference, and train the new emerging generation.
Keywords: modern history of Islamic economics, gaps in Islamic economics, Tawhidi economics, 
spiritual economics, “financialization” of Islamic economics, future of Islamic economics
1. Introduction
The notion of a generation is a convenient way for the 
sake of differentiation or comparison that developed or 
changed with the passage of time at different stages. The 
same method has been used in the present paper to study 
the changes that have occurred in thinking and ideas of 
leaders and followers in the discipline of Islamic economics 
over a period of forty years or so, dividing them into two 
generations. But let us first decide the time span of a 
generation.1
There are different opinions on the duration of a 
generation. Ibn Khaldun assigned a period of forty years 
for a generation of human beings. But that period is for 
vanishing of a particular generation. To him, Children of 
Israel, who lived among the Copts in a life of slavery, in 
a luxurious environment of a city, when they fled from 
Egypt were kept in the desert of Sinai in wanderings for 
forty years so that a new sturdy generation was brought up 
who could face challenges of life and fulfill the Prophetic 
mission (Ibn Khaldun n.d. 141). But forty years is not 
always and in every case a standard period. Our Prophet 
(be peace upon him) said the best qarn (age, generation) 
is my qarn, and then the qarn of those who follow them 
and then the qarn of those who follow them (al-Bukhari 
1987, 5: 3). Here the qarn is in the sense of generation. 
We know that the periods of his generation and those 
of his companions and followers were not equal. His 
prophetic life was twenty-three years. His companions 
lived for a longer life, and so did their followers. We have 
seen how quickly generations of electronic goods are 
changing, which means goods belonging to a specified 
stage of development in manufacture, usually imply 
improvement—for example, a second-generation mobile 
phone. Thus, it is clear that generation differs from object 
to object and even in time span.
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Since our classification is based on the dominant 
characteristic of a time span, this does not mean that when 
one generation stops its functioning it takes charge of the 
next generation. After a generation is grown up and begins 
reproduction, it remains active for a certain period to train 
and bring up the next generation.2
2. First generation of Islamic economists
In this paper, for the sake of generation determination, we 
have not considered the date of birth of a writer. Rather we 
took the duration of 1950 to 1975 for the commencement of 
his writing on and/or association with Islamic economics. 
In this way we combine appropriately the two necessary 
elements of a cultural generation—time and thinking. 
Those who joined it with their writings or association later, 
form the second generation.
The justification for this criterion is that in the period 
between 1950 and 1975 the scholars joined the movement 
in highly unfavorable circumstances. Scholars of the 
first generation devoted themselves to the study of 
Islamic economics without any institutional support. At 
present institutional assistance plays a significant role in 
propagation and dissemination of Islamic Economics and 
finance. Now it has various attractions. In the case of the 
first generation, an interest in Islamic economics sometimes 
meant jeopardizing one’s academic career. Mannan, 
from the first generation, illustrates the situation during 
the 1960s: “… a group of volunteer Islamic economists 
challenge the Neo-classical orthodox paradigm in the wake 
of a great transformation of Muslim societies resulting from 
gaining independence from their colonial past. This group 
of volunteers put themselves forward, at some personal 
cost, moving outside the comfort zone of familiarity to 
engage with new frames of reference and undertaking 
agreed tasks. They were motivated by a complex mixture 
of factors quite specific to their individual situations and 
perceptions of themselves” (Mannan, 2008, p. 62). The 
first generation chalked its way without precedents. Their 
works were mostly original and innovative.3
While in the first half of the 20th century, ulama played a 
leading role in the foundation and formulation of Islamic 
economics, during the 1950s and thereafter the number of 
professionally trained economists increased. In this period 
increasing numbers of professionally trained economists 
joined the field. Generally, individual scholars led the 
movement of Islamic economics forward. They may be 
aptly called “pioneer Islamic economists.” They played the 
leading role and they showed the way. Many of them were 
well-versed both in conventional economics and Shariah 
sciences. As compared to earlier works, their writings were 
more analytical and modern in style. They guided PhD 
scholars on Islamic economics in economics departments. 
Some of them started teaching students of economics. 
Some others got involved in establishment of institutions 
like cooperative societies and self-help groups.
They generally focused on topics such as the nature of 
Islamic economic systems, critiques of capitalism and 
communism, property rights, economic roles of state and 
public finance, money and banking, partnership and equity 
finance, production and consumption, labor relations, etc. 
As Mannan (2008, 45) puts it: “The contributions made 
during that period were mostly ideological, detailing the 
economic system of Islam as distinguished from capitalism 
and socialism.” The literature prepared in this period was 
inspired many to establish Islamic banking and financial 
institutions. They set up Mit Ghamr Saving Bank in Egypt; 
Tabung Haji in Malaysia during early 1960s; and Dubai 
Islamic Bank, Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and Kuwait 
Finance House, all by the middle of 1970s.
The culmination of this period is the event of the First 
International Conference on Islamic Economics at King 
Abdulaziz University. The Conference was scheduled to be 
held in 1975, but due to a tragic incident it could only be 
organized in early 1976. The first international conference 
provided a forum for Muslim economists and Shariah 
scholars to discuss together some of the major issues and 
themes in economics. It provided a golden opportunity for 
scholars working in isolation on Islamic economics to be 
aware of the existing state of affairs in the field of Islamic 
economics, to exchange ideas with each other, to take stock 
of the existing literature on the subject and realize the 
challenges ahead.
3. Post conference developments and rise of 
the second generation
In its communiqué the First International Conference 
exhorted universities to start teaching Islamic Economics, 
support researches in this area and provide basic facilities 
for this purpose through specialized libraries, research 
units, full time research scholarships, publication of 
periodicals, exchange programs and the establishment of 
scientific associations (Ahmad, 1980, pp. 353–56).
The first International Centre for Research in Islamic 
Economics was founded at King Abdulaziz University, 
Jeddah, as part of the implementation of the conference’s 
resolutions. In 1983 the center started the first refereed 
professional journal in the field of Islamic economics, 
“Journal of Research in Islamic Economics.”4 Another 
research institute was also established in Jeddah by 
the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) called Islamic 
Research and Training Institute (IRTI). It was founded in 
1401H/1981 and became operational in 1403H/1983.
In 1988 IDB started international Islamic economics and 
banking. Europe saw the first professional research journal 
“Review of Islamic Economics,” Leicester, U.K., in 1991. IRTI 
issued a refereed professional journal, “Islamic Economic 
Studies” in 1993.5
Islamic economics gained momentum after the first 
conference. It led to intensive and extensive research on 
various aspects of the discipline, development of curricula 
on Islamic economics, foundation of research centers and 
study departments, establishment of a chain of Islamic 
banks and financial institutions—which were already 
founded in a few places—and issue of specialized journals 
on Islamic economics. And a new generation was brought 
up in the post-Makkah conference period. However, this 
does not mean that the role of first generation Islamic 
economists was finished. In fact it is they who prepared 
the second generation by their guidance, supervision, 
works, and instructions. They continued writing on various 
significant topics in the post-conference period. Some of 
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them are still active after passage of more than 35 years to 
the conference.6
In the period of the second generation, a number of new 
developments took place that provided a boost to the 
new discipline of Islamic economics. No doubt, in many 
cases, patronage was extended by the leading scholars of 
the first generation. The second generation saw chains of 
conferences, seminars and discussion forums. In these 
programs, Islamic banking and finance increasingly became 
the dominating theme. Advanced courses of study have 
been initiated not only in Muslim countries, but also in the 
West (For details, refer to Belouafi, et al. 2012). Numbers 
of research centers, banking and financial institutions have 
been established. Prizes and awards have been announced. 
Some non-Muslim writers were also attracted to Islamic 
economics. Generally, they look at it with great curiosity, 
show sympathetic association or demonstrate neutral 
scholarship with respect to the subject of Islamic economics. 
Contribution of Volker Nienhaus to the discipline goes back 
to the early eighties of the last century. Rodney Wilson and 
John Presley also established relations during the same 
decade. Badal Mukherji, Vasudevan Sundararajan, Frank 
Vogel, Ibrahim Warde are some other renowned names. 
The second generation also saw a number of critics both 
from within and outside. Constructive, unbiased criticism is 
always welcome and beneficial, but a criticism to tarnish the 
image and objective of the discipline cannot be considered 
as healthy criticism. Unfortunately ideological differences 
on the part of a few writers have taken this kind of criticism.
4. General characteristics of their works
With the expansion of quantity, the control of quality is the 
biggest challenge. In the post-conference period, although 
quantity of research has increased considerably, the record 
is not very promising. The invention of the internet has 
considerably increased the availability of information and 
facilitated data collection in the short time. But this has 
affected the quality of research “because there is no barrier 
to entry, hence regardless of credentials or veracity anyone 
can post anything as a ‘fact’” (Ali, 2008, 225). Perhaps this 
is the reason that sometimes their works are duplicative, 
repetitive and monotonous. Generally repetition occurs 
due to not being aware of the extent to which research has 
advanced. For example, sometimes we find discussions 
such as whether credit creation is allowed or not allowed; 
paper money will be subject to zakah or it is not zakatable, 
while these issued have already been settled. There is 
also complaint that works of most writers does not reflect 
knowledge of developments that are taking place in 
contemporary Western writings on economics and allied 
subjects to update their knowledge.
The evil of plagiarism has also been detected. In the opinion 
of a leading scholar of the first generation “plagiarism 
is an endemic disease afflicting scholarship” (Siddiqi 
2008, 7). To him there are indicators that “it is assuming 
bothersome proportions.” However, efforts are going on 
at various levels to root out this evil. Organizers of various 
conferences, editors of research journals, and publishers 
give stern warning on plagiarism.
Reliance on secondary sources is a common complaint 
against the writings of the second generation. Siddiqi 
(2008, 4) feels that “the source of most of the economics 
projected as Islamic has been fiqh,” and that is also mostly 
picked up from secondary sources. They blur our vision of 
the total picture, because we are living in a different time 
and place and “with the passage of time the constraining 
influence of the detailed rules and regulations of fiqh 
seems to have all but extinguished the spark of maqasid-
inspired thinking” (ibid.).7 Nienhaus (2012) also feels 
that the contemporary generation sticks to the “legalistic 
approach.” They determine Shariah compliance on the 
basis of Islamic law or fiqh without considering whether 
there is any economic justification.
But it is also a fact that quite a few scholars of this 
generation are distinguished in scientific and analytical 
presentations due to their modern academic background 
and training in reputable Western institutions. They started 
using econometric models in their research. Specialization 
in various aspects of the subject increased, such as finance, 
insurance, waqf, zakah, history of economic thought, etc. 
In many cases their works feature a distinct combination of 
theoretical and applied research. They innovated analytical 
tools applicable to financial lease and operational lease. 
They have wider audiences and enjoy multicultural and 
multi-lingual interactions. This has provided a great 
opportunity to enrich the discipline of Islamic economics 
and disseminate it to others.
5. Dissatisfaction over the unsatisfactory 
growth
Within ten years after the First International Conference, it 
was felt that progress of the discipline is not smooth and in 
accordance with the vision of its pioneers. For the first time, 
in 1986, a symposium was held by the Royal Academy for 
Research on Islamic Civilization “Al al-Bayt Foundation” in 
Amman, Jordan, in cooperation with the Islamic Research 
and Training Institute, to discuss obstacles and problems 
faced in the way of research in Islamic economics. The 
next year a workshop was organized in Kuala Lumpur on 
the same issue. Since then, up to date, several meetings, 
seminars, conferences and workshops have been organized 
to discuss this issue and suggest corrective measures. In 
May 2004, the Islamic Research and Training Institute 
arranged a round table discussion on the “Current State 
of Knowledge in Islamic Economics and Development of 
the Discipline.” The theme of the Seventh International 
Conference was “Thirty Years of Research on Islamic 
Economics.” It was organized by the Islamic Economics 
Research Center, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, 
over 1–3 April, 2008. In a similar effort, the International 
Institute of Islamic Thought also organized a seminar on the 
“Methodology of Islamic Economics” on 1 st July 2011. And 
lately, the Islamic Economics Institute (formerly Islamic 
Economics Research Center), Jeddah, held a workshop on 
“the future of Islamic Economics” during 12–13 November, 
2012. Many leading economists of the first generation have 
expressed their exasperation and dissatisfaction with the 
present development of the discipline.8 But their annoyance 
shows a paternal affection for correction and reformation, 
not frustration and abandonment.
Even within the second generation, there is feeling of 
dissatisfaction with the developments that are taking place 
at present. Haneef (2008, p.19) wonders: “have we been 
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agents of change or have we become changed agents? He 
thinks that “the loss of idealism or the ‘spirit of the Makkah 
Conference’ is a root cause for much of the problems 
we face” (ibid.). Zaman (2008, 110) also feels that there is 
“need to find ways of Islamizing the economy that conform 
to both the spirit and the form of Islamic law, instead of just 
the form, which is taking up most of the current efforts of 
Islamic economists.”
6. Research gaps
At present, the largest numbers of works are focused on 
Islamic banking and finance rather than Islamic Economics, 
because that is the most saleable literature. This has 
incurred an opportunity cost as many other important 
areas have missed their attentions. Some important gaps in 
well-known areas are noted below:
One important gap in the contemporary scholarship of 
Islamic economics is the lack of empirical studies. The 
first generation has an excuse if it has not done so because 
they have spent their energy in theorization of Islamic 
economics and banking. With the establishment of Islamic 
banks and financial institutions, and with the development 
of numerous theoretical works, it was expected that there 
would be enough empirical research so that one could see 
to what extent those theoretical works stand the test of 
time, and to know whether Islamic economic institutions 
are moving in the correct direction. Only then we can 
know whether our institutions are actually playing the role 
claimed for them in Islamic economic literature and then 
we can evaluate our achievements. This is also necessary 
for future planning. But very little change in research 
patterns has been noticed in the second generation. We still 
have a larger amount of theoretical research than empirical 
and case studies. There is hardly any study on discrepancy 
in Muslim ideals and actual conduct. Siddiqi (1972), who 
once wrote on desirable behavior of firms and consumers 
“under Islamic spirit” complains: “We know very little about 
contemporary Muslim economic behavior” (2008, 5). No 
doubt, empirical research needs teamwork and sustained 
efforts. It also needs financial support. The absence of these 
two is, indeed, behind the insufficient number of empirical 
research.
There is dearth of Islamic economic literature on poverty 
removal, inequality, development and redistribution 
of income. While pointing out these gaps Kahf (2004) 
writes: “It was only recently that a few Islamic economists 
started dealing with issues of development, political 
economics of the role of government and of the economics 
of poverty reduction.” Siddiqi (2004) reiterates: “One has 
only to compare the emphasis on poverty elimination and 
inequality reduction in the early Islamic economic literature 
with the almost total neglect of these subjects during the 
recent years to feel the change.” IERC (2008, 49) in “A 
Proposed Strategic Vision for Future Research in Islamic 
Economics” has rightly pointed out: “All religions have 
been poor-friendly, Islam particularly so. But this cannot be 
claimed for Islamic economics, so far. The attention paid to 
zakat, sadaqat and awqaf, the most poor-friendly of Islamic 
institutions, has been sporadic and feeble. The jewel in the 
crown of Islamic economics, Islamic banking and finance, 
proved to be largely irrelevant for the poor.”
Zaman (2008, P. 17) suggests that “effective da’wah 
to Muslims to pay zakah and to adopt simple lifestyles 
recommended by Islam has the potential to eliminate 
poverty in Islamic societies.” But this claim needs to be 
verified by empirical studies. We find so many incidences 
in history of the denial/evasion of zakah, beginning from 
the early days of Islam. Sometimes da`wah is not enough. 
It requires enforcing authority and efficient management. 
Moreover, poverty removal also requires enlargement of 
the size of the cake, not only its fair distribution.
A number of Muslim countries are rich in natural resource 
and fertile lands. Building the foundations for sustainable 
development is the greatest challenge we face today as 
an international community. How to achieve growth with 
sustainable development should be their serious agenda. 
But very little attention has been paid to address this 
topic. Much earlier Khurshid Ahmad (1980) showed the 
way of tanmiyah with tazkiyah, material growth along 
with improvement among human beings. Chapra (1997) 
has also made it his focus of attention. But little headway 
has been made in this direction in the subsequent period. 
Works on environment and sustainable development are 
also not very substantial.
In Islam, in the field of economics, perhaps the area of 
public finance was first to attract the attention of Muslim 
scholars. Exclusive writings started on this subject as early 
as 2nd century Hijrah (8th century CE). This was but 
natural in the wake of the expanding territory of the Islamic 
state, availability of new sources of income, confronting 
new heads of expenditure and facing other socio-economic 
challenges. But at present, works “on taxation, fiscal policy, 
social welfare and development financing” are very few. 
They followed almost the same patter as their predecessors 
in their treatment of the problem. They seldom look up “to 
gauge the reality faced in modern living” (Siddiqi 2008, 
10). The first generation had the excuse, as in the first place 
there was need to know our heritage in these areas. But it 
was expected from the second generation to advance this 
study through interaction with the current situation while 
taking into consideration the present reality.
In spite of commitment by many Muslim states to Islamize 
their economy, public finance and fiscal policy has not 
attracted the attention of writers. This aspect of Islamic 
economics needs fresh thinking, as some of the traditional 
sources of government revenue no longer exist. For 
example, fay’, ghanimah, jizyah and tributes represent a 
socioeconomic reality long extinct. Kharaj was the mainstay 
of government financing for many early centuries but it lost 
its importance in the modern period (Zarka 2008, 27). 
There is a need to fully discuss what would be sources of 
public revenue for a modern Islamic state and what would 
be its expenditure policy.
An important gap in Islamic economics is “the absence 
of a unified and well-defined Shari’ah methodology” 
(al-Jarhi 2012). In the opinions of many scholars, Islamic 
economists never discussed methodology properly. “Those 
who were trying to talk of methodology, referred to usul 
al-fiqh, which was understood as the methodology of 
Islamic law/jurisprudence” (Haneef 2012, 146). It was 
due to the importance of subject that Islamic Economics 
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Institute (IEI) in its recently held workshop made it one of 
the main themes of discussion.
Research on the history of Islamic economic thought and 
the economic history of Muslim peoples started before 
the fifties in the last century. However, it is still “a very 
thinly researched area” (Siddiqi 2008, 4; 2008, 3). Drive 
to “financialization” and concentration on practical aspect 
of Islamic economics, left very few to pay attention to study 
history of Islamic economic thought. Hitherto the research 
in this area has been language, region and period specific—
Arabic, the Middle East and up to 9th/15th century, 
respectively. Scholars of erstwhile Andalus, West Africa, 
Turkey, Persia and South East and Far East Asia have not 
been made subject of the enquiry. More attention has been 
paid to write on the economic thought of few personalities 
than others. There is a fneed for intensive and extensive 
research to include more personalities, ideas, periods, 
languages and regions and to write a systematic history of 
the subject (Islahi 2008, 347).
Zaman (2012a), in one of his articles, protests: “There is no 
textbook of Islamic Economics, despite numerous efforts 
to create one.” No doubt it is a serious gap that has to be 
filled up. Much earlier Mannan (1970) prepared the first 
textbook on the pattern of contemporary texts. Until that 
time, modern Islamic economics was in its early stage. But 
he tried to give a Islamic perspective on every topic. Since 
then the literature on Islamic economics has increased 
tremendously. There should have been effort to develop 
a textbook on Islamic economics in a more systematic 
way, with up to date information.9 This feeling is shared 
by many, and several efforts are going on at individual 
and institutional levels to produce an authentic standard 
textbook on Islamic economics.
Islamic Economics Research Center (IERC) in its “A 
Proposed Strategic Vision for Future Research in Islamic 
Economics” (IERC 2008, p. 40) brought into notice various 
research gaps in the scholarship of Islamic economics 
and challenges faced in the fields of globalization, 
environmental concerns, housing, drinking water, clean 
air, rapid technological changes, flexible labor markets, hot 
money and flying capital, rising anxiety levels outpacing 
rising living standards, gender relations, family problems, 
an aging population and challenges arising out of it. All 
these issues got very little space in the works of second 
generation.
7. Departures and deviations from the first 
conference generation
Diversity of opinions and differences on various issues 
are not something uncommon among the intellectuals. 
Sometimes a seemingly different stand is just a matter of 
interpretation, with no consequential effect. Examples of 
changing outlook with the passage of time, and withdrawal 
of opinions are abundant in the short history of modern 
Islamic economics. It is full of controversies like mudarabah 
vs. murabahah, mudarabah vs. time multiple loans, paper 
money vs. gold money, insurance vs. no-insurance or 
which kind of insurance, sukuk vs. no sukuk, or which 
kind of sukuk, financial lease vs. operational lease, scarcity 
vs. no scarcity, competition vs. cooperation, tawarruq 
fiqhi vs. tawarruq masrafi, self interest vs. selflessness, 
maximization vs. altruism, etc. With the passage of time 
and experience, such differences are narrowed down, or 
lose their importance, or disappear altogether. They are 
not worrisome.
However, one cannot pass unnoticed from two significant 
departures shown by two eminent scholars of Islamic 
economics—Masudul Alam Choudhury and Asad Zaman. 
Both of them are educated in the prestigious institutions of 
the West, and specialize in mathematics and econometrics 
respectively. Both of them criticize Western economics and 
call for getting rid of neoclassical economics influences. 
They equally criticize mainstream Islamic economics, 
and each of the two claims that he presents the real 
Islamic economics. However, the similarity ends here. 
Their writing styles are quite different. One writes in 
philosophical and mathematical jargon that the majority 
of readers are unable to understand,10 while the other 
writes in simple understandable language. They are critical 
of each other.11 One focuses on ‘tawhidi economics” and 
the other preaches “spiritual economics.” In Choudhury’s 
opinion Zaman’s thinking is “utopian.” To him, reading 
his work “one gets the impression of an irreconcilable gap 
between a misconceived Western intellection and an ideal 
Islamic reemergence” (Choudhury, 2012, 181). In Zaman’s 
opinion Choudhuri limits the perfection of the Quran to its 
episteme. It “is perfect in its technique and in its phronesis 
as well” (2012b). “MAC (Masudul Alam Choudhury) seems 
to suggest that if we used topology instead of calculus, that 
would solve the problems we face. This seems very simple 
minded and ignores the fact that a tremendous amount of 
efforts to apply Differential Topology, Catastrophe Theory, 
Chaos Theory and other complex branches of mathematics 
over the past forty years or so have failed to produce 
a single worthwhile or substantial contribution to our 
understanding of the economic affairs of man” (ibid.).
Choudhury’s first inroads into Tawhidi epistemology of the 
Islamic world system was opened up by his various works 
during the 1990s and relentlessly continues till date. He has 
benefited from Ibn Arabi’s ideas of Wahdat al-Wujud (the 
Oneness of Being) to support his tawhidi argumentations 
presented in his work Science and Epistemology in the 
Qur’an (2006b).
Choudhury’s approach is not confined to a religious way 
of disseminating thought. Tawhid, as he understands it, as 
the law of divine oneness expressed through the epistemic 
law of unity of knowledge, is a highly methodological 
worldview. It applies uniformly to all the sciences, even 
without the constriction of calling it Islamic-such-and-
such.12
Choudhury (2006a) claims that foundationally, the 
Tawhidi methodological worldview is derived by analytical 
investigation and discourse from the Quran, the Sunnah, 
and critical examination of the historical works in 
comparative perspectives. He thinks that the present 
situation of a mess in Islamic economics can be remedied 
if we “return to the Tawhidi methodological worldview 
and establish the universal and unique epistemology of 
the whole socio-scientific order on this as derived from 
the Qur’an, the Sunnah, and by learned discourse and 
applications.” The rest of Islamic economics “died before it 
could deliver.”13
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Many scholars who tried to understand “tawhidi 
economics” find it an abstract idea that has no significant 
practical importance, just like the concept of “general 
equilibrium,” which is in itself a beautiful idea but cannot 
exist in practice.14
Zaman (2012a, 149) also thinks, though differently, 
that “current approaches to the development of Islamic 
Economics are bound to fail.” He emphasizes “the Spiritual 
Focus” in his economic discourses. Hence it seems 
appropriate for our purpose to give his ideas the name 
of “Spiritual Economics.” He states: “The strong spiritual 
focus of Islam contrasts favorably with conventional 
materialistic approaches to economics” (ibid. 159).15 He 
further says: “All of our acquisition of knowledge and our 
struggle to change the world occurs for the sole purpose of 
pleasing Allah Subhanuhu wa T’aala. This explicit spiritual 
focus characterizes the efforts of our Prophet Mohammad 
S.A.W. and differentiates Islamic economics from any other 
existing approach” (ibid. 158).
It may be noted that the mainstream Islamic economists 
find “Spiritual Economics” a one-sided approach, which 
presents a half picture of the whole system of Islamic 
economics. They do not and cannot disagree with this 
half.16 But they insist on taking into account the other half 
as well.17
It is a fact that at present there is more than one stream of 
thinking in Islamic economics. But they have still not taken 
definite shapes. We have mainstream Islamic economics 
represented by a majority of scholars in the field. There are 
Tawhidi and Spiritual streams. We have another stream of 
thought that insists on adoption of conventional assumptions 
(such as self-interest, maximization, rationality, etc.) of 
capitalist system with certain modifications. It may be noted 
that before the fall of communist systems there was also a 
group that advocated for “Islamic socialism.” Of course, 
all these streams are not equally forceful. But in the future 
either they will turn into various schools, or the principle of 
the survival of the fittest would work.
8. “Financialization” of Islamic economics
It is the issue of ‘financialization’18 of Islamic economics 
and banking that bothers leading scholars of the first 
generation and most of the writers of the second 
generation. ‘Islamic banks have taken their own course, 
which causes frustration’ to Islamic economists. Generally, 
dissatisfaction is expressed over the widening gap between 
theoreticians and practitioners in the area of banking and 
finance and the increasing role of the latter.
It is to be noted that the propounders of Islamic banking 
and finance have been stressing the value-based nature of 
the industry that would operate under the Islamic spirit. It 
would aim at earning a reasonable profit with investment 
in merit goods and services. The advocates of Islamic 
finance always characterized it as faith and ethics based. 
But in practice today various providers of financial products 
and services primarily take “the form of negative screens” 
(El-Gamal 2006).
Similarly, in theory, it was claimed that partnership and 
risk sharing is the core of Islamic banking and finance. But 
now the dominance in practice is for debt-based finance, 
including sukuk based on ijarah, salam and istisna.` At 
one time there was controversy about the legitimacy of 
murabahah, but it has been left behind. 19 Now sale of debt 
(bay` al-dayn) has been introduced in Islamic finance. 
Tawarruq and `inah are used as a way of obtaining cash 
now against a larger amount of cash to be paid at a date in 
future. Though it is given a shape of sale and purchase, in 
the opinions of experts “the economic role of the transaction 
can hardly be different from that of lending and borrowing 
money.” “From the macroeconomic point of view” says 
Siddiqi, “the position of Islamic banks practicing tawarruq 
is exactly the same as that of the conventional banks giving 
(interest-based) loans to their clients” (Siddiqi, 2006, 16). It 
bears all the evils of interest bearing loans. Just like interest-
based debt financing, in the case of tawarruq, also, there is 
no integration. In fact there is a clear hiatus, between the 
real sector of goods and services and the financial sector. No 
real asset corresponds to an interest-bearing loan.
Development of financial engineering ignored the objective 
and spirit of Islamic economics and finance. Consultation 
and seeking guidance from the original and classical 
Islamic sources has declined. Recourse to legal stratagem 
has increased. There are high resentments over the role of 
Shariah Supervisory Boards. Shari`ah advisers have a fiqh 
background and hardly any economics training. Hence they 
consider that their only duty is to fulfill legal requirements, 
not any economic criteria or rationale.
The Islamic banks and financial institutions try to fulfill their 
objective of competing conventional institutions through 
some kind of financial engineering. The maqasid prove 
hindrance in their way of ‘financialization.’ They develop 
products that are shaped in a way that satisfy fiqh rules, but 
they are not in conformity with the maqasid of Shariah. It 
is well known that financial engineering is very different 
from social engineering. Financial engineering is driven by 
financial goals—monetary gains. Needless to say in many 
cases financial goals are not harmonious to social goals.
It is the result of ‘financialization’ of Islamic economics that 
banking and finance has become the most growing sector 
of Islamic economics. So much so that it overshadowed the 
other sectors such as zakah, waqf, etc., as if Islamic banking 
and finance is the other name of Islamic economics. At one 
time, theoreticians of Islamic banking and finance spent 
lot of energy to prove that Islamic products are different. 
Today maximum efforts are made to prepare products that 
could match the conventional ones. Thus the gap between 
Islamic and conventional financial practices is shrinking. 
This has made the barrier to entry much easier to surmount. 
That is the reason that indigenous financial institutions in 
the Islamic world are facing growing competition from 
multinational Western banks. If Islamic institutions do not 
reform themselves and return to genuine Islamic conducts, 
they may lose their identity. It is a matter of satisfaction 
that a majority of scholars share this feeling and at various 
levels efforts are going on to correct the situation.
9. The future of Islamic economics is not 
gloomy
However, the present writer thinks that there is no reason 
to be disappointed with the performance of the second 
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generation as a whole. He may not agree with such 
statements as: “it [Islamic economics] does not seem to be 
moving forward. It seems to be stagnating” (Haneef, 2012). 
Similarly, there seems to be a little bit exaggeration in Prof. 
Siddiqi’s statement (2008, 8) that “Islamic economists 
hardly did any better than those without any learning of 
social dynamics, specializing only in traditional Islamic 
sciences developed more than a thousand years ago.” True, 
“too much focus has been given to Islamic Banking and 
Finance” and generally form dominates over substance or 
fiqh dominates on maqasid. Some writers prefer easy going 
and quick gaining, termed by Nienhaus (2012) as “Islamic 
Economics Light.” But all have not accepted the current 
state of affairs. Dissatisfaction on the part of many from 
within the second generation, Islamic economists give hope 
for correction and future direction. No doubt, the discipline 
is making progress in spite of many ups and downs. A few 
topics on which we did not have any work until recently, 
such as risk analysis, hedging, risk sharing, microfinance, 
now we have important additions by the scholars of second 
generation Greuning and Iqbal (2008), al-Suwailem 
(2006), Askari et al. (2012), Obaidullah (2008, 2011), etc.
Similarly, in spite of certain limitations in research on 
history of Islamic economic thought, literatures prepared 
until now by Siddiqi (1964, 1982), Mirakhor (1987), 
Hosseini (2003), Ghazanfar (2003), and Islahi (2005) 
have refuted the Schumpeterian great gap thesis (1954) 
and pointed out to the “serious omission in the history 
of economics of profound contribution made by Muslim 
scholars.” This literature has exerted some effects on 
scholars of the mainstream economic thought, and a few 
of them are trying to rehabilitate it in the main body of 
economic thought. Moreover, for a long time, we were in 
complete darkness about what was the situation of Islamic 
economic thought after the 15th century. In recent years, 
first time effort has been made to explore Muslim economic 
thinking in post Khaldunian era and other regions and 
languages. Now there are works to give at least some idea 
about it (Islahi, 2009, 2011a, 2011b).
The leading Islamic economists of the first generation, who 
are still active, continued to enrich the discipline with their 
valuable works all through these years. They are source 
of guidance and inspiration for the existing generation as 
well as for the coming one. At present there are several 
institutes dedicated to the research in Islamic economics, 
banking and finance, we have a number of professional and 
specialized journals on the subject and increasing number 
of courses, and teaching departments. It is not true that all 
are confined to the present trend of banking and finance, 
and there is no reason to think that they will be so in the 
future. The very existence of dissenting voices is rays of 
hope, not the shadows of frustration. The literature on 
Islamic economics and its various components increased 
in the past 40 - 50 years like a flood. And as happens with 
every torrent, it bears along the swelling foam. “Then, as 
for the foam, it passes away as scum upon the banks, while 
that which is for the good of mankind remains on the 
Earth” (The Qur’an 13: 17).
10. Concluding remarks
Thanks to the financial crises in recent years. It forced 
economists all over the world to return to fundamentals. 
It has also awakened fanatics of “financialization.” The 
recent crisis was the crisis of the system. Excessive debt 
promoted by interest-based and risk-shifting gambling–like 
instruments—was the root cause behind it. It enhanced 
the conviction and self-confidence of the first generation. 
It has opened the eyes of many second-generation Islamic 
economists who were trying to imitate conventional 
banking and finance “in an Islamic way.” It has also alerted 
the new generation in the offing and created an urge among 
them to return to the fundamentals of Islamic economics.
The crises seen in conventional economics have provided 
an opportunity to Islamic economists to have a critical look 
at the present state of the discipline and avoid repeating 
similar mistakes. During and after the recent crisis, a number 
of seminars and symposia were held to discuss the causes 
and remedial measures and how Islamic economy can 
avoid such happenings. For instance, in such a conference 
held in Amman, Jordan, 1–2 December, 2010, there was 
consensus among the participants that excessive lending 
and risk shifting in conventional finance, in addition to 
interest (riba), excessive risk (gharar), gambling (maysir), 
speculations (mujazafah), were the main reasons behind 
the financial crisis. The capitalist system was noted to have 
an inherent tendency of frequent crises. In their opinions, 
the risk-sharing and Islamic economic system, based on 
ethical values, presents an alternative to avoid occurrence 
of such crises (Oran 2012).
Islamic economics, since its revival in the modern period, 
presented a balanced economic system between the two 
extreme of socialism and capitalism. At a time when these 
two systems were struggling to take the rest of humanity 
into their hegemony, first generation Islamic economists 
presented a convincing Islamic alternative to capitalism 
and communism. At that time, the focus of Islamic 
economics was to prove supremacy of Islamic economics 
against those two extreme economic systems (Mawdudi 
(1969), Siddiqi (1975), Rafi’uddin, M. (1969), Hamidullah 
(1950), Ahmad (1969), Abdul-Hakim (1953) and al-Sibai 
(1960). The second generation faced the challenges of 
widespread banking and finance. At that juncture it showed 
how interest-free participatory financial institutions could 
be established to avoid the curse of interest. Now the 
generation of Islamic economists in the offing is facing 
the challenges of globalization. In the past, the world was 
divided into cities, states and continents. Now the whole 
world has become a global village. So the new generation 
must address challenges arising out of it such as ecology, 
sustainable development, equity, and poverty eradication. 
These are shared concerns of humanity.20
Now the generation in the offing must adopt this approach. 
It has to carry the message of Islamic economics to all over 
the world, making their problems one with the problem of 
Islamic economics. This is what IERC, the organizer of 7th 
International Conference, declared: “Let Islamic economics 
be for each and all, declaring their problems to be its 
problems, taking up the causes of humanity as its causes” 
(IERC p. 41).
I feel that the second generation is also about to lose its 
energy. There should not be much expectation from them. 
A new generation is coming up. Now certain measures 
should be taken to prepare them well and train them better:
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There is need to organize a fresh round of conferences 
and seminars to discuss relevant issues and emerging 
challenges in Islamic economics. In such events, a 
maximum participation of young generation must be 
ensured. They should be guided and persuaded to take up 
those issues for research that missed the attention of the 
second generation.
Interaction with them should be increased to convince 
them to fill the existing gaps in theory and practice of 
the discipline. Various methods should be adopted to 
encourage and appreciate good talents in this field, such 
as scholarship for non-traditional topics, stipend to do 
research in areas of gaps, prizes for young economists, etc.
For raising a new generation of Islamic economics 
researchers, IERC (2008, p. 50) has rightly emphasized the 
need to reiterate the challenges, constantly illuminate the 
potentials and promises of Islam, and expose the current 
grave human situation, and then make it rewarding for 
those who take up the cause. The young scholars should 
be motivated to undertake researches relating to problems 
facing common man. They should not remain confined to 
specific issues of limited implications.
Last but not the least, they should establish direct relation 
with the Quran and Sunnah and seek recourse to maqasid 
al-Shariah, the spirit and not the form of fiqh and its 
regulations. It is well known that Islamic economics is mainly 
based on the Quran revealed to Prophet Muhammad (peace 
be upon him) and the Sunnah—his excellent example 
(uswah hasanah), who was mercy for all creatures (Rahmah 
li’l-`alamin) (Qur’an 21: 107), not only for Muslims. Let 
Islamic economics be mercy for the whole world.
Notes
1. A generation is generally defined as all the people 
of approximately the same age, especially when 
considered shared, certain attitudes, etc. There 
are two main forms of generation—familial and 
cultural. Familial generation have been determined 
as ranging from 16 years to 30 years depending on 
the level of economic and cultural situations. We 
can roughly take 23 years as an average generation 
time, a period in which a person was born and 
started reproduction. But academic or cultural 
generations are cohorts of people who lived in the 
same age and shared similar cultural experiences. 
A new generation comes into existence when these 
two elements change.
2. In an earlier discussion paper, this writer, 
conveniently taking a period of 25 years for a 
generation, divided Islamic economists into four 
generations beginning from the first writings, 
which appeared during the second quarter of the 
20th century, precisely during the 1930s and 40s 
(Islahi 2010). There is no essential difference 
between that classification and the present 
division. In the present paper we have ignored the 
developments that took place in the first half of the 
20th century and the last one, the new generation, 
which is in the offing.
3. It may be noted that writing on modern Islamic 
economics started before 1950s during the second 
quarter of 20th century at the hand of mostly ulama 
(religious scholars). Few in numbers, they may be 
called as founding scholars of this new discipline. 
“Founding scholars” is in contrast to “pioneering 
Islamic economists.” Prominent among those 
who started wring on Islamic economics before 
the 1950s are: Abul-Ala Mawdudi, Muhammad 
Hamidullah, Hifzur-Rahman Seoharawi, Anwar 
Iqbal Qureshi, Muhammad Yusufuddin, Manazir 
Ahsan Guilani, and Shaikh Mahmud Ahmad from 
the subcontinent. From the Arab world we can put 
in this category Zaki Salih, Muhammad Ali Nash’at, 
Ahmad Muhammad Ridwan, Muhammad Abu 
Zaharah, Ali Fahmi Taman, Muhammad Abdullah 
al-Arabi, Muhammad al-Ghazali, Sayyid Qutb, et 
cetera.
4. It is the first and the oldest journal of Islamic 
economics. In 1989 it was renamed as the Journal 
of King Abdulaziz University - Islamic Economics].
5. Series of conferences, seminar, institutions and 
journal started after the first conference. At present 
there are more than a dozen specialized journals 
on Islamic economics, banking, finance, waqf, and 
accounting. These journals helped in dissemination 
of Islamic economics and finance all over the world.
6. Some of the first generation Islamic economists who 
are still active include: Muhammad Umar Zubair, 
Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, Khurshid Ahmad, 
M. A. Mannan, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, M. U. Chapra, 
Abdul Hamid Abu Sulaiman, Hasanuzzaman, M. 
Anas Zarqa, Monzer Kahf, Muhammad Ahmad 
Saqr, Akram Khan, Rifat al-Awdi, Abd al-Salam 
al-Abbadi, Abd a-Rahman Yousri Ahmad, Rafic 
Younus al-Misri, etc.
7. It may be noted that most of the contemporary 
writers confine the maqasid of Shariah into 
five objectives: protection and preservation of 
religion (din), life (nafs), progeny (nasl), property 
(mal), and intellect (‘aql). This is a traditional 
classification inherited from al-Ghazali (450–
505/1058–1111), al-Shatibi (d.790/1388), and 
others. Siddiqi argue for the expansion of this list. 
He seems to be supporting Allal al-Fasi (1963) and 
Ibn  Ashur (1366 H), who advocate expansion of 
this list. Siddiqi would like to include the following 
objectives relating to economics: “Sustenance for 
all, dignity, security, justice and equity, freedom 
of choice, moderation and balance, peace and 
progress, reduction of inequality in the distribution 
of income and wealth” (Siddiqi 2004).
8. For such statements see Zaman (2012a).
9. A few years before, another textbook came into 
the market under the title “Microeconomics with 
Islamic perspective” but it had very little Islamic 
input (Yusoff 2008). The author could not find 
anyone from the host of Islamic literature to refer 
except to himself and to a book written in Urdu in 
1939.
10. The present writer wonders: Tawhid is a Quranic 
concept. Quran is meant for all. It uses the language 
known as “Arabiy mubin” (clear Arabic language 
that everyone can understand). How people will 
benefit from tawhidi economics if it is discussed in 
philosophical style and in mathematical language 
that at the most only few selected could follow it.
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11. See Choudhury’s comments on Zamans’ paper 
entitled “Crisis in Islamic Economics: Diagnosis 
and Prescriptions” in JKAU--Islamic Economics, 
25:1 and the latter’s rejoinder in JKAU--Islamic 
Economics, 25:2.
12. In reply to a letter of this writer.
13. Explained to this writer in a personal 
correspondence.
14. Readers are advised to go through an article 
published in JKAU – Islamic Economics, 22:2 along 
with some comments. Although it is on “Islamic 
Critique and Alternative to Financial Engineering 
Issues,” it will give an idea about Choudhury’s 
Tawhidi economics and how main stream Islamic 
economists think about it.
15. We had such current of thought in our history 
sometimes called sufi economics. In the Islamic 
tradition, a group of sufis presented a somewhat 
different school of thought in economics. Their 
thrust has been the minimization of wants, 
purification of soul, and preference of others to 
their own needs. According to Siddiqi (1992, 
p. 15): “The main contribution of tasawwuf (or 
zuhd) to economic thought in Islam is a constant 
pull against giving too high a value to material 
wealth and a persistent push towards altruism 
and unselfish service of Allah’s creatures. They 
emphasized the ultimate concern of the human 
soul and its reaching out towards its source in the 
Divine. They personally exemplified this concern 
by minimizing the material values and extolling 
the virtues and attributes that contributed towards 
felicity in the hereafter while also enabling the life 
here on the Earth.”
16. For example, Siddiqi (2004) says: “Islam is 
primarily about a spiritual view of life and a moral 
approach to life’s problems, including the economic 
problem. The contentment Islam promised man 
is rooted in this spiritual and moral framework.” 
Zarka (2008, p. 35) observes: “Islamic economics 
will not be complete theoretically in research 
and teaching, nor in application on the ground 
through appropriate policies, but with the help of 
Allah the Almighty and then relying on those who 
know economics in addition to the knowledge of 
Shari’ah, jurisprudence and economic reality.”
17. Readers are advised to go through Zaman’s article 
published in KAUJ–Islamic Economics, 25:1, along 
with comments by M.N. Siddiqi, Shamim Siddiqui, 
Seif el-Din Tag el-Din, and M.A. Choudhury, and 
Zaman’s rejoinder in 25:2. They will give an idea 
about Zaman’s spiritual economics and how the 
mainstream Islamic economists think about it.
18. I borrow the term “financialization” from Askari 
et al. (2012, 31) who used it in the sense of “fast 
expansion of financial institutions,” “a significant 
expansion of the financial sector relative to the real 
sector,” and “an expansion that was not beneficial 
to the broader economy and may have even turned 
out to be harmful…”
19. According to Kahf (2004), discussion on issues 
of mudarabah and murabahah kept Islamic 
economists busy in vain for a long time. The real 
practice of Islamic banks ended up at tawarruq, 
which brought “the whole Islamic banking theory 
to square 1.”
20. As the IERC puts it: “It is no longer the question 
how Muslims are going to manage their economies. 
It is one world, one economy. The new economic 
order has to be conceived and executed at the 
global level. It has to be an Islamic economics for 
all, the entire humanity, rather than a Muslim 
manual on how to conduct your economy, as the 
contemporary Islamic economics largely happens 
to be” (IERC 2008, 46).
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Abstract - The sustainable development of Islamic economics as a discipline depends also on 
methodological development that provides a clear direction on how to appraise economic theories 
and provide evidence of its reliability. This paper attempts to study the methodology of Islamic 
economics in two ways: (1) by examining the works by scholars in their specific writings on this 
subject, and (2) by observing the writings on Islamic economics, banking and finance to see 
how Islamic economists develop their discipline. The paper found three categories of writings, 
namely: (1) the usul al-fiqh methodology applied in economics, (2) methodological pluralism 
that tries to utilize various methodologies developed in both western and Islamic tradition, and 
(3) conventional mainstream positive economic methodology applied in Islamic cases. These 
are evaluated thoroughly and suggestions are made as to what needs to be done to assist Islamic 
economics’ develop.
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1. Introduction
Methodology of economics as a discourse received wide 
attention among economists in the 1970s and experienced 
dramatic growth in the 1980s whereby it had become a 
recognizable sub discipline within economics (Backhouse, 
1994:4). It brought new debates on how economics was to 
be approached and how its theories and later on body of 
knowledge was to be constructed.
Methodology is not to be interpreted as a method, 
technical procedures or an approach to modeling, instead 
methodology, to quote Machlup (1978:55) is “a study of 
the reasons behind the principles on the basis of which 
various types of propositions are accepted or rejected as 
part of the body of ordered knowledge in general or of any 
special discipline.” In this regard, methodological study 
would provide arguments, perhaps rationalizations, which 
support various preferences entertained by the scientific 
community for certain rules of intellectual procedure, 
including those for forming concepts, building models, 
formulating hypothesis and testing theories (Machlup, 
1978: 54).
Hence, the product of methodological inquiry would be (1) 
a set of criteria, rules, principles, standards, rationalization, 
arguments and justifications for theory appraisal as well 
as testing and proving the reliability of that theory so that 
we could distinguish between valid theories and invalid 
ones (Fox 1997:34); and (2) the methods, techniques or 
procedural steps needed for appraising and justifying 
theories which come much later after the criteria and 
arguments are clearly established.1
For Islamic economics as a new discipline, the 
methodological study plays a role in developing the 
discipline itself. In addition, if most of Islamic economists 
claim that conventional economic theories are infused by 
vision or values that are not in-line with Islamic vision and 
values, then, one main task is how to develop economic 
theory that can be, and is, infused by Islamic vision and 
values. Without a proper methodology of Islamic economics 
this task could not be done properly.
In this paper we attempt to identify the type of methodology 
of Islamic economics as proposed by scholars in their 
specific writing on the subject and based on the modes of 
writings in the literature of Islamic economics, banking 
and finance. In the latter, although we might not find 
explicit methodological discussions, we could infer the 
writer’s methodological preference. Based on this we 
would classify the typology of methodology of Islamic 
economics and identify the features as well as examine 
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those methodologies to assist in developing the discipline 
of Islamic economics.
2. Methodology of Islamic economics: The 
typology
In general, we observe three types of approaches to 
methodology: (1) the use of usul al-fiqh methodology 
applied in economics, (2) the use of methodological 
plurality, utilizing various methodologies developed in both 
western and Islamic traditions, and (3) the mainstream 
conventional positive economic methodology applied in 
Islamic cases.
Type I: Usul al-Fiqh as the methodology of Islamic 
economics
Usul al-fiqh or the methodology in deriving rules (ahkam) 
is used in the discussion of Islamic economics to develop 
Islamic economics. This comes from the understanding 
that the nature of Islamic economics is similar to fiqh 
al-mu’amalah. And this was observed by Addas (2008:5,97)
Islamic economics is no more than the result of applying 
the Islamic rules and injunctions, i.e., Islamic fiqh, to 
the prevalent secular theoretical structure of economics 
to separate the permissible from the non-permissible, 
as well as to ascertain the position of the shari’ah on 
economic acts and current business events.2
Islamic economists could use usul al-fiqh as their 
methodology and also in their attempt to identify and 
establish an economic order that conforms to Islamic 
scripture and traditions by discovering the theorem in 
texts (nusus) and derive general rules and principles in 
establishing consistent drawings of the Islamic economic 
theories and system (Yalcintas, 1987:27).
The approach is like the fuqaha¯’ (jurists) practices in their 
attempt to construct al-qawa¯id al-fiqhiyyah (legal maxims) 
to be the source of derivation of economic theories 
(Hasanuzzaman, 1984, 2007). The Islamic economic 
theory would then be “the application of juristic principles 
and ethical norms to the mainstream dispensation” (Addas, 
2008:108).
This notion of methodology of Islamic economics reflects 
that the contemporary body of knowledge of Islamic 
economics is still dominated by fiqh, which is unfortunately 
almost always narrowly defined as ‘”law.” Hence, efforts 
using this methodology are not able to focus on “Islamic 
economics as a social science.” Islamic economics is loosely 
viewed as “fiqhinomics” that is equated with fiqh or that of 
a branch of fiqh body of knowledge. This, in our opinion, is 
not really appropriate because of two reasons. First, the two 
subjects have different subject-matter. Fiqh (as commonly 
understood today) studies the practical rules and laws that 
are attached to the human acts (ahkam al-shari’ah) such 
as obligation (wujub), prohibition (hazr), indifference 
(ibaha), recommendation (nadb), or reprehension 
(karaha) and the like (Moad, 2007: 142). Islamic 
economics, on the other hand, discusses a much wider area 
of human behavior. It attempts to find means and tools that 
are suitable to analyze the economic problems and to find 
out their causes, consequences and solutions in practical 
life. Islamic economics would include both the normative 
and positive dimension of economic analysis and policy.
Second, methodologically speaking, usul fiqh is not really 
appropriate to be the methodology of Islamic economics. 
Usul al-fiqh as a methodology aims to “provide standard and 
criteria for the correct deduction of the rules of fiqh from 
the sources of Sharı‘ah (nusus, texts)” (Kamali, 1989: 2)3. 
The object of study of usul al-fiqh is the divine ordinance 
or proofs of Shariah that mainly refers to the Qur’an and 
Sunnah as well as from ‘aql (reason) in solving cases which 
are not explicitly indicated by the primary sources. While 
the experience, customs and the public interest are also well-
taken in juristic formulation, a rigorous approach in dealing 
with them is not well-elaborated in usul al-fiqh as it is done 
in the social sciences. The methodology of Islamic economic, 
on the other hand, will deal with those three sources of 
knowledge; doctrinal-revelation, intellectual-reasoning and 
factual-observation thoroughly. Its object of study would 
include a wide spectrum of revelational texts (nusus) and 
human actual behavior in making choices and decisions 
in solving economic problems. The methodology will not 
only attempt to investigate the ideals-framework of how 
economic problems should be solved, but also investigate 
the best means of how to solve them. This dimension of 
empirical study, is not really elaborated in usul fiqh.
With that limitation in scope of methodological inquiry, 
usul al-fiqh methodology is not a really an appropriate 
methodology in understanding the practical reality 
of economic phenomena and therefore is not readily 
substituted for the task of overcoming the inadequacy of 
Western contemporary methodologies and at the same 
time, they are inadequate for guiding modern economics 
activities. Al-Faruqi (1987: 19) sees this inadequacy as 
stemming from two diametrically opposed tendencies in 
usul al-fiqh methodology; (1) the tendency to restrict the 
field of ijtihad to legalistic reasoning, i.e. the subsuming 
of modern problems under legal categories and thereby 
reducing the mujtahid [which should also include 
economist] to a faqih (jurist), and reducing science to 
legal science, and (2) the tendency to eliminate all rational 
criteria and standards by adopting “a purely intuitive 
and esoteric methodology, or confine the methodology 
to textual studies of language, traditions and orthodox 
jurisprudence.”4
In developing Islamic economics, we certainly have to 
go beyond ‘juridicial texts’ and focus on the implications 
these rules and regulations positions have on the economic 
system as a whole. It is quite important at this juncture 
that we reaffirm an important point that does not seem to 
have received sufficient attention as can be seen from the 
practice of contemporary Islamic Banking and Finance.
Type II: Methodological pluralism in Islamic 
economics 
Currently, there is a growing interest in economics for a 
methodological pluralism by enlarging the methodological 
practices and criteria from the dominant positivist/
empiricist framework. Any exclusivist prescriptivism which 
seeks to establish one approach to methodology as supreme 
or to give it a privileged position is not accepted (Samuels, 
1998: 301).
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For Islamic economists, the call for methodological plurality 
comes from the fact that Islamic epistemology recognizes 
multiple sources of knowledge from where theories can be 
appraised. For Siddiqi (2001: 47) “the Islamic tradition in 
economics has always been free of formalism, focusing on 
meaning and purpose with a flexible methodology and must 
be open to contributions to realize in economic affairs, the 
Islamic vision of good life”. In addition, Islamic economics’ 
task is much greater and harder than conventional 
economics as it aims at furthering of human well-being, 
rather than just explaining, predicting or persuading 
(Chapra, 1996:35).
We are not sure whether this is a definite solution 
or whether it is a reflection that the methodological 
discussion has reached a deadlock. For Islamic economics, 
we are not really clear what is meant by methodological 
pluralism since its proponents did not elaborate further. 
Nevertheless, we might see this approach in Islamic 
economics coming from the common practice in the 
interaction and integration of conventional economics and 
Islamic heritage. Rather than just being dependent on one 
mainstream view, methodological sources are developed 
from both conventional and Islamic scientific tradition.
Before accepting the thesis of methodological pluralism, 
some clarifications need to be answered. Does Islamic 
epistemology really recognize methodological pluralism or 
just acknowledge the possibility of plural methodologies? 
Let’s say, even if we answer yes, Islamic epistemology 
accepts methodological pluralism, the next question would 
be: does the fundamental epistemological difference 
between the Islamic conception of methodology of 
economics and that of modern economics still exist, or 
has it all but disappeared? Those are among the questions 
that need to be clarified before we accept methodological 
pluralism as an Islamic economic methodology.
With need to acknowledge as Bakar (1984:17) did that 
Islamic methodology is based on epistemology that is 
fundamentally different from the dominant epistemology 
of economics. The conventional methodology is developed 
in a secular worldview that excludes religion in the 
scientific realm. In Islamic methodology, not only religion 
is linked to scientific endeavor, but it is its epistemological 
basis and foundation. The religious sources’ exclusion 
and inclusion in the epistemological foundation implies 
the differences methodological development. In the 
discussion of methodological pluralism in economics, there 
is no clear position whether religious sources’ inclusion 
in the scientific methodology could be accepted as part 
of pluralism in methodology. The pluralism seems still 
sought within human epistemological realm with no divine 
intervention.5
In addition, in methodological pluralism there will be 
no ultimate (if not dominant) truth generated by any 
methodology. What we have is a relative truth. This is 
because methodological pluralism, according to Samuels 
(1998:301) “does not deny the usefulness of the several 
positions constituting these antinomies, but maintains 
that no position can be summarily disregarded and that 
insight can be achieved on the basis of the matrix formed 
by knowledge generated potentially using each position 
in all antinomies, whatever individual preferences may 
be.” Therefore, methodological pluralism in developing 
theories tends to accept any goals and any methodologies 
in theory appraisal. Logic may yield valid inferences or 
conclusions given the premises and system of reasoning, 
but a valid inference is not necessarily true. Neither can 
empirical testing yield a singular and conclusive truth. 
This, perhaps, might be applied also to knowledge derived 
from revelation. That knowledge cannot claim the only 
truth. All are relative truths depending on their respective 
perspective of truth, and no such single truth could be 
claimed.
While one may agree that there should be no single way 
of “defining the truth,” especially if we are talking of a 
global/plural setting, the indifference of truth could lead 
to indifference in solutions, which according to Bakar 
(1984:17) is “a kind of theoretical anarchism.” While the 
desired output of methodological pluralism is to have a 
better understanding of economic realities benefitting 
from various methodologies, the practice that leaves an 
“open” answer without a clear decision on what goals to 
be pursued or what theory is correct might create further 
theoretical confusion and later on practical uncertainties.
As far as Islamic methodology is concerned, there are some 
flaws and limitations of those methods, which somehow 
cannot be accepted in Islamic methodology. The problems 
such as (1) strict followers of scientism, empiricism 
and materialism hold that there is nothing real beyond 
matter and observed phenomena; (2) they believe that 
only repeated observed (external) phenomena are true, 
irrespective of morally or ethically right or wrong, good 
or bad; (3) this is because science cannot provide answers 
(or in a lesser degree it is indifferent) to moral and ethical 
problems that are external to the scientific realm; and (4) 
science is not completely objective, neutral and value-
free as most people assume it to be (Ahmad and Ahmad, 
2004:43–46).
Methodological pluralism might recognize those 
limitations, but no conclusive position should be taken 
as that might reflect methodological absolutism. They 
are true in their respective criteria, and they are false in 
their respective criteria, and hence should be accepted as 
part of methodological pluralism. For us, the argument of 
methodological pluralism is not really plausible.
Instead, we would like to argue that while Islamic 
methodology acknowledges and promotes multiplicity 
(plurality) of methods in scientific enquiry, it does not really 
promote methodological pluralism. Instead, it promotes 
methodological unification (tawhidic methodology).
Islamic epistemology gives equality to all methods of 
inquiry, and tawhid sets the framework of ethics and values 
as well as direction and goals that will ensure a multiplicity 
of methods that complement each other and would 
integrate into totality. Those various methods are used to 
arrive at total understanding and coherent interpretation 
of reality rather than seeing them as conflicting theories 
with rival claims to truth as they are bounded in a unified 
goal and direction of achieving the ultimate truth (al-
haqq), which is the unification of multiple truth; objective 
truth, logical truth, and the truth of revelation (Bakar, 
1984:18).6
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Type III: Islamization of Economics (IOE) 
methodology
The third approach is the methodology in the Islamization 
of economics project when the scholars attempt to 
interact and integrate the mainstream economics with 
Islamic principles/heritage in economics and vice versa. 
The program is part of a bigger project of Islamization 
of knowledge that attempts to recast the whole legacy of a 
body of knowledge from an Islamic perspective by adopting 
the best that conventional offers, then to imbue these with 
Islamic principles and to inform further developments with 
Islamic values (Bennet, 2005: 110).
The development of Islamic economics as a discipline will 
not start from the scratch; instead it will utilize the relative 
more advance development in economics (theories and 
methodologies) and attempt to make them compatible 
with Islamic frameworks/principles.7 Besides, there might 
be some common ground where (some) conventional 
theories might be accepted as long as they are not in 
conflict with the logical structure of the Islamic worldview 
(Chapra, 1996), they are not against the explicit or implicit 
injunctions of Islam (Mannan, 1984:17), or they do not 
contradict with the principles of Islamic teachings, and 
should be evaluated within an Islamic framework and 
using Islamic criteria (Haneef, 1997).
The Islamic economists express this approach in various 
ways. Anwar (1990) proposes to contrast the components 
of conventional economic theories with components of 
an Islamic corpus and nucleus in order to classify the 
components of conventional economic theories into 
Islamic and neutral elements and to then accept the Islamic 
economic theories while rejecting the un-Islamic theories. 
Kahf (2003) proposes takhliya, (identification and isolation 
of the biased postulates of conventional economics) and 
tahliya (incorporation in economics of positive postulates 
derived from Shariah) in order to revise the conventional 
economic theories. Zarqa (2003) on the other hand argues 
that if we replace those values on which the science of 
economics should be based by Islamic values, and if we add 
to the secular statements, then Islamic economic theories 
can be produced. Hasan (1998) states that conventional 
economics can be sifted, pruned, and modified, where 
possible, to conform to the Shariah tenets. In general, the 
interaction and integration, will generally take place in two 
areas of the discipline; (1) the substantive dimension of the 
discipline, which includes economic concepts, principles 
and theories in modern economics and economic teachings 
or views on economic matters in the Islamic heritage, and 
(2) the formal (technical) dimension of the discipline, which 
includes methodology of modern economics and ‘usu¯l’ 
studies in the Islamic heritage (Haneef and Furqani, 2007).
While we are not denying the importance of blending the 
conventional economics with the legacy of Islamic heritage, 
the understanding of the concept as well as the  actual 
process of Islamization of economics (IOE) as we see in the 
literature is questionable.
Conceptually, the IOE seems to be understood in a very 
shallow way, keeping intact the bulk of conventional 
economics’ assumptions and underlying values. Then 
either a mere adding of an Islamic prefix on each concept/
theorie is done to reflect the internalization of Islamic 
values or, sometimes, minor modifications are made. Those 
who are not happy with this lament the uncritical stance of 
Islamic economists with many fundamental assumptions 
in conventional theory. They choose the path of what Maki 
(1994:237) terms as “family quarrels” in evaluating the 
assumptions of conventional economic theory by refusing 
to move to another version of a theory or framework, 
instead of adopting an antagonistic approach that sees 
mutually incompatible frameworks of analysis, theories and 
approaches, traditions and schools of thought and hence 
attempt to provide alternative (i.e., new better concepts).
Methodologically speaking, we see there is a “task division” 
(if not to say a ‘methodological dualism’) in the writings 
of Islamic economics, banking and finance, whereby in 
the conceptual (normative) part, Islamic economists 
attempt to find Islamic justification based on Qur’anic 
verses (or fiqh judgments) over certain theories, while in 
the empirical part, Islamic economists simply utilize and 
apply the common analytical tools into an Islamic/Muslim 
cases, retaining the positivist criteria and assuming no 
contradiction to Islamic heritage.8 Such practice seems to 
infer that IOE is approached ‘dichotomous-ly’, instead of 
‘integrative-ly’ between the conceptual (theoretical) and 
its empirical dimensions.
In addition, the tool of analysis is also largely viewed as 
purely technical procedures, lacking of any normative 
elements, and hence completely objective (value-neutral) 
and could then be adopted as it is in Islamic economics. 
Islamic economists simply utilize what is the latest 
technique available in the market and to some extent they 
heavily depend on those tools and the criteria, principles 
and paradigm that make up them. Islamic economists fail 
to see that methodologies culminated in the logical positive 
approach embodied in Western behavioralism, and their 
conditions for using methods cannot be described as purely 
technical and empty of any epistemological assumptions 
(Sardar, 1988: 162).9
That simplistic approach in the Islamization of economics 
program puts Islamic economics within the fold of Western 
modernist discourse in terms of theoretical concerns and 
methodology, and has therefore been unable to develop 
itself as a new and better alternative.10 At most, the current 
development of Islamic economics is working within the 
boundaries of neoclassical theory, with some adjustments 
to incorporate teachings/norms/values that reflected 
certain requirements of Islam (Haneef: 1997).11
As a result, Islamic economics, instead of becoming a distinct 
discipline that could analyze economics using its own distinct 
philosophy, concepts, framework and methods of analysis 
as intended by the project of Islamization of knowledge, has 
become almost a sub-discipline of conventional neoclassical 
economics, without Islamic justification. Instead of contesting 
the existing paradigm, it seeks to justify scientific practices 
and hence legitimizes what already took place in Islam’s name 
(case study). The current methodology practice in Islamic 
economics seems to conform to Lawson’s (2003:28–9) first 
category of methodological discussion of economics, namely 
“those who accept the scientificity of economics as practiced 
and seek (for the time being at least) mostly to justify and/
or clarify the way in which economics is already done, to 
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demonstrate the nature and rationality of what goes on,” 
instead of “seek to impose onto economics conceptions of 
proper science or method determined outside the discipline.” 
Islamic economists largely forgo the possibility of a significant 
philosophical input from Islamic perspective.12
Islamization of economics: The way forward
While we believe that Islamic economics could benefit from 
modern economics in developing its body of knowledge, 
interaction and integration should be genuine and 
creative at the same time. While the need to interact with 
the mainstream economics is undeniable for disciplined 
progress, the approaches in this interaction, the criteria 
in theory appraisal and justifications as well as the Islamic 
framework/foundation as benchmark in that interaction 
need to be specified clearly. The Islamization of economics 
is actually an intellectual attempt to recast the whole legacy 
of economics from an Islamic perspective.
This seems to be missing as Islamic economists are 
more interested in detailing steps and procedures in 
the Islamization of economics that are more “methods” 
than “methodology” of Islamic economics that seeks to 
establish the criteria and principles in theory, appraisal and 
evaluation.
Little attempt has been made to address the methodology 
of conventional economics and to discuss and propose 
economic methodology from an Islamic perspective with 
its underlying conceptualization of reality (the Islamic 
worldview) in relation to the preferred mode of reasoning 
as well as the standards and criteria used to appraise and 
evaluate theories. This meaning and understanding of 
methodology is not fully reflected in the works of the Islamic 
economics scholars although it is important to justify the 
“Islamicity” of a theory in the process of interaction and 
assimilation of conventional concepts/theories into an 
Islamic framework.
In addition, the methodological principles or criteria that 
are widely discussed in conventional economics, such as 
falsification, verification, rhetoric, etc., have not received 
adequate responses from Islamic economists writing on the 
subject. Not only that, the discussion of what is the purpose 
of Islamic economic methodology (is it for understanding, 
description, explanation, prediction, persuasion or something 
else?) has also not been given sufficient attention by Islamic 
economists yet. What adds to the challenge faced is that those 
principles or criteria (that are discussed in methodology of 
economics) may have been designed in accordance with a 
Western logic and framework in mind, and in itself needs to 
be critically evaluated from Islamic perspectives as they may 
be unable to cope with contemporary complex realities, nor 
with the richness and multidimensional nature of Islamic 
concepts (Sardar, 1988: 212).
We believe that if this critical evaluation is not done, it 
will leave the young Islamic economists who are involved 
in the process of developing Islamic economics unaware 
of what is “acceptable” or “unacceptable” and why this is 
so. If the Islamic methodological criteria of establishing 
good theory over bad theory is not developed, one can only 
see palliative works or worse still, patchwork efforts being 
undertaken since Islamic economists would unwittingly 
use ‘Western criteria’ for building and evaluating economic 
theories. Hence, this would distort the potential of 
Islamic economics as a distinct discipline as it would 
give a confusing picture and the analysis would fail to 
comprehend all the dimensions and the full dynamics of 
an Islamic system (Arif, 1987: 64).
A plea for genuine/holistic IOE
Islamization of economics (the interaction and integration 
of two sources) is acceptable and needed, but the process 
should be creative and genuine at the same time. That 
is  the intellectual effort that emerges should to produce 
a distinct (not simply a mixture) discipline of Islamic 
economics. In fact, al-Faruqi (1987: 15), the proponent 
of IOK, has warned that “the task of integration is not an 
eclectic mixing of classical Islamic and modern Western 
knowledge, but rather a systematic reorientation and 
restructuring of the entire field of human knowledge 
in accordance with a new set of criteria and categories, 
derived from, and based on, the Islamic worldview.” The 
IOK work plan (1995:85) also outlines “it is necessary to 
build and restructure correct principles for genuine Islamic 
intellection and to create the conditions conducive to its 
existence and growth by erecting the lofty edifice of Islamic 
knowledge.” With this genuine spirit, the process involving 
agglomeration, augmentation, refinement, harmonization, 
restructuring, and finally the crystallization of the foreign 
element into an Islamic framework is not simply a “creative 
borrowing and absorption” but also a “creative production 
and construction” of “new knowledge.”
The objective is to arrive at Islamic “authentic” knowledge 
in economics whereby we are not blindly imitating and 
adopting the past intellectual legacy and not rejecting 
the mainstream economics for the sake of rejection. In 
this endeavor, Islamic economists should first develop 
an “Islamic economic conceptual scheme” based on the 
Islamic worldview and general Islamic scientific conceptual 
scheme prior to interaction and integration taking place. 
In that “Islamic economic conceptual scheme” we equip 
the discipline with a strong foundation of discipline that 
include values, principles, benchmarks, key-concepts, key-
terminologies, methodological criteria, justifications and 
processes.
In other words, the interaction with modern economics 
should be preceded by a clear explication of the rule of 
interaction, criteria for the acceptance and rejection of 
conventional theory, and most importantly the Islamic 
benchmark as derived from Islamic worldview as the 
reference point and scientific conceptual scheme from 
where we can decide to accept or to reject a conventional 
theory. This is important so that the “creative synthesis” 
is not understood as a creativity to “mix and match,” 
“copy and paste” or “conceptual assemble of addition 
and subtraction dictum” of the conventional and Islamic 
concept/theory, but it really comes from our intellectual 
effort contemplating the “reality’ with our ‘intellectual 
Islamic legacy.”
The foundation should be given attention before specifying 
the steps of interaction and integration of two disciplines. 
This is what is missing in the current IOE, which according 
to Haneef (2009:51) also “suffered from the same disease as 
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the IOK itself, i.e., focus on the end-products at the expense 
of a thorough elaboration, discussion and eventually, 
application of a proper methodology/ies to economics.”
On the side of the Islamizer, likewise, we believe that he/
she has to equip him/herself with a clear understanding 
and consciousness of the Islamic worldview (i.e., Islamic 
vision of Reality and Truth, which is a metaphysical survey 
of the visible and invisible worlds and life as a whole). 
That worldview (ontological) consciousness will then 
remove “ambiguity” and clarify what needs to be isolated, 
amended, reinterpreted, and what needs to be “infused,” 
what are acceptable or not and what alternatives are 
acceptable or not and why this is so. With this “ontological” 
foundation an original and integral Islamic approach to 
Islamize economics, which reflect the Islamic worldview, 
essence and ethos, could be produced and used to construct 
an Islamic economics.
The Islamizer, who is going to interact with modern 
economics, should also at the same time have an awareness 
that the modern conceptions of economics is the product 
of a historical process of evolution that reflects the Western 
laboratory from where it emerged (Yousif. 2001:94). 
Contemporary economic science is the product of the “post-
enlightenment materialistic worldview and has evolved 
to solve problems arising from this intellectual tradition” 
(Butt, 1989: 96–97). Economics, as a body of knowledge 
that has been crystallized into a discipline, is not value-free. 
It necessarily reflects the interpretation and framework of 
the civilization in which it is developed.
Therefore, in the Islamization of economics, al-Faruqi 
(1987) warns to borrow only those aspects, which are 
compatible with the Islamic doctrine of unity (tawhid) 
and truth (haqq), as defined and upheld by the Shariah. 
He argues that it is tawhid that gives Islamic civilization 
its identity and binds all its constituents together, making 
them into an integral, organic body that we call civilization. 
Therefore, borrowing (i.e., interaction and integration) 
from the mainstream economics must be exercised with 
caution. With this consciousness, “borrowing” ideas from 
other civilizations, as Yousif (2001:96) rightly notes “is 
not only permissible, but can be a powerful vehicle of 
stimulating new thought.”
In this process, evaluation, interaction and synthesis will 
normally take place in Islamic economics discourse but 
always with reference to our benchmarks with Islam (and its 
worldview) as the reference point. In this perspective, IOE 
is interpreted as an epistemological and methodological 
concern, dealing with how Islamically creative minds can 
evaluate modern knowledge using Islamic benchmarks, 
and reformulate and reconstruct the contemporary 
economics in Islamic framework.
The process of theory appraisal in Islamic economics is 
to be preceded by developing “primary concepts and its 
philosophical foundations” or “economic vision” in Islam 
(Naqvi:1981, Arif:1987, Haneef:1997). That foundation/
vision will be a “conceptual framework of Islamic 
economics” that function as benchmarks, parameters, 
schemes and guidelines for the production of Islamic 
economic postulates, hypothesis, precepts, assumptions 
and theories.
The methodological discussion in Islamic economics to 
appraise theories and provide justification of the reliability 
of that theory, in our opinion, should be directed to achieve 
a theory that could link the Islamic normative doctrine/
values and practical reality, able to explain economic 
phenomena and human actions and human behaviors 
in making choices/decisions with a comprehensive and 
integrated perspective to contribute to goal realization. 
To produce that kind of theory, Islamic economics needs 
a methodology that would go beyond interaction and 
integration of conventional economics and Islamic heritage, 
to the methodology that would genuinely attempt to derive 
knowledge from the sources of knowledge recognized in 
Islamic epistemology, namely divine revelation, intellectual 
reasoning and fact observation, as well as following the 
scientific criteria as delineated in Islamic epistemological 
tradition.
3. Conclusion
In general, the practice of methodological discussion of 
Islamic economics are generally could be classified into 
three types: (1) the usul al-fiqh methodology applied in 
economics, (2) the methodological plurality to various 
methodologies developed in both western and Islamic 
tradition, and (3) the mainstream positive economic 
methodology applied in Islamic cases.
We have reviewed the conceptual foundation of each 
methodology and the practical application of those 
methodologies in theory appraisal and in developing 
Islamic economics in general. Each methodology poses 
certain methodological shortcomings that should be 
addressed thoroughly by its proponents, if not the scientific 
community who commit to develop Islamic economics. 
Effort should be put to develop a methodology of Islamic 
economics that has a solid structure and foundation 
where the science of Islamic economics will flourish. 
That methodology would not only recognize and able 
to derive knowledge/theories from Islamic legitimate 
sources of knowledge (revelation, intellectual reasoning 
and facts/experience), but would also reflect the Islamic 
epistemological principles and purposes in theory of 
knowledge.
That epistemological and methodological renewal 
should not be treated as evaluating modern economics 
from an Islamic perspective or restructuring of its 
theoretical and practical frameworks, but it should 
go beyond that and lay the essential foundation of an 
Islamic economics discipline which include the structure, 
content and scientific strategy of Islamic economic 
theory. Methodology of Islamic economics should be able 
to produce a distinct knowledge of economics based on 
Islamic epistemological sources.
Notes
1. In a more lengthy statement Blaug (1992:264) 
explains the role of methodology in economics as 
follows:
 What methodology can do is to provide criteria 
for the acceptance and rejection of research 
programs, setting standards that will help us to 
discriminate between wheat and chaff. These 
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standards, we have seen, are hierarchical, 
relative, dynamic, and by no means unambiguous 
in terms of the practical advice they offer to 
working economists.
2. Yalcintas (1987: 28) earlier on argues that 
Islamic economics is a modern version of fiqh al-
mu’amalah. He justifies, if fiqh mu’amalat sets the 
legal framework of economic transactions, Islamic 
economics studies the rationale and motives of the 
same. Fiqh is an inexhaustible source of insight 
and indispensible for economic analysis if it was to 
carry the description ‘Islamic’ (in order to put them 
in the juristic scoop in accordance with Shari’ah). 
This he says, is simply because in Islamic economics 
we do not only deal with the how, but we also deal 
with the ought.
3. This is quite different from the early understanding 
of Shariah and fiqh as having a much wider (and 
correct) connotation of ‘overall guidance’ and 
‘understanding of the Shariah and of the din’. How 
and why these fundamental concepts were unfairly 
‘narrowed’ in their meaning requires further study.
4. Another critics by Abu Sulayman (1985: 268–
9) is that usul al-fiqh, as a discipline, has been 
developed with an emphasis on technicalities in 
studying texts at the expense of goals and purposes 
of Shariah (maqasid al-Shariah) that would inject 
methodological flexibility and dynamism. As a 
result, usul fiqh has become a theoretical discipline 
studied as a part of the legal heritage rather than 
a tool to regulate and encourage ijtihad (Kamali, 
1989: iii).
5. One of the opinions is from Nienhaus (1989:95) 
who believes that there is a possibility of 
acceptance of Islamic economics in mainstream 
economics if methodological pluralism is accepted 
because “with this methodological stand, one 
should be ready to consider without prejudice 
‘unconventional’ approaches which promise 
to make some interesting contributions for the 
solution of a problem at hand.”
6. In this regard, an explanation provides by al-Attas 
(1981: 8) in how tawhid provides a unified and 
coherent vision of that multiplicity of realities and 
methodologies is very enlightening:
 Indeed, reason and experience are in Islam 
valid channels by which knowledge is attained 
- knowledge, that is, at the rational and 
empirical level of ordinary experience…at the 
spiritual levels, reason, and experience in a 
transcendental order… the rational has merged 
with the intellectual, the empirical with what 
pertains to authentic spiritual experiences such 
as ‘inner witnessing’ (shuhud), ‘tasting’ (dhawq), 
‘presence’ (hudur), and other states of trans-
empirical awareness. These are the levels in which 
knowledge means unification
7. Some expressions from the early prominent 
scholars who engaged in the Islamization of 
economics are as follows. Siddiqi (1981: 80) argues 
that “to abandon teaching of modern economic 
theories and their applications is neither possible 
and nor desirable. What is needed is a judicious 
selection of the more enduring elements in the 
corpus of modern economics and the handling 
of them in a critical manner.” Naqvi (1981) also 
argues that Islamic economics should integrate 
what relevant knowledge is already available and 
then transmute it into a ‘new frame of thought’ 
where Islamic economics can selectively assimilate 
elements in modern economics that are not 
contradictory to Islamic economic axioms. Mannan 
(1983: 42) likewise argues “that in every system 
of thought, there are some assumptions and ideas 
in common with other systems of thought. It is 
through emphasis or de-emphasis or rejection, that 
an identity is established…in this respect, adopting 
or adapting any existing institution and practices of 
modern economics in an Islamic economics is not 
wrong for its development.”
8. In Zarqa’s (1987: 55) observation “so far, no clear 
research methodology in Islamic economics has 
been adopted. Research in the fiqh component of 
Islamic economics follows a methodology that 
derives from the usul fiqh and from the purport 
of Shari’ah. Research in the economic-analysis 
component, on the other hand, has been developed 
in the West and seeks to draw upon an inductive 
method.” 
9. Tibi (2001: 184) in a strong statement criticizes the 
misleading belief that tools of analysis are value- 
neutral. He says “it cannot be understood if Muslims 
feel able to borrow and use the content of Western 
science, its technological tools, while rejecting 
its context. It is wrong to separate technical tools 
from the social context and attitudes that produced 
them or from a particular worldview that binds it” 
(quoted from Bennet, 2005:125).
10. Yousif (2001:95) contends that such practice 
is permissive, rather than creative as it “did 
not stimulate further thought, spontaneity and 
creativity as expected, but lead to syncretism, 
confusion and deviation in social ideas and 
behavior instead.”
11. Many critics could be found in the literature. Haneef 
(2005:41) for example says such approach is 
“modeled along neoclassical lines, working almost 
within the boundaries of neoclassical theory, with 
some adjustments to incorporate teachings/norms/
values that reflected certain requirements of Islam” 
and Alatas (2006) criticizes Islamic economics 
as an empirical theory with “neo-classical guise” 
that “merely substituted Islamic terms for neo-
classical ones, retaining the latter’s assumptions, 
procedures and modes of analysis. As such, it has 
failed to engage in the analysis and critique of a 
highly unequal world economic order in which the 
gaps are ever widening.”
12. This situation also similar to Blaug’s observation 
(1992: xxvii) whereby: “too many writers on 
economic methodology have seen their role as 
simply rationalizing the traditional modes of 
argument of economists, and perhaps this is why 
the average modern economist has little use for 
methodological inquiries. To be perfectly frank, 
economic methodology has little place in the 
training of modern economists” (and likewise 
Islamic economists).
Furqani and Haneef
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Abstract - The last few decades have seen a phenomenal growth of the emerging discipline of 
Islamic Economics and Finance. In this paper I trace the origins and birth of this nascent science, 
examining the various factors that gave impetus to its emergence and development. I contrast 
the different characterisations of the discipline as it has developed within the broader socio-
political context and the reasons thereof. Despite the concerted efforts of the proponents of Islamic 
economics to shape for their discipline a distinctive paradigm they have had little success in doing 
so beyond arguing that it is underpinned by a strong moral ethic. By and large, its epistemological 
roots have remained firmly within the framework of Rationalism and methodological individualism 
and, consequently, it has not been able to shed itself of its neoclassical moorings, the very paradigm 
it originally set out to replace. I illustrate several of the contradictions apparent in the discipline 
as hitherto enunciated, and I critically analyse the reasons for some of these shortcomings. Finally, 
I conclude by arguing that if Islamic economics is to fulfil its raison d’être, its proponents must 
resolve its theoretical and practical difficulties by clearly expounding on its weltanschauung and 
develop its content and form appropriate to this worldview.
Keywords: Islamic economic thought, economic history
1. Introduction – The birth of the discipline
Muslim communities residing in the Middle East, North 
Africa and large parts of Asia had for several centuries 
attempted to pattern their lives according to the principles, 
values and norms of Islamic civilisation. Consequently, 
a number of Muslim scholars had documented several 
monumental works dating as far back as the 8th century 
(e.g. Abu Yusuf (d. 798)1, Ibn Hazm (d. 1064)2, al-Ghazali 
(d. 1111)3, Ibn Taymiyya (d.1328)4, Ibn Khaldun (d. 
1406)5, etc))6 regarding the theory and practice of 
economics in Muslim societies. Almost all of these 
scholars, however, were not economic specialists as we 
understand the profession today, and accordingly, their 
works had analysed and examined economic issues from 
a multidisciplinary socio-political perspective. Until the 
beginning of the twentieth century much of this discourse 
incorporated various moral, social, and political factors, 
and there was not any particular emphasis on the economic 
variables that are of interest in the contemporary world. 
Consequently then, the field was never conceived as an 
isolated phenomenon and Islamic Economics remained 
primarily an integral part of the unified social and moral 
philosophy of Islam until the Second World War.
It has only been from the middle of the last century that 
scholars have begun to consider and analyse the emerging 
discipline of Islamic Economics with greater scrutiny. 
There were two interrelated developments that played a 
significant contributory role in the characterisation of the 
subject as a dedicated science: one socio-political and the 
other, epistemological.
With the colonial invasions of Muslim lands, many of the 
institutions7 that formed an integral part of Muslim society 
were obliterated and supplanted with foreign ones that 
were alien and inimical to the culture of Islam. Subsequent 
to the political independence8 of most Muslim countries 
after the War, social reformers realised the urgent need 
to revive and restore these Islamic institutions.9 Their 
aspirations received a further boost from the general 
resurgence and activism that swept across the Muslim 
world, especially during the 1970s. There were strong calls 
by the intelligentsia of these countries for their economies 
to be restructured in the light of Islamic teachings (Behdad, 
1994; Hefner, 2006). Given the competing forces for 
change that inevitably characterises any post-liberation 
period, it became imperative for Islamic scholars to clearly 
outline their vision of the kind of economic order that they 
hoped to establish.
On the intellectual front, Muslim social scientists were too 
keenly aware of the impact that secularism and its natural 
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corollary – the compartmentalisation of knowledge – has 
had on the social sciences in the Western world. They were 
convinced that any such dichotomy between the secular and 
sacred sciences in the Islamic scheme is untenable. Over the 
last four decades there has accordingly been a concerted 
effort to unify the body of all knowledge, a process which 
has become known in Islamic academic circles as the 
“Islamisation of Knowledge/Science.” Islamising economics 
was thus an extension of this intellectual movement and is 
in fact considered to be one of its most important pillars 
(Haneef, 2007, Hefner, 2006). In a sense, then, it might 
also be seen as an important test case of this ambitious 
project. Chiefly among the proponents of this movement 
are the likes of Nasr (1968), al-Attas (1978, 1995), 
al-Faruqi (1982) and Choudhury (1990, 1995, 2006).
Against this background, key figures in the Islamic revivalist 
movement of the last century such as Sayyid Qutb of Egypt, 
Sayyid Mawdudi of Pakistan and Baqir al-Sadr in Iraq set 
the tone and popularised the idea through their writings10 
that Islam prescribes its own distinctive economic ideology. 
The impetus was thenceforth provided for scholars from 
across a broad spectrum of economists (both Western and 
Muslim), socio-political activists, Orientalists and (Islamic) 
legal experts to examine and analyse this somewhat newly 
delineated field of study. Since then, thousands of books, 
journal articles and pamphlets in many languages have 
been published in an attempt to establish the separate 
identity of the subject.
In addition, numerous Islamic economics conferences in 
various parts of the world have been hosted and a number 
of institutions such as the International Institute of Islamic 
Economics (Pakistan), the Centre of Research in Islamic 
Economics (Saudi Arabia), the International Institute of 
Islamic Thought (USA), and more recently, the Markfield 
Institute of Higher Education (UK) have been established 
to support the growth and advancement of this field. The 
stated commitment by the Islamic Development Bank 
based in Saudi Arabia to fund projects based on Islamic 
(finance) principles also played a pivotal role in giving life 
to some of the ideas espoused by Islamic economists. As a 
further expression of this drive, the Islamic Finance (and 
banking) industry has expanded at a rapid rate, extending 
its range of “Shariah-compliant” services across the globe.11 
It is from all of these developments that the nascent field of 
Islamic Economics as a dedicated social science has begun 
to grow and attract a great deal of attention in both Muslim 
and non-Muslim12 countries.
But has this concerted effort on so many fronts produced 
the kind of enterprise that its proponents had envisioned? 
Of more recent particularly, the realisation has dawned 
among the various participants in this project that its 
objectives have hardly been achieved, both with respect 
to its intellectual development and its realisation in 
practice. The Islamic economists have had little success in 
articulating a sound and coherent theoretical paradigm 
for the discipline, let alone in demonstrating how it would 
find practical expression in the real economy. This paper 
traces out the various strands of the growth in the idea 
of an economics that is Islamic and the contradictions 
arising therefrom, and it then analyses the reasons for this 
apparent lack of coherence in the way in which the science 
has been cultivated.
2. State of the art
Islamic economics as a socio-political ideal
It is important to note at the outset that Islamic economics 
as a specialised field of study emerged at a time when 
conventional economics was the dominant paradigm in 
economic thinking in most parts of the world. As a new science 
in the making, and one that explicitly aimed at establishing 
a superior or at least a viable alternative vis-à-vis the subject 
matter, value-orientation, methodology, objectives and 
outcomes to that espoused by the Western world, much of its 
discourse has been located within the jargon and dialectic of 
the mainstream neo-classical paradigm. Partly as a result, 
there have been several pathways along which much of 
the literature on the character of Islamic economics has 
manifested itself. The specific orientation of the contributors 
to the field would thus also have been reflective of, and 
influenced by, their fields of specialisation, their expertise 
in its related sciences, their personal biases and ideological 
predispositions and quite decisively, the cultural and 
political milieu in which they lived. This phenomenon of the 
influence of the ideological element is, however, not unique 
to Islamic economics. Schumpeter (1949) demonstrates 
quite cogently why and how it conditions scientific thought 
even in the cases of logic, mathematics and physics and more 
so in the social sciences. Myrdal (1958) underscores even 
more emphatically the inevitability of value impregnation in 
scientific analysis.
At the politico-ideological level, a sizeable amount of effort, 
at the initial stages at least, has been dedicated to comparing 
the principles and practices of Islam vis-à-vis capitalism, 
communism and/or any political economy that may be drawn 
up as a result of the marriage of the two. In other words, 
Islamic economics is presented as a Third-Worldist ideology 
which is defined in terms of Capitalism and Communism, 
and also as that which the two Western ideologies are not 
(Nasr, 1989). The central thrust in most of these writings 
(Khan, 1951; al-Sadr, 1961; Ahmad, 1970; Siddiqi, 1975; 
al-Qadhafi, 1975; al-Faisal, 1986; Taleghani, 1982) was 
firstly, to denounce what they consider to be the inherent 
weaknesses of other economic orders and then to demonstrate 
why Islam is diametrically opposed to them. For example, it 
is asserted that both capitalism and communism are almost 
entirely hedonistic and materialistic in their outlook whereas 
Islam has a transcendental orientation. Similarly, capitalism, 
despite guaranteeing constitutional liberty for individuals, is 
condemned for its ruthlessness and exploitation (through, 
e.g., the institution of interest) whilst communism, regardless 
of its pietistical claims to a just and equal society, is singled 
out for violating man’s basic freedoms.
Inevitably then, many of these writers, by concerning 
themselves primarily with refuting secular Western 
ideologies, described Islamic economics in terms of what 
it is not, rather than developing any positive content for 
it (Phillip, 1990). Notwithstanding this criticism, Islamic 
economists, then and even now, viewed this approach 
as critically important; given that the global political 
landscape of the post-colonial period was characterised by 
the competing economic paradigms of Capitalism in the 
west and Communism in the east, the Muslim world largely 
saw itself sandwiched both physically and ideologically 
between the two. Consequently, these works played a 
crucial role in two respects. It “weaned away the Muslim 
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masses from the lure of socialism and capitalism” and at the 
same time, it “restored confidence in their elite that their 
economic problems could be solved within the framework 
of Islamic teachings” (Siddiqi, 2004:10).
The second pathway along which Islamic economics has 
evolved, though in some respects paradoxical to the works 
mentioned above, is an attempt by some scholars to adopt 
an apparently more conciliatory approach to some of the 
values and practices of capitalism and/or socialism. On the 
one hand, some of these writers (Rodinson, 1966; Labib, 
1969; Hosseini, 1988; al-Lababidi, 1980; Abdul-Rauf, 
1984) assert that because Islam promotes (free) trade, 
guarantees the right to private enterprise/ownership, 
allows the reaping of profit in business transactions, 
etc., it shares a strong affinity with capitalism. Contra 
indicatively, there are others (Lewis, 1954; Abd-al-Hakim, 
1953, Siba’i, 1960; Shariati, 1980) who argue, according 
to their understanding, that Islam justly represents the 
ideals of socialism in both theory and practice. This is so 
because, they claim, Islam aims towards the creation of an 
egalitarian and classless society, eschews the accumulation 
of wealth and instils in its adherents a strong sense of 
compassion, mercy and care for others.
The preceding analysis is not to suggest in anyway that these 
socio-economists were willing to unequivocally endorse the 
form of laissez-faire, unbridled 19 century capitalism, or 
conversely, the extreme variants of Marxism. In the case of 
the latter group for example, apart from Lewis (1954) who 
portrayed a close nexus between Islam and communism, all 
the others are avowedly anticommunists/anti-Marxists.13 
Consequently, it is not unusual for these scholars who have 
a predilection for the principles/ideals of either of these 
systems to designate their variation of it as either Islamic 
Capitalism or Islamic Socialism, respectively, to distinguish 
it from its non-Islamic varieties.14
Islamic economics as a ‘science’
The third track along which Islamic economics has 
developed is the endeavour undertaken by its proponents 
to establish and anchor the discipline as a modern science 
by attempting to use primarily the methodology and tools 
of analysis employed in conventional economics. This 
literature is far more extensive and analytically rigorous 
than the preceding two categories. Given this orientation, 
it is not surprising that many of these writings have largely 
been produced by western trained (Muslim) economists or 
their counterparts who have received a similar education 
in their home country institutions, and to a lesser extent, 
Islamic jurists/legal experts (e.g., Usmani, 2000). These 
works can be classified more generally into those that 
deal with (Islamic) economics as a science and those that 
fall under the rubric of Islamic finance/banking, with 
the preponderance of literature being in the latter class. 
Some of the more renowned contributors in this group 
are the likes of Mannan (1970), Naqvi (1977, 1981), 
Siddiqi (1970, 2004, 2008), Chapra (1979, 1992, 1996, 
2000; 2002), Bani-Sadr (1982), Ahmad (1978, 1980) and 
Choudhury (1986, 1993, 1995, 2006, 2008).
The key focus of most of this discourse is to demonstrate 
that a homo Islamicus, as part of an Islamic economy would 
behave differently to that of his (neoclassical) counterpart, 
homo economicus. A society populated with homo Islamicus 
participants would act both individually and collectively 
within the framework of certain ethico-politico-legal norms, 
e.g., justice, benevolence, self-sacrifice, etc. Such behaviour, 
it is argued, would lead to economic outcomes that are 
just, equitable and optimal.15 So in contrast to neoclassical 
economics which is rooted in positivistic theory, the emphasis 
in most works in Islamic economics is on the normative: 
a thesis on the expected or preferred behaviour of human 
beings in their individual and/or collective capacities.
These professionally trained (Islamic) economists 
generally do not deny the postulates of scarcity, self 
interest, optimisation or even rationality. Rather, they 
argue that because Islam has a transcendental orientation, 
homo Islamicus is also motivated and/or can be constrained 
by other factors and hence his self interest and private gain 
would be tempered by, and subjected to, higher and nobler 
objectives. It is thus clear why Nasr (1989) has interpreted 
this approach as an attempt by these scholars to engage 
neoclassical economic thought in a dialogue and to imbue 
into Western materialism a sense of the sacred.
The above exposition on the different and seemingly 
disparate approaches used by scholars to flesh out the 
concept of Islamic economics does not signify that the 
field of study has no philosophical underpinnings of its 
own. There is a core set of axioms to which most Islamic 
economists more or less subscribe and adhere to. These 
are, for example, a belief in Tawhid (God’s absolute 
Unity and Sovereignty), Khilafah (man’s role as God’s 
vicegerent on earth), the absolute ownership of everything 
resting with God, a relationship of co-operation and 
justice characterising human interrelationships, and 
the indispensable role of Revelation as a primary source 
of guidance for man in both his material and spiritual 
pursuits. On the basis of these axioms, scholars derive 
principles which they consider to be reflective of the 
objectives of the Shariah (Islamic Law), and they then set 
out to demonstrate how these objectives can and ought to 
be accomplished and actualised in an Islamic society.
3. Critique
The outcomes of the process of inference adopted by 
the  Islamic economists, though ostensibly predicated on 
Revelation and apparently formulated around a set of 
values espoused by Islam, is not without its difficulties 
and contradictions both in thought and praxis. Firstly, 
different scholars may, and have indeed derived different 
sets of principles that also have a bias towards their own 
intellectual/cultural persuasions (see also Nasr, 1987). 
Even if we assume that the vast majority of Islamic 
economists hypothetically agree on a given set, what should 
the order of importance in the ranking of these principles 
be? In other words, should there be a primacy of one or 
more principles over others? Or is it theoretically sound, in 
the first place, to even conceive of a ranking? Is it possible 
for one or more principles so derived to be in conflict with 
(historically) established Islamic laws and practices? How 
ought this incongruence between the two be resolved, if 
and when it does arise?
Secondly, and as pointed out earlier, several scholars aver 
that Islam’s economic order is essentially a capitalistic 
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one, with some (e.g., Rahman, 1964; Shams, 2004; 
el-Gamal, 2006; Fadel, (n.d); Farooq, 2007) claiming that 
even interest could also be legitimised in such a system. 
Yet there are others who assert that Islamic economics 
is strongly socialist in its orientation. Given the vast 
treasure-house of the Quraan and Prophetic tradition it 
is technically possible, with some stretch of imagination 
though, to also “torture this data long enough until it 
confesses to anything”. Consequently, it is not uncommon 
to find scholars of greater or lesser reputation attempting to 
integrate a set of preconceived ideas into Islam. But what is 
remarkable in this context is that each group appears to be 
well-armed with appropriate Quraanic citations/Prophetic 
traditions to buttress its logic and justify its (opposing) 
standpoint.16 How then, do the Islamic economists defend 
and resolve these apparent contradictions in the various 
characterisations of their field? What is even more telling is 
that despite some protestations, and vindication to this line 
of thinking (Rahman, 1979), most Islamic scholars have 
soundly rejected the appellation of Islam with either of 
these isms on several grounds, showing quite compellingly 
that the two are innately and manifestly incompatible with 
the core principles of Islam.17
Thirdly, Islamic economists are at pains to emphasise that 
homo Islamicus would behave in a manner more amenable 
and conducive to the goals of realising a prosperous society 
than his cousin homo economicus would. They contend that 
whilst some of his activities may need to be regulated by 
formal rules and regulations, desirable forms of behaviour 
such as altruism, the judicious use of both natural and 
produced resources, a work ethic aimed at excellence, and 
other codes of praise-worthy conduct would, in the main, be 
intrinsically motivated. But apart from a cursory mention 
of the transience of this world and the punishment-reward 
incentive (hoped for by well-behaved individuals) in the 
Hereafter, there is very little in the literature explaining 
how these norms would be actualised in practice. This 
failure on the part of Islamic economists has been very 
harshly criticised, particularly by Kuran (1983), Nasr 
(1986) and Choudhury (2000, 2008). Critically also, 
despite the primacy of the Man-God relationship in Islam 
there is almost no discussion on how this relationship is 
manifested in both belief and action with specific reference 
to economic behaviour.
Fourthly, proponents of Islamic economics have 
consistently emphasised that the founding of the science is 
not merely an intellectual exercise but has as its ultimate 
objective the realisation of an Islamic economic order. 
Even if the epistemological and procedural concerns 
highlighted above were to be assuaged, there still remains 
the contentious issue of formulating appropriate policy to 
implement and realise the envisaged system. On several 
issues of paramount importance identified in the literature, 
Islamic economists have been at variance with one other; 
at times, in fact, offering conflicting prescriptions. For 
example, socioeconomic justice and its assumed corollary, 
the eradication of poverty (or at least its alleviation) ranks 
very high on the list of imperatives in many writings on 
Islamic economics.18 How would an Islamic economic 
system achieve this key objective?
Scholars like Chapra (1992) strongly argue that the 
market mechanism with some institutional constraints, 
a progressive taxation system and the moral persuasion 
of individuals to avoid ‘conspicuous’ and ‘wasteful’ 
consumption is still the best route to realise this objective (à 
la ‘Islamic Capitalism’ again?). At the other extreme Husaini 
(1980), Engineer (1992), etc.19 insist on widespread 
nationalisation of resources and even confiscation of excess 
wealth from private individuals (à la ‘Islamic Socialism’ 
as well?). Siddiqi (1978, 1981) and Naqvi (1977), on 
the other hand, seem to adopt a compromise stance by 
favouring interventionary monetary and fiscal policies 
and moderate amounts of State ownership of resources 
(à la Islamic ‘Welfare State’?). There are still yet others 
like Bani-Sadr (1982) who trust neither the individual’s 
moral conscience nor the State’s hegemony to distribute 
wealth equitably, but who argue for a kind of decentralised 
communitarian ownership and management of resources.
Now if Islamic economics, as hitherto enunciated, is rooted 
in its religious practice and Divine sources then why is 
there hardly any unanimity on issues that its proponents 
argue are fundamental to its raison d’être? Why is there a 
lack of agreement and in many instances, inconsistencies 
and ambiguities on key policy prescriptions? How do the 
Islamic economists reconcile these profound differences 
that arise among themselves, more especially when God, 
The Most high so unequivocally proclaims in the Quraan 
that He “…has perfected your Religion (i.e. Islam) for 
you…” (Ch. 6, V.3) and elsewhere that He “… sent down 
upon thee the Book (i.e. The Quraan) as an explanation for 
every thing, a Guide, a Mercy and Glad Tidings to those who 
submit” (Ch. 16, V. 89)? These and similar other verses do 
not imply that Islam is intolerant to differences of opinion or 
that there is no scope for variation in its interpretation. The 
Qur’an, in fact, quite nonchalantly relates of divergences 
in verdicts issued by even the great prophets of the past, 
without castigating them in any way.20
Furthermore, differences in thought and praxis are not 
without any historical precedent in the other Islamic 
sciences as it was developed by Muslim scholars. It is 
only natural that any intellectual enquiry, any effort to 
build up its knowledge structure, by virtue of it being a 
human experience, would inevitably lead to differences 
by the participants of that process on various aspects of 
its academic discourse. To illustrate, well over a thousand 
years ago various distinct schools of law in Islamic legal 
(and also philosophic) thought had emerged and evolved 
with complex and highly sophisticated intellectual tools 
of analysis. But despite the rich variety of opinions 
expressed on innumerable issues there was almost always 
a general consensus on the essentials viz. fundamental 
principles and methodology. Seemingly, such a consensus 
is disappointingly lacking in Islamic economics.
That Islamic economists do actually have a lot to learn from 
this Islamic intellectual heritage is a point I will return to 
later. It is even conceivable that at some point in future 
there might also emerge various schools of economics 
within the discipline of Islamic economics itself. With the 
extensive writings of Choudhury21, it already appears that 
the foundations have been laid for a distinct school based 
on his “Tawhidi” philosophy. But has ‘mainstream’ Islamic 
economics, in the first place, matured sufficiently enough 
for this to become a reality? Has its proponents been able 
to clearly articulate its basic philosophy coherently and 
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meaningfully so as to see its growth and development as 
a fully-fledged discipline? According to one prominent 
economist, Islamic economics is so entrenched “body 
and soul in mainstream economic doctrines that it has 
remained without (even) a distinctive birth-pang of its 
own” (Maurer, 2002: 652).
4. The need for intellectual clarity
Given some of the shortcomings alluded to above, one can 
easily discern from across the spectrum of cynics, neutral 
observers and (even leading) proponents that all is not well 
with Islamic economics. From amongst its most truculent 
critics, Kuran (1983, 1986, 1989, 1995a, 1995b, 1997), 
Philipp (1990) and Haque (1992) project the phenomenal 
growth in Islamic economics as part of a broad campaign 
by Muslims to preserve their culture and tradition. They 
aver that the discipline has no economic agenda as such 
and consequently dismiss the entire project and effort as an 
exercise in identity politics. In a similar vein, Behdad (1994, 
1995, 2005) and Mehrdad (1993) argue that the idea of 
an “Islamised “ economy in Iran only gained popularity in 
the wake of the Islamic Revolution but disappeared soon 
thereafter from the Iranian political agenda. Furthermore, 
both commentators emphasise the pervasive influence of 
Marxist thinking that characterised much of the debate 
and political discourse of the 1980s. Ultimately, however, 
Mehrdad contends, the reason for its failure in Iran was due 
to conflicting notions of what exactly constituted a “true” 
Islamic economic order.
Many in the West are also fascinated by the zest and 
conviction of the Islamic economists to establish an 
alternative economic paradigm for the adherents of the 
Islamic faith (Nienhaus, 1982, 2006; Wilson, 1983, 1998, 
2007; Pryor, 1984; Pfeifer, 1997; Maurer, 2002; Sauer, 
2002; Shams, 2004; Hefner, 2006; Asutay, 2007). Their 
general observation is that Islam’s textual sources can indeed 
serve as a foundation for Islamic economic thinking but they 
are doubtful about claims, as yet, to a distinctive Islamic 
economic science. Nienhaus (1982), for example, bemoans 
the inability of proponents of Islamic economics to mesh 
their theoretical ideas with the theological basis of Islam 
and its epistemology. Like others, he is particularly critical 
of those who “add a type of cultural/folkloristic colouring to 
Western concepts” and then present them as being “Islamic”.
What is most encouraging in many writings, though, is 
the acknowledgment on the part of Islamic economists 
themselves that “something has gone wrong” and that 
they need to reassess critically the reasons for their mission 
remaining unaccomplished (Nasr, 1986, 1989; Hosseini, 
1988; Ali, 1990; Metwally, 1997; Choudhury, 1999, 2006; 
Akhtar, 2000; Chapra, 2000; Siddiqi, 2004, 2008; Kahf, 
2004, Haneef, 2005, 2007). These writers have proffered 
various explanations for what Siddiqi (2008:1) calls the 
“collapse of the grand Islamic agenda”. The reasons for 
it faltering range from a lack of resources to the more 
fundamental conceptual and epistemological contestations. 
Although some leading proponents such as Siddiqi and Kahf 
are still insistent that Islamic economics can and should 
remain within the purview of neoclassical economics, 
the vast majority of them are vehemently opposed to this 
(traditional) paradigmatic classification of this new area of 
study. It is because of this primary reason, they aver, that 
Islamic economics has lost its purpose. There seems to be 
an increasingly acute awareness among both proponents 
and critics that Islamic economists have slavishly enslaved 
themselves to both the theoretical content and methodology 
of mainstream economics. In the words of Nasr (1991:388), 
the theoretical core of Islamic economics has “failed to 
escape the centripetal pull of western economic thought, 
and has in many regards been caught in the intellectual web 
of the very system it set out to replace”.
Why is it then, that there are such strong sentiments in favour 
of treating Islamic economics separately from competing 
paradigms? Neoclassical economics, as it so often parades 
itself, is not value-free. By imitating Newtonian mechanics, 
adopting Bentham’s rationalism and hedonism and 
assuming the unrealistic ideal world of perfect competition, 
its focus is exclusively on an abstract “economic man” who 
lacks social, ethical and political dimensions (Hosseini, 
1990). By anchoring its philosophical and epistemological 
roots in methodological individualism and Rationalism 
it assumes that the behaviour of this simplistic economic 
man is driven only by self interest and conflict and that 
he is not a creature motivated towards any action due to 
habit, culture or norm. Consequently also, its methodology 
has of recent largely imitated the traditional reductionist 
approach of the natural sciences. Furthermore, in striving 
for sophistication and empirical evidence for its postulates, 
its increasingly extensive use of mathematical tools and 
econometric techniques have rendered it impervious to 
the very elements of human nature that gives the field of 
economics its legitimacy as a social science.
The Islamic faith, on the other hand has a weltanschauung 
which is distinct from that upon which neoclassical 
economics is predicated. It places at its core the overarching 
and deeply-embedded reality of the Unity of God, The 
Most High, and His Divine Will. The raison d’être of man’s 
creation is the realisation and recognition of this Unity 
in  the various socio-politico-economic contexts that man 
finds himself in. He is guided to this fulfilment through 
the agency of Prophethood and Revelation that God, The 
Most High had sent from time to time to the different 
nations of the world. Although the satisfaction of man’s 
sensual needs are explicitly recognised and acknowledged, 
these are never to be regarded as exclusive or as ends in 
themselves. In fact, rather, it is through the purposeful use 
of the bounties of God, The Most High that man achieves 
his higher aims and objectives for which he was created.
If, indeed, the worldview of Islamic economics as briefly 
elaborated above, is different to that of mainstream 
economics, can it be epistemologically sound to assume 
that the theory and methodology of both would therefore 
necessarily concur or at least be compatible? Many Islamic 
economists, especially the likes of Choudhury, Nasr 
and Haneef, including some Western observers such as 
Nienhaus and Sauer, are convinced that they do not. And 
that is why they contend that as long as Islamic economics 
does not exorcise itself of the Western and foreign 
moorings in which it has been entrenched, it will dejectedly 
fail to achieve its objectives. This point is also alluded to 
by some of its most hostile critics when they demonstrate 
that, based on its current framework, there is nothing quite 
unique about Islamic economics for its proponents to lay 
claim to it as a distinct alternative.
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5. Conclusion
The common thread that one clearly discerns from most 
of the critique is the belief that Islamic economics does 
indeed have the potential to make a valuable contribution 
to the science of economics. But in order for it to do 
so, its protagonists firstly need to expand the narrow 
conceptualisation of it being just interest-free economics. 
More importantly, they must transcend its current phase 
of exercises in apologetics and develop for it a character of 
its own.
To begin with, Islamic Economists need to clearly elaborate 
on how its philosophy and the worldview (weltanschauung) 
emanating therefrom meshes and correlates with 
economics. Given the primacy of man’s relationship with 
God it needs to be demonstrated how this relationship 
shapes the individual and collective psyches of adherents 
to the Islamic faith and its consequent impact on economic 
behaviour and outcomes.
Next, but equally importantly, the epistemological 
framework of the discipline needs to be clearly articulated. 
The different modes of enquiry and investigation that 
are admissible as sources of knowledge, the relative 
importance and limitations (if any) of each, and the 
intellectual tools required to adopt them in an integrated 
manner has to be affirmed and clarified. In this regard, 
Islamic scholars have recourse to the most outstanding 
works of early epistemologists like al-Ghazali, ibn-Sina and 
ibn-Rushd,22 and to the writings of contemporary scholars 
like Choudhury and al-Attas, among others.
Lastly, given the pivotal role that morals and ethics play 
in the Islamic scheme, Islamic economists have justifiably 
emphasised the normative nature of Islamic economics. 
But with regard to its positivistic contribution they have 
only paid relatively peripheral attention, though the 
Islamic sources are rich in this content as well. More 
seriously however, even with regard to the values and 
principles implied by its normative content, these have 
not been interpreted by the Islamic economists from the 
perspective of a transcendent/divine norm or ideal, as 
ought to have been the case, but rather from a humanistic 
perspective. It is therefore vital to delineate and redefine, if 
necessary, these ideals ontologically from its divine sources 
and expound on how one expects to see them manifested in 
an Islamic society, and further, to identify how they interact 
and integrate with its positivist content.
To encapsulate then: Islamic economics needs a conceptual 
framework formulated on the basis of its worldview; and 
then, to develop its content and form on its own terms 
and using its own distinct categories, if necessary. As 
(Pfeifer, 1997) remarks, if the discipline is able to resolve 
its theoretical and practical difficulties it could then 
justifiably takes its place alongside Western capitalism and 
its offshoots, with a distinctiveness of its own.
Notes
1. See, for example, his work Kitab al Kharaj in which 
he discusses topics such as economic development, 
taxation, etc.
2. See his magnum opus Al Kitab al-Muhalla¯bi’l Atha¯r.
3. See also his magnum opus Ihya Ulum al-Din. For 
a more detailed expose’ on his economic thought 
refer to Ghazanfar and Islahi (1997) and Ghazanfar 
(2000).
4. Refer to his specific work Al-Hisbah fi’l-Islam. 
For a comprehensive account of Ibn Taimîyah’s 
conceptualisation of economic phenomena see 
Islahi (1988).
5. See Spengler (1964) for an exhaustive account 
of the concepts and ideas in economics that were 
introduced by Ibn Khaldun and which only much 
later came to be elaborated upon by Smith, Laffer 
and others. Based on his significant writings 
and contributions to economics, especially in his 
celebrated work Al- Muqaddimah, several scholars 
regard him to be the real Father of Economics 
(Boulakia, 1971; Oweiss, 1988).
6. Islahi (2005) has undertaken an encyclopaedic 
review of not only the role and impact of medieval 
Muslim scholars in Islamic economic thought but 
also their influence in the evolution of mainstream 
conventional economics.
7. I use the word “institutions” throughout this 
paper in the broadest possible sense as detailed by 
Hodgson (1998), unless otherwise qualified.
8. The extent of this “independence” is still a thorny 
issue in Muslim political discourse and although 
quite intriguing, its detailed analysis is beyond the 
scope of this paper.
9. See Rahman (1979) for an instructive account of 
the challenges faced by reformers in this task.
10. See for example Mawdudi (1941/1978), Qutb 
(1948/1970) and al-Sadr (1961). For a critique on 
the contributions of each of these authors see Kuran 
(1997) and Chapra (2004), Shephard (1992) and 
Wilson (1998), respectively.
11. To the extent that the previous British Prime 
Minister, Gordon Brown, announced of his desire 
to see Britain as the gateway to Islamic trade and to 
make it the global centre for Islamic finance (BBC 
Business News-13 June 2006). More recently, even 
a country as stubbornly secular as France pledged 
to take steps “to make (Islamic banking) activities 
as welcome in Paris as they are in London and 
elsewhere.” (Reuters – Agence France Presse (AFP) 
– 22 July 2008).
12. See also Wilson (2007).
13. See nevertheless, Hosseini (1988) on how Marxist 
thinking has influenced many of the Iranian clergy 
in their conceptualisation of several economic 
precepts!
14. See also (Brohi, 1975) for the conceptual difficulties 
that arise from these hybrid expressions.
15. In this context ‘optimality’ does not necessarily 
mean “efficiency’ as the term is commonly 
understood in conventional economics.
16. See also Pryor (1985).
17. For a fuller discussion of these arguments refer to 
Siddique (1974).
18. See for example, Siddiqi (2004).
19. See also Siddiqi (1981).
20. See for example, al-Quraan: Ch. 21, V. 78–79.
21. See references for some of his works.
22. Better known as Algazel, Avicenna and Averroes, 
respectively, in the West.
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1. Introduction
The more recent literature on Islamic economics is largely 
about Islamic financial instruments and institutions. It 
might give the impression that the main difference between 
conventional and Islamic economics is in the instrumental 
part, rather than fundamental aspects. Islamic economics 
is not about the prohibition of certain goods and services. It 
is a vastly different economic system whose answers to the 
core economic questions vary significantly. As is currently 
done, mimicking conventional economics and finance is 
only creating Islamic economics and finance by name. 
The essence and soul of the capitalist system is largely 
untouched. It is important to start from the foundation 
Islamic economics by redefining assumptions, developing 
new theories of microeconomics and macroeconomics, 
and offering testable models from the Islamic paradigm. As 
Nasr indicates, the theoretical works in Islamic economics 
has “failed to escape the centripetal pull of western 
economic thought, and has in many regards been caught in 
the intellectual web of the very system it set out to replace” 
(Nasr 1991, 388). Indeed, the differences between Islamic 
and capitalist financial institutions are getting more blurry 
every day. As Asutay (2007, 3–18) points out:
“The realities of financial markets which prioritizes 
economic incentives rather than religious behavioral 
norms has forced Islamic finance to become part of the 
international financial system, in which it is recognized 
as heterogeneity of financial products deprived of 
their value system... the difference has been reduced 
to technicality, and the value system is no longer 
mentioned beyond describing the prohibition of riba by 
quoting verses in the Quran.”
This paper is an attempt to present Islamic economics as a 
new economic paradigm based on the distinctive axiomatic 
feature of Islamic worldview. In order to that, the paper 
first outlines the free market capitalism within historical 
evolvement of the western worldview. Then, it outlines 
Islamic worldview from anthropological, epistemological, 
and teleological perspectives. Finally, it re-defines Islamic 
economics and presents its distinguishing axiomatic feature.
2. Crises of capitalism and need for new 
economic paradigm
With the fall of socialist regimes at the end of the last 
century, free market capitalism, which started in Europe a 
few centuries ago, has become the dominant system across 
the world. During and after the 2008 financial crisis, many 
people began to raise questions about the fate of capitalism. 
Even though it was not the first crisis of capitalism, it is the 
biggest one since the Great Depression. Three years later, 
we are still struggling to recover from the crisis. Indeed, 
with the ongoing debt crisis in Europe, we might see 
another global financial meltdown shaking the foundation 
of capitalism. Unlike many economists, I think that the 2008 
financial crisis and the current debt crisis are essentially 
moral crises. It is a moral crisis with its roots going back as 
far as the Enlightenment. Adam Smith’s famous metaphor 
of the “invisible hand” is well-known among economists. 
Indeed, it is an extremely powerful metaphor explaining 
the strength of the free market economy. According to 
Adam Smith, shaped by self-interested human nature, 
supply and demand is sufficient enough to deal with most 
if not all economic problems. However, as seen in the 
recent financial crises, the invisible hand without a moral 
compass could turn to a “stealing hand”. In my view, the 
2008 financial crisis was the greatest theft in the history of 
mankind. It was not seen as a theft perhaps because of the 
invisibility of the hand involved. In my recent paper on the 
2008 financial crisis and capitalism, I argue that the 2008 
crisis was essentially a moral crisis of capitalism with its 
roots going back as far as the Enlightenment (Aydin 2011). 
The paper suggests that during the crisis, the “invisible 
hand” of the free market turned to a “stealing hand” through 
market games driven by the irrational and irresponsible 
behaviors of politicians, creditors, and consumers.
Like any other disease, the real solution is only possible 
if we deal with its root causes rather than relieving its 
symptoms, such as high fever. Indeed, sometime temporary 
relief with general medicine could deceive the patient by 
giving a wrong signal and worsen the conditions in the 
long term. In 1929, when the free market system failed, we 
came to the understanding that government intervention is 
necessary sometimes to deal with economic crises. Similar 
to the Great Depression, the recent and ongoing financial 
crises could be another great opportunity to understand 
and fix a major flaw of free market capitalism. If the fix is 
not possible, this might mean a shift to new paradigm. This 
might be the case because capitalism has produced morally 
driven economic and financial crises as well as failed to 
deliver its promise of paradise in this world. I am talking 
about the crisis of happiness.
It was Easterlin (1974) who first came up with some 
quantitative signs of a happiness crisis in capitalism. In his 
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study which covered the years between 1946 and 1970, he 
found that despite a great increase in the real income per 
capita, there was not a significant change in subjective well-
being. He later did a similar study for Japan and found that 
the average self-reported happiness level did not increase in 
Japan between 1958 and 1987, despite a five-fold increase in 
real income. Since this study, we have seen a surge in studies 
on happiness. Most of them confirm Easterlin’s findings in 
terms of the impact of monetary wealth on happiness. A 
recent study shows that the case is no different for China, 
which has been experimenting with consumer culture for 
the last two decades. The study found that remarkable 
economic growth from 1994 to 2005, with real income per 
capita increase of 250%, ownership of color television sets 
rose from 40% of households to 82%, and the number of 
people with a telephone jumped from 10% to 63%. Yet, 
this did not translate into higher life satisfaction. Rather, 
the percentage of people who say they are dissatisfied has 
increased, and the percentage that says they are satisfied 
has decreased (Kahneman and Krueger 2006).
Easterlin’s Paradox claims that the lack of a direct 
correlation between average life satisfaction to income per 
capita crosses nations. In other words, even though rich 
people report higher life satisfaction than the poor in a 
given country, wealth does not explain differences in self-
reported life satisfaction across countries and in even in the 
same country over time. For instance, Frey (2008) finds that 
income per capita jumped in Japan by a factor of 6 between 
1958 and 1990, while average life satisfaction remained 
unchanged at a level of 2.7 out of four point scale. Layard 
(2005) shows that “for countries above $20,000 a head, 
additional income is not associated with extra happiness.” 
Nevertheless, “within a single country, at a given moment 
of time, the correlation between income and happiness 
exists and it is robust” (Bruni and Porta 2007).
Despite some evidence of its failure in providing happiness 
(Diener et  al. 1997; Easterbrook 2003; Hamilton and 
Denniss 2006; Kasser 2002; Lane 2000), the globalization 
of consumer culture and materialistic values is rapidly 
displacing traditional values. Indeed, those questionable 
new values are spreading all over the world. They have 
entered every realm of human life, including even spiritual 
places like churches, synagogues, and mosques. They have 
turned a human being into a consumption machine. But 
not only does a consumer culture fail to bring happiness, it 
also fails to protect the environment. It has produced many 
environmental problems, including unchecked growth 
in the production of solid waste and in greenhouse gas 
emissions. Therefore, it is not sustainable in the long run 
(Aydin 2010). It is not just weapons of mass destruction; 
it is also the products of mass consumption that are 
threatening the future of all living beings on this planet. 
Indeed, while the former threatens the outer universe, the 
latter threatens  the inner universe. With more and more 
consumption, people are no more, and sometimes even 
less, happy. This is neither desirable nor sustainable. In 
short, wealthy capitalist nations are currently experiencing 
a serious “happiness crisis”. It is spreading around the 
world with the globalization of capitalism. Actually, it is 
more dangerous for capitalism than the current financial 
crisis because of its complexity. There are many studies 
presenting evidence for the existence of the happiness 
crisis without delving into its root causes (Lane 2000). 
In other words, they are discussing symptoms without 
diagnosing the disease. Therefore, there is an urgent need 
to examine and modify or replace the existing dominant 
economic paradigm, which is based on always more 
consumption, in order to achieve more happiness while 
reducing consumption to sustainable levels.
Since both moral and happiness crises of capitalism could 
not be solved within the existing paradigm, according to 
Thomas Kuhn’s (1970, 92) following statement, we need to 
develop a new paradigm:
“Scientific revolutions are inaugurated by a growing 
sense, again often restricted to a narrow subdivision 
of the scientific community, that an existing paradigm 
has ceased to function adequately in the exploration of 
an aspect of nature to which that paradigm itself had 
previously led the way. In both political and scientific 
development the sense of malfunction that can lead to 
crisis is prerequisite to revolution.”
However, it is not easy for scientists to get out of the 
existing paradigm and offer solutions to crises from a new 
perspective. In Kuhn’s (1970, 96) terms, “Normal research, 
which is cumulative, owes its success to the ability of 
scientists regularly to select problems that can be solved 
with conceptual and instrumental techniques close to 
those already in existence”. Revolutionary research has to 
build upon new concepts and instruments; it has to offer 
something new and contradictory with the existing ones. 
This is the case because “scientific revolutions are here 
taken to be those non-cumulative developmental episodes 
in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part 
by an incompatible new one” (Kuhn 1970, 92).
Communism, which emerged as the antithesis of capitalism 
failed to be an alternative due to its misunderstanding 
of human nature. It wrongly associated the problems of 
capitalism with “private ownership” and established its 
foundations on “collective ownership”, which killed the 
individual incentive. Seeing religion as poison for people, 
the system attempted to create a caring society based on 
strictly secular values. In the end, the system collapsed 
from its own contradictory maxims. With the recent global 
financial crisis of capitalism, there is ongoing search for a 
possible alternative paradigm. Islamic (moral) economics 
could attract great attention if it could go beyond the 
existing frame of conventional economics. For that matter, 
if Islamic economics offers an alternative paradigm, it 
has to contradict the existing ones. It has to offer new 
“conceptual and instrumental techniques”. It has to be a 
non-cumulative, rather than cumulative development of the 
existing knowledge. In my view, Islamic economics based on 
Islamic anthropological, epistemological, and teleological 
perspectives could form an alternative paradigm over time. 
In this paper, I attempt to outline the distinctive features 
of an Islamic worldview and its consequences for Islamic 
economics.
It is important to note dissident voices of Islamic economists 
on the need for a new paradigm in economics. For instance, 
Zubair Hasan (1992) claims that the basic features of the 
capitalistic system were evolving during the era of Muslim 
Spain in Europe even before it emerged in England. In my 
view, this judgment is the result of equating the free market 
system with capitalism. Indeed, it is possible to claim 
that the Prophet of Islam himself was functioning within 
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a capitalist economic system if we see private property 
and free enterprise as the defining features of capitalism. 
Hasan argues that Islamic economists make mistakes by 
comparing the ideals of the Islamic system with the realities 
of capitalist system, not its ideals (Hasan 2011). Therefore, 
he considers their writings as being a sort of apple-
orange comparison; he calls for a step-by-step approach 
to Islamizing economics rather than a comprehensive 
approach (Hasan 1998).
3. The evolution of western materialist 
worldview
Aristotle’s Eudonic happiness model
How can we live a good life? This is a simple, but powerful 
question which has been dealt with by many minds 
throughout human history. Aristotle is one of the first people 
who tried to answer this question in a systematic way. 
Not counting the divine scripts, his book of Nicomachean 
Ethics was the first written attempt to find an answer to 
this age-old question. Even though it is a first ethics book, 
it is still an essential one in its field. Aristotle also examines 
“oikonomia” which literally means the management of the 
household in his book “Politica”. In one of his major papers, 
Karl Polanyi (1971, 78–115) argues that Aristotle is the 
first person to discover the economy.
Aristotle uses an analogy to understand the mission or 
function of our life in this planet. He begins with an example 
of a craftsman who works for an end: “Every craft [techne] 
and every line of inquiry [methodos], and likewise every 
action [praxis] and decision [proairesis], seems to seek 
some good; that is why some people were right to describe 
the good as what everything seeks” (Aristotle 1999, 1094a 
1–5).
According to Aristotle, we all aim at an end in our actions 
and thought. Particularly as a rational being, we deliberately 
choose means for an end in our life: “Deliberation is about 
the actions he can do, and actions are for the sake of other 
things; hence we deliberate about things that promote an 
end, not about the end (Aristotle 1999, 1112b 32–35).
However, there are two types of end products we are 
aiming for. One is intermediate and the other is final. We 
value intermediate ends because of their contribution to 
final ends. In other words, anything is good if it serves the 
final end, which is also called the “final good” or “highest 
good”. Aristotle agrees that there could be multiple goods; 
however, they could be ordered in a hierarchical manner. 
In other words, some goods are sought not for the sake 
of themselves alone, but for something else. For instance, 
health is good by itself and because of its role in reaching 
happiness.
Final ends
Intermediate/
instrumental endsMeansActions/thoughts
Figure 1. Final ends.
For Aristotle, the final or highest good is the end for 
whose sake everything else is done. Even though he 
accepts multiple goods, he argues that there is one final 
good everyone seeks for. This is happiness (eudaimonia). 
Aristotle provides two reasons for his argument of the 
final good/end: completeness (final), and self-sufficiency. 
In other words, everything is desired for something else 
while happiness is desired for itself. It is complete and 
sufficient requiring no other things. The happy person 
needs nothing more because happiness is self-sufficient: 
“The ‘self-sufficient’ we posit as being what in isolation 
makes life desirable and lacking in nothing, and we think 
that happiness is like this and moreover most desirable of 
all things, it not being counted with other goods: clearly, 
if it were so counted in with the least of other goods, we 
would think it more desirable, for what is added becomes 
an extra quantity of goods, and the larger amount of goods 
is always more desirable (Aristotle 1999, 1097b, 14–21).
Happiness
(final end, final good, highest good)
Complete
Self-
sufficient
Figure 2. Happiness as final end.
If the highest good is happiness, then one needs to know 
what happiness is: “But presumably the remark that the 
best good is happiness is apparently something [generally] 
agreed, and we still need a clearer statement of what 
the best good is. Perhaps, then, we shall find this if we 
first grasp the function of human beings. For just as the 
good, i.e. [doing] well, for a flautist, a sculptor, and every 
craftsman, and, in general, for whatever has a function and 
[characteristic] action, seems to depend on its function, the 
same seems to be true for a human being, if a human being 
has some function” (Aristotle 1999, 1097b 23–29). He then 
raises the question about the kind of life we are supposed 
to live to reach the highest good. His response is that we 
should live according to our nature. As a rational being, he 
argues, the function of our life is “the activity of the soul in 
accordance with reason, or not apart from reason” (Aristotle 
1999, 1098a 8). “Each function is completed well by being 
completed in a way in accord with the virtue (arête) proper 
to that kind of thing” (Aristotle 1999, 1098a 16–18).
Aristotle attempts to define happiness by distinguishing 
three different traits of the soul: affections, capacities 
and dispositions (Aristotle 1999, 1105b 20). He argues 
that happiness is not pleasure even though it comes with 
pleasure. Happiness is virtue. In other words, happiness 
is to live a virtuous life. For that matter, happiness is not 
knowledge of what is virtuous. It is living in accordance 
with virtue. Therefore, it is not thought, it is action. It is 
not affection and capacity as well: “we are neither called 
good nor called bad, nor are we praised or blamed, insofar 
as we are simply capable of feelings. Further, while we have 
capacities by nature, we do not become good or bad by 
nature” (Aristotle 1999, 1106a 8–12). In Aristotle’s terms, 
happiness “is activity in accord with virtue” (Aristotle,1999, 
1098b 31).
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Capacities and knowledge are not sufficient to be virtues 
and happy if they are not translated into actions. A great 
person who spends all of his time asleep will not be 
considered virtuous even if he knows and embraces every 
kind of virtue. “Presumably, though, it matters quite a 
bit whether we suppose that the best good consists in 
possessing or in using virtue that is to say, in a state or in 
an activity [that actualizes that state]. For someone may be 
in a state that achieves no good if, for instance, he is asleep 
or inactive in some other way but this cannot be true of the 
activity. For it will necessarily act and act well. And just as 
Olympic prizes are not for the finest and the strongest, but 
for the contestants since it is only these who win the same 
is true in life; among the fine and good people, only those 
who act correctly win the prize” (Aristotle 1999, 1098b, 32 
– 1099a, 6).
Prudence
Wisdom
Happiness
Virtuous
actions
Figure 3. Achieving happiness.
If happiness is the highest good which could be achieved 
through virtuous actions, then one needs to know what is 
virtue and how to be virtuous: “since happiness is a certain 
sort of activity in accord with complete virtue, we must 
examine virtue; for that will perhaps also be a way to study 
happiness better (Aristotle 1999, 1102a, 5–8). According 
to Aristotle, virtue is excellence in life. Excellence is 
moderation. Excellence can be known through “practical 
intelligence” or what is called prudence (rationally acquired 
knowledge about what is good) and wisdom (theoretical 
knowledge of necessary truths). That is why Aristotle says 
that “one has all the virtues if and only if one has prudence” 
(Aristotle 1999, 1145a, 2). Whoever employs his mind in 
a proper way will understand that living well is living in 
moderation. He will assign the proper weight to each virtue 
considering their contribution to the final good, happiness. 
If the person fails to do so, he will not be considered wise 
or prudent. In other words, living well is to act wisely in 
terms of making choices for the final good. It is to stay away 
from excessiveness and deficiency. It is striking the means. 
It is a balance between a deficiency and an excess of a trait. 
For example, courage is the mean between fearfulness 
and foolhardiness, confidence the mean between self-
deprecation and arrogance, and generosity the mean 
between stinginess and wastefulness.
=
Happiness Virtuous life Excellence/
Moderation
Figure 4. What is happiness?
Knowing what is good is not sufficient to be good or to 
have a good life. In Aristotle’s view, actions in line with 
virtue are necessary for a happy life. Then, the question is 
whether one needs to have external means to accomplish a 
happy life. Even though, according to Aristotle, happiness 
is a merit for the human soul rather than the body, it is 
still important to have the means to be happy. According 
to Aristotle, “it is impossible or not easy to perform fine 
actions if one is without resources” (Aristotle 1999, 1099a, 
33). He does not necessarily mean wealth or consumer 
goods. He means education and moral training to learn 
about virtue and moderation as a way to a happy life. For 
that matter, eudonia means human flourishing more than 
a pleasant experience which is associated with happiness. 
In Aristotle’s writings, human excellence is imbued with 
pleasant feeling; they are inseparable.
Aristotle does not value a life pursuit of sensual or egoistic 
pleasures. In his view, people generally pursue three types 
of pleasures in their lives: sensual, egoistic (or pleasure 
of honor), and intellectual (contemplative) pleasures. 
The first type is unique to animals while the second one 
is common among politicians. However, the third one, 
which is the highest and most worthy one, is unique to 
human beings. Even though Aristotle considers the highest 
pleasure in contemplative/virtuous life, he does not think 
that pleasure is the highest goal. In other words, his 
happiness model is not hedonic, it is eudonic. Indeed, he 
argues that bad pleasures could even lead to an unhappy 
life: “most people are deceived, and the deception seems 
to come about because of pleasure; for it appears a good 
thing when it is not. So they choose what is pleasant 
as something good, and they avoid pain as something 
bad” (Aristotle 1999, 1113a, 35). Aristotle is not against 
good pleasure: “the pleasure belonging to a worthwhile 
activity is good, while that related to a worthless one is 
bad; for appetites, too, are praiseworthy when they are 
for fine things, and worthy of censure when they are for 
shameful things (Aristotle 1999, 1175b, 25). Therefore, 
it is important to use practical wisdom to identify “bad/
misleading pleasures”. It is important to pursue pleasure in 
virtuous actions, not vice.
Kant’s pragmatic anthropology and secular 
morality
Kant built his anthropological view upon the Aristotelian 
arguments. Both of them employ teleological reasoning to 
explore the best form of human life. His main contributions 
are in the definition of morality and the concepts of innate 
predispositions. For Kant, the highest good is not happiness, 
it is morality. However, the borderline between Kant’s 
moral and Aristotle’s happy life is not quite clear. Indeed, 
Aristotle’s concept of happiness is very much identical to 
Kant’s concept of morality. They both are defining virtuous 
life. While Aristotle believes that moral (or virtuous in his 
term) life brings happiness, Kant thinks that morality and 
happiness are two different ends. Happiness is the end for 
pragmatic disposition while moral character is the end for 
moral disposition. Kant puts great emphasis on education 
in the development of predispositions. His concept of 
proportional development of the predispositions is similar 
to Aristotle’s moderation, or golden mean. Both Aristotle 
and Kant consider deficiency and excessiveness are not 
good.
Kant was very interested in understanding who we are and 
what are the universal elements of our nature, if any. He 
believes that it is almost impossible to really know human 
nature. He argues that a human changes his behavior 
as soon as he realizes that he is being observed. For that 
matter, it is not possible to know human nature through 
objective observation. Despite challenges, Kant still 
focused a great deal on drawing a picture of human nature 
Eds. Hatem A. El-Karanshawy et al. 45
Islamic economics as a new economic paradigm
(Wilson 2006). He suggests that human nature consists of 
four natural dispositions:
1. Predisposition to animality.
2. Technical predisposition.
3. Pragmatic disposition.
4. Moral disposition.
Kant argues that the default state for human beings is the 
animal disposition. Human beings develop humanity from 
animality through education. Indeed, he says that “human 
beings can only become human beings by education” 
because “with education is involved the great secret of the 
perfection of human nature.”(Wilson, 2006, 27).
He further argues that human beings guided by moral 
laws are the final end point of nature. This means that 
everything else is contingent ends to our beings. “The sum 
total of what pragmatic anthropology has to say about 
human destiny and the character of their development is 
this: they are destined by their reason to live in a society 
with others and in it to cultivate themselves, to civilize 
themselves, and to make themselves moral by the arts and 
sciences. No matter how strong their animal tendency to 
yield passively to the attractions of comfort and well-being, 
which they call happiness, they are still destined to make 
themselves worthy of humanity by actively struggling with 
the obstacles that cling to them because of the crudity of 
their nature. Human beings must, therefore, be educated 
to the good” (Wilson 2006, 36).
According to Kant, education has four missions through 
which to disclose human potential and assist with 
excellence in civil and moral life:
1. Education should provide discipline to train the 
animal predisposition. Discipline is the means to 
preserve the species. Discipline helps individuals 
to be freed from the effect of animal impulses and 
subject to “the laws of humanity” (Wilson 2006, 51). 
Otherwise, the animal urges will lead to a life without 
any rules. While animals have instincts to preserve 
their species, human beings are helpless. They need 
to be educated on how to take care of their offspring. 
Kant argues that a person without education could 
procreate, but could not preserve his progeny. He 
gives an example of a fifteen-year-old without any 
education whatsoever. Such a person, in Kant’s view, 
could pursue his animal predisposition and conceive 
a baby, but could not preserve his family (Wilson 
2006, 49).
2. Education should help individuals to gain skills 
to meet their needs and desires. Kant argues that 
this person needs the help of other humans to gain 
technical and pragmatic skills. The end of technical 
predisposition is culture and cultivation. Through 
the culture of passing knowledge to new generations, 
human beings disclose their potential skills and 
invent tools to be used for various ends.
3. Education should teach prudence to help individuals 
in making good choices for their happiness. Prudence 
is the “skill in the choice of means to one’s own 
greatest well-being” (Wilson 2006, 53). Prudence 
is built upon the development of the previous two 
predispositions. The person learns how to apply 
his developed skills in his own best interests in 
relationship to other people. For that matter, Kant 
does not have any problem with use of other people 
as a means for our ends, as long as it is by mutual 
consent. Indeed, he defines prudence as the skill of 
“using other men for his purposes” (Wilson 2006, 
39). However, he warned his students of cunning 
people who would deceive them in order to use them 
as mere means.
4. Education should help individuals to be citizens of 
the world by implanting a love for moral laws for 
their ultimate benefits as a unique species. Kant’s 
morality is based on the maxims which could be 
universalized. In other words, if something is still 
good if it is universally implemented, then it is moral. 
Otherwise, it is immoral. In Kant’s terms, moral 
actions are “those which are necessarily approved 
by everyone, and which may at the same time be the 
aim of everyone” (Wilson 2006, 41).
Similar to Aristotle, Kant thinks that moral character 
is acquired through actions, not just thought. The four 
missions of education mentioned above correspond to the 
four natural dispositions.
Kant thinks that luxury is an obstacle for moral advancement 
because it creates the desire for having more of what others 
have (Wilson 2006, 33). Kant is against the selfish and 
egoist pursuit of possessions. In his view, the egoist wants 
to use the world as the means to his ends while the moralist 
becomes the means to the world’s ends (Wilson 2006, 35). 
Evolvement and Outcome of Natural Dispositions in Kant’s Anthropology
Predisposition Animality Technical Pragmatic Moral
Motivation Animal drives Natural talents Feelings desire
Means to end
(education)
discipline Skill Prudence wisdom
End in individual
(contribution)
Self-
preservation
culture happiness character
End in the
species 
Preservation Cultivation Civilization moralization
Figure 5. Evolvement and outcome of natural dispositions in Kant’s anthropology.
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In his analysis of Kant’s anthropology, Wilson argues that 
“equality among human species is essential to happiness, 
but the fact is that everyone strives to gain superiority 
over the next person in order that they do not gain hated 
superiority over oneself” (Wilson 2006, 53). Thus, no one 
could truly be happy until they submit to universal moral 
laws and discipline their inclinations.
Kant perceives wisdom as different from and superior to 
prudence. He defines wisdom for human beings as “nothing 
other than the inner principle of will to follow moral laws” 
(Wilson 2006, 55). Through gaining wisdom one can gain 
character. In other words, wisdom helps us to understand 
that we could not survive and excel as an individual. We 
need to live in a civil society and follow moral laws in order 
to accomplish our highest ends as individuals and species. 
Wisdom puts restrictions on prudence in terms of seeking 
personal happiness. Wisdom relates the individual to the 
world and makes him think about the whole destiny of the 
human species. Where prudence leads the individual to 
seek his well-being within society through employing his 
skills in making money and pursuing personal happiness, 
wisdom disdains the individual from pragmatic goals and 
guides him toward a happy life in line with the universal 
moral laws.
“Prudence is the capability of choosing the best means to 
happiness. Happiness consists, however, of the fulfillment 
of all inclinations. In order to be able to choose well, 
one must be free. Prudence, however, is frustrated by 
everything that makes us blind, and precisely for that 
reason by affects” (Wilson 2006, 33).
Kant believes that people need the knowledge of the 
world which consists of knowledge of physical nature and 
human nature. He further argues that “everything refers 
to human beings … knowledge of the world is knowledge 
of human beings” (Wilson 2006, 37).What he means is to 
understand human nature and the relationship between 
the nature and human beings. Thus, nature outside and 
nature within help the advance towards real humanity. He 
views human beings as the final ends of all beings because 
“only in man, and even in him as a moral subject, do we find 
unconditioned legislation regarding purposes” (Wilson 
2006, 46). In other words, only humans set final purposes 
and use nature to reach them.
The final end of human beings is to live in accordance 
with his nature. Wisdom is the means to get the morality. 
Even though human beings have predispositions for such 
development, they need education. For that matter, Kant 
believes that the human being is not the rational animal, but 
rather the animal with the potential of becoming rational. 
If he is not educated, the default mode is animality, without 
prudent and wise choices. To be rational means to choose 
the right means for good ends. Choosing discipline will 
help the preservation of the species while gaining skills will 
help to create tools for a convenient life. On the other hand, 
being prudent and wise would help to achieve a civilized 
and moral society. It is reaching the ideal humanity which 
is possible through the proportional development of 
the four natural dispositions. The underdevelopment or 
overdevelopment of these dispositions will lead to failure 
in achieving the ideal of humanity (Wilson 2006, 87). Kant 
writes in the Doctrine of Virtue that “human beings have 
a duty to themselves to be useful members of the world, 
since this also belongs to the worth of humanity in their 
own person, which they ought not to degrade” (Wilson 
2006, 58).
The enlightenment project
The emergence of capitalism in Western Europe coincided 
with the Enlightenment. Indeed, one could claim that 
capitalism is the economic pillar of the Enlightenment 
project. Therefore, we need to examine the Enlightenment 
in order to understand capitalism as a materialist economic 
system. The Enlightenment was a project to release human 
minds from the chains of churches in the Dark Ages. In his 
famous essay entitled “What is Enlightenment?” Immanuel 
Kant (in Gregor 1996) described the Enlightenment simply 
as freedom to use one’s own intelligence. The Enlightenment 
thinkers believed that humans are generally good and 
perfectly rational. Therefore, they should shape their 
destiny, not the dogmas of churches. The thinkers ultimately 
succeeded in gaining freedom for human minds. Their 
victory helped to remove darkness in Europe and replaced 
it with the light of human minds. They did not stop there. 
They expanded their wars against all religions assuming 
that they were no different from Christianity in the Dark 
Ages. Indeed, they labeled religions as myths. Of course, in 
the age of reason, there was no room for myths. Ironically, 
even though they fought against the ancient mythos, they 
created modern ones. They put logos against mythos.
Figure  6 outlines the key components/pillars of the 
Enlightenment project. First, it was a project against 
Christian trinity. As historian Peter Gay (1996) asserts, 
the Enlightenment broke through “the sacred circle,” 
whose dogmatic teaching had confined thinking. In C. 
Wright Mills words, “Once the world was filled with the 
sacred – in thought, practice, and institutional form. 
After the Reformation and the Renaissance, the forces of 
modernization swept across the globe and secularization, a 
corollary historical process, loosened the dominance of the 
The
Enlightenment
Secular
trinity
Secularization
/earthly
paradise
Morality
without God
Truth seeking
without
revelation
Alienation and
animalization
Figure 6. The pillar of enlightenment.
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sacred. In due course, the sacred shall disappear altogether 
except, possibly, in the private realm” (Mills 1967, 32–33).
Most Enlightenment thinkers had difficulty in embracing 
the logically inconsistent Trinitarian idea. They came up 
with an alternative explanation to explain the reality. I call it 
“secular trinity” because it mimics the Christian trinity to a 
large extent. It consists of causation, nature, and chance. In 
other words, rather than explaining the reality as the work 
of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, the Enlightenment thinkers 
offer deterministic cause-effect chains, Mother Nature, and 
chance as the determining forces behind the reality of the 
universe. Second, the Enlightenment was a project of truth 
seeking without revelation. For the Enlightenment thinkers 
human minds were the only source of knowledge. No need 
to seek guidance from divinely-guided individuals because 
in reality there is no evidence for any divine being. Third, 
since God was dead, there would be no need for morality 
based on revelation. However, as strongly articulated by 
Kant, even without God, it is still possible to reach moral 
principles through reasoning (Reath and Timmermann 
2010). Thus, the Enlightenment is a project of morality 
without God. Fourth, since God is dead, no need to aim 
for paradise in the hereafter. We are left with no option 
but to establish a worldly paradise. In this regard, a liberal 
capitalist economic system has been seen as a great tool 
to accomplish such a goal. Finally, the Enlightenment is a 
project of alienation and animalization because, as argued 
by Karl Marx, capitalism alienates humans and treats them 
as a sort of robot, or thinking animal.
The Enlightenment project also re-defined the purpose and 
meaning of life for individuals. It asked individuals to act 
free from the restrictions of churches and to do whatever 
they consider to be best for their interests. The main purpose 
is not to please God anymore; rather, it pleases the desires 
of animal souls. The Enlightenment thinkers reject the idea 
of being a servant to God. Instead, they turn humans into 
the masters of the universe. The ultimate purpose is to gain 
control over nature, rather than living with her in harmony. 
The measure for morality is not the divine revelation 
anymore. It is the internal compass of pain and pleasure, 
or pure reason. Indeed, Bentham suggests that the utility 
calculation should be the yardstick for everything including 
what is good and what is bad (Bentham 2007, 14).
The Enlightenment is a secular trinity project rejecting the 
trinitarian theology in favor of the three gods of secular 
science. This is mainly based on the reality that we cannot 
live without god(s). If we do not have one, we must invent 
one. The Enlightenment finds it to be irrational to embrace 
the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. However, it replaces 
them with the gods of nature (the Mother), cause-effect (the 
Son), and chance (the Holy Spirit). It ascribes all objects and 
events in the universe to these three gods. The mechanistic 
worldview is the natural by product of this “secular trinity”.
The Enlightenment is a reductionist project compart-
mentalizing the universe in order to divide it among 
the three gods of secular science. It tries to explain each 
compartment as the product of causes, nature, or chance, 
based on its reductionist reasoning. It attempts to reduce 
everything to small fragments and ascribe to them to a 
simple material cause. It ignores the indivisible unity and 
interdependency of everything in the universe.
The Enlightenment project is designed to make people 
believe in themselves instead of believing in god(s). It turns 
the human “self” into a kind of “inner god”. It promotes “self-
belief”, “self-help”, “self-actualization”, “self-motivation”, 
“self-confidence”, and “self-sufficiency”. It boosts the self 
by ascribing its accomplishments to the self. It transforms 
the self to the “inner god”.1 It sets the goal of conquering 
and mastering the universe for the inner god by defeating, 
controlling, or stealing from nature.2 However, it does 
not understand that the life of the “inner god” depends 
on the life of nature.3 In Horkheimer and Adorno’s terms, 
“the system the Enlightenment has in mind is the form of 
knowledge which copes more proficiently with the facts 
and supports the individual most effectively in the mastery 
of nature”(Horkheimer and Adorno 1976, 83).
While the Enlightenment turns the self to an “inner god”, 
it also makes him the slave of his desires (I will call it the 
“elephant”). He does everything to serve his desires. He 
sacrifices everything, even his own life, for the desires 
of his elephant. Indeed, a capitalist consumer views the 
ultimate goal in life to be the fulfillment of his/her desires. 
The common saying of “life is fun” in capitalist American 
society reflects this philosophy of life for many people. 
The overwhelming majority who embrace this philosophy 
work very hard during the week in order to have fun over 
the weekend. That is why some of them choose to end 
their lives once they lose their ability to gain expected 
pleasures.4
The Enlightenment is a project of discovering the “outer 
universe” while denying or dismissing the “inner universe.” 
In fact, it has enlightened the outer universe while 
darkening the inner universe. However, it does not know 
that the comprehension of the outer universe is only possible 
through an enlightened inner universe. In Schuurman’s 
terms, “the Enlightenment represents the religion of the 
closed material world that is blind to the non-material 
dimensions of reality” (Schuurman 2008, 75).
Capitalism as economic pillar of the 
enlightenment project
The Enlightenment project relies on capitalist ideology to 
create an earthly paradise. Capitalism pursues this goal 
through market mechanisms. However, capitalism is not 
the market mechanism. It is a worldview that relies on 
the market mechanism. Capitalism is much more than a 
free market system. It is an ideology that makes money 
(capital) the central purpose of life for all individuals. In 
Karl Marx’s terms, “Money degrades all the gods of man – 
and turns them into commodities. Money is the universal 
self-established value of all things. It has, therefore, robbed 
the whole world – both the world of men and nature – of 
its specific value. Money is the estranged essence of man’s 
work and man’s existence, and this alien essence dominates 
him, and he worships it” (Marx and Lederer 1958). In this 
sense, the main goal of a capitalist person is to accumulate/
gain money wealth. For such a person, money is considered 
as a god that can open any door. In Marxist terms, 
capitalism is an ideology, which has turned money into the 
god of the world. It is a secular ideology, which promises to 
build a “technological paradise” in this life, not in the next 
life as promised by many religions. We can call capitalism 
a secular religion in this context. Capitalism relies on the 
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magical power of the free market mechanism to fulfill its 
promise of earthly paradise.
The fathers of free market capitalism were strongly 
influenced by the Enlightenment thinkers. Indeed, the 
laissez-faire capitalism aims for freedom of the market 
from any government intervention. It relies on the 
assumption that individuals follow their self-interest. 
According to Adam Smith, it is part of human nature to act 
on self-interest: “Every man is, no doubt, by nature first and 
principally recommended to his own care; and as he is fitter 
to take care of himself than of any other person, it is fit and 
right that it should be so. Every man, therefore, is much 
more deeply interested in whatever immediately concerns 
himself, than in what concerns any other man” (Smith 
1976, 82–83). From his understanding of human nature, 
Smith concludes that “it is not from the benevolence of 
the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our 
dinner, but from their regard to their own interest” (Smith 
1976, 26–27). In the “Wealth of Nations”, Smith argues 
that in order to enhance wealth, every man should be “free 
to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both 
his industry and capital into competition with those of ... 
other(s)”(Smith 1990, 687).
If self-interested individuals are allowed to make their 
own decisions, they will do whatever is best for them. 
The market mechanism determines what and how much 
to produce if we simply let everyone act based on his or 
her “self-interest”. Individuals will demand and supply 
the optimum amount of goods and services for their self-
interest. Thus, supply and demand driven by self-interest 
work like an invisible hand pushing the market mechanism 
towards an efficient production and consumption. Since 
society is nothing other than the collection of individuals, 
overall what is good for each individual is also good for 
society. In other words, Adam Smith assumes no dichotomy 
between private and social interests. Therefore, he suggests 
that the invisible hand driven by supply and demand alone 
should decide on production and distribution of goods 
and services. There is very limited, if any, role for the 
government hand to get involved in this process.
While Adam Smith establishes his theory of supply and 
demand on self-interested human nature, Bentham shapes 
his utility theory on pleasure-seeking and pain-avoiding 
human nature: “Nature has placed mankind under the 
governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. 
It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well 
as to determine what we shall do ... They govern us in all we 
do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make 
to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate 
and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their 
empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the 
while” (Smith 1976, 14). This means that we do not need 
to do anything other than letting individuals to follow their 
nature for utility maximization through exchanges in the 
market. The end result will be good for both individuals 
and society as a whole.
As Frey and Stutzer (2002, 1), the pioneering researchers 
in the field of economics happiness, say “everyone want to 
be happy … Economic activity – the production of goods 
and services – is certainly not an end in itself but only 
has value in so far as it contributes to human happiness”. 
The mainstream happiness model in capitalism is based on 
Bentham’s hedonistic model, Aristotle’s eudonic model. In 
his book called “Introduction to the Principles of Morals 
and Legislation”, Bentham argues that the utility principle 
is the main determinant of human behaviors. Every 
individual acts according to the utility principle and tries 
to maximize their utilities by calculating the expected pain 
and pleasure of their behaviors.
Even though Polanyi gave credit to Aristotle for being the 
first to write on economics, it is obvious that Aristotle did 
not foresee modern free market capitalism in which luxury 
consumption and pursuit of bodily desires become the 
symbol of a happy life. He did not imagine that rational 
human beings would subject themselves to a hedonic 
calculus of maximizing pleasures. He would expect that 
prudent people would limit their sensual desires for the 
sake of intellectual and virtues ones rather than inflating 
them. Aristotle argues that those who pursue bodily 
pleasures will be occupied with wealth accumulation and 
could have no time to seek virtue: “those who fix their aim 
on the good life [and] seek the good life as measured by 
bodily enjoyments, so that inasmuch as this also seems to 
be found in the possession of property, all their energies are 
occupied in the business of getting wealth” (Aristotle 1944, 
1257b).
While Aristotle distinguishes between natural and excessive 
desires, the modern economy views the role of the market as 
to satisfy any kind of desire. It actually turns everything to 
marketable objects. The ultimate goal is to invent “pleasure 
pills” or “experience machines” with no side effects because 
nothing else matters other than the experience of pleasure. 
In Vicenti’s terms, “the homo oeconomicus seems to be 
thrown into the world, its existence has no final end, apart 
from death, and each end is meant to be overcome and to 
be turned into another means to constitute an open chain of 
means-ends”(Visenti 2011). In Aristotle’s view, hedonistic 
happiness is not even worthy of being called a good life. 
Indeed, Aristotle calls a life dedicated to pleasure the life of 
“grazing cattle” (Aristotle 1999, 1095b, 21).
4. The Islamic worldview
As discussed, free market capitalism did not emerge 
in vacuum. It is the product of the western materialist 
worldview. In order to identify any differences between 
Islamic economics and its counterparts, it is important to 
understand the Islamic worldview which is based on the 
Quran, hadiths, and views of Muslim scholars. Islam is not 
a marginal religion dealing with the spiritual life alone. It is 
a religion providing guidance and well-being for both this 
life and the hereafter. Therefore, the word falah (real well-
being) and its derivatives have been used in the Quran many 
times. In the five time daily azan (call to prayer), people are 
also invited to falah. Islam aims to achieve its goal through 
its value-based and God-centered moral and spiritual 
worldview. It is important to recognize the overlapping 
goals between the worldviews of major religions. Islam 
is not a completely new religion. It is considered to be 
the last chain of Abrahamic religions. Therefore, it is not 
surprising to see that Christianity and Judaism have many 
values in common with Islam. However, the Enlightenment 
movement in Europe deviated from these values and 
embraced a secular, value-neutral, materialist worldview.
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Epistemological perspective
Choudhury claims that Islamic economics relies on an 
epistemological paradigm which is significantly different 
from the western secular paradigm. He suggests that Islamic 
economics should be based upon the Islamic paradigm which 
requires different “methods” and “methodology” in terms 
of gathering and analyzing data about reality. He asserts 
that “the prevailing Islamic socio-scientists” are distant 
from “any substantive reference to the Quranic worldview, 
its epistemology of oneness of the divine laws (tawhid), the 
causal understanding of unification of knowledge in world-
systems by the epistemological methodology embedded 
in ontology and ontic learning domains” (Choudhury 
2007, 76). He strongly criticizes current efforts in Islamic 
economics due to its lack of epistemological foundation and 
necessary data. He argues that the existing literature on 
Islamic economics has become trapped in the neo-classical 
framework which is based on secular western epistemology. 
He discusses the different views of tastes and preferences 
to support his argument. Neo-classical economics takes 
consumer tastes and preferences as exogenous in its 
economic models, while Islamic economics provides 
certain values to guide tastes and preferences. Therefore, 
according to Choudhury, Islamic economics should focus 
on endogenizing preferences and tastes through interactive 
learning.
As Choudhury states, “if the Islamic worldview is premised 
on its distinctive epistemology, ontology, and the unified 
ontic (evidential) way of organizing the world-system, 
then such a revolutionary doctrine cannot be accumulative 
in thought as normal science. It must be distinctive and out 
of the ordinary lineage of normal thinking …. The Islamic 
worldview shares this (Kuhnian) attribute of scientific 
revolution. Without fundamental invocation, there cannot 
be a substantive theory and premise for Islamic economics 
and finance, and thereby, the construction of the Islamic 
worldview and world-system” (Choudhury 2007, 76–77).
Choudhury argues that the irrelevance of ethics in economic 
theory in general and macroeconomics in particular is due 
to the inability of explaining preferences and tastes through 
endogenous models (Choudhury 2004). “Preferences 
and menus at both the individual and aggregate level are 
formed of bundles of such independently and exogenously 
assigned behavior … The dynamic and complex nature 
of learning preferences remains foreign to economic 
and financial theory … The tawhidi epistemological, 
ontological and ontic methodology thoroughly replaces 
the missing issues of unity of knowledge in learning and 
process at the microeconomic and economy-wide levels” 
(Choudhury 2007, 78).
Unity of knowledge
While the materialist worldview relies on the light of the 
human mind alone, the Islamic worldview relies on both 
reason and revelation. Islam does not ask people to shut 
down their minds and blindly follow the divine message. 
Indeed, it is important to note that the very first message 
from God to the Prophet Muhammed (pbuh) (and 
humanity) was not “believe!” or “worship!” – it was “iqra! 
(read!)”. It is reported that the Archangel Gabriel came to 
the Prophet when he was in isolation in a cave. The angel 
commanded him to “read” (“recite”). The prophet replied 
“I cannot read”. At this time the Archangel took Muhammad 
(pbuh) in his arms and pressed him until it was almost too 
much to bear. He then released him and said again “read” 
(“recite”). “I cannot”, replied the prophet, at which the 
Archangel embraced him again. For the third time the 
Archangel commanded Muhammad (pbuh) “read”, but still 
he said he could not. He was embraced one more time. The 
prophet was saying that he does not know how to read.
The repetition of the command was indeed an instruction 
of how and what to read (recite). The first “read” refers to 
the necessity of the divine light; the second “read” refers 
to necessity of the divine instruction; and the third “read” 
refers to the book of the universe. In other words, the angel 
was implicitly saying to the Prophet, you could read (recite) 
the book of the universe with the divine light of the Quran 
under the divine instruction. On releasing him the third 
time, however, the Archangel Gabriel said explicitly what 
and how to read: “Read in and with the Name of your Lord, 
Who has created – Created human from a clot clinging 
(to the wall of the womb). Read, and your Lord is the All-
Munificent, Who has taught (human) by the pen – Taught 
human what he did not know” (Quran 96:1–5).
By referring to the creation of the human, the message was 
clear on where to start reading the vast book of the universe. 
In other words, following divine guidance, we should start 
reading ourselves first. Then, we could accurately read the 
universe. We should read ourselves only in the name of 
God, meaning with His infinite light and guidance. In this 
regard, the Quran is a “study guide”, which shows how to 
read ourselves and the book of the universe. However, the 
Quran is not deluded regarding the human response. It 
accurately predicts how people will respond to this divine 
call: “No indeed, but (despite all His favors to him), human 
is unruly and rebels. In that he sees himself as self-sufficient, 
independent (of his Lord). But to your Lord, surely is the 
return (when everyone will account for their life) (Quran 
96:6–8). In other words, seeing himself as self-sufficient is 
the primary cause of the human denial of God. This is also 
the primary source of the Western dialectic, as suggested 
by Dooyeweerd.
From an Islamic point of view, as seen in Figure 7, it can 
be said that God makes himself known to humanity 
through His words and works. If we listen to the divine 
revelations and read His works in the universe, we will 
know His attributes. We should begin our reading from 
ourSELVES because the knowledge of the self will help us 
to know God. Once we understand that we are absolutely 
impotent and needy, we will realize that nature could 
not produce anything on her own. Everything from an 
atom to galactic systems is the work of God and under His 
control at every moment. He is not the god of gaps. He is 
the God of everything at every moment according to the 
Quran. Therefore, becoming a believer is nothing more 
than the recognition of and participation to the universal 
submission. In this regard, belief is not a blind acceptance; 
it is an affirmation and bearing witness (shahadah) to the 
manifestation of God.
As shown in Figure  7, the oneness of God (tawheed)5 
becomes the source of ontological-epistemological 
knowledge in the Islamic worldview. In other words, 
the tawheedi paradigm provides the unity between the 
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ontological and epistemological level of reality. Therefore, 
there is no dichotomy between the revealed knowledge and 
reasoned knowledge.6 While the former comes from the 
divine words (al-kalaam), the latter comes from the divine 
power (al-kudrah). They are just the different expressions 
of the same reality which comes from the One (al-ahad and 
al-waheed). Due to the unity of knowledge in the Islamic 
worldview, no contradiction is expected between genuine 
scientific and religious truth.
In Nursi’s view, the universe is made in the form of a 
comprehensible book which makes its author known. For 
that matter, while authentic revelation is the word of God, 
true science is nothing but a description of the works of God. 
There should not be any dichotomy between the words and 
works of God. We try to understand how everything works 
and what their meanings are. Modern science reveals the 
mysteries of the universe and explains how they work. Even 
though atheist scientists deny the existence of God, their 
real scientific works reveal evidence for the existence of God. 
As it is eloquently said by a Muslim scholar, “the universe is 
not the property of materialistic science, which has used the 
universe in a destructive way precisely because it has been 
unable to discover its meaning” (Mermer 2007 85).
From the Islamic perspective, divine books such as the 
Quran come from the infinite knowledge of God while 
the book of the universe comes from the infinite power of 
God. They both have a similar message confirming each 
other. According to Nursi, secular scientists make the 
invisible chapters of the book of the universe visible, but 
claim them to be meaningless script because they do not 
know how to read it. As Richard Feynman (1963–1965, 
7) says, scientists “cannot make the mystery go away 
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by explaining how it works”. They “will just tell you how 
it works”. In Nursi’s view, the divine revelation solves 
the mystery. In other words, under the light of authentic 
revelation and through the instruction of the prophets, we 
could read those scripts and learn more about the names 
and attributes of its author. For that matter, the first divine 
command to prophet Muhammed (pbuh) is valid for all 
believers. Reading the book of the universe under light of 
the Quran helps us know “the mind of God”.
Indeed, the Quran encourages the human mind to study 
the book of the universe in several hundred verses. It 
calls our attention to the divine acts in his creatures such 
as cows, honeybees, sheep, ants, gnats, spiders, stars, the 
sun, the moon, etc. It asks us reflect on natural events such 
as the alteration of day and night, the movements of the 
sun, the moon, and the stars. However, the Quran presents 
everything in the universe as purposeful acts of God. It 
explicitly negates the secular trinity. It presents God as the 
real and only cause behind everything. In other words, in 
a Quranic perspective, as our inner self cannot be god, the 
nature, cause-effect, and chance also cannot be god. They 
are just a veil covering the divine power. As Nursi says, 
powerless, contingent, and ignorant causes could not be 
responsible for any result. For instance, an apple tree is 
not the cause of an apple. It cannot produce even a single 
apple because it does not have the knowledge, power, and 
wisdom to do so. Even if all scientists work together they 
cannot produce an apple. So, how can ignorant, blind, deaf, 
and unconscious molecules in an apple tree do it? In Nursi’s 
view, an apple tree and an apple are created together. They 
are always associated with each other. However, one is not 
the cause of the other. We are confusing the association 
with causation. This is like seeing the association between 
a light switch and bulb light and claiming that the light 
switch is the cause of the light that the bulb produces.
From the Islamic perspective, we are expected to unveil 
reality by using our mind under the guidance of the divine 
light. Then, we will see that everything is directly created 
and maintained by the divine power. In other words, God 
is not the first cause. He is the only cause. He is the real 
cause. He does not need to use any means including the 
cause-effect chain or nature. He directly runs everything in 
the universe. “All that are in the heavens and on the earth 
entreat Him (in their needs). Every (moment of every) 
day, He is in a new manifestation (with all His Attributes 
and Names as the Divine Being)” (Quran 55:29). “So, All-
Glorified is He in Whose Hand is the absolute dominion 
of all things ...” (Quran 36:83). His wisdom requires an 
apparent cause as a veil to his power. He is not the god of 
gaps. He is the god of everything. Indeed, there is no gap for 
anything else. Thus, the mechanistic worldview based on 
cause-effect chains is not a description of reality. Perhaps, 
the quantum worldview, which nullifies the deterministic 
worldview, is much closer to reality.
In Nursi’s view, the story of Adam (pbuh) in the Quran shows 
that we could even go beyond the ranks of angels if we read 
the inner and outer universes under the divine guidance. 
This is because Adam was given comprehensive knowledge 
of everything while angels had only partial knowledge. 
He was able to recite the names of God meaning that he 
understood himself and God in the most comprehensive 
way, while angels had only a limited understanding of God 
and reality. As the children of Adam, we can also study the 
inner and outer universes to disclose our potential and 
learn the reality of everything. We should value studying 
human nature as much as we value the outer universe. 
Since knowing the inner universe is the key to knowing 
everything, we should begin from the inner universe. We 
should read them under the divine instruction and light.
As discussed, the Enlightenment project rejects any heavenly 
God, but embraces the earthly one. It has created a “secular 
trinity” which consists of nature, cause-effect, and chance. 
It has also turned the human self to an inner god. In Nursi’s 
view, the main error stems from its understanding of human 
nature. In order to correct this mistake, we need to begin 
with ourselves. We need to discover our inner universe. 
Once we do that, we will understand that we are not self-
sufficient, but contingent. Therefore, we cannot do it by 
ourselves. We need to rely on the divine power and mercy 
at every moment. We are infinitely needy creatures. Our 
life depends on the entire universe. Our desires are as big 
as our imagination. However, we have absolutely no power 
to fulfill our needs and desires. We are like a completely 
paralyzed person. In reality, we cannot even feed ourselves 
because we do not have control over our digestive system. It 
is the divine power working within us. It is the divine mercy 
providing everything for us. Therefore, we should give up 
arrogance and become truly humble. We should give up 
complaining and become truly thankful. We should give 
up serving our desires and ego, and become a true servant 
of God. The Quran clearly states the purpose behind the 
creation of human beings: “I have not created the jinn and 
humankind but to (know and) worship Me (exclusively)” 
(Quran 51:56). As described by Ghazali, the transcendental 
achievement would be possible through God-centric life: 
“The purpose of life is to reach the “martaba” the status 
of tawhid (oneness of Allah), understand it, inculcate it in 
his being to follow His dictates to reach the pedestal of the 
Akhlaqe Alaia (the grandeur of conduct). It would mean a 
singular achievement of transcending from the “bashariat” 
(being a human being: fallible) to the “maqame haqiqat” 
i.e. the position of verity and the truth sublime”(Ghazzali 
2001, 747).
Anthropological perspective
As explained before, Aristotle sees wisdom as the means 
to gain the most desired outcome in life, which is virtue. 
In order to gain wisdom, one needs to know oneself first. 
In Aristotle’s terms, “Knowing yourself is the beginning 
of all wisdom”. From the Islamic perspective, knowing 
self is even more important, as the Prophet says, “he who 
knows himself knows his Lord”. In other words, knowing 
self is the key to knowing God. However, as Gazzhali points 
out, knowing oneself is not an easy job. Human nature is 
composed of complex characteristics. It contains animal 
characteristics in terms of eating, drinking, sleeping, and 
reproducing. It contains beast-like characteristics, like 
harming others for his benefits. It contains satanic and 
angelic characters. Each of these potential characters is 
developed through certain nutrition: “Each one of these 
qualities has its own distinct food that nourishes it, sustains 
and promotes its growth, resulting in the promotion of 
goodness and the approved behavior” (Ghazzali 2001, 2). 
In other words, a human conveys a propensity to become 
animal, Satan, and an angel. Animal are two kinds, good 
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and bad ones. If a person only pursues animal desires, he 
would be like a good animal. If he pursues his interests at 
the cost of others, he will become like beast. The goal is to 
become like angels “to behold the glory of Allah” and to be 
“freed from immoral sensual pleasures and arrogant anger 
on your fellow men” (Ghazzali 2001, 4). Every person has 
the potential to become like an animal, beast, Satan, or an 
angel.
Human nature
Since ancient Greece, there have been many explorations 
about human nature in the Eastern and Western worlds. 
In the twentieth century, Carl Jung tried to define the 
“collective unconscious” of humanity through what he 
called “archetypes” (Jung and Hull 1980). Indeed, Jung 
argued that we are all connected with our fellow humans 
and with nature through the collective unconscious. In 
this regard, Jung’s archetypes are like a big ocean which 
connects individual islands of human society. The key 
elements of human nature presented in this paper are both 
similar to and different from Jung’s archetypes. They are 
similar in the sense that both are universal. The residents 
are not like archetypes. However, they could be considered 
the source of some of Jung’s archetypes.
Inspired largely by the writings of some Muslim scholars 
such as Al-Ghazali7 and Nursi, I recently developed a new 
theory of human nature: “A Grand Theory of Human 
Nature (GTHN)”, using the palace and resident metaphors 
that follow (Aydin 2012). If we compare the human body to 
a luxury recreational vehicle (RV), the following elements 
of human nature would be the companions on this vehicle: 
King, Judge, Wazir, Elephant, Showman, Dog, and Driver. 
The King is the spiritual heart, that is, the source of love 
and inspirational knowledge. The Judge is the conscience 
that is the source of positive feelings after performing 
“good things” and negative feelings experienced after 
doing “bad things”. The Wazir (prime minister) is the 
mind. The Elephant is the animal spirit, which is the source 
of animalistic desires. The Showman is the self-centric ego 
that pursues power and possession to show its importance 
to others. The Dog is an inner drive for protection of 
personal belongings with the potential to oppress others 
for their possessions. The Driver is the deciding self (free 
will) that drives that the vehicle under the influence of the 
residents.
The king: The spiritual heart
Metaphorically speaking, the spiritual heart of an individual 
is like the King in a human vehicle. He has the capacity for 
love, compassion and inspiration. He also has certain needs 
and desires for the fulfillment of his potential and he takes 
actions to acquire what he needs and desires.
Gazhali describes inner self as the essence of what we are. 
It can be seen by the eyes of Batin. The heart (or soul) is the 
core of human existence. Everything else is subservient to 
the heart who is the king of the human vehicle/city: “The 
heart is the rider of the body. Its purpose is for the rider to 
ride its mount. The horse is for the rider and not the rider 
for the horse”(Ghazzali 2001, 44). According to Ghazali, 
“the heart is in control of the whole body.” This is because 
of the fact that all desires emerge from the heart. For 
instance, “when the heart is in anger, the entire body starts 
perspiring. Similarly, when the heart inspired sexually the 
relevant organs of the body are stirred and affected. Also 
when the heart thinks of eating, the agility in the lower 
portion of tongue is aroused to serve him. Hence, it is 
evident that the heart has superintendence over the entire 
body” (Ghazzali 2001, 29). The key qualities of the heart 
could be summarized as follows:
First, the King has almost infinite capacity to love. He needs/
desires beauty, perfection, and benefits in his lover(s). This 
is because the fact that the nature of love is satisfied by 
beauty, perfection, and benefit. The King uses his capital of 
love to make attachments in his search for lover(s). From 
his perspective, life is a journey of making attachments to 
satisfy these needs. Attachments can be made with material 
and/or immaterial things such as money, property, lovers, 
friends, nature, and God. However, according to Ghazali, 
the King finds true satisfaction only with the knowledge, 
submission, and love of God: “the heart is the knight-rider 
of the body. The rest of the body is official of this force. Its 
principal duty is the attainment of the ‘marafat of Allah’ the 
perception and acquisition of His sublime beneficence due 
to the inherent characteristics bestowed by Him in the man’s 
heart to this effect. It throbs in His love. All the time it is 
vocal, reciting His praise, that He alone, He alone is worthy 
of being worshipped. Only He, it is continuously intoning, 
has the power to grant mercy or levy punishment on His 
people … Thus, in whole-heartedly striving to possess the 
‘marafat’ of Allah is the key to this goal” (Ghazzali 2001, 4). 
This is the case because “The ‘marafat’ of Allah is the food 
of the soul, as meals taken by man are nourishment for his 
body” (Ghazzali 2001, 4).
Second, the King has the capacity for compassion, which 
is the source of empathy for the well-being of other 
individuals. For example, compassion for children, the 
elderly, and the poor comes from the King. Through 
exercising compassion, he makes us care about those who 
need help and desires to share our resources with them. He 
receives pleasure from exercising this compassion and feels 
pain when not able to exercise compassion.
Third, the King has the capacity for inspiration. The King 
demonstrates curiosity for the life and the world around 
him. This is the source of learning about the arts and 
sciences. Concentration and contemplation of objects of 
amazement or novelty inspire the King to gain knowledge. 
The King seeks the company of people, objects and events 
that provide inspiration.
In short, it is difficult to substantiate the value of life without 
the King’s attachments; therefore, the King is given a high 
priority and all other residents of the vehicle ultimately 
serve him. GTHN suggests that individuals should take 
care of the needs and desires of the inner King first. This 
requires awareness of what the King desires and protection 
from compromise of these desires. No wonder that 
Harvard psychiatrist, George Vaillant, who directed a 72-
year longitudinal study known as the Grant Study, which 
aimed to identify a formula for a happy and successful life, 
declared that “Happiness is love, full stop” (Joshua Wolf 
Shenk 2009).
According to Ghazali, the heart and its kingdom are 
provided to reach to the highest of high (allayi illiyin). 
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He must consider this world a temporary house and the 
hereafter a permanent residence. He should use all of 
his forces under the command of the king to reach his 
final destination. If they all follow the command of the 
heart, there will be peace and happiness in life’s journey. 
Otherwise, there will be chaos and misery.
The judge: The human conscience
Conscience, which is defined as the ability to distinguish 
right from wrong, is like an inner judge in the human 
vehicle. The Judge makes judgments about an individual’s 
decisions in life. If we treat someone unfairly, the inner 
judge causes us to be aware of this injustice and feels guilty 
for being unfair to others. A recent experiment by the Brain 
Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences (2009) 
confirms the existence of an inner judge mechanism present 
in human beings. According to the director of the center, 
“There is a mechanism in our brain which informs us that 
we have done something wrong. This mechanism launches 
the phenomenon known as remorse. And it is actually our 
remorse which makes us hate our conscience. That is why 
a lot of people try to get rid of it. And the most popular and 
available way to get rid of conscience is alcohol.”
Central to the Judge is the notion of equity or fairness. 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000; 2002; 2005) conducted several 
studies to find out how people understand the concept of 
fairness. These studies concluded that most participants 
conceptualized “fairness” as “living up to what they think 
they should be doing to make other people happy”. The 
Judge is affected by perceived unfairness in his community 
or broader society. He desires “fairness” in relationships and 
seeks equitable social arrangements in which the individual 
trusts and is trusted by other members of society. Feelings 
of inner peace exist when community norms and social 
policy reflect values consistent with those of the Judge. In 
order to make the inner Judge happy, an individual must 
develop a code of ethical behavior and consider fairness in 
every action.
The wazir: Mind
Mind, which consists of intellect, logic, and memory, serves 
as Wazir to the King, the ruler of the human vehicle. If 
the Elephant described below is in power, the Wazir will 
serve him by providing guidance on available choices for 
pleasure. Thoughts that are deemed logical and rational 
also serve as guidance to the King (heart) and the Judge 
(conscience). However, if the Wazir is pre-occupied with 
helping the Elephant, he may not have the resources to 
serve the King and the Judge. The Wazir has the capacity 
of reasoning and memorization. His fulfillment comes 
with gaining knowledge by comprehending objects in the 
environment and through events that he experiences. The 
Wazir acts to learn, reason, and contemplate the inner and 
outer universes.
The Wazir is thirsty for knowledge and meaning. He asks 
questions and enjoys learning their answers. He performs 
the role of making rational decisions for the King and other 
residents such as the Elephant and Judge. However, he has 
no power to endorse his decisions and may be silenced if 
the Elephant is too strong. When this analogy is applied to 
free market capitalism, individuals often exhibit behaviors 
that are dominated by the Elephant despite attempts at 
guidance from the Wazir.
The elephant: Animal spirit
The Elephant is an animal spirit in the human vehicle. 
In traditional Islamic literature, it is known as nafs. 
Al-Ghazzali calls it “horse”; he argues that if we spend all 
our time looking after it and feeding it, we would never get 
anywhere. Instead we should train it and give it just enough 
attention so that it can carry us where we want to go 
(Ghazzali and Winter 1997). I prefer to call it the Elephant 
because of its similarities to what is described by Jonathan 
Haidt in his book titled “The Happiness Hypothesis”. Haidt 
suggests that we have a divided self, which consists of a 
rider and an Elephant. The rider is the reasoning part of 
the mind and the Elephant is the part seeking pleasure. 
To Haidt, “the rider is an advisor, or servant, not a king, 
president, or charioteer with a firm grip on the reins” 
(Haidt 2005). Haidt defines life as a constant struggle 
between the elephant and the rider. However, according to 
Haidt, it is the elephant that is in control, not the rider, “It 
is really the elephant holding the reins, guiding the rider. 
The rider becomes a lawyer fighting in the court of public 
opinion to persuade others of the elephant’s point of view” 
(Haidt 2005, 21–22).
The Elephant has the capacity for sensual experience 
through using the five senses. He needs and/or desires 
many things such as food, drink, sleep, sex, etc. His 
fulfillment is determined by the acts of eating, drinking, 
sleeping, sexual activity and so on. Nursi, (1996a; 1996b; 
1996c) wrote extensively on what the Elephant desires 
and how to train/control him. In his view, the Elephant 
is addicted to pleasure. The Elephant pursues instant 
gratification and selects present pleasure over any greater 
reward that could be achieved through deferment. Blind 
to the future, he wants to gain pleasure and avoid pain 
now with no ability to conduct long-term cost and benefit 
analysis. He is never satisfied with what he has and always 
asks for more. Due to the phenomenon known as “hedonic 
adaptation”, he is very adaptable to his current situations. 
He ceases to appreciate what he has and always looks for 
new sources of pleasures. He resists limits and without 
external restraint will consume anything and everything 
that provides instant gratification. He collaborates with the 
Showman and consumes “positional goods and services”. 
Indeed, according to Haidt, the Elephant is concerned with 
“prestige, not happiness” (Haidt 2005, 22). In Nursi’s view, 
one of the key purposes of religion is to provide restraint 
and to control of the Elephant, guide and train him.
The showman: The self-centric ego
The self-centric ego is like a showman in the human 
vehicle. He enjoys working for the Elephant because of 
the recognition he receives from the latter’s activities. He 
is motivated by acts that acquire recognition, identity, 
fame, etc. and frequently compares his own possessions 
with those of others. However, if the Showman gains too 
much power in the vehicle, he will act like a dictator trying 
to control other people and nature. Indeed, he might even 
claim to be a sort of God. Relying on his assumed power, 
he will attempt to oppress others for his interests. He will 
not accept his imperfection and impotence. He will become 
a selfish creature as defined by Haidt: “We are shaped by 
individual selection to be selfish creatures who struggle 
for resources, pleasure, and prestige, and we were shaped 
by group selection to be hive creatures who long to lose 
ourselves in something larger” (Haidt 2005, 21–22).
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In the modern consumer society, individuals are in a 
continuous process of constructing their personal identity 
through consuming material goods as social and cultural 
symbols. Cushman said that the “empty self” of a consumer 
is constantly in need of “filling up” through material 
consumption (Cushman 1990). Companies are quite 
successful in providing positional goods and services to 
conspicuous consumers. They do not sell “just” products; 
they sell brands, prestige, visions, dreams, associations, 
status, etc. (Klein 2001).
The dog: The oppressive ego
The Dog is an inner drive for the protection of personal 
belongings with potential to oppress others for their 
possessions. If unchecked by moral and religious values, 
he will act like a dictator trying to control other people 
and nature. Indeed, he might even claim to be a sort of 
God. Relying on his assumed power, he will attempt to 
oppress others for his interests. He will not accept the innate 
impotence and neediness. According to Ghazali, the power of 
anger (quvate ghazab) is “like a hunting dog”. It is given “to 
suppress the devil in man” in two ways (Ghazzali 2001, 733):
• By remaining in the confines of the code of conduct 
of the Shariat.
• By overcoming the savage, the sensual and self-
aggrandizing urges.
Ghazali elaborates on the outcome of being overtaken 
by the Dog as follows: “then the damaging traits that will 
develop in you will be those of being rash and unmindful 
of consequences, impurity, bragging, arrogance, wanton 
flaunting of your faults, taunting and torturing others, 
picking up flights and squabbles with others.” On the 
other hand, “if you prevail over this dog of destruction, 
you will acquire the added qualities of patience, suavity, 
forgiveness, stability, bravery, tranquility and saintliness” 
(Ghazzali 2001, 15).
The driver: The deciding self 
The observing/deciding self is like a driver in the human 
vehicle. He is the source of self-awareness and serves 
as a conduit for relationships with other human beings 
and the external environment. He is the reference point 
for knowing everything including other beings and God 
(Al-Ghazzali 2007; Nursi 1996c). He is in charge of the 
vehicle. He is aware of his possessions and protects them 
from intruders. As shown in Figure  8, the Driver pursues 
self-esteem, awareness, and identity formation.
Teleological perspective
From the Islamic point of view, as everything in the 
universe is created for certain purposes, a human being 
is also created for certain purposes. The main purpose of 
the human is not to boost the self, turning him to an inner 
god. The purpose is also not to serve the Elephant, as in 
becoming his slave. Rather, the purpose is to understand 
our nature embedded with infinite impotence and poverty, 
and act accordingly. It is to disclose our almost infinite 
potential by relying on the divine power and mercy through 
understanding our true nature. In other words, the purpose 
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Figure 8. God’s human project.
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is to excel spiritually, intellectually, and morally and be 
“insan-i kamil” (a perfect human) by disclosing our human 
potentiality as much as we can.
A story told by the 13th century poet Rumi fits well in 
explaining what the Enlightenment has done to human 
potential. In his masterpiece Mathnavi Ma’navi “Spiritual 
Couplet”, Rumi compares the human to a goose’s egg along 
with many hen’s eggs placed under a hen for incubation. 
Even though the chick from the goose’s egg will become 
a goose, if she imitates her siblings, she can only walk. 
However, if she becomes aware of her potential, she can 
walk on the ground, swim in the water, and fly in the air. 
Similarly, if we truly become aware of the key elements of 
our nature, we can have many different experiences and 
reach a higher level of enjoyment in our life.
God’s human project
From the Quranic perspective, a human being is a (perhaps 
the) major project of God. The Islamic worldview is built 
upon this project. The Quran provides detail information 
about the initiation of the project and its expected outcome. 
“Remember (when) your Lord said to the angels: “I am 
setting on the earth a vicegerent.” The angels asked: “Will 
you set therein one who will cause disorder and corruption 
on it and shed blood … He said: “Surely I know what you 
do not know” (Quran 2:30). In another verse, the Quran 
states that human beings were created in the best form 
(ahsan-i taqwim): “Surely we have created human of the 
best stature, as the perfect pattern of creation” (95:5). This 
refers to the potential in human beings. Indeed, the Quran 
clearly indicates that human beings are potentially superior 
to all creatures, even angels. Therefore, when Adam was 
created, the angels were asked to “prostrate before Adam! 
They all prostrated, but Iblis Satan did not; he refused, and 
grew arrogant, and displayed himself as an unbeliever.” 
(Quran 2:34) The superiority of Adam was not coming 
from wealth, pleasure, fame etc. It was coming from his 
ability to learn the truth about God in a comprehensive 
manner. “(Having brought him into existence,) God taught 
Adam the names, all of them. Then (in order to clarify the 
supremacy of humankind and the wisdom in their being 
created and made vicegerent on the earth), He presented 
them (the things and beings, whose names had been taught 
to Adam, with their names) to the angels, and said, ‘Now tell 
Me the names of these, if you are truthful (in your praising, 
worshipping, and sanctifying Me as My being God and Lord 
deserves)’” (Quran 2:31). The angels acknowledged that 
they could not gain knowledge as much as a human could. 
The Quran (95:5) also warns about the failure of not using 
the great potential given to human beings by saying that he 
will “reduce him to the lowest of the low”. The only way out 
from such failure is be among “… those who believe and do 
good, righteous deeds” (Quran 95:6).
From the Islamic perspective, the ultimate purpose of 
life is to excel in virtuous and sincere deeds in order to 
fulfill the mission of vicegerent and earn God’s pleasure. 
This means that human beings should be guided in terms 
of how to live a good life and fulfill this divine mission. 
However, the guidance does not come from the secular 
mind; it comes from the mind enlightened by the divine 
revelation. As seen in Figure 8 below, God’s human project 
will succeed if we enrich our heart, conscience, and mind, 
and control our weaknesses, namely animal soul, and 
selfish and oppressive ego through the teaching of the 
Tawheedi paradigm. Nursi defines the tawheedi paradigm 
on five pillars: tawhid (oneness of God); nubuvvah 
(prophethood), hereafter (akhirah); adalah (justice); and 
obedience to God (ibadah). The last one is not just praying, 
it is living wholely according to the divine guidance. God’s 
human project is built upon these pillars. They help human 
beings to control their negative sides and to disclose their 
positive sides in fulfilling their mission as vicegerent and to 
reach to the highest of the high, going even beyond angels. 
If we fulfill our mission by following our nature, we will 
excel and reach to the highest of high. If we fail to do so, we 
will fall to the lowest of the low. For that reason, the Quran 
praises the Prophet Muhammed in terms of his character: 
“You are surely of a sublime character, and do act by a 
sublime pattern of conduct” (Quran 68:4).
The success of the project is not measured by material 
outcomes. It is measured by spiritual, moral, and 
intellectual outcomes. Ghazali outlines the outcome of a 
good and a bad life as follows: “Beware that your acts and 
deeds will create in you a corresponding trend of character 
which will make you or mar you. Indeed nothing but 
the good emerges out of the good. Vice versa, if you are 
obedient to the swine of desire, you will have similar habits 
of profanity, shamelessness, avarice, flattery, dirtiness and 
that of being happy over the wickedness of the others. 
However if you succeed in suppressing the swine; getting 
the better of him, you will be crowned with the qualities 
of contentment, grace, wisdom, piety and selflessness etc.” 
(Ghazzali 2001, 14).
Ghazali gives the example of a person who aims to go 
to Kabah by camel. Of course, the person has to take care 
of the camel to a certain extent in order to complete his 
journey successfully. However, if he acts as if his main job 
is to serve the camel, he will perish on his way without 
reaching the destination. The relationship between body 
and soul is like that of a rider and camel. The rider aims 
to go to Kabah (Ghazzali 2001, 78). He will take care of 
his camel to realize his goal. If he spends all of his time 
serving the camel, but making no progress, he would be 
considered foolish. In another place, Ghazali again refers to 
the kingdom metaphor to explain the purpose of life: “Allah 
thus gave man the heart and its kingdom to reign over. He 
provide him with the army – the force to do so, also the 
wherewithal to ride, in order to make him rise to the higher 
grounds of grandeur” (Ghazzali 2001, 9).
For that matter, life is not fun even though there is room 
for fun in life. Rather, life is a test. “We have surely made 
whatever is on the earth as an ornament for it (appealing 
to humanity), so that We may try them (by demonstrating 
it to themselves) which of them is best in conduct. Yet, We 
surely reduce whatever is on it to a barren dust-heap (and 
will do so when the term of trial ends)” (Quran 18:7–8). 
Therefore, material possessions cannot be the goal in life; 
they can only be a means of accomplishing the ultimate 
goal of disclosing our potential. For a believer “the present, 
worldly life is nothing but a play and pastime, and better 
is the abode of the Hereafter for those who keep from 
disobedience to God in reverence for Him and piety…” 
(Quran 6:32). The purpose of life is to pursue God’s pleasure 
by fulfilling our mission as desired and designed rather 
Aydin
56 Islamic economic: Theory, policy and social justice
than pursuing self-pleasure. However, from the Islamic 
perspective, well-being in this life and in the hereafter will 
be realized as by product of God’s pleasure. Ghazali points 
out the hapless pursuit of happiness in sensual pleasure as 
follows: “some people think that they have been made to 
eat, drink and fulfill their urge for the other sex. People of 
this kind wither away all their life in such hapless pursuits” 
(Ghazzali 2001, 17).
5. Islamic economics as a new economic 
paradigm
Islamic economics has been a key subject matter among 
a diverse pool of Muslim scholars, such as commentators 
of the Quran, jurists, historians, and social, political, and 
moral philosophers. In last few decades, discussions on 
Islamic economics have intensified. Muslim economists 
have been discussing the need for Islamic economics as 
a new discipline. Even though there is a great consensus 
among scholars that the Islamic worldview differs from its 
secular counterpart, “the debate on ‘nature’ of and ‘need’ for 
Islamic economics and finance as an alternative paradigm 
is not settled yet” (Iqbal et al. 2007, 4). Despite significant 
progress in the discussion, there is still argument even on 
the very definition of Islamic economics.
There groups of people who write on Islamic economics. 
The first group of scholars is those who attempt to present 
the Islamic economic system as an alternative system to 
capitalism and/or socialism. They are in favor of radical 
changes rather gradual modification of the existing system. 
The second group acknowledges that Islamic economics 
should be a distinct system, but they do not think that 
Muslim scholars are ready to present such a comprehensive 
alternative system. Therefore, they are in favor of gradual 
reformation of conventional economics. The third group 
consists of critics of Islamic economics who do not see 
any potential for Islamic economics to be a distinct model. 
For instance, Timur argues that Islamic economics is not 
a genuine answer to the world’s economic problems, but 
an invented device to protect “Islamic civilization against 
foreign cultural influences” (Kuran 1995, 156). In my 
view, Timur and other skeptics of Islamic economics do 
not understand the distinctive features of the Islamic 
worldview. They see the efforts towards Islamic economics 
as capitalism minus interest plus zakah, or socialism minus 
state control plus God. They do not think Islamic economics 
could be defined as something unique. In this section, I 
would like to discuss the definitions of Islamic economics 
suggested by leading scholars of the first two groups 
mentioned above. Then, I will present my own definition 
based on the Islamic worldview outlined in this paper.
Conventional economics
Marshall, in his famous book “Principles of Economics” 
published in 1890, defines economics as follows:
“Political Economy or Economics is a study of mankind 
in the ordinary business of life; it examines that part 
of individual and social action which is most closely 
connected with the attainment and with the use of 
the material requisites of wellbeing. Thus it is on the 
one side a study of wealth; and on the other, and more 
important side, a part of the study of man.”
It means that the main subject matter of economics, 
irrespective of whether it is capitalist or Islamic, is the 
allocation of scarce resources to produce and distribute 
goods and services in order to fulfill the needs and wants of 
human beings. Thus, need and want fulfillment of human 
beings are at the final end of economic activities. However, 
the challenge arises from the scarcity of resources versus 
the unlimited wants of human beings. Economists are 
supposed to help with finding the answers to three core 
questions: what, how, and for whom to produce? Even 
conventional economics is divided over how to answer 
the questions above. Positive economics deals with those 
questions without taking any norms into consideration 
while normative economics tries to find out universally 
desired answers. In other words, positive economics 
aims for efficiency in production and distribution while 
normative economics considers value judgments above 
efficiency.
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Figure 9. Basis of economics.
Due to the scarcity of resources and the unlimited nature 
of human wants, the core questions are same for every 
kind of economics, capitalist, socialist or Islamic. However, 
the answers to those questions depend on worldviews. In 
general, we could talk about two main worldviews:
1. Materialist and secular.
2. Spiritual and religious.
The materialist and secular worldview rejects the 
spiritual realm of the human being and the universe. 
There is nothing beyond the material world. The life is 
strictly limited to this world. There is no room for belief 
in the hereafter. For that matter, the primary concern of 
materialist people is the acquisition of material goods 
and the enjoyment of physical satisfactions, and as a 
consequent rejection of or indifference to the spiritual, 
aesthetic, or ethical things (Stuart 1989, 19). This is same 
for the socialist economic system. Despite disagreement 
between the two, in reality, the capitalist and socialist 
systems are two twins who prefer different means to the 
same ends. In other words, both capitalism and socialism 
see human pleasure as the final ends. The disagreement 
is about how to produce goods and services for human 
pleasure and who to please among human beings. Well-
being is defined in a purely materialist and hedonist sense. 
While free market capitalism envisions the fulfillment of 
social interests within the free pursuit of self-interests, 
socialism gives priority to social interests. Both capitalism 
and socialism aim for a “worldly paradise” through the 
material well-being of people. The disagreement is in the 
tools they suggest for the final end.
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Islamic economics
Even though Islamic economics overlaps with conventional 
economics in terms of dealing with scarce resources in order 
to fulfill the needs and wants of human beings, it differs 
significantly in the way it answers the core questions and 
defines human needs and well-being. Islam recognizes the 
spiritual, moral, and social needs of human beings in addition 
to material needs. In Islamic economics, human well-being 
is not defined from a hedonic perspective; rather it is defined 
from a spiritual, moral, and social perspective. Even though 
Islamic economics is for free market in general, it does 
provide certain filters to avoid the madness and unfairness 
of the market. Thus, the answer to “what to produce” is 
determined by a comprehensive understanding of human 
nature and needs, not by self-interest. Self-pleasure is not 
the final end, it is the by-product of God’s pleasure.
There are many competing definitions of Islamic 
economics. I would like to discuss several of them here. 
Hasannuzzaman is one of the first people who attempted 
to come up with a comprehensive definition: “Islamic 
economics is the knowledge and application of injunctions 
and rules of the Shariah that prevent injustice in the 
acquisition and disposal of material resources in order 
to provide satisfaction to human beings and enable them 
to perform their obligations to Allah and the society” 
(emphasis added) (Hasanuzzaman 1984, 52) This 
definition is quite vague. It does not specify which rules 
and knowledge are relevant to Islamic economics. Islamic 
economics is defined mainly on the concept of justice. It 
is not clear whether the author would consider capitalism 
or socialism as acceptable economic systems if they are 
modified to prevent injustice.
For Mannan, the defining feature of Islamic economics 
is its values: “Islamic economics is a social science which 
studies the economic problems of a people imbued with 
the values of Islam” (emphasis added) (Mannan 1987, 18). 
However, he does not elaborate on the relevant values and 
how their involvement will create Islamic economics as 
a distinct field. For Khurshid Ahmad, Islamic economics 
is “a systematic effort to try to understand the economic 
problem and man’s behavior in relation to that problem 
from an Islamic perspective” (emphasis added) (Ahmad 
1992, 19). Again, the definition does not provide any hint 
on how the Islamic perspective requires Islamic economics 
to be distinct. Likewise, the following definitions portray 
Islamic economics as something shaped by Muslim 
scholars within the Islamic perspective, but do not say 
how it differs in terms of answering the core questions: 
“the Muslim thinkers’ response to the economic challenges 
of their times. In this endeavor they were aided by the 
Quran and the Sunnah as well as by reason and experience” 
(emphasis added) ((Siddiqi 1992, 69). “Islamic economics 
is the representative Muslim’s behavior in a typical Muslim 
society” (emphasis added) (Naqvi 1994, 176).
For Khan, the distinctive feature of Islamic economics 
is well-being through co-operation and participation; 
however, he does not elaborate on the implications of his 
definition for the nature of the Islamic economic system: 
“Islamic economics aims at the study of human falah [well-
being] achieved by organizing the resources of the earth 
on the basis of cooperation and participation” (emphasis 
added) (Khan 1994, 33). Although Hasan expands the 
preceding definition by highlighting the multiplicity of 
wants and scarcity of resources, he does not go far enough 
to outline the distinctive nature of the Islamic economic 
system: “Islamic economics is the subject that studies 
human behavior in relation to a multiplicity of wants and 
scarcity of resources with alternative uses so as to maximize 
falah that is the well-being both in the present world and 
the hereafter” (emphasis added) (Hasan 2011, 21).
Umar Chapra provides the most comprehensive definition: 
“The primary function of Islamic economics, like that of 
any other body of knowledge, should be the realization 
of human well-being through the actualization of the 
maqasid. Within this perspective Islamic economics may 
be defined as that branch of knowledge which helps realize 
human well-being through an allocation and distribution of 
scarce resources that is in conformity with Islamic teachings 
without unduly curbing individual freedom or creating 
continued macroeconomic and ecological imbalances” 
(emphasis added) (Chapra 1996, 30).
To me the distinctive features of Islamic economics come 
from the Islamic worldview, particularly its ontological, 
epistemological, and teleological differences from the 
materialist worldview. Therefore, it is important to 
highlight the multi-dimensional well-being goals and 
morally guided market mechanism in the definition: 
“Islamic economics foresees an economic system based on 
the Islamic worldview aiming to realize spiritual, moral, 
intellectual, social, and material well-beings of individuals 
in this life and the hereafter through allocation and 
distribution of scarce resources in a morally guided market 
system.” Thus, the answers to the core questions could be 
as follows: what to produce? Produce goods and services 
which help human beings to excel spiritually, intellectually, 
morally, and socially. What to produce? Produce the basic 
goods and services for everyone, but others for those who 
could afford more. Accumulate spiritual, moral, and social 
capital in addition to physical and financial capital. How 
to produce? Produce through an efficient and fair market 
mechanism.
6. Desired outcome in Islamic economics 
versus conventional economics
In this section, I will present the key distinguishing features 
of Islamic economics. As well-argued by Aristotle, the 
ultimate end or final good is what we should care about. For 
that matter, it is important to understand how the final good 
in Islamic economics differs from that of in conventional 
economics. I would like to make this comparison through 
examining three happiness models. The first one, G-donic 
model, is the path to happiness through the Islamic 
worldview; the second, the eudonic model, is the path to 
happiness through Aristotelian philosophy; the third, the 
hedonic model, is the path to happiness through a capitalist 
utilitarian prescription. The eudonic model has already 
been discussed, so I will outline the other two models 
before making a comparison between the three.
G-donic happiness model
The G-donic happiness model is based on a comprehensive 
understanding of human nature from the Islamic 
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perspective. Understanding and commanding our inner 
nature are very important in the pursuit of happiness. As 
Toynbee argues, “the command over non-human nature, 
which science has in its gift, is of almost infinitely less 
importance to Man than his relations with himself, with 
his fellow man, and with God” (Toynbee and Somervell 
1946, 99). In fact, the authors go to the extent of saying 
that “a crushing victory of science over religion would be 
disastrous for both parties; for reason as well as religion is 
one of the essential faculties of human nature.”
As Buddha says, “there is no way to happiness. Happiness 
is the way.” I call it the “happiness highway”. In this regard, 
happiness is not a destination to reach. It is the experience 
while driving on the happiness highway. Happiness is the 
by-product of living according to the God’s pleasure. Using 
the analogy in the section on human nature, we can define 
happiness as overall life satisfaction for the residents of the 
RV while driving on the straight path (sirattal mustakim). 
In other words, happiness is to drive the RV to under 
the collaborative command of the King (heart), Judge 
(conscience), and Wazir (mind). It is to drive towards 
excellence in sincere spiritual, intellectual, and moral 
intentions and actions. It is to keep the Elephant (animal 
soul), Dog (anger), and Showman (egoistic self) under the 
command of the King, Wazir, and Judge.
While the G-donic model provides guidance to nourish the 
heart, mind, and intellect, it also highlights the danger of 
being slave to the animal soul, ego, and anger. It warns 
people that, if not trained, the Elephant, Showman, and 
Dog will dominate the RV and urge certain irrational 
actions despite any objection from the King, Wazir, and 
the Judge. The G-donic model provides nourishment for 
the King, who has the capacity for love, compassion and 
inspiration. It guides people on how to find authentic and 
lasting love in life for the fulfillment of the King. It discusses 
the role of loving mates, children, friends and jobs in the 
pursuit of happiness. The G-donic model notes that the 
inner Judge (conscience) always makes judgment about 
what we do to others. If we treat someone unfairly, he 
causes us to be aware of this injustice and to feel guilty for 
being unfair. If we treat others fairly, we receive spiritual 
pleasure experienced through the fulfillment of the judge. 
The G-donic model presents the food station for the 
Wazir who is thirsty for knowledge and meaning. Finding 
meaning in life is very important for the Wazir because, as 
the navigator, he needs to know where to go. Life without 
meaning is like driving without knowing the destination. 
The G-donic model also offers a guide on how to keep the 
animal soul, showman, and god under control. It suggests 
moderation in consumption and warns about the poisons 
present in some food. It makes some recommendations 
for pleasure maximization under restraints of the “law of 
diminishing marginal utility”, “adaption principle”, and the 
“hedonic treadmill”.
Based on the GTHN, it is not possible for a person to discuss 
“happiness” in the singular form because there are many 
“residents” (selves) who are competing within the human 
“vehicle”. When we say “I am happy”, who do we mean 
is happy: the Dog, the King, the Judge, the Wazir, the 
Elephant, or the Showman? Of course, we could make a 
collective statement on behalf of all the residents if they all 
experiencing the same level of happiness. In this regard, 
happiness is not a destination; it is experience on the 
highway of life. We can summarize the overall subjective 
wellbeing of the residents as a happiness matrix.
The happiness matrix captures six different dimensions 
of the human experience as represented by the residents 
of the vehicle. For instance, happiness for the King depends 
on how one fulfills the needs/desires of love, compassion 
and inspiration. Love pursues beauty, perfection and 
benefits. Life for the King in this regard is a journey of 
making attachments. The number, intensity, and duration 
of attachments produce spiritual or esthetical pleasures. As 
the King gains pleasure by making attachments through 
love, compassion, and inspiration, he also suffers from 
any detachments that occur. Like the King, each resident 
of the human vehicle experiences pains and/or pleasures 
from daily activities. Therefore, we will define happiness as 
a function of subjective well-being for all residents in the 
matrix as shown below:
H =  Σ wi hi(Xi) = w1 h1(K) + w2 h2(J) + w3 h3(W)  
+ w4 h4(E) + w5 h5(D) − w6 h6(S)
“There is no way to happiness. Happiness is the way” 
Buddha
Key Residents of the RV
1.  The self (the driver)
2.  The spiritual heart (the king)
3.  The conscience (the judge)
4.  The mind (the advisor)
5.  The animal soul (the elephant)
6.  The egoistic self (the showman)
7.  The oppressing ego (the dog)
Figure 10. Key residents of the RV.
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where H is one’s overall with satisfaction with life; wi is 
the weight of specific happiness variable in one is overall 
happiness with life; h1 is one’s happiness function with 
the King; h2 is one’s happiness function with the Judge; 
h3 is one’s happiness function with the Wazir; h4 is one’s 
happiness function with the Elephant; h5 is one’s happiness 
function with the Dog; and h6 is one’s happiness function 
with the Showman. In Nursi’s view, overall life satisfaction 
is maximized when the needs and desires of first five are 
fulfilled in the balanced way while the effect of the last one 
(the Showman) is minimized.
In the G-donic model, authentic happiness is possible 
if individuals listen to the voices of all residents of the 
human vehicle and try to fulfill their needs and desires in 
a balanced manner. One cannot achieve true happiness by 
listening to only one resident while disregarding the others. 
By knowing each resident in terms of their needs, desires, 
and dangers an individual can attempt to find that balance. 
In many ways, the residents of our body are quite similar 
to the members of a family living in the same house. As the 
entire family’s peace and happiness is possible if each family 
member lives in peace and prosperity, the inner peace of a 
person is also possible if each resident of his vehicle lives 
in peace and prosperity. Making one family member happy 
and leaving the rest of the family in misery is not true 
happiness for the family. Likewise, making one resident 
of the human vehicle happy, but neglecting the others, is 
a recipe for discontent. Therefore, it is important to define 
the happiness function for each resident separately based 
on the relevant variables in the matrix shown above.
In order to achieve overall happiness, each resident’s 
happiness should be considered. Prioritizing the needs and 
desires of residents in case of scarcity and conflict allows 
harmony. For instance, if we spend too much time earning 
money for sensual pleasure, we will have less time left 
for pursuing other pleasures. Furthermore, things that give 
pleasure to one resident might be painful for the other. For 
instance, drinking too much alcohol might create sensual 
pleasure, but it kills intellectual pleasure. Thus, overall 
happiness requires effort to balance the needs and desires 
of all residents. In short, from the Islamic perspective, 
authentic, pure, and lasting happiness is only possible if 
one listens to the voices of all the residents of the vehicle 
and attempts to fulfill their needs and desires in a balanced 
way. One cannot be truly happy if s/he listens only to one of 
residents while disregarding the others.
Hedonic happiness model
Since the Enlightenment, particularly in the West, the 
quest for happiness has been mainly through material 
consumption. As Jeremy Bentham says, the goal of 
human beings is to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. 
Capitalist ideology provides a utility calculator in order to 
assist people in making estimates towards maximizing their 
utility through material consumption. The simple formula 
for happiness is defined as follows: the more you consume, 
the happier you will be. Indeed, the global market economy 
based on the capitalist ideology has been very successful 
in producing more wealth and in creating opportunities 
for people to consume more. Living in a global consumer 
culture, people have gone far beyond purchasing goods 
and services to fulfill their essential needs. They have 
almost turned into “consumption machines” to produce 
happiness.
The capitalist ideology based on the utility principle which 
produces “popular culture” and the “consumer society” 
views self (ego) and animal spirits as the main elements of 
human nature. Indeed, the system relies on these pillars. 
For instance, Adam Smith, the father of capitalist ideology, 
explains the “invisible hand” behind the market mechanism 
based on the concept of “self-interest”. In his terms: “It is 
not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the 
baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to 
their own interest” (Smith 1990, 26–27). Inspired by Adam 
Smith and Jeremy Bentham, the capitalistic ideology uses 
market mechanisms to please animal spirits and boost 
human egos. Therefore, it undermines many elements of 
human nature. It reduces humanity to the animal level of 
life experience. It destroys most of his positive potentials.
In my view, self-interest relies on two key elements 
of human nature. “Self” refers to “ego” and “interest” refers 
to the desires of “animal spirits”. According to Adam Smith, 
the market mechanism determines what and how much 
to produce if we simply let everyone act based upon his 
or her “self-interest”. Individuals will demand and supply 
an optimum amount of goods and services to boost their 
ego (or make up their images) and fulfill the desires of 
their animal spirits. Thus, supply and demand driven by 
the interests of self (ego) and animal spirits will work like 
an invisible hand pushing the market mechanism toward 
the most efficient production and consumption. Therefore, 
the role for government is limited to a few areas such as 
security, national defense, and justice. Furthermore, the 
free market mechanism could even provide some of those 
services if it is allowed to be so. The ultimate purpose is 
to let the market system produce all goods and services, if 
possible. Perhaps, with strong lobbying power, the market 
system could even run the government.
Free market capitalism uses money to fulfill the desires 
of the Elephant, the Showman, and the Dog. The system 
turns everything into commodities. As argued by Karl 
Polanyi (1957), during the pre-capitalist era, “economic” 
relations and practices were “embedded” in non-economic 
social relationships, such as kinship, communal, religious, 
and political relationships. The main motive behind 
economic activity was not money. People used to seek the 
achievement of prestige or the maintenance of communal 
solidarity. However, in the modern “market society”, the 
main purpose is to make money. Even human beings and 
nature are treated as market commodities in the form of 
labor and land.
Capitalism commercializes everything, including human 
values and relationships because of its lack of understanding 
of true human nature. It replaces authentic and lasting love 
with fake and fast love. It kills friendship for the sake of 
making more money. It replaces long-lived family life with 
short-lived dating. However, what free market capitalism 
offers is far from satisfying the King. The King also enjoys 
real and authentic attachments rather than superficial 
ones. It is not the King; it is the Elephant who wants sensual 
and sexual love. The King wants emotional and eternal 
love. Indeed, some ancient philosophers hate sensual and 
sexual love because they think “(…) love is attachment. 
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Attachments, particularly sensual and sexual attachments, 
must be broken to permit spiritual progress” (Haidt 2005, 
128). They think the love of self is an impediment to love of 
neighbors, love of truth, love of God, love of beauty. “They 
all know that virtue resides in a well-trained elephant” 
(Haidt 2005, 160).
Free market capitalism does not recognize the desires of 
the inner Judge. Therefore, the system does not consider 
fairness in determining prices and wages. However, the 
lack of fairness and confidence hurts people and diminishes 
their subjective well-being. It is one key factor driving both 
financial and happiness crisis. Akerlof and Kranton (2000; 
2002; 2005) conducted several studies to find out what 
people think about fairness. They reported that people 
generally consider it an insult if others think they are not 
fair. At the same time, they get upset if others do not act 
fairly to them. People cannot reach authentic happiness if 
fairness and confidence are missing.
Free market capitalism has turned people into selfish 
creatures as described by Haidt: “during the twentieth 
century, as people become wealthier and the producer 
society turned gradually into the mass consumption 
society, alternative visions of the self arose – a vision 
centered on the idea of individual preferences and personal 
fulfillment” (Haidt 2005, 176). The capitalist system makes 
it very difficult for people to gain self-control because of 
the temptation of their animal spirits. However, social 
psychologists who study self-control argue that it is “one of 
the most precious endowments of the human self”, mainly 
because many problems such as depression, aggression, 
teenage pregnancy, obesity, gambling, and poor school 
performance are directly related to weak self-control 
(Muraven et al. 1998).
Comparisons of three happiness models
Again using the RV metaphor, each resident has different 
tastes. The Elephant pursues sensual and emotional 
pleasures by pursuing fun, food, and flirting. The Showman 
and Dog pursue egotistical pleasure through image making 
and power. The Wazir pursues intellectual pleasure. 
The King and the Judge receive emotional and spiritual 
pleasures through love, compassion and belief. The Dog 
pursues control over things. However, the pleasure of one 
resident could be pain for another. Authentic happiness 
can be possible if all residents pursue their own pleasures 
without harming the others.
In the G-donic model, happiness is not a destination; it is a 
state of being while driving spiritual, moral, and intellectual 
excellence. It is the progress made toward excellence on 
the straight path. Happiness is the by-product of living 
according to human nature and fulfilling his/her mission 
according to the divine project. This will result in God’s 
pleasure. The Quran clearly states that God’s pleasure is 
highest good:8 “God has promised the believers, both men 
and women, Gardens through which rivers flow, therein 
to abide, and blessed dwellings in Gardens of perpetual 
bliss; and greater (than those) is God’s being pleased with 
them. That indeed is the supreme triumph.” (Quran 9:72) 
Believers are called to do everything only for God’s pleasure. 
For instance, when the rich believers help the poor, they 
are asked to say the following to them: “We feed you only 
for God’s sake; we desire from you neither recompense nor 
thanks (we desire only the acceptance of God)” (Quran 
76:9). Believers are asked to say the following: “My Prayer, 
and all my (other) acts and forms of devotion and worship, 
and my living and my dying are for God alone, the Lord of 
the worlds” (Quran 6:162).
The G-donic model is fundamentally different from the 
hedonic happiness model. While the former puts God’s 
pleasure as the highest good in the pursuit of happiness, the 
latter sees self-pleasure as the ultimate purpose. True and 
lasting happiness can be possible if the needs and desires 
of all residents are met in a balanced way. In the hedonic 
model, the Elephant, Showman, and/or Dog are in charge 
of the RV. Indeed, all other residents work hard to please 
them. People become the slave of their desires only. They 
generally pursue their sensual pleasure. They think life is 
“just” fun. They sacrifice virtues for their instant pleasures 
if their virtues contradict their animal desires. The problem 
is that the Elephant and the Showman are greedy and, 
therefore, never satisfied. They are also blind to the future, 
and therefore, they focus on short-term pain and pleasures, 
rather than the long-term ones. Furthermore, some of their 
desires could be harmful to other residents. Therefore, 
pleasing them alone cannot bring anyone happiness.
The G-donic model differs from the eudonic happiness 
model as well, despite major overlaps between the two:
• In Islam the pleasure of God is the highest good, not 
happiness.
• In Islam virtuous actions are important, but they have 
to be for the divine pleasure. For instance, courage 
is praised virtue in Islam. However, courage against 
enemy for the sake of fame is not praiseworthy.
• In the eudonic model, practical reason alone is 
sufficient to know what is virtuous and how to live a 
virtuous life. In the Islamic model, the human mind 
guided by the divine mind determines and practices 
virtuous actions to gain the divine pleasure.
• For the eudonic model, it is important to have the 
necessary external prosperity in order to be virtuous 
because thought or intentions are not sufficient. 
Actions are necessary. In the Islamic model, intention 
alone could be sufficient if external means are not 
accessible.
For Aristotle, happiness is the highest good because it is 
complete and self-sufficient. From a secular perspective, 
it is true to consider happiness as the final end; however, 
it is hard to claim it is the highest good or self-sufficient. 
According to Aristotle, practical reason clearly indicates 
that the ultimate purpose of human life is to act in rational 
manner. The rationality would direct us to moderation to 
live a good life. There are two crucial problems with such 
reasoning:
1. Aristotle perceives the human mind as the sole 
source of virtue. In reality, the human mind could fail 
to determine virtue. In other words, what is thought 
in a society to be virtue might not be real virtue.
2. If life is limited to this world, it would be hard to 
justify virtuous actions for oneself. Since everything 
will soon be annihilated, the ultimate result of 
human endeavors will be nothing. The human mind 
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does not see any goodness in effort for nothing. 
Gaining excellence to be decayed in the grave is not 
satisfactory.
For Aristotle, happiness is a qualitative trait. It is overall 
satisfaction from life as a result of virtuous actions. 
However, it would be a mistake to say that happiness is 
not measurable from the Aristotelian perspective. As the 
happiness level could vary throughout life for a person, 
it could also vary from person to person. We could define 
Aristotelian happiness as the function of virtue, actions, 
and external prosperity. And, for that matter, we could 
define the hedonic (HH), eudonic (HE), and G-donic (HG) 
happiness functions as follows:
HH =  f (self-interest, pragmatic mind, external prosperity, 
consumption).
HE = f (practical wisdom/prudence, virtue, virtuous actions, 
required external prosperity).
HG  =  f (revelation, practical wisdom/prudence, virtue, 
sincerity, virtuous and sincere actions if possible, external 
prosperity)
7. Concluding remarks
This paper attempts to make a strong case for Islamic 
economics as an alternative paradigm to deal with the 
crises of capitalism. It paints the Western worldview in 
which free market capitalism emerged and flourished. 
Then, it re-defines Islamic economics based on distinctive 
worldview of Islam, particularly from anthropological, 
epistemological, and teleological perspectives. The paper 
also discusses some distinguishing features of Islamic 
economics, particularly that of pertaining happiness.
Even though free market capitalism has been very 
successful in the use of scarce resources, the paper argues 
strongly that the ultimate outcome of capitalism is not 
progress toward human excellence, rather it is regress 
toward animality. This is why the system has failed to 
bring authentic happiness. Indeed, the more progress it 
makes, the more it takes us away from such happiness. This 
reminds us the Seneca’s opening words in De Vita Beata:
“To live happily, my brother Gallio, is the desire of all 
men, but their minds are blinded to a clear vision of 
just what it is that makes life happy; and so far from its 
being easy to attain the happy life, the more eagerly a 
man strives to reach it, the farther he recedes from it if 
he has made a mistake on the road; for when it leads in 
the opposite direction, his very speed will increase the 
distance that separates him.”
It is important to note that, despite a few decades of work, 
we are still at the beginning of a long path to present 
Islamic economics as a viable paradigm. There are many 
tasks ahead:
1. We need to go beyond the existing paradigm and 
to create our own concepts and models whenever 
necessary.
2. We need to begin from microeconomics.
As Yalcintas (1986, 38) pointed out over two decades 
ago “construction of microeconomic theory under Islamic 
constraints might be the most challenging task for Islamic 
economics.” We need to establish “a separate theory of 
consumer behavior and a separate theory of firm in the 
context of Islamic economics” (Ahmad 1986). This should 
not be just the relabeling of the existing microeconomics 
literature. As Chapra suggests, it should reflect “the radical 
differences in the worldviews of Islamic and conventional 
economics” (Chapra 1996, 50).
3. We need to examine the existing empirical and 
theoretical studies to gather evidence for new 
concepts and models of Islamic economics.
4. We need to conduct experimental and empirical 
studies to gather data and to test economic 
assumptions and models from the Islamic 
perspective.
Most existing papers on Islamic studies do not offer any 
scientifically acceptable evidence for their arguments. 
Therefore, they are more rhetorical rather than scientific. 
The famous motto attributed to Lord Kevin puts 
measurement as the yardstick for scientific knowledge: 
“When you can measure what you are speaking about, 
and express it in numbers, you know something about 
Table 1. Hedonic, Eudonic and G-donic happiness functions.
Hedonic Eudonic G-donic
Final End Self-pleasure Happiness Pleasure of God
Means to End Consumption Virtue/Excellence Sincerity (ihklas)  
in intention and  
virtuous actions
Guidance Self-interest  
and rationality
Prudence and  
wisdom of human  
mind
Prudence and  
wisdom guided by  
the divine mind
Ideal Life Style Always more Moderation Moderation
External Prosperity Extremely  
important
Important if needed  
for virtuous actions
Important but not  
necessary
Education/Training Means for  
prosperity
Means for virtue Means for sincerity  
and virtue
Pleasure Ultimate goal Byproduct of virtue Byproduct of divine  
pleasure
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it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot 
express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meager and 
unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge, 
but you have scarcely in your thoughts advanced to the 
state of Science, whatever the matter may be.”9 We now 
have more measurement tools to gather qualitative data 
in order to test concepts, assumptions, and models from 
Islamic economics.
Notes
1. “Man’s likeness to God consists in sovereignty over 
existence, in the countenance of the lord and master, 
and in command. Myth turns into enlightenment, 
and nature into mere objectivity. Men pay for the 
increase of their power with alienation from that 
over which they exercise their power. Enlightenment 
behaves toward things as a dictator toward men. He 
knows them in so far as he can manipulate them. 
The man of science knows things in so far as he can 
manipulate them.” (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1976).
2. The following excerpt from Francis Bacon reflects 
the mindset of the Enlightenment thinkers on the 
power and purpose of gaining knowledge: “no doubt 
the sovereignty of man lieth hid in knowledge; 
wherein many things are reserved, which kings 
with their treasure cannot buy, nor with their force 
command; their spials and intelligencers can give no 
news of them, their seamen and discoverers cannot 
sail where they grow. Now we govern nature in 
opinions, but we are thrall unto her in necessity; but 
if we would be led by her in invention, me should 
command her in action.” (Bacon, 2008).
3. For the comparison Islam and the Enlightenment 
in terms of their understanding of human nature, 
science, and technology, please refer to my following 
article: “Human Nature vs. the Nature of Science and 
Technology,” in Henk Jochemsen (ed.) “Our Common 
World. A Cultural Dialogue between Christians and 
Muslims about the Role of Technology in Our Global 
Society,” Rozenberg Publishers, March 2010.
4. The well-known movie, The Matrix, is a good 
description of the world created by capitalism. The 
Matrix is defined as follows by a key actor in that 
movie: “It is an illusionary world. …It is all around 
us. Even now in this room. You can see it when you 
look out of your window, or when you turn on your 
TV. You can feel it when you go to work, when you 
go to church, when you pay your taxes. It is the world 
that has been pulled over your eyes to blind you from 
the truth…. That you are a slave…. Like everyone 
else, you were born into bondage, born into a prison 
that you cannot smell or taste or touch. A prison for 
your mind.”
5. Tawhid is the epistemology of the Oneness of God 
which becomes the foundation of the unity of 
knowledge. God is the source and beginning of all 
knowledge. In other words, “this is to accept the 
divine roots of knowledge as the primal foundation 
of all knowledge, hence of all configurations of 
world-systems.” (A. Choudhury, 2007, p.24).
6. “… while from the point of view of the One, the 
Absolute, there is no ‘otherness’ or ‘separation’. All 
things are one, not materially and substantially but 
inwardly and essentially. Again it is a question of 
realizing the levels of reality and the hierarchy of the 
different domains of being.” (S. H. Nasr, 1997, p.30).
7. Here is how Ghazali describes the element of human 
nature: “The body is like a city. The hand and the 
feet are like workmen in this city. The desire is its 
prime-mover. The anger is the city ‘Kotwal’ i.e. it’s 
police chief. The heart is its king and the reason it’s 
Wazir the Prime Minister. The king needs all of them 
to run the government but the lust which is a strong 
motivating force, is evil and provocating. On the 
other hand, the Ration which is like the wise Wazir 
always apposes him, so the funds of the government 
are not misappropriated or usurped. The anger, like 
mischief mongering city ‘Kotwat’, the chief of the 
police is always diversive and reactionary. He tends 
to be sadistic. Under the circumstances, the king, 
who is above them all; takes stock of things firmly, 
consults his ‘Wazir’, and does not allow matters to go 
out of his hand. It clearly indicates that desire and 
anger play their respective subversive roles and to 
nip the evil in the bud becomes the prime duty of the 
king. That is the position of the heart.” (I. Ghazzali, 
2001, pp. 9–10).
8. The following Hadith carries the similar message: 
“Abu Sa’eed al-Khudree (ra) relates that the Prophet 
said: “Allah, the Lord of Honour and Glory, will call 
the inmates of Paradise, ‘O Residents of Paradise!’ 
They will respond, ‘Here we are, our Lord, and all 
good is in Your Hands. ‘He will ask them: ‘Are you now 
pleased?’ They will answer: ‘Why should we not be 
pleased, our Lord? When You have bestowed upon us 
such bounties which You have not bestowed on any of 
Your other creation. ‘He will then say to them: ‘Shall 
I not bestow upon you something even better than 
that?’ The inhabitants of Paradise will inquire: ‘What 
could be better than that?’ Allah will say, ‘I bestow 
upon you My Pleasure and shall never thereafter be 
displeased with you’” Bukhari and Muslim.
9. The shorter version of this motto is posted on the 
wall of the Social Science Research Building at the 
University of Chicago.
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Abstract - Mainstream economics postulates the concept of scarcity as a defining notion, while 
heterodox economics denies the proposition of scarcity. In contrast, there is no clear stand among 
Islamic economists towards the concept of scarcity. This paper explores the concept of scarcity 
ideologically and examines empirically the effect of scarcity thinking on human wants. The concept 
of scarcity is one of the unresolved issues in Islamic economics. Conceptually, this paper aims to 
explore and uncover the ideological basis of the concept of scarcity in the writings of Malthus and 
Robbins with reference to the Islamic perspective. In so doing, analysis of texts was performed. 
In contrast to positivism, which relies on sensible observation, this paper attempts to analyze 
the concept of scarcity and abundance from the perspectives of critical realism. Critical realism 
goes beyond the Seen phenomena to include elements from the Un-Seen reality. Empirically, this 
paper attempts to explore the effect of scarcity thinking on human wants among Muslims. With 
reference to social psychology and specifically to commodity theory, scarcity enhances desires 
in people. Consequently, this paper attempts to abstract scarcity thinking out of the concept of 
scarcity that defines mainstream economics. Scarcity thinking means that there is not enough for 
everyone to go around. In doing so, this paper has constructed a measurement strategy around 
Scarcity Thinking, Human Wants and Islamic Religiosity. The quantitative data used for this 
empirical research was collected through a questionnaire administered on 345 Muslim individuals 
working within the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. A measurement and structural 
model were formulated through adopting the structural equation modeling approach (using AMOS 
version 18). This paper concluded that Scarcity Thinking enhances Human Wants significantly and 
has the opposite relationship to Islamic Religiosity. One major implication of this paper is that the 
concept of scarcity of mainstream economics reflects scarcity thinking in which Scarcity thinking 
is causing a dissonance between Islamic Religiosity of moderation in expenditure and excessive 
buying behavior of Human Wants. Therefore, the concept of scarcity and its thinking state inflates 
human wants and contradicts the Islamic worldview of cooperation and obedience.
Keywords: scarcity thinking, religiosity, human wants, social psychology, heterodox economics
1. Introduction
A student attends the first lecture in economics and learns 
that economics is the study of the allocation of scarce 
resources to meet unlimited wants. He learns that scarcity 
is a primary concept in economics. If scarcity did not exist, 
then he wouldn’t be studying economics. According to 
mainstream economics, the science of economics exists 
in order to provide the theoretical and practical tools to 
solve the problem of scarcity. The concept of scarcity as it is 
taught in economics refers to the limited resources that fall 
Wahbalbari et al.
66 Islamic economic: Theory, policy and social justice
short of satisfying the unlimited human wants (Samuelsson 
and Nordhaus, 2010).
In contrast, heterodox economists in their movement to 
oppose mainstream economics consider the objects of 
study of mainstream economics, such as preferences-
utility, marginal products, demand curves, rationality, 
relative scarcity, and homogeneous agents, as ill-defined 
and having no real world existence (Lee, 2011). Likewise, 
institutional economics is one of the heterodox economics 
streams. Dugger and Peach (2006) have explored the 
writings of early insituitional economists that convey 
abundance rather than scarcity. Affluence can be achieved 
either through producing much or desiring less, in which 
the gap between means and ends can be reduced by 
industrial productivity (Sahlins, 1972). Furthermore, 
Daoud (2010) in his emphasis on the crucial role of socio-
cultural mechanisms argued that Malthus and Robbins 
postulated that scarcity is natural, universal and ignored the 
possibility of both the state of abundance and sufficiency. 
In addition, Matthaei (1984) considered scarcity a social 
product that can be abolished through social, economic 
and change process.
From another perspective, scarcity has been the object of 
inquiry in the field of social psychology. Research in social 
psychology has found that people tend to desire scarce 
commodities more than comparable available commodities 
because the acquisition of scarce commodities reveals 
feelings of personal uniqueness (Brock, 1968).
This paper is classified into six sections. The second section 
reviews the literature of scarcity from the perspective of 
heterodox economics and social psychology in addition 
to exploring the ideological orientation of the concept 
of scarcity. The third section introduces the conceptual 
framework while the fourth presents the method and 
results. The fifth and sixth sections present the discussion 
and conclusion.
2. Literature review
The ideological orientation of the concept 
of scarcity
Malthus (1798) introduced the theory of population. In 
his famous essay, The Principle Of Poulation as it Affects the 
Future Improvement of Society, Malthus mentioned some 
core principles among which were: Food is necessary for 
human existence and human population, if unchecked, 
tends to grow faster that the power in the earth to produce 
subsisitence. However, Malthus’ population principle had a 
preliminary ideology and thought that influenced Malthus 
to advocate his thoeory and policy recommendations. 
According to Hunt (1979), Malthus’s population theory 
was to have an influential-intellectual impact. Its normative 
orientation convinces that poverty is inevitable and that 
nothing can be done to eradicate it and moreover, poverty 
is due to the weakness or moral inferiority of the poor.
Suppose that by a subscription of the rich the eighteen 
pence a day which men earn now was made up five 
shillings, it might be imagined, perhaps, that they would 
then be able to live comfortably and have a piece of meat 
every day for their dinners. But this would be a very false 
conclusion … The receipt of five shillings a day instead 
of eighteen pence would make every man fancy himself 
comparatively rich and able to indulge himself in many 
hours or days of leisure. This would give a strong and 
immediate check to productive industry, and, in a short 
time, not only the nation would be poorer, but the lower 
classes themselves would be much more distressed than 
when they received only eighteen pence a day (Malthus, 
1826:61).
Despite the impact of Malthus’s principle on theories of 
economic development, Malthus’ population principle was 
criticized severely with the contemporary understanding 
of the concept of scarcity arising from its relative basis, 
not from its absolute basis. The concept of scarcity as it is 
taught in contemporary economics refers to the limited 
resources that fall short of satisfying the unlimited human 
wants. Lionel Robbins used the term scarcity but he meant 
the relative term as we will see from his interpretation of 
scarcity in his definition formulation. In his book, Robbins 
(1945) postulated the relationship between means and 
ends where he claimed that the quality of scarcity in goods 
is not an absolute quality. According to him, scarcity does 
not mean mere infrequency in occurrence but it means 
limitations in relation to demand.
From the point of view of the economist, the conditions of 
human existence exhibit four fundamental characteristics. 
The ends are various. The time and the means for 
achieving these ends are limited and capable of alternative 
application. At the same time the ends have different 
importance. Robbins (1945:12).
Importantly, the derivation of these four fundamentals was 
the result and reflection of Robbins’ thought, perception 
and ideology towards the behavior of human being and 
the nature of resources. Hence, such fundamentals and 
ideology set the establishment for Robbins’ standard 
definition of the science of economics as “the science which 
studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and 
scarce means which have alternative uses” Robbins (1945: 
12). Unlike Malthus who focuses on the aspect of limited 
resources, Robbins’ scarcity focuses more on the competing 
ends, which are known as unlimited human wants (Daoud, 
2010).
Here we are, sentient creatures with bundles of desires 
and aspirations, with masses of instinctive tendencies 
all urging us in different ways to action. But the time 
in which these tendencies can be expressed is limited. 
Robbins (1945: 13).
The relativity of the concepts of needs and wants is 
considered to be one of the contrasting aspects between 
absolute scarcity and relative scarcity. Needs are the desires 
which take the form of a “must” urgency in obtaining goods 
and services such as clothing, medicine, food and shelter 
in order to achieve satisfaction. Needs are a basic organic 
part of wants while wants include needs but go beyond 
them; wants are needs plus some residual desires that do 
not correspond to needs (Uyar & Raiklin, 1996). Keynes 
has differenciated between needs and wants by classifying 
them into absolute and relative needs. Absolute needs are 
the must-fullfilled needs while relative needs are needs that 
imply supperority as it has appeared in Keynes writings.
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Now it is true that the needs of human beings may seem 
to be insatiable. But they fall into two classes-those 
needs which are absolute in the sense that we feel them 
whatever the situation of our fellow human beings may 
be, and those which are relative in the sense that we 
feel them only if their satisfaction lifts us above, makes 
us feel superior to our fellows. Needs of the second 
class, those which satisfy the desire for superiority, 
may indeed be insatiable; for the higher the general 
level, the higher still are they. But this is not so true of 
the absolute needs-a point may soon be reached, much 
sooner perhaps than we all of us are aware of, when 
those needs are satisfied in the sense that we prefer to 
devote our further energies to non-economic purposes 
(Keynes 1972:326).
From the above statement, it becomes apparent how 
wants or needs in its relative sense induce human 
insatiablity in which consumpsion becomes subjective to 
the dynamic standard of living from period to period. In 
our contemporary time where consumerisim has widely 
spread across the world through globalization and in fact 
relative scarcity induced people to consume more for the 
sake of social prestige and wants fulfillment. In addition, 
Kasser (2002) showed how widespread materialism has 
prevailed in our contemporary time as people have started 
to compromise on community and family values for the 
culture of consumerism. Relevantly, neo-Malthusians 
criticize widespread materialism and consumerism by 
incorporating religious teachings into their argument. They 
advocate simple living as part of a higher level of existence; 
that stress cooperation, fulfillment in work, and spiritual 
development. The widespread consumerism is attributed 
to the human greed of freely choosing individuals and the 
only way to overcome it is through elevating consciousness 
to a higher, non-material level (Matthaei, 1984).
Despite the apparent differences between absolute 
and relative scarcity, both Malthus and Robbins shared 
common views pertaining to the nature and the tendency 
for human desires to be limitless. Excessive human wants 
contradicts the religious teaching of promoting simplicity 
and moderate standard of living. Accordingly, Malthus 
ended his first essay with a sanctimonious appeal to religion 
and God’s Will.
Life is, generally speaking, a blessing…. The partial 
pain, therefore, that is inflicted by the supreme creator, 
while he is forming numberless beings to a capacity of 
the highest enjoyments, is but as the dust of the balance 
in comparison of the happiness that is communicated, 
and we have every reason to think that there is no more 
evil in the world than what is absolutely necessary as 
one of the ingredients in the mighty process. (Hunt, 
1979:68 quoting Malthus, 1798)
Similarly and in his ideological orientation, Robbins didn’t 
differ much from Malthus in terms of looking at nature as 
niggardly and scarcely.
Here we are, sentient creatures with bundles of desires 
and aspirations, with masses of instinctive tendencies 
all urging us in different ways to action. But the time in 
which these tendencies can be expressed is limited. The 
external world does not offer full opportunities for their 
complete achievement. Life is short. Nature is niggardly. 
Our fellows have other objectives. Yet we can use our 
lives for doing different things, our materials and the 
services of others for achieving different objectives 
Robbins. (1945:13).
These ideologies and views contradict the religious 
worldview of abundance creation. One possible explanation 
of these divergent ideologies from religion lies on the rise 
of secularism. According to Rothbard (1995), the rise of 
the secular group contributed significantly to the decline of 
scholasticism in the sixteenth century where their decline 
was attributed partly to the scholastic favor for the banning 
of usury. Indeed, St. Thomas Aquinas was the famous 
Scholastic thinker whose economic views were against 
usury. But such views were not welcomed by secular 
businessmen, and it was against the overall interests of 
secularism, so they attacked it severely until it was eclipsed 
by the Renaissance movement. Furthermore, Whitehead 
(2001) stressed the conflict that arises between science 
and religion when he stated that the death of religion 
comes with the repression of high hopes of adventure. 
According to him, religion obstructs the science from 
exploring adventure. Even when he discussed Christianity, 
he mentioned that the general belief among Christians in 
the early days was that the world was coming to an end 
in the lifetime of people then living. However, such belief, 
according to Whitehead, was proved to be mistaken and 
it resulted in controversies that always put religion in the 
wrong and science in the right. Releventaly, Whitehead 
(2001) was referring to the eighteenth and ninteenth 
century in which secularism was in its stage of growth. 
Consequently, secularism had an influential impact on the 
ideologies of early and recent economists such as Thomas 
Robert Malthus and Lionel Robbins. Therefore and due to 
the influence of secularism, Malthus and Robbins seemed 
not to consider religion in their ideological framework.
3. Scarcity from the perspective of 
Heterodox economics
Heterodox economics has emerged in response to the 
dissatisfaction with the methodological individualism of 
mainstream economics that base its knowledge inquiry 
on deductive mathematical approach. It is worthwhile to 
define heterodox economics in order to get deeper insight on 
its approach of studying economics. “Heterodox economics 
refers to a specific group of theories aimed at explaining it, 
to economic policies recommendations predicated on the 
theories, and to a community of economists engaged in this 
theoretical and applied scientific activity” (Lee, 2011:6). 
Furthermore, it approaches economics with different 
epistemological stand, relying more on critical realism, 
and Lee (2011: 10) elaborates on the nature of heterodox 
microeconomics approaches.
… delineation of heterodox microeconomic theory 
takes the form of theory creation. Scientific theory 
creation requires a methodology for the task and the 
methodology is the method of grounded theory, and 
its philosophical foundation of realism, critical realism, 
and epistemological relativism.
Interestingly, heterodox economists consider the objects of 
study of mainstream economics, such as preferences-utility, 
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marginal products, demand curves, rationality, relative 
scarcity, and homogeneous agents, are ill-defined, have no 
real world existence. Not only that, they tend to consider 
economics as the science of the social provisioning process. 
In addition, the methods used by the researchers to study 
the objects and address the problems and issues need to be 
grounded in the real world (Lee, 2011).
Furthermore, institutional economics is one of the 
heterodox economics streams. Dugger and Peach (2006) 
have explored the writings of early insituitional economists 
that convey abundance rather than scarcity. Abundance 
is mainfested clearly in the writings of early economists 
such as Adam Smith, Veblen and Mill. Instituitonal 
economists presented an alternative definition of 
economics that doesn’t indicate scarcity. They follow 
Allan Gruchy’s definition of economics as “the science of 
the social provisioning process” (1987:21). They refer 
to Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Thorstein Veblen, and John 
Maynard Keynes as “abundance economists.” In general, 
instituitional economists consider the era of industrial 
revoluton as the era of abundance creation. John Stuart 
Mill (1848) summarized most of the mentioned aspects 
by the institutional economists. He argued that abundance 
can be achieved through expansion of man’s power over 
nature, more preservation of property, increasing business 
capacities and spreading cooperation.
In fact heterodox economics view economics as nothing 
but a historical science of the social provisioning process. 
It inquires the factors that are part of the process of social 
provisioning. The structure and use of resources, and 
the structure and change of social wants are among the 
factors that inquired by heterodox economics. Therefore, 
the resulted abundance creates a surplus that to be used 
for social provisioning, that is for consumption, private 
investment, government usage, and exports (Lee, 2011).
Moreover, affluence can be achieved either through 
producing much or desiring less, in which the gap between 
means and ends can be reduced by industrial productivity 
(Sahlins, 1972). Furthermore, Daoud (2010) in his 
emphasis on the crucial role of socio-cultural mechanisms 
mentioned that Malthus and Robbins tend to postulate that 
scarcity is natural and universal, in which they ignore the 
possibility of both the state of abundance and sufficiency. 
In addition, Matthaei (1984) considered scarcity a social 
product that can be abolished through social, economic 
and change process. According to Daoud (2011) deflating 
human wants can overcome scarcity and realize relative 
abundance. In his analysis, he referred to the ethical practice 
of the Modus Vivendi of Material Simplicity (VMS).1 The 
Buddhist ethical practice of VMS enables people to deflate 
their wants and make their material resources abundant 
relative to their wants (Daoud, 2011). As a result, relative 
abundance creates surplus and that surplus plays a vital 
role in enhancing the process of social provisioning.
Nonetheless, for relative scarcity to be abolished and 
relative abundance to be realized, human wants should be 
decreased. Therefore, this paper explores the factors that 
make human wants unlimited. The next section integrates 
the perspective of social psychology on scarcity and 
attempts to uncover the factors that increase, inflate and 
accelerate human wants.
Scarcity from the perspective of social psychology
Brock (1968) proposed a commodity theory in which 
he stated that people may desire scarce commodities 
more than comparable available commodities because 
the acquisition of scarce commodities reveals feelings of 
personal uniqueness. Similarly, Cialdini (2001) has found 
that perceived scarcity has an effect on human judgment 
as items and opportunities become more desirable to 
people as they become scarce. Accordingly, Knishinsky 
(1982) who was Cialdini’s former PhD student has found 
respondents who were told that there would be a shortage 
of Australian beef in the near future purchased twice the 
amount of beef as compared to respondents who were not 
given such information.
Following Brock’s (1968) commodity theory, Lynn (1991) 
did a meta-analysis to show that scarcity enhances the value 
of anything that can be possessed in which the scarcer a 
commodity is, the more valued or desirable it becomes. 
As a result, Lynn’s (1991) meta-analysis results supported 
commodity theory and suggest for marketers to manipulate 
the perceived scarcity of the products and services to 
increase their perceived value. He demonstrated examples 
of practices like advertising a product’s scarcity, producing 
limited editions of products, distributing products through 
exclusive outlets, prestige pricing of products and services, 
and restricting maximum order sizes for products and 
promotional offerings to increase perceived value of such 
products and services.
Furthermore Verhallen and Robben (1994) have designed 
an experiment in which participants had to evaluate three 
recipe books and to choose one of them. In doing so, 
information was provided about the contents of the books 
and their availability. Results from the analyses of variance 
for the uniqueness data reveal that participants preferred 
a book of limited availability due to market conditions to 
books that were accidently unavailable or of unlimited 
availability. According to the perception of the participants, 
books of limited availability due to market circumstances 
were perceived as more costly and more unique than books 
that were accidentally unavailable or abundantly available.
Likewise, Aggarwal et al. (2011) have observed the tendency 
of scarcity to create a sense of urgency among buyers that 
stimulate an increase in the quantities purchased, shorter 
searches, and greater satisfaction with the purchased 
products. In carrying their experiment, Aggarwal et  al. 
(2011) have hypothesized that, compared with an 
unrestricted promotional offer, a restricted promotional 
offer (scarcity message) will have a greater impact on 
consumer purchase intentions. The result obtained from 
ANOVA reveals evidence of a significant impact of the 
restrictive promotion on participants’ purchase intentions, 
and therefore the hypothesis was supported.
In contrast to the above studies that examined scarcity 
effect by single test, Wu and Hsing (2006) have used SEM 
(Structural Equation Modelling) to develop and examine 
how scarcity influences consumer’s value perception 
and purchase intent through the mediation of assumed 
expensiveness, perceived quality, perceived symbolic 
benefits and perceived monetary sacrifices. According to 
Wu and Hsing (2006), the reason behind the adaptation 
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of SEM is to develop an enhanced conceptual model that 
can overcome the shortcomings of using single statistical 
tests. The single test approach is not sufficient to explain 
scarcity’s value-enhancing effect. However, their results 
were consistent with the previous studies that adopt a 
single test approach in which the perception of scarcity 
enhances consumer’s value perception and willingness 
to buy.
Another study that attempts to demonstrate cross-
national differences in proneness to the scarcity effect was 
conducted by Jung and Kellaris (2004). In their study, 
they hypothesized that the magnitude of the scarcity 
effect will vary across cultures such that the effect will be 
more pronounced in a lower-context culture (US) versus 
a higher-context culture (France). Results from ANOVA 
tests indicate that a scarce brand was perceived as more 
desirable across the American and French participants.
Critically speaking, there are two identified implications 
from the findings of social psychology with regard to the 
scarcity effect on enhancing desirability and expenditure 
among people. The first implication appears in the form 
of the tendency of scarcity to create scarcity thinking 
among people. Several conceptual studies have examined 
the concept of scarcity from the mental state of human 
thinking. Such a state of thinking is known as scarcity 
thinking or mentality. Scarcity thinking means that people 
believe in scarcity, that they evaluate their life in terms of 
what it lacks. With scarcity thinking, the focus is on what 
a person does not have, and this continues to be his or 
her experience of life. Scarcity thinking is best mainfested 
as there is not enough to go around (Covey, 1989). With 
scarcity thinking, people tend to consume more than what 
they need and to become protective of what they have. If 
the object is believed to be scarce, it will be valued, kept, 
hoarded, sought and consumed. With scarcity thinking, 
no matter how much a person has, it is never enough even 
if he/she has it in abundance (Johnson, 2005; Thomas, 
2007).
The second implication of the scarcity effect is that people 
tend to consume and spend excessively whenever they 
have enhanced desires. Nonetheless, most religions have 
conveyed and advocated moderation in spending and 
minimization of human desires. Given the fact that God has 
ordered human beings to behave in a moderate way and 
to decrease their human desire, one of the main objectives 
of this paper is to examine the effect of scarcity thinking in 
enhancing human wants among Muslims. This research has 
been conducted in Kuala Lumpur, where Islam is considered 
to be the dominant and official religion. Therefore, this 
paper explores the effect of scarcity thinking on enhancing 
human wants among Muslims, in which Islamic Religiosity 
is considered to be the determinant measure of the Islamic 
behavior among Muslims.
4. Scarcity’s enhancement of desirability 
(S-E-D) model
Following his (1991) meta-analysis, Lynn (1992) has 
studied the effect of scarcity on enhancing desirability 
among people. In that study, Lynn (1992) postulated 
that scarcity’s enhancement of desirability is mediated 
by assumed expensiveness, thus several empirical 
relationships should be investigated. Firstly, people 
should believe that scarce things cost more than available 
ones. Secondly, scarcity on the economic market 
should enhance desirability more than does nonmarket 
scarcity. Thirdly, thoughts about price should strengthen 
scarcity’s enhancement of desirability. Lastly, blocking 
assumptions about expensiveness should weaken scarcity’s 
enhancement of desirability. He presented a model of 
scarcity effects referred to as the Scarcity Enhancement 
Desirability (S-E-D) model. The S-E-D model posits 
assumed expensiveness, attributed quality and perceived 
status as mediators of scarcity’s effect on desirability. Lynn’s 
study concluded that scarcity’s enhancement of desirability 
may be explainable to people’s informal or naive economic 
theories. People might desire scarce products more than 
available ones because they believe that scarce goods are 
expensive, of high quality and good investments. In the 
theoretical framework of the S-E-D model, commodity 
theory and the theory of psychological reactance, besides 
downward social comparison theory and need-for-
uniqueness theory, explain the scarcity enhancement 
desirability (Lynn, 1992).
5. Conceptual theoretical framework
In the conceptual theoretical framework of this paper, 
there is one independent variable, one mediator and one 
dependent variable. As it is shown in the below diagram, 
Islamic Religiosity is the independent variable, Human 
Wants is the dependent variable while scarcity thinking 
acts as a mediator.
Furthermore, the conceptual theoretical framework is 
represented by commodity and cognitive dissonance theories 
and the Islamic principle of moderation. Theoretically and 
firstly, commodity theory deals with the psychological 
implications of scarcity. It postulates that that “any 
commodity will be valued to the extent that it is unavailable” 
(Brock, 1968:246). Moreover, cognitive dissonance theory 
states that there is a tendency for individuals to seek 
consistency among their cognitions such as his beliefs and 
opinions. When there is an inconsistency between attitudes 
or behaviors, something must change to eliminate the 
dissonance (Festinger, 1957). The Islamic principle of 
moderation is manifested in Al-Quran (25:67) and in 
his interpretation of this verse, Al-Sabouni (1981:370) 
stated: “When they spend neither extravagantly nor in 
niggardly manner which is considered the fifth attribute 
of God’s servants. However, they spend in a middle way.” 
Convincingly, Islam unequivocally discourages its followers 
to cross the limits and follows extremes (Chaudhry, 1999).
In the Scarcity Enhancement Desirability (S.E.D) model, 
commodity theory and the theory of psychological 
reactance beside downward social comparison theory 
and need-for-uniqueness theory explain the Scarcity 
Enhancement Desirability (S.E.D) model that was 
formulated by Lynn (1992). However, this paper refers to 
the Islamic principle of moderation to explain the indirect 
path from Islamic Religiosity to Human Wants. Moreover, 
the relationship between scarcity thinking and Human 
Wants is best explained by commodity theory. Furthermore, 
the theory of cognitive dissonance explains the path from 
Islamic Religiosity to Human Wants through the mediator 
effect of scarcity thinking.
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6. Human wants
A want is something that is desired. It is said that every 
person has unlimited wants, but limited resources. Thus, 
people cannot have everything they want and must look for 
the most affordable alternatives (American Psychological 
Association, 2007). Human wants are frequently associated 
with the concept of scarcity that postulate resources 
are limited but human wants are unlimited. According 
to Raiklin and Uyar (1996), the desires which take the 
form of urgency in acquiring goods and services to fulfil 
satisfaction are called needs while wants include needs 
but go beyond them to reflect social and cultural status. 
Both “needs” and “wants” belong to the realm of personal 
consumption which is the ultimate goal of the productive 
and distributive efforts of all economic systems, capitalist 
or otherwise. Both needs and wants are characterized with 
desires to satisfy and fulfil the acquisition of goods and 
services through consumption. Witt (2001: 26) stated that:
Basic wants are part of the human genetic endowment. 
They can be satisfied temporarily either singularly or 
in more or less complex combinations by consuming 
appropriate items in suitable quantities, and the desire 
to satisfy the wants motivates the corresponding 
activity.
Based on the above quotation, human wants are manifested 
through consumption. The social relations that were 
central in political economy were replaced by the concept 
of the economic man who is driven by insatiable consumer 
desires (Gagnier, 2000). According to Pindyck & Rubinfeld 
(2001) the theory of consumer behavior describes how 
consumers allocate income among different goods and 
services to maximize their satisfaction. Given the fact that 
human wants are best described by consumption, the items 
of the construct of Human wants are constructed in such 
a way that tend to measure expenditure and shopping 
behavior.
7. Scarcity thinking
Scarcity thinking is best mainfested as there is not enough to 
go around. Covey (1989: 219) demonstrates:
People with a “Scarcity Mentality” (p. 219) believe that 
there isn’t enough for everyone – that only a select few 
will be rewarded with jobs, love, power, money, talent, 
promotions, gifts, recognition, or other rewards. These 
people do not trust others and do not share joy in others’ 
accomplishments, believing that someone else’s success 
will take away from their own. In a sense, they dam up 
their emotions behind a wall of mistrust, preventing 
the flow of good will from them to others. This creates 
more negativity and resentment, which reinforces their 
view that the world is a challenging place and their 
belief that, “I’d better get mine while I have the chance, 
because it won’t come again.”
From the above quotation, the scarcity way of thinking 
or mentality affects the human behavior. The items of the 
scarcity thinking are conceptualized from the literature 
of scarcity thinking as it is postulated by Covey (1989), 
Thomas (2007), and Johnson (2005).
8. Islamic religiosity
In this paper, the items that measure Islamic Religiosity 
will be cited from the Religious Personality’ subscale of the 
Muslim Religiosity-Personality Inventory (MRPI) developed 
by Krauss et  al. (2006). Psychometric results of the scale 
reveal that the scale is reliable, valid and relevant for use with 
multiple faith groups as Malaysia such as Buddhists, Christian, 
Hindus, and Muslims. The MRPI is categorized into two 
main subscales: Islamic Worldview and Religious Personality. 
Islamic worldview is measured or assessed through the 
Islamic creed (aqidah), which details what a Muslim should 
know, believe and inwardly comprehend about God and 
religion as laid down by the Qur’an and the tradition of the 
Prophet Muhammad. The Religious Personality includes 
behaviours, motivations, attitudes and emotions that aim to 
assess personal manifestation of the Islamic teachings and 
commands. This construct is represented by item statements 
relating to the formal ritual worship or ‘special ibadat’, that 
reflects one’s direct relationship with God; and the daily 
mu’amalat, or the religiously-guided behaviours towards 
one’s family, fellow human beings and the rest of creation 
i.e., animals, the natural environment, etc. known as the 
general worship or ‘general ‘ibadat’ (Krauss et al., 2006).
9. Research method
Data was collected through a structured questionnaire. 
This study was conducted in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The 
rationale behind selecting Kuala Lumpur as the study area 
is because it is the home to a large number of migrants from 
other states within Malaysia and foreign countries. Non-
probability sampling techniques using purposive sampling 
method were adopted because this research is exploratory. 
According to Adler and Clark (2010), the desirable 
sampling method in exploratory research is purposive 
sampling. Furthermore, 450 questionnaires have been 
distributed to selected Muslim employees from different 
professional lines, such as banks, private companies, hotels 
and other organizations. The rationale behind selecting 
Muslim employees is that they must earn fixed monthly 
income so that they can posses the purchasing power to 
spend and shop. The questionnaire2 was divided into two 
parts. The first part gathered data on the demographic 
characteristics of the target sample. The second part 
consists of three sections to measure Islamic Religiosity 
(independent variable), scarcity thinking (mediator) and 
Human Wants (dependent variable).
All the responses were measured on a 4-point “Likert” scale 
with no midpoint, known as forced choice with 1 “Strongly 
Disagree” and 4 “Strongly Agree.” Upon the completion of 
the data collection, 345 out of the total of 440 distributed 
questionnaires were considered usable. The remaining 
95 questionnaires comprised omitted and missed data 
that exceed 25 percent from the total number of items. 
Following the guideline of Sekaran and Bougie (2010), 
these questionnaires were excluded from the usable 
questionnaires. Nonetheless, there was slight missing data 
in the usable questionnaires, accounting for 2–3 percent 
of the total number of items. Based on the suggestions of 
Sekaran and Bougie (2010), a similar response pattern 
imputation was adopted to deduce a logical answer to the 
missing response questions.
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10. Results
Firstly, Table  1 presents the demographic factors of the 
sample. Using SPSS (version 20), the obtained data were 
further subjected to data cleaning, test of adequacy and 
reliability tests using the kolmogorov-smirnov, KMO and 
Bartlett’s test of Sphericity, and the Chronbach Alpha tests 
respectively. The exploratory factor analysis has loaded 
each latent construct into several factors. Human Wants 
were loaded into two factors, which are shopping and 
expenditure; Islamic Religiosity (R) was loaded into three 
factors which are Obedience, Cooperation, Commitment; 
Scarcity Thinking has loaded into three factors which are 
Lack, Conflict, and Mistrust. As a result, these loaded factors 
are represented and measured directly by measurement 
items. This is known as first order measurement model.
11. Second order measurement model
In confirming the measurement model, the three 
constructed dimensions of Islamic Religiosity, scarcity 
thinking and Human Wants are labeled as second order 
measurement model because they are measured indirectly 
through the first order factors.
For model estimation, a second order measurement model 
was performed based on structural equation modeling using 
AMOS software (Version 18.0). In addition, the Normed 
chi-square (i.e., CMIN/DF), the Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI) and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA) were adopted in evaluating the model. According 
to Hair et al. (2010), the threshold of fit indices of a given 
measurement model with sample size > 250 and observed 
variables (items) within the range between 12 and 30 items 
are as follows: CFI is .90 and RMSEA is 0.07. For CIMN/DF, 
a value of less than 3 is considered a good value for model 
fit to the data (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988).
The second order measurement model of the three latent 
variables showed that the overall fit of the model to the 
data appear as c² (264) = 404.465. The CFI was found to 
be .945, which is above the threshold value of .90. Also, 
the Normed chi-square was 1.735, which is considered 
acceptable as it is below the cut-off 3. Similarly, the RMSEA 
value for the second order measurement model was .039, 
which falls below the threshold of .07.
Based in the Goodness of Fit Indices, there is no doubt that 
the second order measurement model shows encouraging 
fit to the data. Following the recommendation of Hair et al. 
(2010), items IR5, IR6 and ST8  showed factor loading 
below 0.50 and were excluded from the model in order to 
improve the model fit to the data. Accordingly, and as it is 
apparent in Figure 1, the revised second order measurement 
model revealed great model fit to the data as it appears 
as c2 (198) =  300.043, CFI =  .958, RMSEA =  0.039 and 
CIMN = 1.515.
12. Second order structural model
Bootstrapping is one of the non-parametric methods of 
resampling (Kline, 2010). The method of bootstrap was used 
because this study used purposive sampling. The structural 
model was estimated by means of maximum likelihood 
estimate (MLE) using the AMOS version 18 software. The 
test of the overall model fit yielded a Chi Square 300.052 
with 199  degrees of freedom and a p-value of less than 
0.001. Results presented in Table  2  reveal the regression 
weight, which shows that all relationships were statistically 
Table 1. Distribution of respondents according to their background 
characteristics.
Demographic Variables Frequency Percent
Gender Male 
Female
60 
185
46.4 
53.6
Age 20–25 yrs 
26–30 yrs 
31–40 yrs 
41–50 yrs 
51 and above
102 
111 
85 
40 
7
29.6 
32.2 
24.6 
11.6 
2
Marital status Single 
Married 
Divorced 
Widow
176 
161 
7 
1
51.0 
46.7 
2.0 
0.3
Income 1000–2500 
2501–4000 
4001–8000 
8001 and above
123 
163 
49 
10
35.7 
47.2 
14.2 
2.9
Job sector Government 
Private
115 
226
34 
66
Qualification Secondary school 
Diploma 
University Degree 
Master 
PhD
123 
65 
116 
37 
4
35.7 
18.8 
33.6 
10.7 
1.2
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significant. It has been found that Islamic Religiosity has 
an inverse relationship to scarcity thinking. The critical 
ratio between IR and ST is -3.483, and its absolute value is 
greater than the threshold of 1.96 at p-value < 0.05.
Furthermore, results also show direct relationship between 
scarcity thinking and Human Wants . The critical ratio 
between ST and HW is 2.825 which exceeds 1.96 at p-value 
<0.05. All the fit indices were above the recommended 
values. The Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.958, the Root 
Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) was 0.038 
and CIMN/DF = 1.508 as it is shown in Figure 2.
In the analysis of SEM, bootstrapping is also considered 
as one of the methods that can be used to test mediation 
(Bollen and Stine, 1990; Shrout and Bolger, 2002). One 
of the main objectives of this paper is to examine whether 
scarcity thinking mediates the relationship between 
Islamic Religiosity and Human Wants. One of the bootstrap 
methods that test for mediation effect is the bias-corrected 
bootstrap. When the mediated effect is nonzero, the bias-
corrected bootstrap is accurate in computing confidence 
interval for the meditational effect (Efron, 1987). 
Meaning, for evidence of mediation, the p-value must be 
statistically significant from the null hypothesis that claims 
no meditational effect.
Table 3 presents the estimate section of AMOS output which 
reveals that the standardized indirect effect is – 0.021 and 
the standard error of the indirect effect (bootstrap standard 
Figure 1. Second order measurement model.
Table 2. Regression weights: (Second order structural model).
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
SCARCITY  
THINKING
<--- ISLAMIC  
RELIGOSITY
-0.345 0.099 -3.483 ***
HUMAN WANTS <--- SCARCITY  
THINKING
0.335 0.119 2.825 0.005
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error) is 0.062. In order to determine the significance 
of mediation effect, the p-value must indicate significance. 
The bias-corrected percentile method presents two-tailed 
significance for the indirect effects, in which the p-value for 
the indirect effect is equal to 0.023, indicating evidence of 
significant mediation of scarcity thinking between Islamic 
Religiosity and Human Wants . Therefore the path between 
Islamic Religiosity to Human Wants is mediated by scarcity 
thinking.
13. Discussion
In this section, the discussion is classified into two parts. 
The first part discusses the concept of scarcity from the 
perspective of critical realism while the second part 
discusses the effect of scarcity thinking on human wants in 
the context of a society that assume Islam in its practices.
The concept of scarcity: Searching the perspective 
of critical realism
In contrast to positivism, critical realism is meant to 
acknowledge both the creativity of man’s mind, and the 
existence of patterns in events that are not created by man’s 
mind (Barbour, 1966). As a result, the existence of patterns 
in events that are not created by man’s mind can explain 
the possibility to integrate the belief of revelation into the 
discourse of economics. Revelation represents the unseen 
reality, in which it postulates God’s power in creating and 
providing provisions to living creatures. Accordingly, such 
unseen reality of revelation could reflect the existence 
of abundance in contrast to the widespread perception 
of scarcity. This paper utilizes the wide scope of critical 
realism to explain the Islamic interpretation of what is 
known as the Seen World ( ) and the Unseen World 
( ).
A.L.M. * This is the Book; in it is guidance sure, without 
doubt, to those who fear Allah. * Who believe in the 
Unseen* And who believe in the Revelation sent to thee, 
and sent before thy time, and (in their hearts) have the 
assurance of the Hereafter (Qur’an, 2: 1–4).
This book, which is in no doubt, as it guides the righteous 
people; those who fear God, believe in the Unseen and in 
revelation (Al-Sabouni, 1981: 32). On the contrary, both 
Malthus and Robbins were depending on their observation 
and they were not incorporating the unseen elements into 
their views on nature. From a critical realism perspective, 
“knowledge of objects is mediated by ideas which are in 
Figure 2. Second order structural model.
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some sense distinct from the objects of knowledge” (Losch, 
2009: 88 quoting Roy Wood Sellars, 1927). Meaning, 
critical realism claims that an entity can exist independently 
of our identification of it. Saying that an entity can exist 
independently of its identification implies that it can exist 
without someone observing, knowing, and constructing 
it (Fleetwood, 2005). Furthermore, critical realism 
prioritizes and emphasizes ontology over epistemology 
(Fleetwood, 1999). According to Lawson (2012), 
mainstream economics often commits the error of the 
epistemic fallacy. Epistemic fallacy means that a statement 
about ontology can always be reduced to the statement of 
epistemology. As a result, Robbins (1945), who advocates 
the concept of scarcity, committed the error of epistemic 
fallacy by claiming and asserting that nature is niggardly.
Here we are, sentient creatures with bundles of desires 
and aspirations, with masses of instinctive tendencies 
all urging us in different ways to action. But the time in 
which these tendencies can be expressed is limited. The 
external world does not offer full opportunities for their 
complete achievement. Life is short. Nature is niggardly. 
Our fellows have other objectives. Yet we can use our 
lives for doing different things, our materials and the 
services of others for achieving different objectives 
Robbins. (1945: 13).
According to Robbins, the object of knowledge is nature. From 
a critical realism perspective, the ideas mediate the objects 
of knowledge. For example Robbins claims that nature is 
niggardly. However, and from the perspective of critical 
realism, Robbins’ idea of “nature is niggardly” is distinct from 
the object of identification, which is the surrounding nature. 
Therefore and from the perspective of critical realism, nature 
is not necessarily niggardly as nature acts as an independent 
entity from Robbins’ idea towards nature.
On the contrary, the Quran presents several verses3 that 
promote abundance in nature. Likewise, a believer who is 
inspired by the Qura’nic postulation of abundance might 
hold an idea of abundance in nature and s/he might claim 
that nature is abundant and plenty despite the fact that s/he 
realizes limitation in resources. Consequently, ideas about 
nature can be secular ideas or religious ideas depending on 
the worldview and perspective of the viewer. Therefore, 
the concept of scarcity cannot be universal as it is subjective 
to different humans’ interpretations towards nature.
For a critical realist, an entity is said to be real if it has causal 
efficacy; has an effect on behavior; makes a difference. 
There are four modes of reality: materially real, ideally 
real, artificially real and socially real (Fleetwood, 2005). 
In this paper, the focus is directed only on materially real 
Table  3. Standardized Indirect Effects – Two Tailed Significance (BC), Bootstrap standard error, 
Indirect Effects – Lower Bounds (BC), Indirect Effects – Upper Bounds (BC).
Standardized Indirect Effects
Islamic Religiosity  
(IR)
Scarcity Thinking  
(ST)
Human Wants  
(HW)
Scarcity Thinking (ST) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Human Wants (HW) -0.152 0.000 0.000
Bootstrap Standard Error
Islamic Religiosity  
(IR)
Scarcity Thinking  
(ST)
Human Wants  
(HW)
Scarcity Thinking (ST) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Human Wants (HW) 0.139 0.000 0.000
Indirect Effects – Lower Bounds (BC)
Islamic Religiosity  
(IR)
Scarcity Thinking  
(ST)
Human Wants  
(HW)
Scarcity Thinking (ST) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Human Wants (HW) -0.616 0.000 0.000
Indirect Effects – Upper Bounds (BC)
Islamic Religiosity  
(IR)
Scarcity Thinking  
(ST)
Human Wants  
(HW)
Scarcity Thinking (ST) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Human Wants (HW) -0.032 0.000 0.000
Indirect Effects – Two Tailed Significance (BC)
Islamic Religiosity  
(IR)
Scarcity Thinking  
(ST)
Human Wants  
(HW)
Scarcity Thinking (ST) – – –
Human Wants (HW) 0.011 – –
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and ideally real for explaining the elements of the Seen and 
Un-Seen world. Materially real refers to material entities 
like oceans, the weather, the moon and mountains that can 
exist independently of what individuals or communities 
do, say, or think. This can be referred to as the Seen World. 
In contrast, ideally real refers to conceptual entities like 
discourse, language, genres, tropes, styles, signs, symbols, 
ideas, beliefs, meanings, understandings, explanations, 
opinions, concepts, representations, models, theories 
and so on.4 Such ideally real can be referred to as the 
Un-Seen world and in this context; the researcher limits 
the discussion to the entity of belief as the reference to it 
represents the religious belief of revelation.
In his explanation of the Islamic worldview of the Seen and 
Un-Seen world, Al-Attas (2003) interprets the following 
Quranic verse: “So I do call to witness what ye see, And 
what ye see not” (Qur’an, 69: 38–39). According to him, in 
Islam, the worldview is not merely the mind’s view of the 
physical world and of man’s historical, social, political and 
cultural involvement. The Islamic worldview, according 
to him, is not based upon philosophical speculation 
formulated mainly from observation of the data of 
sensible experience, of what is visible to the eye; nor is it 
restricted to the universe, which is the world of sensible 
experience, the world of created things. The worldview of 
Islam includes both worldly life and the Hereafter, where 
worldly life must be in harmony with the Hereafter. At 
the end, the Hereafter has ultimate and final significance. 
Obviously, there is a strong relationship between the Un-
Seen world, the Hereafter and Revelation in which the belief 
in the Hereafter will be determined through the belief in 
the Revelation. Revelation, in turn requires the belief in the 
Un-Seen world. Consequently, those who deny Revelation 
will certainly deny the existence of the Unseen world and 
automatically ignore the Hereafter whereas those who 
believe in Revelation will believe automatically in the Un-
Seen world and then, of course, the Hereafter (Wahbalbari, 
2010). Therefore, we see our environment including 
the earth, sea, river, lakes, mountains and the apparent 
sky; however, we do not see God, although many people 
believe in God.5 Therefore, God is unseen because we 
do not see him. Likewise, God who is unseen creates the 
abundant resources and provisions that are unseen. As 
a result, Robbins falls into the trap of attributing scarcity 
and niggardliness to nature as he excluded religion from 
his discourse, which leads him to ignore Revelation and 
by ignoring revelation the belief in the Un-Seen World 
disappeared from his framework (Wahbalbari, 2010). 
However, critical realism can explain the existence of 
revelation as an independent entity from our sensible 
observation. Accordingly, critical realism also can explain 
the aspect of the Un-Seen world, which is denied from the 
perspective of positivism. There are various verses in the 
Quran that postulate the belief in abundance and in God’s 
power to give provision and sustenance despite the fact 
that we do not see the resources abundantly. Consequently, 
the belief of abundance in nature acts as a mediating idea 
between the object of knowledge (nature) and the human 
mind. Therefore and based on critical realism, resources 
are considered to be abundant even though they appear 
in proportion and finite quantities, assuming that we look 
at them from the Islamic perspective of abundance. As a 
consequence, abundance thinking rather than scarcity 
thinking will prevail.
Relevantly, scarcity thinking is often contrasted with 
abundance thinking. Several conceptual studies have 
been consistent with the religious belief of abundance that 
postulates abundance thinking or mentality. “Abundance 
Mentality as that there is plenty out there and enough to 
spare for everybody” (Covey, 1989: 220). Even corporations 
and organizations are coaching abundance thinking. As 
Johnson (2005) stated, abundance is the state in which there 
is more than one as there are pelntiful resources available 
to everyone. Furthermore, he postulates a philosophy of 
shared abundance that teaches that a world of giving is a 
world of receiving and a key principle of Shared Abundance 
is that all resources are available to all; and the more you 
give, the more you will receive; and the more you share, the 
more you will receive abundance by sharing. Abundance 
thinking or mentality causes cooperation and generous 
behavior. It is not surprising to find that both religious 
teachings and abundance thinking postulate cooperation 
and generous collective behavior among human beings. 
As a result, people cooperate with each other through the 
act of support, motivation, giving donation and charity. 
Nevertheless, the mainstream postulate of the concept 
of scarcity creates scarcity thinking. The next subsection 
discusses the effect of scarcity thinking on human wants.
14. The Effect of scarcity thinking on 
human wants
Results have revealed direct relationship between scarcity 
thinking and Human Wants. This result resembles the 
findings of the relevant literature of social psychology 
on the effect of scarcity in enhancing desirability and 
expenditure among people [Brock, 1968; Cialdini (2001; 
Aggarwal et  al., 2011; Knishinsky (1982); Lynn (1991); 
Lynn, 1992); Verhallen and Robben, 1994]. Several 
conceptual studies have claimed that scarcity thinking 
stimulates people to consume more than what they need 
and to become protective of what they have and as a result 
scarce objects will be valued, kept, hoarded, sought and 
consumed [Johnson, 2005; Thomas, 2007]. Therefore, 
the above empirical result proves those conceptual studies 
that have examined the implication of scarcity thinking on 
human behavior.
Furthermore and before explaining the path from Islamic 
Religiosity to scarcity thinking, it is worthwhile to explain 
the first order factors that explain Islamic Religiosity. The 
exploratory factor analysis has revealed three factors for 
Islamic Religiosity, which is obedience, cooperation and 
commitment. Firstly, the Islamic perspective of obedience 
appear in the form of obedience to God, the Prophet of 
Islam and the Authority of the state. “O ye who believe! 
Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged 
with authority among you” (Al-Quran, 4:59). Obedience 
has been a subject of inquiry in social psychology. According 
to Milgram (1963), obedience is one of the fundamental 
elements in the structure of social life in which some system 
of authority is a requirement of all communal living through 
submission, to the commands of others. Moreover, Milgram 
(1963) was interested in examining and investigating how 
far people would go in obeying an instruction if it meant 
to harm another person.6 He found that people are likely 
to follow orders instructed by an authority figure, even to 
the extent of killing an innocent human being. Obedience 
implies that a person obeys a rule, order and command even 
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if it goes against his/her desire and wants. From the Islamic 
perspective, the greatest form of obedience is reflected on the 
full submission to God’s orders and commands. The story of 
prophet Ibrahim and his son Ismail demonstrated the highest 
model for obedience and submission to God’s commands.
He said: “I will go to my Lord! He will surely guide 
me!. ”O my Lord! Grant me a righteous (son)!” So We 
gave him the good news of a boy ready to suffer and 
forbear. Then, when (the son) reached (the age of) 
(serious) work with him, he said: “O my son! I see in 
vision that I offer thee in sacrifice: Now see what thy 
view is!” (The son) said: “O my father! Do as thou art 
commanded: thou will find me, if Allah so wills one 
practising Patience and Constancy!” So when they had 
both submitted their wills (to Allah, and he had laid 
him prostrate on his forehead (for sacrifice), We called 
out to him “O Abraham!”Thou hast already fulfilled the 
vision!” – thus indeed do We reward those who do right. 
For this was obviously a trial- And We ransomed him 
with a momentous sacrifice: And We left (this blessing) 
for him among generations (to come) in later times: 
“Peace and salutation to Abraham!” Thus indeed do 
we reward those who do right? for he was one of our 
believing Servants (Al-Quran, 37: 99–111).
The objective of the divine’s test on Ibrahim was not to 
sacrifice his son Ismail, but to determine the level of their 
obedience and submission to God’s commands. Because 
Ibrahim and Ismail were obedient through the submission 
of their wills to God’s will, God has rewarded Ibrahim with 
a momentous sacrifice instead of sacrificing his son Ismail. 
The above verses revealed two crucial facts. The first 
fact is that this worldly life is nothing but a test and trial 
from God on human being. The second fact demonstrates 
obedience to God through full submission to His orders and 
commands. Therefore, obedience is the effect of the divine 
test and trial on human beings. Accordingly, Islam in itself 
is nothing but a full submission to God’s orders, rules and 
commands (Al-Sabouni, 1981).
Another factor that explains Islamic Religiosity is 
cooperation. Cooperation is central to human existence 
and social behavior (Argyle, 1991). Moreover, human 
beings are social and are disposed to cooperate (Tuomela, 
2000). However, mainstream economics replaces the social 
relations that were central in political economy with the 
concept of the economic man. The economics man seeks 
to maximize his self interest as he is driven by insatiable 
consumer desires (Gagnier, 2000). Nonetheless, there are 
several verses from the Quran that promote and advocate 
cooperation: “Help ye one another in righteousness and 
piety” (Al-Quran, 5: 2). Cooperation is manifested clearly 
in several verses in Al-Quran through the act of spending 
charity for the poor and needy.
And the likeness of those who spend their wealth 
Seeking to please Allah And to strengthen their souls, 
is as a garden, high And fertile: heavy rain Falls on it 
but makes it yield a double increase of Harvest, and if it 
receives not Heavy rain, light moisture Sufficeth it, Allah 
seeth well whatever ye do (Al-Qur’an, 2: 265).
In examining the empirical relationship between 
Religiosity (R) and scarcity thinking, it has been found 
that Islamic Religiosity (R) has an inverse relationship with 
scarcity thinking. The finding reveals that scarcity thinking 
goes against the Islamic Religiosity. Consequently, the 
three extracted factors of lack, conflict, and mistrust that 
represent scarcity thinking construct have no reference in 
the Quran and Islam. Instead of scarcity, most religions 
propagate abundance. It was found in Genesis (17:6), God 
promised Abraham, “I will make thee exceeding fruitful 
and I will make nations of thee.” Likewise and according to 
the Old Testament, God is supposed to have been resource 
optimist (D’Oyly & Mant, 1839). “Let us make man in our 
image, after our likeness and let them have dominant over 
the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air and over 
every living thing that moveth upon the earth.” (Genesis 
1:26, 28). In addition, “The Almighty did not seem worried 
about the limitations of the earth’s resources for Abraham’s 
descendents as God also said “I will multiply thy seed as the 
stars of the heaven and as the sand which is upon the sea 
shore” (Genesis 22:17). Similarly, Al-Quran goes in parallel 
with Genesis and Old Testament. “And there is not a thing 
but its (sources and) treasures (inexhaustible) are with Us; 
but We only send down thereof in due and ascertainable 
measures” (Qur’an, 15: 21). It has been proven empirically 
that Islamic Religiosity has an inverse relationship with 
scarcity thinking and therefore scarcity thinking does 
not promote the Islamic worldview of cooperation and 
abundance.
In addition and as stated earlier, several verses in Al-Quran 
postulate moderation in expenditure and condemnation of 
excessive desires. “Those who, when they spend, are not 
extravagant and not niggardly, but hold a just (balance) 
between those (extremes); (Qur’an, 25: 67). Furthermore, 
the following verse condemns excessive desires “But after 
them there followed a posterity who missed prayers and 
followed after lusts soon, then, will they face Destruction” 
(Al-Quran, 19: 59). Then there were a people who follow 
their desires and lust and they will be in great loss, 
destruction and in the state of evil (Al-Sabouni, 1981).
Supporting the above literature, this paper has found that 
the relationship between Islamic Religiosity and Human 
Wants is indirect (see Table  3). This result reveals an 
opposite relationship between Islamic Religiosity and 
Human Wants, which explains the Islamic principle of 
moderation that condemns extravagance and excessive 
desires. It also indicates the significance of religious 
belief in determining buying behavior. Accordingly, 
Mokhlis and Spartks (2007) have confirmed that highly 
religious individuals are less likely to make impulsive 
purchase decisions. In addition, Essoo and Dibb (2004) 
have discovered that devoutly religious consumers are 
less demanding in their shopping behavior than casually 
religious consumers. However, Bailey and Sood (1993) 
have examined the effects of religious affiliation on 
consumer behavior in Washington DC and they found 
that Muslims tend be imperious and impulsive shoppers. 
Indeed, the level of religiosity tends to vary among Muslims 
as people vary in terms of their religious beliefs. People 
might believe in moderation in their expenditure but at 
the same time they spend excessively in their shopping, 
which raises a tradeoff between religious beliefs and 
buying behavior. Such tradeoff is termed as dissonance in 
the literature of social psychology. According to Festinger 
(1957), dissonance occurs most often in situations where 
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an individual must choose between two conflicting beliefs 
or actions. When these two conflicting beliefs have equal 
attractions, the extent of the dissonance between them 
will be greater. Consequently, obedience to God’s orders 
and commands in terms of moderation in expenditure 
explains Islamic Religiosity while excessive shopping and 
buying behavior explains Human Wants. Accordingly, the 
dissonance will be created when the person demonstrates 
obedience in terms of moderation in expenditure and at 
the same time s/he spends excessively whenever s/he goes 
for shopping. Then, the question arises, what is causing the 
dissonance?
One possible answer for the above question could lie on 
examining the mediation effect of scarcity thinking between 
Islamic Religiosity and Human Wants. As has been discussed 
previously, scarcity thinking enhances Human Wants 
while at the same time; scarcity thinking shows an inverse 
relationship with Islamic Religiosity. The test of mediation 
provides evidence for scarcity thinking to mediate the 
relationship between Islamic Religiosity and Human Wants. 
Meaning, scarcity thinking is causing the dissonance between 
the Islamic Religiosity of Obedience in terms of moderation 
in expenditure and the extravagant buying behavior of 
Human Wants. As a result, scarcity thinking acts as the 
source of dissonance between the Islamic Religiosity (that is 
explained by obedience to God’s order of Moderation) and 
Human Wants (that is explained by extravagant shopping 
and buying behavior) among Muslims.
Convincingly, Mokhlis and Spartks (2007) in addition 
to Essoo and Dibb (2004) have confirmed that highly 
religious individuals are less likely to make impulsive 
purchase decisions and less demanding in their shopping 
behavior than casually religious individuals indicates that 
the more religious the individuals are, the less likely they 
are to experience dissonance of scarcity thinking and vice 
versa. Indeed, the theory of cognitive dissonance explains 
the mediation effect of scarcity thinking on the relationship 
between Islamic Religiosity and Human Wants among 
Muslims.
Nonetheless, Festinger (1957) have presented three 
ways to eliminate dissonance: to reduce the importance 
of the dissonant beliefs, to add more consonant beliefs 
that outweigh the dissonant beliefs, or to change the 
dissonant beliefs so that they are no longer inconsistent. As 
it was mentioned previously, scarcity thinking causes the 
dissonance between the Islamic Religiosity of Obedience 
and Human Wants of excessive shopping and expenditure. 
In order to eliminate the dissonance of scarcity thinking, 
Muslims have to reduce, eliminate the scarcity thinking and 
revive their beliefs towards God. In doing so, abundance 
thinking should overcome the scarcity thinking as there are 
numerous verses in the Quran that postulate abundance 
rather than scarcity.
In contrast to abundance thinking, scarcity thinking 
implicitly indicates that God does not provide enough 
scarcity thinking enhances
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Figure 3. Towards a holistic model of scarcity thinking, Islamic religiosity and human wants.
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resources to fufill the unlimted Human Want that He 
Imputed on His creatures. This was clearly stated in the 
writings of Malthus and Robbins.7 However, God has the 
power that makes Him continuously creating resources and 
provisions in abundance. But because of the nature of this 
worldly life that is characterized as the world of test and 
trial upon human beings, God expands and restricts the 
resources. “See they not that Allah enlarges the provision 
and restricts it, to whomsoever He pleases? Verily in that are 
Signs for those who believe” (Qur’an, 30: 37). Do not they 
see God’s Power in enlarging and restricting the provisions 
so that they do not give up if they are poor in which the 
fact of God power is the sign for those who believe in God’s 
wisdom (Al-Sabouni, 1981). Therefore, reviving the belief 
in God and in His power of creation and provisions helps 
Muslim to reduce and eliminate the dissonance of scarcity 
thinking.
15. Towards a holistic model of scarcity 
thinking, Islamic religiosity and human 
wants
As has been discussed previously, scarcity thinking is 
explained by lack, conflict and mistrust, which in turn 
enhance Human Wants through excessive shopping and 
expenditure. Moreover, the elements of obedience to 
God’s order and commands, cooperation behavior and 
commitment to follow the teachings of Islam represent 
Islamic Religiosity. In the model of scarcity thinking and 
Human Wants, two scenarios are presented.
The first scenario represents the disobedience of Muslims 
to God’s order of moderation, which results in excessive 
shopping and buying behavior. As a result, resources don’t 
meet the unlimited Human Wants and as a consequence, 
Relative Scarcity prevails as a product of disobedience to 
God’s order through following excessive desire. In contrast, 
the second scenario (see Figure  2) reflects the obedience 
of Muslims to God’s order for moderation. As a result, the 
available resources fulfill the moderated and regulated 
Human Wants and as a consequence, Relative Abundance 
prevails as a product of obedience to God’s orders and 
commands. Furthermore, such Relative Abundance is 
shared through the mechanism of cooperation.
Several verses in the Quran obligate and recommend 
spending charity and donation for the poor. Lastly, 
commitment to obedience and cooperation create 
sustainable abundance. The historical case of the Islamic 
state during the period of the caliph Omer Ibn Abdul-
Aziz confirms the possibility of realizing abundance. The 
caliph, who was obedient to God propagated and conveyed 
obedience and cooperation for his citizens. As a result, 
abundance was realized, poverty was eradicated and 
there was no evidence of poor people to receive charity 
and donations (Najeebabadi, 2001). This historical case 
confirms the finding of Matthaei (1984) that scarcity is 
a social product that can be abolished through social, 
economic and change process. Obedience to God’s order of 
moderation in expenditure and wants can abolish relative 
scarcity. Human wants can be easily moderated and with 
the belief in God’s Power that creates abundance, the 
dissonance of scarcity thinking will be reduced. Likewise, 
by reducing the dissonance of scarcity thinking, Human 
Wants will be moderated.
Consequently, the belief in God’s creation of absolute 
abundance and in His power to expand and restrict the 
resources stimulates Abundance Thinking. As a result, 
Abundance Thinking promotes obedience and cooperation 
that can overcome scarcity thinking. The findings of Daoud 
(2010) question the postulation of mainstream economics 
that relative scarcity is universal whereby they ignore the 
possibility of realizing sufficiency and abundance. As was 
stated in the beginning of this section, God tests human 
beings by expanding and restricting their resources. The 
outcome of this divine test appears as a phenomenon that 
might exhibit scarcity or abundance at certain point of time 
and place. From the Islamic perspective, such phenomenon 
is temporary and not permanent as God tests human 
beings by the means of good and evil. “…and we test you 
by evil and by good by way of trial. To Us must ye return” 
Al-Quran, 21: 35).
16. Summary and conclusion
To summarize and conclude, this paper has explored the 
concept of scarcity ideologically and examined the effect 
of scarcity thinking on human wants among Muslims. 
Conceptually, this paper has integrated critical realism 
in explaining the Seen and Un-Seen world as it does 
not have any contradiction with the religious belief of 
revelation. In contrast, positivism, which is adopted by 
mainstream economics, restricts and reduces knowledge 
inquiry to sensible observation and therefore does not 
incorporate revelation in the discourse of economics. 
Nonetheless, critical realism can explain the possibility 
of the existence of revelation as an independent ideally-
real entity that mediates the knowledge of abundance 
from nature. At the same time, critical realism can 
refute the scarcity postulate as it tolerates revelation 
to play a role in the analysis. Therefore, abundance 
can be rationalized if it is viewed from the perspective 
of critical realism. Empirically, it has been found that 
scarcity thinking enhances Human Wants, while at the 
same time it shows an inverse relationship with Islamic 
Religiosity. The test of mediation provides evidence for 
Scarcity Thinking to mediate the relationship between 
Islamic Religiosity and Human Wants. This indicates that 
Scarcity Thinking is the source of dissonance between 
the Islamic Religiosity (that is explained by obedience to 
God’s order of moderation) and Human Wants (that is 
explained by excessive shopping and buying behavior). 
Scarcity Thinking indicates that God does not provide 
enough resources to fufill the unlimted Human Wants 
that He Imputed on His creatures. However and from 
the Islamic perspective, God has the power that makes 
Him continuously to create resources and provisions 
in abundance. However, God expands and restricts the 
resources to human beings because He is testing them 
in this worldly life. Therefore, reviving the belief in God 
and in His power of creation and provisions helps Muslim 
to reduce and eliminate the dissonance of Scarcity 
Thinking. Eliminating and reducing the dissonance of 
scarcity thinking helps the Muslims to moderate human 
wants and by moderating human wants in relation to the 
available resources, relative abundance will be realized. 
Al last, the concept of scarcity of mainstream economics 
and its state of Scarcity Thinking enhances Human Wants. 
Nevertheless, Human Wants if not moderated in relation 
to the available resources will create relative scarcity. 
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Therefore, the mainstream postulate of relative scarcity is 
not universal but a phenomenon that can be abolished by 
moderating Human Wants and reducing the dissonance 
of Scarcity Thinking. Furthermore, Islamic Religiosity in 
the form of the belief in God’s creation of abundance in 
addition to obeying His rule of moderation in expenditure 
reduce and eliminate the dissonance of Scarcity Thinking. 
Hence, Scarcity Thinking is responsible for accelerating 
and making Human Wants to be unlimited. This paper 
suggests a future research such as a cross-sectional study 
that attempts to compare the relationship between Islamic 
religiosity, scarcity thinking and human wants across 
different Muslim societies. Moreover, this paper suggests 
further research that can attempt to test the relationship 
between religiosity, scarcity thinking and human wants in 
the contexts of societies that adhere to different religious 
faiths such as Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism.
Lastly, the concept of scarcity as it is postulated by 
mainstream economics tends to clash with the Islamic 
worldview as it doesn’t have any reference in Islam. Relative 
scarcity can act as a phenomenon in economic activities but 
not as the defining concept of economics in general and 
Islamic economics in particular. Finally, this paper calls for 
isolating the concept of scarcity from economics in general 
and Islamic economics in particular. Hopefully by doing 
that, abundance will be realized, poverty will be eradicated 
and sustainable development will be achieved.
Notes
1. For further discussion on Modus, see Daoud, A. 
(2011). The Modus Vivendi of Material Simplicity: 
Counteracting Scarcity via the Deflation of Wants. 
Review of Social Economy, LXIX(3), 276–305.
2. The questionnaire is available from the authors upon 
request.
3. Refer to (Qur’an, 14: 32–34) and (Qur’an, 15: 21) 
for the Qur’anic promotion of abundance.
4. For further explanation of the modes of reality, see 
Fleetwood (2005).
5. According to Fleetwood (2005) God may or may not 
be real, but the idea of God is real because the idea of 
God makes a difference to people’s actions.
6. For further illustration of Milgram experiment, 
refer to Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral study of 
obedience.  The Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology 67(4), 371.
7. Robbins (1945) claims nature to be niggardly while 
Malthus (1798) questioned “How can God who is good, 
wise and omnipotent will scarcity on His creatures?”
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Abstract - We investigate the differences in banks’ responses to monetary policy shocks across bank 
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We find that following a monetary contraction, small banks with liquid balance sheets cut their 
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1. Introduction
Islamic banking is one of the fastest growing segments of 
the global financial sector. It is currently and expanding at 
a rate of approximately 20% per year. In some countries 
the share of the Islamic financial sector has now reached 
a size and a level of development such that the financial 
arrangements it offers are a full-fledged alternative to 
those in the conventional financial sector. The countries 
where this has happened include Malaysia, Iran and the 
Gulf Cooperation Countries, i.e., Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. Some 
Asian countries like Bangladesh, Pakistan and Indonesia 
are also experiencing a phenomenal increase in Islamic 
finance. Moreover, a number of western countries are 
now facilitating Islamic banking. And to tap this growing 
market, large conventional banks that have fairly recently 
opened an Islamic window include Barclays, BNP Paribus, 
Citi Group, Deutsche Bank, Standard Chartered and the 
Royal Bank of Scotland.
The total volume of Islamic finance was estimated to 
roughly equal $1 trillion in 2010 (Standard & Poor’s 
2010). Commercial banking comprised the largest share, 
i.e., 74 percent (International Financial Services London 
2010). Investment banking accounted for 10 percent. 
The remaining part consists of Sukuk (Islamic bonds) 
and Takaful (Islamic Insurance). Assets of the largest 500 
Islamic banks increased by 29 percent, to $822 billion, in 
2009, around the same time that the rest of the world’s 
financial system contracted, and many of the financial 
institutions were deleveraging their positions. The reason 
for this starkly different development resides in the fact 
that Islamic banking tenets do not allow the banks to charge 
interest and to be involved in the sales of debt instruments. 
Therefore, Islamic banks did not invest in the kind of 
instruments that were badly affected during the financial 
crises, namely derivatives, conventional securities and toxic 
assets. Banning short selling of shares after the crisis was a 
further reflection of Islamic finance as it stopped dealers 
from selling the assets that they do not own. A key question 
this brisk growth poses to academics and policymakers 
alike is whether the transmission of monetary policy 
through the so-called bank-lending channel will be altered 
in strength when the Islamic segment of the banking sector 
becomes even more important.1 Indeed, the potency of the 
bank lending channel crucially depends on the ability of 
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the central bank to affect bank loan supply, i.e., whether 
banks cannot attract (time) deposits perfectly elastically 
or do not consider the loans granted and securities held in 
portfolio as perfect substitutes.
Islamic banks may be, on the one hand, unable or unwilling 
to “buy” wholesale time deposits at a fixed rate and may 
not consider their Islamic loans substitutable for any of 
the securities they would hold in their portfolio. This may 
make the transmission of monetary policy shocks through 
the Islamic segment of the banking sector more potent. On 
the other hand, Islamic banks singularly attract deposits 
and lend under interest free arrangements, likely entered 
for religious reasons by depositors and borrowers (Khan 
and Khanna (2010); Baele, Farooq and Ongena (2010)). 
These contractual and motivational features on both their 
liability and asset sides may allow Islamic banks to shield 
themselves from monetary policy shocks. Consequently, 
whether Islamic banks transmit monetary policy differently 
than conventional banks is an empirical question we aim to 
address in this paper.
Following Bernanke and Blinder (1992), who find that a 
monetary contraction is followed by a significant decline 
in aggregate bank lending, Kashyap and Stein (2000) 
analyze if there are important cross-sectional differences 
in the way that banks respond to monetary policy shocks. 
In this way controlling for loan demand, they find that 
following a monetary contraction, small banks with liquid 
balance sheets cut their lending less than other small 
banks. Brissimis, Kamberoglou and Simigiannis (2003), 
de Haan (2003), Kaufmann (2003), Loupias, Savignac 
and Sevestre (2003), Worms (2003), and Gambacorta 
(2005), for example, also find that liquidity positions of 
banks play a significant role for the way banks respond to a 
monetary shock in various European countries. Kishan and 
Opiela (2000), Jayaratne and Morgan (2000), Ashcraft 
(2006) and Black, Hancock and Passmore (2009) similarly 
examine the differentiation across bank capitalization, core 
deposits, bank holding company status and bank business 
strategies, for instance.
We follow the seminal paper by Kashyap and Stein (2000) 
by investigating the cross-sectional differences in the way 
that banks respond to monetary policy shocks not only 
across bank size and liquidity, but also across bank type, i.e., 
conventional versus Islamic, in Pakistan between 2002:II 
and 2010:I. The country and sample period provide a 
unique setting to analyze this differential response. Pakistan 
may be one of the few countries in the world where both 
well-developed conventional and Islamic banking sectors 
have co-existed for a considerable period, formally since 
2002 when Islamic Banking was re-introduced in Pakistan. 
Out of 40 banks that grant business loans, six are Islamic.
As in Kashyap and Stein (2000) we find that following a 
monetary contraction, small banks with liquid balance 
sheets cut their lending less than other small banks, and 
that large banks maintain their lending irrespective of their 
liquidity positions.
Islamic banks, and this is the main contribution of our paper, 
though similar in size to small banks, respond to monetary 
policy shocks much like large banks. Hence, ceteris paribus, 
the expected growth in the Islamic segment of the banking 
sector in many countries may lead to a weakening in the 
potency of the credit channel of monetary policy there.
Khwaja and Mian (2008) also analyze lending by banks in 
Pakistan. They examine the drop in lending by different 
banks to similar firms following shocks to banks’ liquidity 
induced by unanticipated nuclear tests that took place in 
1998 in Pakistan. They find that banks pass their liquidity 
shortages to firms, but firms with strong business or 
political ties can turn to alternative sources in the credit 
market. In contrast, we focus on the monetary policy shocks 
responding to foreign capital inflows that followed this 
period and assess the differential transmission through the 
conventional and Islamic segments of the banking sector. 
Other studies that focus on the banking sector in Pakistan 
include Khwaja and Mian (2005), Mian (2006), and Zia 
(2008), for example.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section  2 discusses the relevant institutional framework 
in Pakistan after 2001. Section  3 describes the data and 
introduces the econometric specification and Section  4 
discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Pakistan after 2001
Monetary conditions
Following 9/11 there was a substantial inflow of capital in 
Pakistan. Workers’ remittances especially those from the 
US, UK, Saudi Arabia and UAE increased tremendously. 
Spurred by the privatization of major public sector 
corporations by the Government of Pakistan foreign direct 
investment (FDI) also boomed.
The growing inflow of remittances and FDI caused an 
appreciation in the local currency, the Pakistan rupee 
(PKR), against most other currencies. Prior to 2001, 
Pakistan had faced severe shortages in foreign reserves 
because of the nuclear tests in 1998 (Khwaja and Mian 
(2008)). The inflow of foreign capital was initially 
therefore welcomed. The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), the 
nation’s central bank, reacted to the inflow of foreign funds 
by purchasing US dollars and by increasingly accumulating 
these and other foreign reserves. Its aim was clearly also 
to curb the appreciation of the rupee against most other 
currencies to safeguard the competitiveness of Pakistanis 
exports. The purchase of dollars by the central bank almost 
inevitably caused the money supply to expand, despite 
attempts to sterilize the increase in money supply through 
the open market sales of government securities.
As a result, the financial markets in Pakistan became 
saturated with excess liquidity and in August 2003 the 
interest rate on government securities for example dropped 
to as low as 1.27 percent. It is only after 2005 that monetary 
policy started to tighten in response to inflation, inexorably 
following the relentless monetary expansion during the 
preceding years.
Since monetary policy during most of the analyzed time-
period simply responded to this unique and large external 
shock, i.e., the concurrent inflow of remittances and FDI, 
our analysis will rely on the changes in the three-month 
treasury bill rate as a most straightforward indicator of 
Eds. Hatem A. El-Karanshawy et al. 85
The transmission of monetary policy through conventional and Islamic banks
monetary policy. The use of variations in the short-term 
interest rate as a measure that proxies the change in the 
stance of monetary policy is fully in line with the literature 
analyzing the credit channel at the micro level.2 The use of a 
three-month interest rate follows many articles in Angeloni, 
Kashyap and Mojon (2003) for example that analyze 
European data. Replacing the changes in the three-month 
interest rate with the changes in the overnight interbank 
interest rate or with the changes in the six-month Treasury 
bill rate yields very similar results, maybe not surprisingly 
as the correlation between all interest series is very high.
3. Islamic banks
Preferably, Islamic banking is equity-, rather than fixed-
interest-, based with profit and loss sharing on both the 
liability and asset side of a bank’s balance sheet. Depositors 
in Islamic banks are for all practical purposes shareholders 
that receive no guarantee with respect to the face value of 
their “deposits”. In principle, they fully share in the profits 
and losses of the bank in which they have their deposits. 
Similarly, on their asset side Islamic banks deploy an array 
of deferred sales and profit and loss sharing arrangements 
to finance household consumption or firm investment. In 
many respects, Islamic banks are not unlike conventional 
mutual fund banks (e.g., Cowen and Kroszner (1990)).
Islamic banks seek funding through transaction deposits 
and investment accounts. Transaction deposits are similar 
to conventional banks’ demand deposits, i.e., cash can be 
withdrawn at any time by writing a check or by accessing an 
automatic teller machine (ATM), and the bank guarantees 
the nominal value of the deposit. However, Islamic banks 
cannot lend the funds to projects that are Haram, i.e., not 
permissible under Islamic jurisprudence related to alcohol, 
pork, sex, etc., or dealing with interest payments (Riba), 
gambling (Maysar), or excessive uncertainty (Garrar). 
In general, Islamic banks aspire to be more conservative in 
lending.
Investment accounts are the equivalent of the conventional 
savings accounts. However, these accounts do not offer a 
fixed interest rate, but rather involve profit and loss sharing 
between bank and depositors. Although consequently 
the face value of the investment deposits is not ensured, 
Islamic banks invariably observe due diligence in financing 
various projects.
Joint venture financing arrangements constitute the 
most principled form of financing households and firms. 
However, in the early stages of their development, Islamic 
banks often adopt asset-backed fixed return arrangements, 
mainly deferred payment sales (Murabaha) and operational 
leases (Ijara), to finance household consumption, car 
purchases and real estate. In Pakistan these two types cover 
approximately 80 percent of the total financing provide by 
Islamic banks (as of December 2004), which has decreased 
to about 60 percent over time (as of December 2009).3
4. Monetary conditions and Islamic banks
The first Islamic bank in Pakistan was established in 2002 
as a response to the (until then) unmet market demand 
for Islamic financial products (Source: Financial Sector 
Assessment, SBP, 2004). Islamic banking quickly observed 
sharp growth, as new and established banks entered the 
market by designing and offering suitable contracts to 
collect deposits from and extend credit to households and 
enterprises.
The main problem immediately faced by the Islamic 
banks was the absence of a government security designed 
in accordance with Islamic principles, for use as a safe 
investment or to fulfill the liquidity requirements set by 
the SBP. In the absence of such an Islamic government 
security, Islamic banks had no immediate base rate to price 
their Murabaha and Ijara contracts. Instead, they use the 
Karachi Interbank Offer Rate (KIBOR) (Source: Handbook 
of Islamic Products, SBP, 2009). However, the KIBOR is 
largely determined by the rate on short-term government 
securities such as the three-month Treasury bill, which 
is set in fortnightly auctions. Because fixed return modes 
cover a large part of the total financing that is provided 
by Islamic banks, for the estimation of the strength of a 
lending channel the three-month Treasury bill rate can also 
be used as an indicator of the monetary policy stance.
The balance sheet data in Table  1 provide a first glimpse 
of the crucial differences between large and small 
conventional banks and Islamic banks in terms of liquidity 
for example. A large bank is defined as a bank with more 
than two hundred billion PKR (around 2.5  billion US 
dollar) in assets. According to this definition there are 
six large banks, representing around sixty percent of all 
banking assets. We label the remaining banks as small 
banks. By assets, all Islamic banks are small banks.
Liquidity is defined as the sum of cash, balances with 
Treasury banks and balances with other banks (as in Loupias, 
Savignac and Sevestre (2003) for example). Although 
the cash reserve requirement for both conventional and 
Islamic banks remained same through the entire sample 
period, liquidity varies noticeably across bank type. Small 
conventional banks are on average more liquid than large 
conventional banks during the period of easy monetary 
policy in 2003. However, the situation is reversed during 
the period of tight monetary policy after 2005. Hence, 
contractionary monetary policy creates more liquidity 
problems for small banks than for large banks. This is due 
to the fact that the large banks have relatively more options 
for nonreversible financing like debt or equity instruments.
In comparison with conventional banks Islamic banks have 
the higher fraction of their assets in cash and balances with 
Treasury and other banks. This is also the case in many 
other countries where Islamic banks are present (Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Merrouche (2010)). The explanation 
may be straightforward: In the early stages of their 
existence, Islamic banks had fewer immediate investment 
opportunities in comparison with their conventional 
counterparts.
Most of their liquidity remained in the form of cash and 
balances with other financial institutions. This is mainly 
due to the absence of a Shariah compliant instrument 
called Sukuk (Islamic bond), Islamic banks initially did not 
have any alternative investment option in securities. This is 
evident from the low fraction of their assets in investments 
in 2003 (Table  1). The first compliant instrument was 
issued by a public sector enterprise only in 2005 but it could 
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not fulfill the large investment appetite of Islamic banks. So 
until 2008, and in the absence of any Islamic government 
security, Islamic banks held cash to fulfill the statutory 
liquidity and cash reserve requirements (SLR).
Holding only cash resulted in higher opportunity costs for 
Islamic banks than for conventional banks. Realizing that 
Islamic banks were at a cost disadvantage compared to 
conventional banks in meeting the SLR, the SBP relaxed 
it for Islamic banks. While their cash reserve requirements 
are the same, Islamic banks, on average, have been required 
to hold ten percent less in SLR than the conventional banks. 
Currently Islamic banks need to hold nine percent of the 
total demand and time deposits for SLR purpose, whereas 
conventional banks are liable to maintain nineteen percent 
of demand and time deposits (Table 2). Therefore, and in 
order to make our analysis comparable across bank type, 
we take the liquidity variable equal to the first two liquidity 
items, i.e., cash and balances with Treasury and other 
banks, for which the requirements and the opportunities 
are likely most similar for conventional and Islamic banks.
Table  1. Balance sheet items for conventional banks and Islamic banks. Balance sheet items for 
conventional banks and Islamic banks as a percentage of assets and liabilities, and indicated items.
Conventional Banks Islamic Banks
Large Banks Small Banks
2003 2009 2003 2009 2003 2009
Assets
Cash and Balances With Treasury Banks 10 10 9 6 12 8
Balances With Other Banks 4 3 4 2 12 7
Lending To Financial Institutions 7 3 11 4 0 16
 Call Money 8 11 14 13 0 0
 Repurchase Agreements 86 84 75 66 0 2
 Other 6 6 11 21 0 98
Investments – Net 36 25 22 31 7 16
 Market Treasury Bills 69 51 49 67 0 5
 Pakistan Investment Bonds 19 9 43 14 0 2
 Other 12 40 8 19 100 93
Advances – Net 37 52 50 45 64 44
Other Assets 6 8 5 12 4 9
Liabilities
Borrowing From Financial Institutions 5 6 22 17 12 4
Deposits and Other Accounts 84 78 66 64 69 80
 Time Deposits 18 28 23 38 42 42
 Saving Deposits 50 36 54 33 46 31
 Current Accounts 31 36 23 28 12 26
Subordinated Loans 0 1 1 1 0 0
Other Liabilities 5 4 6 7 4 5
Equity 5 10 6 10 15 10
Source: State Bank of Pakistan.
Table 2. Statutory cash and liquidity reserve requirements. 
Statutory cash and liquidity reserve requirements as a 
percentage of time and demand deposits.
Cash  
Requirements
Liquidity  
Requirements
Dates All Banks
Conventional 
Banks
Islamic 
Banks
Until 2006 5 15 6
Feb 15, 2006 5 15 8
July 18, 2006 5 15 8
July 18, 2006 7 18 8
June 31, 2008 8 18 8
May 22, 2008 9 19 9
Oct 17, 2008 6 19 9
Nov 1, 2008 5 19 9
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In the absence of a risk-free Islamic instrument, Islamic 
banks also benchmarked their fixed-return contracts, 
Murabaha and Ijara, to the conventional interest rate 
charged in the interbank market, which is usually based on 
the Treasury-bill rate. However, the loan supply of Islamic 
banks is less likely to react to changes in monetary policy 
because as said they have fewer investment opportunities 
and are more likely to sit on a lot of spare liquidity. In 
addition, since Islamic banks assets are only indirectly 
linked to the policy rate, Islamic banks are less affected by 
the changes in monetary policy.
5. Bank lending channel in Pakistan
The structure of a country’s banking system is likely to 
determine the strength of the response of bank lending to 
monetary policy shocks. The size of the banking sector and 
its market concentration, the fraction of banking assets that 
are liquid, and the banks’ capitalization could be crucial in 
establishing the potency of the bank lending channel.
State and foreign ownership of domestically operating 
banks will also be important in determining the impact 
of domestic monetary policy on bank loan supply. State 
owned banks, that are mostly publicly guaranteed, 
likely attract new funds elastically to offset the impact 
of monetary contractions for example (Ehrmann, et  al. 
(2003)). Similarly, foreign banks with close links to their 
parent institutions and global bank networks are likely to 
absorb the impact of domestic monetary policy without 
altering their domestic loan supply (foreign banks with 
most of their funding in their home country may contract 
lending relatively more following contractionary monetary 
policy in their home country).
This section presents salient features of the banking 
system in Pakistan, such as the importance of banks within 
the financial system and corporate finance, the market 
structure, the heterogeneity of the banks, their overall 
performance and the role of the state in the banking 
system. Each of these features may determine the potency 
of the bank lending channel. Tables 3 and 4 provide many 
of the statistics we now discuss, while Table 5 summarizes 
how the various characteristics we will discuss determine 
the potency of the bank lending channel in Pakistan.
Importance of banks within the financial system
Banks play a central and still expanding role in the financial 
system of Pakistan. In the wake of reforms, that started 
during 1990s and which included bank privatizations and 
interest rate liberalization for example, the total assets of 
the banking system increased during the last decade, both 
in absolute value and as a share of the total assets of the 
financial system, from 65 percent in 2002 to 74 percent 
in 2009.4
In contrast, the share of nonbank financial institutions 
and the Central Directorate of National Savings decreased 
from 6.2 to 5.6 and from 25 to 17 percent, respectively. The 
latter category of financial institutions comprises various 
national saving schemes through which the government 
mobilizes household savings by offering various debt 
instruments at varying maturities and constitutes a major 
source of nonbank borrowing for the government. The 
minute share of microfinance and insurance institutions 
increased slightly.
In general, global macroeconomic and political 
developments remain favorable to the Pakistani banking 
sector. Yet, total private sector credit granted by banks over 
gross domestic product (GDP) expanded briskly until 2005, 
but then leveled off, and for the first time dropped in 2007, 
corresponding to the tightening of monetary conditions 
and suggestive of the existence of a lending channel in 
Pakistan.
Table 3. Financial intermediation in Pakistan in 2002–2009.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
As a Share of Total Assets of Financial Sector
Microfinance Institutions   0.1   0.1   0.1   0.2   0.2   0.2   0.2   0.2
Nonbank Financial Institutions   6.2   6.6   7.0   7.6   7.8   8.0   7.6   5.3
Insurance   3.8   3.8   3.8   3.9   4.1   4.6   4.4   4.4
Central Directorate of National Savings Institutions 24.9 25.0 21.7 18.0 16.1 14.6 14.8 16.6
Banks 65.0 64.5 67.3 70.4 71.9 72.7 73.0 73.5
As a Percent of Gross Domestic Product
Microfinance Institutions   0.1   0.1   0.1   0.1   0.1   0.1   0.1   0.1
Nonbank Financial Institutions   4.6   4.9   5.2   5.6   5.7   5.9   5.0   3.4
Insurance   2.8   2.9   2.8   2.9   3.0   3.4   2.9   2.8
Central Directorate of National Savings Institutions 18.2 18.8 16.1 13.3 11.7 10.8   9.8 10.8
Banks 47.7 48.3 50.1 51.8 52.4 53.9 48.1 47.6
All 73.3 75.0 74.4 73.7 72.9 74.1 66.0 64.7
Private Sector Credit 18.0 19.9 22.6 26.3 27.8 28.5 27.6 22.8
Source: State Bank of Pakistan.
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Importance of banks for the financing of 
corporations
Banks around the world are very important in fulfilling 
the financing needs of the corporate sector. Public debt 
and equity play, for most firms and even in financially 
well-developed countries, only a minor role in financing 
corporate activities.
Debt and equity markets are often found to be less developed 
and subject to more intense market imperfections in 
emerging economies. This is also the case in Pakistan. The 
issuance of public debt is very limited, and especially small 
firms rely heavily on bank debt. Bond market capitalization 
has even decreased over time in nominal terms. Stock 
markets continue to play a modest role in corporate sector 
funding. Stock market capitalization has shown an upward 
trend, but still the market is relatively thin, dominated by a 
handful of commercial banks’ stocks, and mainly driven by 
the demand from foreign investors.
In sum, banks play a dominant role as financial 
intermediaries in Pakistan. If the supply of bank loans 
to firms changes following changes in monetary policy, 
firms likely will be affected as for most firms financing 
alternatives may not be readily available.
Performance of the banking sector
The transmission of monetary policy will also depend on 
the performance of the banks. Stronger banking sector 
results in a weaker effect of monetary policy on the loan 
supply (Cecchetti (1999)). The financial strength of the 
Table 4. Banking structure in Pakistan in 2002–2009.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Public Debt and Stock Market Financing
Domestic Debt Securities Issued by the Corporate 
Sector, in% of GDP
0.19 0.05 0.08 0.16 0.04 0.07 0.25 0.02
Domestic Debt Securities Issued by the Corporate 
Sector, in% of Bank Loans to Corporate Sector
1.50 0.30 0.40 0.60 0.20 0.30 0.90 0.10
Stock Market Capitalization, in% of GDP 14 20 30 42 36 49 14 20
Bank Performance
ROE (Profit after Tax over Capital  
and Reserves), in%
21 35 31 37 36 23 11 13
Cost Income Ratio, in% 67 59 63 72 71 68 70 72
Measures of Banking Sector Concentration
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 973 912 850 762 745 739 736 712
Coefficient of Variation 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
Assets of Largest 5 Banks, in% of Total Bank Assets 61 59 56 54 52 52 52 51
Assets of Large Banks (Assets > 200 bln. PKR),  
in% of Total Bank Assets
n/a n/a 65 64 60 58 59 57
State Ownership
Assets of the Public Sector Banks, in% of Total Bank 
Assets
52 49 27 26 26 27 25 26
Source: State Bank of Pakistan.
Table  5. Factors determining the potency of the bank 
lending channel. This table provides the factors that 
determine the potency of the bank lending channel and the 
direction of their impact.
Factor Strengthening Weakening
Importance of the banking 
sector
  Importance of bank 
financing

  Investors protection and 
capital markets

Bank dependence 
Structure of the banking 
system
 Concentration and size 
 Financial strength 
 State influence 
  Foreign ownership and 
bank networks

Regulatory requirements
 Capital adequacy 
 Deposit insurance 
Bank failures 
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banking system can be measured through asset quality, 
capital adequacy, liquidity and the earnings of the banking 
system.
The first half of the sample period is characterized by an 
increase in the stability and expansion regarding banking 
system. Banking business remained profitable and return 
on equity (ROE) for example grew until 2006. Similarly, 
the cost – income ratio dropped until the same year.
However, after the tightening of monetary policy started in 
2005, performance of the banking sector weakened and in 
subsequent years there was a rise in non-performing loans 
and a resultant erosion of capital. The banking sector in 
Pakistan is clearly not immune to contractionary monetary 
policy shocks, as bank balance sheets are affected by the 
increasing interest rates.
Relationship lending
A strong relationship with a bank may insulate an individual 
firm to some extent from the cut in bank lending that follows 
a contractionary monetary policy. This shielding may not 
only be vis-á-vis other firms that have no relationship, but 
also across time if banks would intertemporally “subsidize.”
If firms engage multiple banks, firms can switch if one 
bank is affected more by contractionary monetary policy 
than the others (Detragiache, Garella and Guiso (2000)). 
Large firms are mostly immune from any type of financing 
shortage by switching among banks when needed (Khwaja 
and Mian (2008)). Small firms however are often unable to 
substitute between banks, or between bank and other type 
financing.
Market concentration and size structure
Informational frictions in the banking sector are important 
for the lending channel to operate. If market players in 
the interbank markets are facing significant informational 
asymmetries, then distributional effects are likely to occur 
between banks that are confronted with informational 
issues to various degrees. Size criterion is used as standard 
in literature as a proxy to measure the informational 
opaque situation of banks. Small banks, in general, are 
considered to be more exposed to informational frictions 
than large banks. Therefore, the external finance premium 
for the former category is probably higher than for the 
latter group.
The banking market is characterized by a steadily 
decreasing concentration during the sample period. The 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (i.e., the sum of market shares 
squared) decreased from 973 in 2002 to 736 in 2008, while 
the C-5 (the market share of the five largest banks by total 
assets) dropped from 61 to 52 percent. The group of the 
largest banks (with total assets more than 200 billion PKR) 
slipped from 65 percent in 2004 to 52 percent in 2008. As 
concentration dropped, competition may have intensified, 
possibly making the bank lending channel more potent.
State influence in the banking sector
Before the financial reforms in 1990s, the Pakistani financial 
system was mainly characterized by high government 
borrowing, bank-level credit ceilings, directly controlled 
interest rates, and directed and subsidized loan supply.
Public ownership of banks was introduced in the 1970s and 
lasted until the early 1990s, making the state all dominant 
in the banking sector. In 1990 there was not a single 
domestic private bank.
However, due to additional privatization of state-owned 
banks during the sample period studied, the influence of 
the state has been waning. The fraction of assets of state-
owned banks over total assets of the banking system halved 
from 52 percent in 2002 to 26 percent in 2009 potentially 
strengthening the banking lending channel of monetary 
policy transmission.
Deposit insurance
There is no deposit insurance in Pakistan. Rather, deposits 
are in principle indirectly insured only by the continuous 
supervision by the regulatory authority. Detailed prudential 
regulations have been issued to avoid different types of 
risks a bank could be exposed to. Moreover, stringent 
liquidity requirements are in place to restrain banks to take 
excess leverage.
Therefore, in absence of explicit deposit insurance the 
lending channel may be more potent, because the lack 
of certainty about the nominal value of deposits makes 
depositors feel unsafe about their money. Consequently, 
following a tightening of monetary policy, deposits may be 
withdrawn and banks compelled to cut lending.
Bank failures
There were few bank failures in Pakistan during the 1990s. 
Some institutions became involved in scandals and failed 
due to imprudent banking. The Mehran Bank scandal 
is well-known, for example. Some banks were involved 
in a few scandals causing depositors to feel insecure. 
Furthermore, some cooperative societies also collected 
deposits from the people with a promise of higher returns 
than the ongoing market rates. These societies inevitably 
failed and caused a loss for their depositors.
Due to these incidents in the past, there may be a higher 
occurrence of rumors and a abrupt contraction in deposits 
following a tighter monetary policy. Furthermore, fraud 
and forgeries independently affect deposits, which in turn 
affect lending of the banks. Data related to such cases 
indicate a significant increase in such cases during the last 
few years (Source: Financial Stability Review 2008–09, 
SBP).
Foreign banks and bank networks
In case any liquidity problem arises, due to a decrease in 
demandable deposits, foreign banks and banks in networks 
can resort to their head office or holding company to cover 
the liquidity shortage. Under this scenario, the potency 
of the bank lending channel of domestic monetary policy 
transmission becomes weaker. The role of foreign banks 
has been limited in Pakistan, i.e., they account for only 
ten percent of total banking sector assets. There are some 
implicit bank networks in Pakistan in that ownership of 
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some banks is common. There is also foreign ownership 
in some large banks. However, evidence strongly suggests 
banks in Pakistan do pass shocks to their liquidity position to 
their borrowers (Khwaja and Mian (2008)). This evidence, 
combined with the weak role of foreign banks and bank 
networks, makes it more likely that tight monetary policy 
eventually leads to the loss of deposits by the banks and a 
contraction in lending.
6. Data and econometric specification
The main source of data is the Quarterly Report of 
Conditions (QRCs) of all banks submitted to the State 
Bank of Pakistan (SBP). The data set covers the whole 
population of all banking institutions that is operational in 
the financial system and incorporates their QRCs’ figures. 
The time period is from 2002:III to 2010:I at a quarterly 
basis. There are 40 banks, of which six are Islamic Banks.
We lose observations because: (1) Some banks start 
operating after 2002:III; (2) we employ up to four lags 
of quarterly growth rates; (3) some banks merge and 
following Kashyap and Stein (2000) we remove banks’ 
observations in any quarter in which they are involved in 
a merger; (4) we remove observations for which the loan 
growth rate is more than three standard deviations from its 
sample mean; (5) there are missing values in the dataset. 
We are left with 756 bank – year: quarter observations that 
can be used in the estimations.
The methodology, in general, is based on an assessment 
of the differences in the response of individual banks 
to a monetary policy shock according to their liquidity 
positions. We follow the one-step regression methodology, 
as in Kashyap and Stein (2000):
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whereby,
ci = bank i specific fixed effect,
Dlog(Lit-j) =  the quarterly change in the logarithm of the 
total amount of the loans granted to the private sector by 
bank i in year: quarter t-j,
DRt-j  =  the quarterly change in the three-month Treasury 
bill rate in year: quarter t-j,
Tt  = time trend,
Quarterkt = dummy for quarter k in year: quarter t, and
Xit-1 = liquid assets (i.e., cash and balances with the banks) 
over total assets of bank i in year: quarter t.
m is set to equal four, i.e., one calendar year. This 
corresponds to the number of lags used in other papers 
assessing the potency of the credit channel in other 
countries.
The main hypothesis is that contractionary monetary 
policy affects the illiquid banks more than the liquid banks, 
as the latter can offset any decrease in deposits by reducing 
their liquid assets. Consequently, our main coefficient of 
interest is the sum of interaction terms of liquidity Xit-1 with 
the monetary policy measure DRt-j, i.e., Σf .
Equation (1) is first estimated for the entire banking 
sector to evaluate the potency of the aggregate bank 
lending channel. Large banks are possibly less influenced 
than small banks by monetary shocks because of their 
ability to raise time deposits, which - irrespective of their 
internal liquidity positions - would make their lending 
less dependent on monetary policy shocks. Islamic banks 
may also be less affected. Therefore, we also estimate 
Equation (1) including dummies both for large banks and 
Islamic banks. Both dummies are interacted then with 
all coefficients, except the trend, quarter, and province 
shares. These shares replace the bank-specific effects and 
are constructed by calculating for each bank the relative 
number of branches it has in each province.
In robustness, and to further control for the business cycle 
and loan demand, we also include change in the industrial 
production index (IPI). Equation (2) equals:
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To check for endogeneity between lag dependent variable 
and the error term we use a Hausman-Wu test with the 5th 
to 8th lag in level of the dependent variable as the set of 
instruments. The result shows that the lagged dependent 
variable in both equations (1) and (2) is not correlated 
with the error term.
7. Results
All banks
Table 7 presents the results of the baseline regression, i.e., 
Equation (1), estimated using the observations of all banks. 
The purpose is to assess the potency of the bank lending 
channel for the overall banking sector. The table shows 
the sum of the estimated coefficients. The coefficients for 
provinces, quarter dummies and time trend are not shown. 
All estimates are in percentage terms and robust to White’s 
adjusted standard errors.
The estimated coefficients confirm that the bank lending 
channel is operational in Pakistan. The sum of the estimated 
coefficients on the changes in the three-month Treasury 
bill rate equal -5.83***.5 Hence, an increase in the interest 
rate by one percentage point decreases loan growth by 5.83 
percentage points.
To identify that this decrease in loan growth actually 
represents a contraction in the supply of credit and not 
a reduction in the demand for credit, we interact the 
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measure for bank specific liquidity with the interest rate 
(as in Kashyap and Stein (2000)). The sum of the estimated 
coefficients on this interaction term equals 20.71*. 
Consequently, banks with a higher level of liquidity contract 
lending less following a monetary shock (we discuss the 
economic relevancy of similar estimates in the next table).
To check the robustness of these estimates we replace the 
three-month Treasury bill rate with the KIBOR in Model (2) 
and the six-month Treasury bill rate in Model (3). The sum 
of the estimated coefficients on the changes in the interest 
rates equal -3.69*** and -5.12***, respectively, while the 
sum of the estimated coefficients on the interaction term 
with liquidity equal 20.71 and 15.42. Individual liquidity 
coefficients are insignificant for all specifications.
To control better regional effects Model (4) replaces the 
bank fixed effects with bank province shares, i.e., for 
each bank the number of branches it has in each province 
divided by the total number of branches it has. To control 
better for business cycle and loan demand Model (5) 
includes the change in industrial production. Results are 
mostly unaffected.
Large and Islamic banks
We now assess the role played by large and small 
(conventional) banks, and Islamic banks in the bank 
lending channel. We interact dummies for Large and 
Islamic banks with all independent variables (except with 
for the trend, season and province shares). Table 8 exhibits 
the results for various specifications.
The baseline Model (1) indicates especially the small banks 
make the bank lending channel operational, a finding also 
present in Kashyap and Stein (2000). An increase in the 
three-month Treasury bill rate of one percentage point 
decreases the loan growth of small banks by 7.17*** 
percentage points in a year. The sum of the estimated 
coefficients on the interaction terms of liquidity and 
interest rates equal 25.06***.
To assess if the estimated coefficients also have economically 
relevant implications, we need to calculate the response 
in lending by similarly sized banks, but different liquidity 
positions, to a monetary policy shock. Using the liquidity 
distribution of small banks in 2010:I, we consider a bank 
at the 9th decile as a ‘liquid’ bank and at the 1st decile as 
an ‘illiquid’ bank. The liquidity ratios according to this 
criterion are 24 and 5 percent, respectively. Under this 
scenario, a one percentage point increase in the interest 
rate reduces the lending by an illiquid bank 4.5 percentage 
points more than the lending by a liquid bank over one year 
time period. This is calculated through multiplying åf by 
liquidity differential of the liquid and illiquid banks i.e. 
25.06 × (0.24 - 0.05).
The estimated results for the large banks are different. The 
sum of the estimated coefficients on the change in interest 
rate is positive, i.e., 7.06*, but only marginally significant. 
Hence, large banks are not sensitive to changes in monetary 
policy due to their ability to fund their lending from the 
market other than deposits. The sum of the interaction 
terms of liquidity and the interest rate is now negative, as 
in Kashyap and Stein (2000), but insignificant. Using the 
Table 7. Loan growth, all banks. The dependent variable is Δlog(Lit) which is the quarterly change in the logarithm of 
the total amount of the loans granted to the private sector by bank i in year: quarter t. The independent variables are: 
Δlog(Lit-j) which is the quarterly change in the logarithm of the total amount of the loans granted to the private sector by 
bank i in year: quarter t-j, ΔRt-j is the quarterly change in the three-month Treasury bill rate in year: quarter t-j, and Xit-1 
is the liquid assets (i.e., cash and balances with the banks) over total assets of bank i in year: quarter t. The estimations 
use 756 bank – year: quarter observations. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Sum of) Estimated 
Coefficients
Baseline R = KIBOR R = Six-month  
Treasury bill rate
With Bank  
Province Shares
With Industrial 
Production
D log( )Lit j
j
-
=
∑
1
4 0.34*** 0.36*** 0.33*** 0.40*** 0.34***
DRt j
j
-
=
∑
0
4
-5.83*** -3.69*** -5.12*** -5.95*** -5.04***
X Rit t j
j
*D
-
=
∑
0
4 20.71* 15.01 15.42 19.22 19.20
DIPIt j
j
-
=
∑
0
3 0.19
Quarter Dummies, 
Trend
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Bank Province Shares No No No Yes No
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difference between small banks and large banks coefficient 
there is 11.6 percent gap in the level of lending across 
liquid and illiquid large versus small banks one year after 
a monetary shock.
All in all, these findings are very similar to those in Kashyap 
and Stein (1995), i.e., tight monetary policy decreases the 
loan growth of small banks but may actually increase credit 
granted by large banks in the short run. Romer and Romer 
(1990), Bernanke and Blinder (1992), and Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Evans (1996) also show that credit reacts 
sluggishly or initially even expands following a monetary 
tightening. In Pakistan this effect is also present due to the 
response of the large banks.
Islamic banks are equivalent to small banks in terms of asset 
size and as Islamic banks use the conventional interest rate 
as a key benchmark, one can expect that the bank lending 
channel will also operate through Islamic banks. However, 
since Islamic banks were expanding during the sample 
period, their deposit growth may have been less affected 
by tight monetary policy. Also, share of their fixed deposits 
in total deposits is higher than conventional banks. Using 
panel data of bank deposits across all commercial banks in 
Pakistan, Khan (2010) also found that Islamic banks enjoy 
substantially higher deposit growth rates than other banks 
including the crises period of 2008. Moreover, the liquidity 
position of the Islamic bank makes them less susceptible to 
a change in the interest rate.
The results indeed show that the loan growth of Islamic 
banks is not affected by changes in the interest rate. The 
sum of the estimated coefficients equals, 2.05, positive 
but not statistically significant. Similarly, the sum of the 
estimated coefficients on the interaction terms of bank 
liquidity and changes in the interest rate equal -31.83, 
which is negative and insignificant. In both cases Islamic 
banks are statistically different from small banks with an 
estimated difference that equals 9.22* for the changes in 
the interest rate and 56.90*** for the interaction term, but 
similar to the large banks.
As before, and to check the robustness of these estimates, we 
replace the three-month Treasury bill rate with the KIBOR 
in Model (2) and the six-month Treasury bill rate in Model 
(3), and introduce bank province shares and the change in 
industrial production in Models (4) and (5). Results are 
mostly unaffected and document that even though Islamic 
banks are small (in terms of asset size), their response in 
lending to a monetary policy shock is similar to that of the 
large banks in the sample.
8. Conclusion
We investigate the differences in banks’ responses to 
monetary policy shocks across bank size, liquidity, and 
type, i.e., conventional versus Islamic, in Pakistan between 
2002:III to 2010:I. We find that following a monetary 
contraction, small banks with liquid balance sheets cut 
their lending less than other small banks. In contrast 
large banks maintain their lending irrespective of their 
liquidity positions. Islamic banks, though similar in size to 
small banks, respond to monetary policy shocks like large 
banks. Hence the credit channel of monetary policy may 
weaken when Islamic banking grows, with their current 
portfolio under conventional monetary policy, in relative 
importance.
However, if there are (1) sukuk issuance that can be used 
as a monetary policy indicator for Islamic banks, (2) more 
investment opportunities available for Islamic banks, (3) 
an efficient Islamic interbank market, and (4) a competitive 
Islamic banking industry then the credit channel through 
Islamic banks may start gaining in potency to the extent 
that some Islamic banks remain small and hence face 
funding constraints.
Notes
1. This bank balance sheet channel may be operational 
because of agency problems between banks and their 
providers of funds depositors, other debt-holders 
and equity holders (Bernanke (2007)). Gertler and 
Kiyotaki (2010) formalize this channel modeling 
financial intermediation as in Gertler and Karadi 
(2010) but include liquidity risk as in Kiyotaki 
and Moore (2008). The agency problems between 
banks and their borrowers (firms and households) 
give similarly rise to the firm balance-sheet channel 
(Lang and Nakamura (1995); Bernanke, Gertler 
and Gilchrist (1996); Bernanke, Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1999)). Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and 
Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) for example find 
that, following the dates of monetary contractions 
identified in Romer and Romer (1989)), the ratio 
of bank loans to small versus large manufacturing 
firms falls. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) show 
that, even after controlling for differences in sales 
between these firms, the differences in the behavior 
of small and large firm debt remain. If for firms 
bank loans are imperfectly substitutable with public 
financing, and prices adjust imperfectly, monetary 
policy affects real activity through the so-called 
credit channel.
2. See Jayaratne and Morgan (2000), Kashyap and 
Stein (2000), Kishan and Opiela (2000), Ashcraft 
(2006) and Black, Hancock and Passmore (2009) 
among others. On the other hand, Bernanke and 
Blinder (1992) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and 
Evans (1996) use vector auto regressions to identify 
monetary policy shocks. However Kashyap and 
Stein (2000) find very similar results using either 
the variation in the federal funds rate, the Boschen 
and Mills (1995) index or the Bernanke and Mihov 
(1998) measure.
3. These two products are mainly replaced by another 
fixed-return scheme called diminishing Musharikah 
(i.e., “diminishing partnership”), in which the 
partner in an asset (a house for example) not only 
pays rental payments to the bank but over time also 
buys the share owned by the bank.
4. The banks also own shares in nonbank financial 
institutions, insurance companies, brokerage 
houses, and financial advisory services further 
underlining their central role in the financial system 
(Source: Financial Stability Review 2007–08, SBP).
5. As in the Tables we star (the sum of) the estimated 
coefficients according to their significance levels. 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant 
at 10%.
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Abstract - Monetary policy influences the real economy through various channels, including bank 
lending. Currently, Malaysia is operating under dual banking systems: conventional and Islamic 
banking. The latter has the distinctive feature of interest-free. Hence, this study aims to empirically 
explore the relevance of Islamic banks’ financing in channeling the monetary policy effects to the 
real economy. To achieve this objective, the study relies on an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) 
bound testing approach and innovation accounting approach and uses quarterly data spanning 
from 1991:Q1 to 2010:Q4. The study documents that Islamic financing channel for monetary 
transmission exists in Malaysia. Islamic financing is unequally distributed to economic sectors in 
response to monetary policy shock. Furthermore, the findings also reflect that Islamic banking, 
as operating a dual banking system, is not spared from the interest rate and monetary conditions 
of the country. This clearly shows the behavior of Islamic banking, which cannot shun the interest 
rate while its operation delinks from the interest rates. In designing monetary policy, the central 
bank should consider Islamic financing as an alternative or complement channel for monetary 
transmission, since this channel is just as active as conventional lending channel.
Keywords: Islamic banks, monetary transmission mechanism, autoregressive distributed lag, Malaysia
Introduction
The monetary policy conducted by central banks targets 
to influence the overall performance of the economy in 
order to achieve its objectives. The common objectives of 
monetary policy are: sustainable economic growth, stable 
price, full employment, and exchange rate stability. To 
achieve such objectives, central banks set an intermediate 
target, i.e. monetary aggregate or interest rate that are 
strongly linked to economic activities. For example, during 
a boom period, a central bank conducts tight monetary 
policy by raising interest rates or using other monetary 
policy tools, i.e., increase of statutory reserve requirement 
(SRR) or selling bonds, to reduce inflation. Following the 
increase of the interest rate, the price of loans increases 
which in turn encourages investors not to borrow. As a 
result, investment spending declines, thereby causing 
aggregate demand to decrease. Hence, output falls.
The channel of monetary transmission in affecting 
economic activities is also important and much relevant to 
the effectiveness of monetary policy. The above description 
has illustrated the mechanism of monetary transmission 
through the interest rate channel. The interest rate is 
used to influence the decision of investors in borrowing 
and making investments. Investment spending is part of 
GDP; lower investment spending will reduce aggregate 
demand, thereby causing the economic activities to 
decline. However, the interest rate channel is not the only 
channel that monetary policy can transmit through. There 
are also other channels that can be conduits for monetary 
transmission, such as bank lending, exchange rate, asset 
price and balance-sheet channels.
Bank lending is one of the conduits through which 
monetary policy can be transmitted. In a boom period 
with high inflation, a central bank might implement 
tight monetary policy by increasing the statutory reserve 
requirement (SRR) in order to reduce inflation. Upon this 
regulation, bank reserve decreases, causing fewer bank 
loans to be made available. Thus, investment spending 
declines, because of which fewer number of investors will be 
getting loans. Consequently, aggregate demand decreases, 
affecting output to decline. In this channel, banks play 
an important role as financial intermediaries that have 
Hasin and Majid
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specialized knowledge in making credit that costs them less 
than other sources. In market imperfection, there are some 
borrowers who depend on loans of banks. In other words, 
loans are perceived as imperfect substitutions for another 
type of credit, i.e., raising money in capital markets. Hence, 
the reduction of loans leads to the decline in investment 
spending, and consequently output decreases.
Bank lending channels have captured the attention of many 
economists and researchers. There is substantial literature 
in this area for developed countries, such as those by 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), 
Kashyap and Stein (1997), and Brissmis et al. (2001). 
Many studies document evidence supporting the existence 
of the bank-lending channel in many countries. Altunbas 
et al. (2002), for example, has found the bank-lending 
channel in Europe. Also, many aspects of the bank-lending 
channel have been analyzed, among them are: the issue of 
sensitivity of bank lending based on different size, capital 
strength and liquidity on monetary policy (Brissmis et al., 
2001; Gambacorta, 2005; Worm, 2001), and also the issue 
of sectoral effects of monetary policy (Dale and Haldane, 
1995; Dedola and Lippi, 2001; Arnold and Vrugt, 2002).
Furthermore, many studies on monetary transmission 
for developing countries were also conducted by those 
such as Arena et al. (2006), Agung (1998) and Ramlogan 
(2004). Various channels of monetary transmission are 
investigated in those countries. The results vary from 
one country to another, yet all of these studies seem to 
suggest the existence of credit channel (Ramlogan, 2004; 
Huang and Pfau, 2008; Ahmad, 2008). Some studies also 
document the factors affecting the activeness of the bank-
lending channel, i.e., size, liquidity and origin of banks 
(Arena et al., 2006; Agung, 1998). However, these studies 
mainly focus on bank lending from conventional banking 
system only.
Unlike other countries, Malaysia is operating under the 
dual banking system, namely conventional and Islamic 
banking systems. This makes Malaysian banking system 
unique. Therefore, the bank-lending channel in Malaysia 
can be viewed in two aspects. The first aspect is the 
traditional lending channel through conventional banks, 
while the second one is the financing channel, through 
Islamic banks.
However, both conventional and Islamic banks provide 
similar products and services, but with different underlying 
contracts. Deposit and financing are based on loan contracts 
in conventional cases. In contrast, Islamic banks provide 
deposit and financing based on Islamic contracts such as 
wadi’ah, mudarabah, musharakah and murabahah. The 
reason such practices are exercised is that the interest is 
prohibited by Islam. Such practices help avoid the elements 
of interest. Thus, this unique feature of Islamic banking has 
brought a new avenue to the banking industry, and it affects 
all parties involved in the industry including depositors, 
investors, borrowers and also those in economic and social 
welfare organizations.
Like conventional banks, Islamic banks are under 
supervision and regulation of the central bank of Malaysia, 
Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM). Therefore, BNM has the 
power to control and influence the Islamic banks, as it has 
the control on conventional banks. For example, deposits 
from Islamic banks is subject to SRR and also liquidity 
requirement ratios (LRR). An increase (decrease) of 
SRR will affect bank reserve to (decrease) so that banks’ 
financing will reduce (increase). Based on the theoretical 
background of the bank-lending channel, it is questionable 
whether monetary policy can be passed through the Islamic 
financing channel or not? If yes, how strong it is?
In this light, both bank lending and Islamic financing 
channels are investigated. In terms of bank-lending 
channels, existing studies show that monetary transmission 
through them is active; for example, Goh and Yong (2007), 
Kassim and Majid (2009), Kassim (2006) and Sayuti 
(2009). Few other studies, such as Domac (1999), Ibrahim 
(2005) and Karim et al. (2006) focus on the distributional 
effects of monetary policy in Malaysia. These studies seem 
to suggest the disparities in the effects of monetary policy 
on bank lending and economic sectors.
With regard to the Islamic financing channel, there are 
hardly any studies. This may be due to the recentness of 
the establishment and improvement of Islamic banking 
systems in Malaysia. The limited existing studies, however, 
investigate mainly to prove the existence of Islamic 
financing channels for monetary transmission in Malaysia 
(Said and Ismail, 2007; Sukmana and Kassim, 2010; Sayuti, 
2009). Other than documenting the presence of Islamic 
financing channels for monetary transmission in Malaysia, 
they do not employ methodologies such as the VAR model, 
or structural VAR model, in producing empirical results 
(Sayuti, 2009; Said and Ismail, 2007; Kassim, Majid and 
Yusof, 2009). Then, there are few studies that analyze 
the causality between interest rate and Islamic financing 
by using the Toda-Yamamoto approach. The results show 
strong causality between the interest rate and Islamic 
financing (Ibrahim and Sukmana, 2011). Nevertheless, no 
study explored the distributional effects of monetary policy 
on Islamic financing. This aspect still thus demands further 
investigating.
To this end, the present study may fills up the space left by 
reexamining the current Islamic financing channels relying 
on different methods—the ARDL model, for instance. 
The study also would take the challenge of exploring 
distributional effects of monetary policy on Islamic 
financing as well as economic sectors. The study expects 
to produce findings that would enrich the literature along 
these lines.
Specifically, this study aims at investigating whether or 
not there exists any Islamic financing channel in Malaysia; 
analyzing the distributional effects of monetary policy on 
the Islamic financing provided for various economic sectors 
such as agriculture, manufacturing and construction, and 
assessing the sensitivity of various economic sectors to 
monetary policy stance and Islamic financing change.
The remainders of the study are organized in the following 
manner: Section  2 provides the review of literature on 
the bank-lending channel. Section 3 is devoted to discuss 
methodology employed in this study, while Section  4 
discusses the empirical results and findings of the study. 
Finally, Section  5 concludes and summarizes the major 
findings of the study.
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2. Monetary transmission mechanism
Monetary transmission mechanism is one of the economic 
topics of research that has been explored by many 
researchers. This may be because of the importance 
and the dynamic of the matter itself. Understanding the 
monetary transmission mechanism would give the central 
bank the most effective channel in conducting monetary 
policy and in affecting economic activities. This is perhaps 
the challenging task for many central banks since there 
are many channels that could be conduits for monetary 
transmission.
Channels of monetary transmission mechanism
The objectives of monetary policy are to achieve its 
targets such as sustainable economic growth and 
instituting stable price. It is important for policy makers to 
understand monetary transmission mechanisms in order to 
influence economic variables. The channels of monetary 
transmission have been well established at least in theory. 
For the purpose of this research, four channels of monetary 
transmission will be discussed.
Interest rate channel
A monetary transmission mechanism with interest rate 
channel has been established for over fifty years. The 
mechanism is based on the basic Keynesian IS/LM model 
in mainstream economics (Mishkin, 1996). This channel 
is also known as money view. In money view, monetary 
policy stance can influence economic variables via interest 
rate. The mechanism of this monetary transmission can 
be illustrated as below, assuming that it is monetary 
contraction:
M  i, I  Y
When monetary contraction is implemented, it affects 
real interest rate, causing it to increase. High real interest 
rate would increase the cost of borrowing to investors. 
Therefore, the investment spending falls, which cause the 
decrease of aggregate demand thereby causing economic 
output to decrease.
Bank lending channel
Monetary policy can be transmitted through the bank-
lending channel. In this channel, banks as financial 
intermediaries play a crucial role. To understand this 
channel, two assumptions must hold. Firstly, monetary 
policy must have the ability in influencing bank loans. 
Secondly, there is no perfect substitutability between retail 
bank deposits and other sources of funding for banks. The 
following schematic will show the mechanism.
M  deposit  bank loan  I  Y
When the central bank conducts monetary contraction, 
bank loans decrease in response to the fall in the bank 
reserve. Therefore, supply of bank loans to investors 
decreases, leading to decline in investment spending. As a 
consequence, output will decrease.
Asset price channel
Under the asset price channel, there are two conduits that 
monetary policy has to pass-through: Tobin’s q theory of 
investment and wealth effects. However, these two channels 
are almost the same except that the Tobin’s q channel will 
affect investment decisions, while wealth effect channel 
will involve the consumption decision.
Tobin’s q theory can be the channel for monetary 
transmission affecting economic variables through the 
valuation of equities. Tobin defines q as “the market 
value of firms divided by the replacement cost of capital” 
(Mishkin, 1996). If the value of q is high then the company 
will invest more because the value of the firm is higher 
than the replacement cost of capital and otherwise. The 
schematic of this channel can be presented as below.
M  Pe q   I   Y
From the above schematic, money supply decreases in the 
economy because of monetary contraction. Individuals 
would have less money than they want. Therefore, in 
order to smooth their consumption they will try to sell 
their assets—securities for instance. This will decrease 
the demand for stock thereby leading the price of stock 
to decrease. Hence, the q value of firms falls. Firms will 
reduce their investments, which will cause output to fall.
Under wealth effect, monetary transmission goes through 
wealth effect on consumption. Based on the life-cycle 
hypothesis model, consumption spending is determined 
by lifetime resources. If the value of wealth increases 
permanently, this would also increase the consumption 
of individuals. The following schematic presents the 
mechanism.
M  Pe  W   C  Y
Monetary contraction affects the value of stock prices, 
causing them to decline. Since most of the financial asset 
is common stock, the decrease of stock price leads to 
decrease of wealth. Therefore, the individual will decrease 
their consumption. As a result, because of the decrease in 
aggregate demand output will fall.
Exchange rate channel
With an open economy, the country has to involve 
international transactions. To accommodate international 
trade, the exchange rate has to be preset. Under flexible 
exchange rate systems, the impact of change in interest 
rate can be absorbed by the exchange rate (Mishkin, 1995). 
Therefore, monetary transmission can also pass-through 
the exchange rate which affects economic variables such as 
inflation and output. The schematic of the exchange rate 
channel is presented below.
M  i, IY  
From the schematic above, when monetary policy 
contraction is implemented, the real interest rate increases, 
which makes the domestic real interest rate relatively 
higher than the foreign real interest rate. Consequently, the 
funding from foreign investors will flow into the country, 
and the exchange rate will appreciate causing the price of 
exported products to be relatively higher than other foreign 
competitors. Therefore, as a result of decrease in aggregate 
demand, output will decline.
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There have been many studies on the monetary 
transmission through the bank-lending channels. Most 
of the studies support the presence of the bank-lending 
channel. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of this channel is 
still conclusive.
Among the early empirical studies on the bank-lending 
channel is Bernanke and Blinder (1992). They investigate 
the sensitivity of supply of reserve of the banks in the US 
on the federal fund rate shock as a monetary policy by 
employing the VAR model from 1959 to 1978. The finding 
shows that monetary policy contraction works in part by 
affecting the composition of bank assets. During tight 
monetary policy, banks will sell securities to smooth their 
loan supply. Nevertheless, over time banks will arrange a 
new loan and terminate the old loan in response to such 
monetary policy.
Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008) examined monetary 
policy through the bank-lending channels of two different 
categories of banks, namely domestically-oriented banks 
which do not have international operation, and global-
oriented banks. Their study showed that monetary policy 
only passes through domestically-oriented banks while 
global-oriented banks rely on internal capital markets in 
smoothing their liquidity. Therefore, they concluded that 
the bank-lending channel in the US would be diminishing 
in strength if banking becomes more globalized.
Agung (1998) used bank level data from Indonesia 
spanning from 1983 to 1995 to investigate the responses 
of different bank classes to monetary policy changes by 
employing VAR model. The study concluded that monetary 
contraction does not influence the lending of state banks, 
but does so to the lending of small banks. Besides, credit for 
investment and working capital from small banks decline 
more than state banks during tight monetary policy. 
However, consumer loans fall for all bank types.
Yusof (2006) examined the monetary policy channels in 
affecting aggregate and sectoral output in Asian countries, 
namely Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand. The study employed the cointegration and 
VECM approach. The most effective variable in effecting 
output is M1 for Malaysia and the Philippines, M2 for 
Indonesia and Thailand, and bank-lending for Singapore. 
Nevertheless, only the impact of monetary policy on 
sectoral output of Malaysia is significant. The results 
indicated that agriculture and manufacturing services, 
and construction sectors are affected most by M1, M2 and 
credit lending, respectively.
Said and Ismail (2005), investigated the bank-lending 
channel in Malaysia and also attempted to examine the size 
and capital strength of banks for the effectiveness of the 
channel. They used bank level data and applied fixed effect 
cross-sectional models with GLS estimation. The results 
supported the presence of the bank-lending channel, but 
they seemed to suggest that size and capital strength are 
irrelevant on the performance of the channel. Ghazali 
(2005) conducted a similar study but with different 
methods. The study used aggregate data of loans over 
the period from 1982 to 1999 and employed the Granger 
causality approach. The findings showed that there is 
strong causation running from bank liabilities to bank 
assets, while the result also indicated significant causation, 
running from the credit variables to the performance of 
the economy.
Sayuti (2009) employed the structural VAR model under 
small open economy framework. The study documented 
the presence of the bank-lending channels in Malaysia. 
In the same vein, Goh and Yong (2007) used bank level 
data and employed Autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) 
model in finding the evidence for the existence of bank-
lending transmission in Malaysia before and after the 
structural shift in interest rate. The results are different in 
these two periods. Before the shift, tight monetary policy 
influenced loan supply, which in turn supported the bank-
lending view. However, it had a limited strength after the 
shift, which indicated to the reduced effectiveness of the 
channel.
A similar study by Kassim (2006) applied multivariate 
causality analysis based on VECM and Toda-Yamamoto 
method, and Variance decomposition. The overall results 
showed the presence of bank-lending channels in Malaysia. 
Besides, the study also showed that smaller banking 
institutions are more sensitive to monetary change than 
larger banking institutions.
In addition, Karim et al. (2006) analyzed the impacts of 
monetary policy on commercial banks in Malaysia, lending 
to various economic sectors by using VAR model. The 
results showed that the tight monetary policy has a negative 
impact on bank lending to economic sectors. Meanwhile, 
bank lending to economic sectors also responds differently 
to monetary policy shocks. A similar study by Ibrahim 
(2005) also confirmed potential disparities in the effect 
of monetary policy on real sectoral activities in Malaysia.
Said and Ismail (2007) analyzed the role of Islamic banks 
in the transmission of monetary policy in Malaysia. He 
employed fixed effect model with GLS estimation and used 
15 commercial Islamic bank balance sheets. The study 
showed the presence of financing channels in Malaysia. On 
the other hand, Sayuti (2009) employed the structural VAR 
model in investigation of monetary policy transmission 
through the Islamic financing channel in Malaysia. The 
study confirmed the results of earlier studies.
Sukmana and Kassim (2010) analyzed the effects of Islamic 
financing and deposits in monetary transmission on real 
economy. They found that Islamic financing and deposits 
can be the conduits in liking the monetary policy indicator 
to economic activities. In addition, Ibrahim and Sukmana 
(2011) evaluated the dynamic interactions between Islamic 
financing and macroeconomic and financial variables using 
Toda-Yamamoto causality test and innovation accounting 
approach. The results suggested strong causal influences of 
interest rate, but not of real stock price and real production, 
on Islamic financing.
Kassim, Majid and Yusof (2009) investigated the impact of 
monetary policy shocks on conventional and Islamic banks 
in Malaysia. The study employed VAR model with monthly 
aggregate data. The finding showed that the impact of 
monetary policy change is more sensitive for Islamic banks 
than the conventional banks.
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To summarize, the existing studies seem to agree that the 
Islamic financing channel is active in Malaysia. However, 
there are other issues which are yet to be investigated such 
as distributional effects of monetary policy on Islamic 
financing to various economic sectors and the effectiveness 
of the channel in respect to size, capital strength and 
liquidity of Islamic banks. To fill up the space left, the 
present study takes up the challenge of exploring the issue 
of distributional effects of monetary policy on Islamic 
financing as well as economic sectors. The study would 
also reinvestigate to prove the presence of Islamic financing 
channels in Malaysia.
3. Empirical framework
Data
This research attempts to examine whether Islamic 
financing can be the channel for monetary transmission 
or not and also to analyze the distributional effects of 
monetary policy in the context of Malaysia. The study 
utilizes quarterly data from 1999.Q1 to 2010.Q4. The 
study uses five main variables, namely interest rate, total 
Islamic financing and eight sectoral Islamic financing, 
economic growth (proxied by real Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and eight sectoral GDP, inflation rate and real 
effective exchange rate. Table  1 describes the data and 
their sources.
Methodology
To accomplish the objectives of the study, various techniques 
and methods were employed. The study cautiously chooses 
the methods and approaches that are most suitable to the 
purposes and objectives of the study as well as to the data.
To simplify the analysis, the analysis is divided into three 
systems, namely aggregate system, financing system and 
output system. This is purposely made in order to answer 
each of the objectives of the study. The aggregate system 
refers to a five-variable system consisting of interest rate, 
real exchange rate, Islamic financing, inflation rate and 
GDP. This system is designed to examine the existence of 
the transmission of monetary policy through the Islamic 
financing channel. Meanwhile, the financing and output 
systems are designed to analyze the distributional effects 
of monetary policy on Islamic financing and economic 
sectors. Each system consists of eight sub systems. The 
financing system refers to a six-variable system consisting 
of interest rate, real exchange rate, total Islamic financing 
less financing to the sector under consideration (i.e., 
total financing less financing given to agriculture sector 
Table 1. Data description.
Variable Description Abbr. Source
Monetary Policy Interbank overnight money rate Int IMF
Financing Total Islamic financing Fnc BNM
Islamic financing for primary agriculture sector Fag BNM
Islamic financing for mining and quarrying sector Fmi BNM
Islamic financing for manufacturing sector Fma BNM
Islamic financing for electricity, gas and water sector Fel BNM
Islamic financing for wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants sector Fwh BNM
Islamic financing for construction sector Fco BNM
Islamic financing for transport, storage and communication sector Ftr BNM
Islamic financing to finance, insurance and business services sector Ffi BNM
Output Aggregate gross domestic product Gdp BNM
Output in agriculture, forestry and fishing sector Gag BNM
Output in mining and quarrying sector Gmi BNM
Output in manufacturing sector Gma BNM
Output in electricity, gas and water sector Gel BNM
Output in wholesale and retail trade, accommodation and restaurants sector Gwh BNM
Output in construction sector Gco BNM
Output in transport, storage and communication sector Gtr BNM
Output in finance, insurance, real estate, and business services sector Gfi BNM
Inflation Rate Consumer price Index, 2005 base year Inf IMF
Exchange Rate Real effective exchange rate Rex IMF
Note: The BNM data are from the Monthly Statistical Bulletin (various issues) while the IMF data are from International 
Financial Statistics CD-ROM. BNM = Bank Negara Malaysia; IMF = International Monetary Fund; Abbr = Abbreviation.
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(sfga)), financing to the sector under consideration (i.e., 
financing providing to agriculture sector (fga)), inflation 
rate and GDP. Similarly, the output system refers to a six-
variable system consisting of interest rate, real exchange 
rate, total Islamic financing, inflation rate, GDP less the 
sector under consideration and the output for the sector 
under consideration. The inclusion of aggregate financing 
and output (by less the amount of interested sector) into 
disaggregate systems is meant to increase the likelihood 
shocks in the monetary policy similarly across sectors 
(Ibrahim, 2005).
As a requirement for the time series analysis, it is 
necessary to examine the property of time series, i.e., 
the stationary properties. This is very critical to avoiding 
spurious regression. In this study, we employ augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test, which was developed 
by Dickey and Fuller (1979). The test may be estimated 
in three different forms to allow various possibilities. The 
regressions are as follows:
1. The regression with intercept
 
Y Y Yt t t ti
m
1 1 1 11
∝∑β d eD = + + D +
- -
=
 (1)
2. The regression with intercept and trend
 
Y T Y Yt t t ti
m
1 2 1 1 11
∝∑β β d eD = + + + D +
- -
=
 (2)
3. The regression without intercept
 
Y Y Yt t t ti
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1 1 11
∝∑d eD = + D +
- -
=
 (3)
where T is trend, ∆ is difference operator and e is pure white 
noise error term.
This requires us to test the significance of d whether the 
time series is stationary or otherwise. In each form, the 
hypotheses are as below.
Null hypothesis:  H0 : d = 0 (i.e. the time series is 
non-stationary)
Alternative hypothesis: H0 : d < 0 (i.e. the time series is 
stationary)
The next step of analysis is to conduct a cointegration test. 
The test examines the existence of long-run equilibrium 
relationships among variables. In this regard, the 
autoregressive distribution lag (ARDL) framework for 
cointegration which is introduced by Pesaran, et al. (2001) 
is adopted. There are numerous advantages of the ARDL 
approach. Firstly, it employs only one single reduced form 
equation. Secondly, it does not require pre-testing variables. 
This means that the cointegration test is applicable to 
underlying regressors regardless of its integration, whether 
purely I(0) or purely I(1) or mixture of both. Thirdly, the 
ARDL is also applicable for small number of observations. 
Fourthly, it avoids the larger number of specification made 
in the conventional cointegration (Duasa, 2007). Lastly, 
it takes sufficient of lags to capture the data generating 
process whereby it estimates (p + 1)k number of regressions 
to obtain optimal lag-length for each variable, where p is 
the maximum lag and k is the number of variables in the 
equation (Karim and Majid, 2010). Having a small number 
of observations of 48 as well as considering the advantages 
of ARDL, it justified that the study employ the ARDL 
approach for cointegration test.
The ARDL involves estimating the conditional error 
correction version of the ARDL model relating to dependent 
variables and its determinants. The process of cointegration 
test is applied to all three systems in our analysis. To 
conserve space, only the ARDL model for aggregate system 
is shown below:
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where D is the difference operator, fnc is total Islamic 
financing, int is overnight interest rate, rex is real exchange 
rate, inf is inflation rate, gdp is aggregate output, et is white 
noise error term and p is the optimal lag length.
In order to test cointegration, the null hypothesis 
H0: Ø1 = Ø2 = Ø3 = Ø4 = Ø5 = 0 (i.e. there is no cointegration 
among variables) is tested against the alternative 
hypothesis H1: Ø1  ≠  Ø2  ≠  Ø3  ≠  Ø4  ≠  Ø5  ≠  0 (i.e. there is 
cointegration among variable or there exists the long-
run relationship among variables.). The F-test has a non-
standard distribution. Therefore, the critical value bounds 
are generated. The critical value bound consists of the 
critical values for I(0) and I(1) series which are referred as 
lower bond and upper bound respectively. If the calculated 
F-statistics exceed their respective upper critical values, we 
conclude that there is evidence of long-run relationship 
and that the null hypothesis cannot be accepted, and vice 
versa. Narayan (2005)’s critical value bounds are used as 
the study has a small sample size.
Following the cointegration test, the study extent its 
aggregate system analysis to long-run and short-run 
dynamic. Accordingly, the following long-run model is 
estimated.
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In addition, the short-run dynamics based on ARDL 
specification is derived by constructing an error correction 
model as below:
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where ECMt-1 is the error correction term.
To further investigate the presence of the Islamic financing 
channel, the study explores further by conducting 
multivariate causality tests. This test enables to see the 
direction of causality between variables, i.e. causality 
relationship between monetary policy and Islamic 
financing. To this end, the vector error-correction model 
(VECM) for aggregate system is formed as below;
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where k is constant term, n is coefficient of lagged 
independent variables, l is error- correction coefficient and 
ϖ is error term.
4. Empirical results
The results will be reported step by step as the study 
progresses. It starts with unit root test’s results and is 
followed by cointegration’s results. For extension of 
aggregate system analysis, a long-run model and short-
run dynamic derived from the ARDL model as well as 
multivariate causality analysis are included.
Unit root tests
Table  2  summarizes the results of the ADF unit root 
test for the data series. The results may be classified 
into five cases. Firstly, almost all the data series are 
not significant at level, but they are significant at first 
difference. Secondly, some data series are significant 
with intercept, at level and also significant at least at 5% 
level at first difference. They are fma, fel, gmi, sfag, sfma, 
sfco, and sftr. Thirdly, there are four data series namely 
fco, gag, gfi and sgmi under this case. The variables are 
only significant with trend and intercept at log level with 
1% significance level except for fco at 5% significance 
level.
Fourthly, for fag, fmi and sffi, their null hypotheses are 
rejected at log level with intercept, and trend and intercept 
at 1% significance level. For sfwh, it is also under this group 
but slightly different in term of significance level. The series 
is significant at 5% level with intercept and at 10% level 
with intercept and trend. At first difference, the series are 
also significant at least at 10% level. Lastly, two data series 
are found to be non-stationary, both in level and in first 
difference, i.e., gco and gwh. Therefore, the study decided 
to drop these variables in the analysis because they do not 
suggest any stationarity at first difference despite of being 
dependent variable in the ARDL model.
Cointegration tests
To examine the existence of the long-run relationship 
among variables, the study adopts a bound testing 
approach and Autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model 
for cointegration testing. This framework was originally 
proposed by Pesaran, et al. (2001). The advantages of 
the ARDL model are that it is applicable for underlying 
regressors, which are purely I(0), or I(1), or a mixture of 
both. It is also able to deal with even small sample numbers 
(Duasa, 2007). In the present case, the variables are a 
mixture of I(0) and I(1) with an observation number of 
only 48. Therefore, it is justified to apply the ARDL model 
for cointegration testing in the study.
To be consistent with our objectives, we report the 
results into three tables, namely Tables  2, 3 and 4., each 
representing the aggregate, financing, and output system 
respectively. The aggregate system refers to a five-variable 
system consisting of total Islamic financing, overnight 
interest rate, real exchange rate, inflation rate and GDP.
The financing system is a six-variable system consisting of 
Islamic financing to sector under consideration, overnight 
interest rate, real exchange rate, inflation rate, economic 
growth and total Islamic financing less the financing of 
sector under consideration. Due to the deletion of fag and 
fmi in the previous section, the total financing sub-systems 
are left to be only six, namely fmas, fels, fwhs, fcos, ftrs 
and ffis.
Like the financing system, the output system is a six-variable 
system consisting of output sectors under consideration, 
overnight interest rate, real exchange rate, inflation rate, 
and GDP less the output of sector under consideration. 
There are only six sub systems for output, namely gags, 
gmis, gmas, gels, gtrs and gfis since gco and gwh are dropped 
from the analysis in the previous section.
In each table the computed F-statistics for each lag length 
are presented. The last column of each table also includes 
the critical value bounds for unrestricted intercept and 
no trend, which were obtained from Narayan (2005), for 
sample sizes between 30 and 80. If the F-statistics exceed 
their respective upper critical values at any lag-length, it 
implies that there exists the long-run relationship among 
variables and vice versa.
Table  3  shows calculated F-statistics from lag length 1–6 
for the aggregate system. At lag length, 1–5 are found to 
be significant at least at 5% level. This implies that the 
null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be accepted at 
a 5% level. Therefore, there is a cointegration relationship 
among the variable in aggregate system, implying that the 
variables tend to move together in the long run.
Table  4 presents the ARDL cointergration’s results for a 
financing system. The calculated F-statistics of all financing 
sub-systems, except fcos, are found to be higher than 
their upper bound critical value, at least at 10% level of 
significance with at least one lag length, if not all. The 
null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected at a 
10% level. This implies that fmas, fels, fwhs, ftrs and ffis, 
have long-run relationships among the variables in the 
system. Regarding to fcos, it is found that there exists no 
cointegration. Hence, and since it is not consistent with the 
other systems, it was dropped from the analysis.
Table  5  shows the result of ARDL cointegration tests for 
output systems. Only gags is not significant at all levels 
and at all lag lengths. The remaining, namely gmis, gmas, 
gels, gtrs and gfis, are found to be significant at least at 
10% level with at least one lag length, if not all. Their null 
hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at 10% level of 
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Table 2. Unit root tests summary statistics
Variable
Augmented Dickey-Fuller
Level 1st difference
Intercept
Trend & 
Intercept None Intercept
Trend & 
Intercept None
Int -2.321 -2.254 0.038 -10.109*** -9.626*** -10.382***
Fnc -2.501 -2.228 2.696 -3.863*** -4.303*** -2.476**
Fag -4.863*** -4.466*** 1.703 -7.966*** -8.505*** -7.517***
Fmi -5.212*** -6.231*** 0.627 18.402*** 18.357*** 18.230***
Fma -5.144*** -2.985 2.992 -4.542*** -5.687*** -3.336***
Fel -2.619* -2.595 0.876 -6.866*** -5.575*** -6.776***
Fwh -1.240 -1.551 2.890 -7.599*** -7.574*** -3.521***
Fco -2.663 -3.738** 3.309 -6.578*** -6.543*** -5.593***
Ftr  0.083 -1.586 2.232 -6.299*** -6.450*** -5.928***
Ffi -1.033 -2.855 3.107 -7.687*** -7.622*** -6.361***
Gdp -0.793 -2.079 2.787 -4.363*** -4.319*** -3.065***
Gag -0.273 -3.961** 1.424 -6.789*** -6.804*** -8.625***
Gmi -2.699* -2.550 1.840 -4.986*** -5.115*** -4.778***
Gma -0.740 -2.222 1.438 -7.614*** -7.555*** -3.816***
Gel -1.155 -2.568 4.037 -10.374*** -10.331*** -2.103**
Gwh -0.161 -2.358 2.154 -2.538 -2.516 -1.310
Gco  0.409 -0.826 1.471 -1.827 -2.401 -1.212
Gtr -1.345 -2.564 2.491 -3.579** -3.533** -2.330**
Gfi -1.588 -4.895*** 3.182 -9.695*** -9.719*** -8.325***
Inf  0.468 -2.489 4.657 -5.415*** -5.416*** -4.069***
Rex -2.226 -1.536 0.350 -5.069*** -5.000*** -5.110***
Sfag -4.513*** -2.892 2.681 -3.717*** -4.268*** -2.223**
Sfmi -2.538 -2.239 2.657 -3.824*** -4.284*** -2.473**
Sfma -3.921*** -2.022 2.763 -10.215*** -11.321*** -2.600**
Sfel -2.593 -2.171 2.561 -3.642*** -4.157** -2.332**
Sfwh -4.375*** -3.406* 6.122 -11.205*** -12.635*** -1.621*
Sfco -2.673* -2.361 2.609 -3.762*** -4.308*** -2.418**
Sftr -2.628* -2.423 2.700 -3.904*** -4.284*** -1.594
Sffi -5.075*** -5.476*** 2.618 -3.772*** -4.248*** -1.553
Sgag -0.932 -1.991 2.617 -4.151*** -4.126** -2.976***
Sgmi -0.506 -4.524*** 3.042 -4.226*** -4.154** -2.635***
Sgma -0.709 -2.555 2.746 -4.034*** -3.986** -2.701***
Sgel -0.789 -2.084 2.756 -4.349*** -4.304*** -3.079***
Sgwh -1.230 -2.766 2.823 -6.756*** -6.732*** -3.328***
Sgco -0.850 -2.012 2.722 -4.301*** -4.265*** -3.052***
Sgtr -0.760 -2.064 2.766 -4.413*** -4.366*** -3.146***
Sgfi -0.688 -1.824 2.859 -4.775*** -4.705*** -3.482***
Note: *,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Critical values are based on MacKinnon 
(1996). Lag lengths are based on Schwarz Info Criterion (SIC) with maximum lag of 10.
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Table 3. ARDL cointegration test for aggregate system.
Lag F-statistics Bound critical values  
(unrestricted intercept  
and no trend)1 9.121***
2 4.845**
3 5.209** k = 4 & n = 48
4 4.748** 1% ; 4.306–5.874
5 4.841** 5% ; 3.136–4.416
6 3.653 10% ; 2.614–3.746
Notes: *,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively.
The critical value bounds are obtained from Narayan 
(2005).
Table 4. ARDL cointegration test for financing system.
Lag  
length
F-statistics Bound critical  
values (unrestricted  
intercept and no  
trend)
fmas Fels fcos fwhs ftrs ffis
1 4.082* 3.456 2.035 3.473 1.919 4.267**
2 2.375 4.272** 2.501 3.025 1.725 3.950** K = 5 & n = 48
3 4.320** 2.180 1.871 3.526 1.217 3.635* 1% ; 3.955–5.583
4 5.985*** 8.087*** 1.164 4.769** 3.070 3.652* 5% ; 2.900–4.218
5 2.529 2.326 1.923 1.263 8.769*** 6.580*** 10% ; 2.435–3.600
Notes: *,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
The critical value bounds are obtained from Narayan (2005).
Table 5. ARDL cointegration test for output system.
Lag  
Length
F-statistic Bound critical  
values (unrestricted  
intercept and no  
trend)
gags gmis gmas gels gtrs gfis
1 1.159 3.606* 2.725 3.624* 2.501 2.321
2 0.781 2.443 0.775 1.216 1.959 8.319*** K = 5 & n = 48
3 0.501 1.858 1.633 1.734 2.176 2.155 1% ; 3.955–5.583
4 0.753 4.245** 2.104 3.311 7.245*** 2.520 5% ; 2.900–4.218
5 0.656 1.419 6.893*** 3.146 9.679*** 1.708 10% ; 2.435–3.600
Notes: *,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
The critical value bounds are obtained from Narayan (2005).
significance. This provides evidence that each output sub-
system, except gags, is cointegrated implying that the long-
run relationship among the variables in the system exists. 
Like fcos, the study had to drop gags from the analysis since 
the system is not cointegrated, that is because it will not 
consistent with the present analysis.
Cointegrating regression results (Long-run model)
In order to serve the objective of the study, the aggregate 
system analysis was extended and the long-run relationship 
of aggregate systems was investigated. If the variables 
have long-run relationships, then the long-run model can 
be constructed. In the previous section, the study found 
evidence of cointegration in the aggregate system. This 
implies that there is a long-run relationship among the 
variables in the aggregate system. Hence, the long-run 
model can be established. Table  6 presents the long-run 
model using the ARDL approach. By estimating it, the 
study follows Majid and Yusof (2007), Majid (2007) and 
Karim and Majid (2010) in identifying the maximum lag 
order. The lag order of 1 is chosen as it reveals the highest 
F-statistics value (see Table  3). The ARDL (1,0,0,0,0) is 
selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC).
In the long-run model, it seems that overnight interest rate 
has a negative relationship with Islamic financing. If the 
interest rate increases by one percent, the Islamic financing 
will decrease by 0.04 percent. This suggests that interest 
rate as a proxy of monetary policy can affect Islamic 
financing and it proves the existence of the active of bank-
lending/financing channel for monetary transmission. This 
result is also consistent with many studies (Said and Ismail, 
2007; Sayuti 2009; Sukmana and Kassim, 2010).
The model also indicates a positive relationship between 
the real exchange rate and Islamic financing. A one 
percent increase in real exchange rate will increase Islamic 
financing by 0.28 percent. The explanation for this could be 
indirect. When the currency depreciates (i.e., real exchange 
rate index increases), the domestic good becomes cheaper 
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Error correction model (ECM)
This section turns to short-run dynamics of Islamic 
financing. The error correction model (ECM) is established 
based on the ARDL model by retaining the lag length of 1 
as suggested in the previous section. The ECM of the ARDL 
(1,0,0,0,0) based on SBC is reported in Table 6.
Except real exchange rate, the coefficients of variables are 
significant at least at the 5% level. The sign coefficients of 
these variables are the same as the long-run model. The 
Islamic financing still evidently has a negative relationship 
associated with interest rate, whereby it positively links 
with GDP. Here coefficient of inflation rate appears to 
be significant while it failed in the long-run model. The 
inflation rate seems to have a negative relationship with 
Islamic financing. The findings seem to suggest that 
monetary policy, i.e., overnight interest rates, together with 
GDP, are linked to the change of Islamic financing at least 
in the short-run. The explanation for the first could be that, 
contraction monetary policy may reduce the availability 
of Islamic financing by means of raising statutory reserve 
requirements. On the other hand, during recession when 
aggregate demand decreases, it results in a decrease of 
demand for financing.
The coefficient of the ECM is negative and highly significant 
at 1%. This confirms the existence of stable long-run 
relationships among the variables. The coefficient of ECM is 
-0.077 indicating slow rate of convergence to equilibrium. 
It implies that a deviation from the long-run equilibrium 
following the short-run shock is corrected by 7 percent 
after one quarter. Table 7 also provides the diagnostic test. 
The underlying ARDL equation fits very well at adjusted 
R2 = 0.895 while DW is more than 2. We find no evidence 
of serial correlation, but fail for functional form, normality 
and heteroscedasticity tests.
Multivariate causality test
To produce more evidence for aggregate system, multivariate 
causality analysis is conducted. The VECM approach makes 
us differentiate between short- and long-run forms of 
Granger causality. Here, the F-statistics of lagged difference 
independent variables indicate the short-run causal effects 
while the t-statistic of the lagged error correction terms 
shows the long-run causal effects (Yusof, 2003).
Table 8 reports multivariate causality analysis. The findings 
show that at least one way of Granger causality is active for 
all variables, namely Islamic financing, interest rate, real 
exchange rate, inflation rate and GDP. At the same time, the 
error correction for all variables also seems to be negatively 
significant at least at the 5% level of significance. This 
implies that the variables appear to bear the brunt of short-
run adjustment to long-run equilibrium.
Based on Table 8, it seems that the causation may run from 
overnight interest rate to real exchange rate to GDP to 
inflation rate to Islamic financing then go back to overnight 
interest rate. We also can see the causation from Islamic 
financing to GDP and return back to overnight interest rate. 
At the same time, overnight interest rate may also directly 
affect GDP thereby causing Islamic financing to then 
turn to the interest rate. In short, it can be seen here that 
Islamic financing can cause the GDP at least in the short 
Table 7. Error correction model.
Independent  
variables Coefficient
Standard  
Error
∆int -0.058** 0.024
∆rex 0.236 0.201
∆inf -1.333** 0.502
∆gdp 0.242** 0.088
∆c -2.432*** 0.753
Ecmt-1 -0.077*** 0.024
Diagnostic tests
R2 0.919
Adj-R2 0.895
DW 2.175
c2 LM 7.068
c2 RESET 3.702*
c2 Norm 6.022**
c2 Hetro 9.172***
Notes: *,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% level respectively. LM is Lagrange multiplier test of 
residual serial correlation. RESET is Ramsey’s RESET test 
of functional form. Norm is Jarque-Bera test of normality. 
Hetro is White test for heteroscedasticity. DW is Durbin-
Watson statistics.
Table 6. Long-run model.
Dependent  
variable
Independent variables
intt-1 rext-1 inft-1 gdpt-1
Fnc -0.041*** 
(0.009)
0.284**  
(0.105)
-0.294  
(0.194)
0.254***  
(0.086)
Notes: *,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively.
Standard error is in parentheses.
than foreign goods, thereby causing net export to increase, 
and hence in aggregate demand (Mishkin, 1996). This, 
in turn, raises the demand for money thereby increasing 
Islamic financing. For the GDP, it also shows a positive 
relationship with Islamic financing. When GDP rises by one 
percent, Islamic financing will increase by 0.25 percent. 
When aggregate output increases, it raises the demand 
for credit thereby causing the financing to increase. This 
may infer that Islamic financing cannot turn away from the 
fluctuation in the real economic activities (Ibrahim, 2005).
In conclusion, the findings seem to suggest that overnight 
interest rate, real exchange rate and GDP are linked to 
Islamic financing over the long run. We could see at least in 
the long run, the direction of relationship of the variables 
with Islamic financing where interest rate is shown to have 
positive relationship while real exchange rate and GDP are 
evidently opposite.
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run, implying that the financing channel can be a conduit 
for a monetary policy to influence the aggregate demand 
although the causal effect from interest rate to financing is 
not significant in this test.
5. Conclusion
The findings suggest clearly that there is monetary 
transmission through Islamic financing, although it shows 
only in a short period. Islamic financing seems to be able to 
influence the output, which reconfirms the existence of its 
channel. Regarding disaggregate analyses, it suggests that 
Islamic financing is disproportionate in its distribution. 
It is found that Islamic financing is unequally distributed 
to economic sectors in response to monetary policy 
shock. The most affected sectors for Islamic financing are 
electricity, gas and water while finance, insurance and 
business service sectors are the least affected. The findings 
also found that monetary policy shock and financing shock 
unevenly affect economic sectors. It seems to show that the 
mining and quarrying sector is the most sensitive to these 
two shocks in comparison to the remaining sectors.
The results from the study seem to suggest that Islamic 
financing channel for monetary transmission exists in 
case of Malaysia. The cointegration results first indicate 
that there is long-run relationship among the variables: 
monetary policy, Islamic financing, GDP, exchange rate 
and inflation. Based on the ARDL model, it was proved that 
the interest rate has a significant negative relationship to 
Islamic financing in the long-run model. In addition, based 
on the multivariate causality analysis, the study showed that 
there is a bi-directional causality between Islamic financing 
and GDP. In the short run, an increase in Islamic financing 
can significantly cause GDP to increase and vice versa. 
In the meantime, the long-run model derived from the 
ARDL model also shows the similar results. To an increase 
in GDP, Islamic financing also increases in the long run. 
These evidences seem to imply that while Islamic financing 
influences economic activities, it is also affected by the 
fluctuation of the economy. All in all, it could be inferred 
that monetary transmission through Islamic financing 
exists in Malaysia. Monetary mechanisms stem from 
tight monetary policies affecting the quantity of Islamic 
financing, toward decrease, thereby causing economic 
activities to decline. Furthermore, the findings also reflect 
that Islamic banking, as it operates in a dual banking 
system, is not spared from the interest rate and monetary 
conditions of the country (Ibrahim and Sukmana, 2011). 
When interest rate increases, it affects Islamic financing, 
causing decrease. This clearly shows the behavior of Islamic 
banking which cannot shun away from the interest rate 
while its operation delinks from the interest rates.
From the study it could be suggested that in designing 
monetary policy, the central bank may consider Islamic 
financing as an alternative or complement channel for 
monetary transmission since this channel is just as active as 
the conventional lending channel. This means that the BNM 
can use monetary policy by influencing Islamic financing to 
overcome the recession and inflation in the economy (Said 
and Ismail, 2007). In addition, the study may suggest that 
Islamic banking follow the pricing strategy in competing 
with conventional banking, since the evidence shows that 
Islamic banking experiences similar risks, i.e., interest rate 
exposure and monetary conditions, as conventional ones 
(Ibrahim and Sukmana, 2011).
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Abstract - The purpose of monetary policy is to affect the economic activity through various 
channels  of monetary transmission. One of the transmission channels is via Islamic banking 
through financing to various sectors of the economy. The change of monetary instruments certainly 
affects economic sectors differently. Given the dual monetary system (Islamic and conventional) 
in Indonesia, it is interesting to see how those rates influence each of the economic sectors. This is 
important for the government in designing future economic programs by determining the specific 
sectors which must be prioritized. This paper aims to investigate the sensitivity of the economic 
sectors in response to the change in the Islamic and conventional monetary rate. The paper relies 
on the unit root test, the co-integration test, and impulse response functions, focusing on the period 
from May 2006 to February 2011. The data used is from monthly economic sectors for Islamic and 
conventional systems, Islamic monetary rates, and conventional monetary rates. The results show 
that Islamic banks play important roles in the monetary transmission process in the Indonesian 
economy. In particular, specific economic sectors react differently to both Islamic monetary 
instruments as well as conventional monetary instruments.
Keywords: monetary policy, Islamic monetary rate, conventional monetary rate
1. Introduction
The important question on monetary policy is whether it 
affects output. Monetarist would argue that money is the 
most important factor affecting the output. Conversely, 
Keynes would argue that other variable, such as government 
expenditure, would also affect the real output. However, 
recently, there is consensus among monetary economists 
and policy-makers that monetary policy does have real 
effects, at least in the short run (Alam and Waheed, 2006). 
Hence, debate on this relationship (money and output) 
seems to be decreasing in number. However, the discussion 
remains on the different aspect of the relationship between 
monetary policy and output.
Specific aspect that need to be put in attention nowadays 
is how sensitive is the economic sector on the shock of 
the monetary policy. Previous studies have shown that 
economic sector responds differently to the shock of the 
monetary policy. Studies on this issue are important 
as they give a detailed picture to the central banks of 
the characteristics of the economic sector. Having this 
important information, central banks may treat different 
economic sectors differently.
For example, tight monetary policy aiming to reduce capital 
flight might, to some extent, provide advantage to the 
manufacturing companies which import raw material as 
exchange rates will be no longer be depreciating. However, 
increase in policy rates certainly will lower demand for 
loans (by the trader) as the borrower would not be able to 
pay back the loan. Therefore, information on the sensitivity 
of the sectors is important.
Moreover, the results of this paper can add to our 
understanding of the nature of the transmission mechanism. 
Many economists have called for a disaggregated analysis 
of monetary transmission mechanism (Alam and Waheed, 
2006). The initial attempt to discover the monetary 
transmission at the disaggregated level is detailed by 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995). They adopt a vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model to seek the different effect of 
monetary policy on components in the final expenditures.
Another study on this issue was done by Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1993). They conclude that the output of the 
smaller firms in the US is more sensitive to monetary shocks 
as compared to large firms. Ganley and Salmon (1997) has 
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attempted to examine a similar issue. They found out that 
the construction sector is the most interest-sensitive sector. 
This is followed by the manufacturing industry, services, 
and agriculture.
Ibrahim (2005) found out that sectors of manufacturing, 
construction, and finance insurance, real estate and business 
service sectors seem to decline more than aggregate 
production in response to the interest rate shock in the case 
of Malaysia. Carlino and DeFina (1998) seek the sensitivity 
in the area of monetary policy shocks. They found evidence 
that New England, Mideast, Plains, the Southeast and the 
Farwest respond to monetary policy changes in ways that 
closely approximate the US average response.
Arnold and Vrugt (2002) attempt to measure the effect of 
monetary policy shocks on regional and sectoral output for 
the Netherlands. They have documented the variation in 
the regional and sectoral transmission of monetary policy 
across 132 region-sector combinations. They found out 
that regional effects of monetary policy are significantly 
related to industrial composition. Moreover, they found 
that sectoral effects account for most of the variation in 
interest coefficient.
Alam and Waheed (2006) evidenced that manufacturing, 
wholesale and retail trade and finance and insurance 
sectors seem to decline more on the shock of the interest 
rate. They argue that those sectors are the driving force 
behind the aggregate fluctuation.
The structure of this paper is as follows. The following 
section describes background of the Islamic banking 
industry in Indonesia. Following it, it explains the data 
and empirical framework. Next is to discuss the estimation 
results and end with the conclusion.
2. Islamic banks in Indonesia
Although the Muslim population in Indonesia reaches 
more than 70%, the establishment of Islamic banks was 
relatively late as compared to in the neighbouring country, 
Malaysia. The first Islamic bank, namely Bank Muamalat 
Indonesia (BMI), which was established in November 
1, 1991, was highly supported by the then President of 
Indonesia, Suharto. Up to the current time, Indonesia, 
unlike Malaysia, does not have an Islamic Banking Act. 
The existing Islamic banks are under the revision of the 
conventional banking act, which mentions that banks have 
been allowed to operate other types of systems that do not 
rely on interest. Besides Islamic banks, there exist also the 
Islamic Rural Banks and Islamic Banking Units.
Eight years after the establishment of the first Islamic 
bank, the second bank known as Bank Syariah Mandiri was 
established. It was a conversion of the conventional bank, 
Bank Susila Bakti. In the same year, Islamic Banking Units 
were established. These were units within conventional 
banks that offered Islamic banking products. However, 
the difference between Malaysia and Indonesia is that 
Malaysia uses Islamic windows, whereby within the office 
of conventional banks, there exists a different counter 
for Islamic banking products. In Indonesia, conventional 
banks would normally have a separate building as well as 
separate management.
In terms of the number of Islamic Banks that existed in the 
last seven years, there was steady growth (see Table 1). In 
2000, there were only three Islamic banking units, namely: 
Bank IFI Syariah, Bank Jabar Syariah, and Bank BNI 
Syariah. The third Islamic full-fledged bank, namely Bank 
Syariah Mega Indonesia was established in 2004.
Bank Muamalat performed well in its early years. In the 
second year of its existence, deposits increased from 
20,800 million Rupiah, in 1992, to 60,320 million, in 1993. 
Similarly, financing also increased very significantly, from 
32,650  million Rupiah to 92,000  million Rupiah in the 
subsequent year (Table  2). The following years, BMI was 
able to maintain good performance. However, the Asian 
crisis in 1997 created damage to the banking system. Not 
only did the conventional banks suffer, Islamic Banks 
were also affected. Table  2  shows that in 1998, Islamic 
banking assets, financing and deposits were declining 
very significantly. Growth of those three indicators shows 
contractions of 18.3%, 30.5%, and 15.4% respectively.
At that time, Bank Indonesia had to increase the interest 
rate significantly to prevent further deterioration of the 
Rupiah due to capital flight. Consequently, this high interest 
rate caused the withdrawal of funds from the Islamic banks 
to conventional banks. This kind of situation, known as the 
displacement commercial risk, had to be faced by Islamic 
banks. It is the risk whereby depositors withdraw their 
money from Islamic banks and put it in the conventional 
banks due to more attractive interest rates given by their 
conventional counterparts. Nevertheless, in 1999, Islamic 
banks were able to recover. Asset, Financing and Deposit 
increased to 44.5%, 8.05% and 34.7%, respectively.
Table 1. Number of Islamic banking institutions 
in Indonesia.
Year Islamic Bank Islamic Banking Unit
1992 1 0
1993 1 0
1994 1 0
1995 1 0
1996 1 0
1997 1 0
1998 1 0
1999 2 1
2000 2 3
2001 2 3
2002 2 6
2003 2 8
2004 3 15
2005 3 19
2006 3 20
2007 3 26
Source: Bank Indonesia, Shariah Banking 
Development Report 2007.
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The growth of Islamic banks in Indonesia, however, 
increased significantly in the nominal term, yet did not 
increase in terms of the percentage share of the total banking 
asset. In 2000, total Islamic banking assets amounted 
to Rp 1,790,168  million and that amount accounted for 
only 0.17% of total banking assets. 2004 marked the year 
in which the proportion of Islamic banking assets out of 
total banking assets reached beyond 1% (Shariah Banking 
Statistics, August 2004). Comparing the percentage share 
of the total banking assets between Malaysia and Indonesia, 
Malaysia is still far ahead of Indonesia. Currently, Islamic 
banking assets in Malaysia are over 10% out of total banking 
assets, whereas in Indonesia they are around 2%. This is of 
no surprise given the fact that Islamic banking in Malaysia 
was established ten years earlier than that of Indonesia.
In terms of the economic sectors, which were financed by 
Islamic banks, there exist two sectors which dominated 
the Islamic bank financing portfolio. These sectors include: 
business services sector and trade, restaurants and hotels 
sectors. The former sector accounted for about Rp 4.5 
trillion, and Rp 8.4 trillion in 2005 and 2007, respectively. 
Meanwhile the trade, restaurant and hotels sector as the 
second biggest sector financed by Islamic banks accounted 
for about Rp 1.7 trillion and Rp 4.1 trillion in 2005 and 
2007, respectively. The sector that was least financed by the 
Islamic banks was the utilities sector, which accounted for Rp 
66 billion in 2005 and Rp 165 billion in 2007 (see Table 3).
In terms of the types of financing contract in Islamic 
banks, it has been dominated by the buy and sell concept 
or Murabahah. This figure is more or less same as what 
has existed in Malaysia. Financing in Indonesia is still 
dominated by Murabahah. In 2000, this contract amounted 
to Rp 775,721 million (see Table 4) whilst the profit sharing 
concept which uses of Musyarakah and Mudharabah were 
Rp 31 billion and Rp 378 billion respectively. Interestingly, 
over the last four years, the composition mix has changed 
in that while the trend of the proportion of Murabahah 
showed a decrease, the profit sharing concept showed an 
increasing trend. This is because Islamic banks have been 
able to extend the use of the profit sharing concept to the 
cooperative societies even though they extend the funds 
to their members using the Murabahah concept. Although 
it is Shariah-compliant, the Murabahah concept is almost 
similar to that of conventional bank lending. Hence in order 
for Islamic banks to be differentiated from conventional 
banks, they should emphasize and implement more the 
profit-sharing concept.
3. Data and empirical framework
Data
In an attempt to examine the sensitivity of the economic 
sector funded by banks supported by major studies such as 
Ibrahim (2005), Ganley, J. and C.Salmon (1997), Alam, 
T and Waheed, M (2006), the study analyzes a model 
comprising variables representing the real economy and 
monetary policy. Focus variables being considered are 
economic sectors funded by both banks (Islamic and 
conventional banks). In view of this, the following model 
is being considered:
IPI = f(ISMONIST/CONMONINST, economic sectors)
Table 2. Performance of Islamic banks in Indonesia.
Year Asseta Financingb Depositc
Growth (%)
Asset Financing Deposit
1992 120,880 32,560 20,800
1993 166,960 92,000 60,320   38.12 182.56 190.00
1994 246,080 188,800 132,880   47.39 105.22 120.29
1995 394,400 285,920 275,680   60.27   51.44 107.47
1996 515,200 310,480 396,560   30.63    8.59   43.85
1997 586,720 456,160 463,440   13.88   46.92   16.87
1998 479,200 317,040 391,920 -18.33 -30.50 -15.43
1999 692,800 342,560 528,080   44.57    8.05   34.74
2000 1,790,168 1,271,162 1,028,923 158.40 271.08   94.84
2001 2,718,770 2,049,793 1,806,366   51.87   61.25   75.56
2002 4,045,235 3,276,650 2,917,726   48.79   59.85   61.52
2003 7,858,918 5,530,167 5,724,909   94.28   68.78   96.21
2004 15,325,997 11,489,933 11,862,117   95.01 107.77 107.20
2005 20,879,874 15,231,942 15,582,329   36.24   32.57   31.36
2006 26,722,030 20,444,907 20,672,181   27.98   34.22   32.66
2007 36,537,637 27,944,311 28,011,670   36.73   36.68   35.50
Note: a,b,c are in Million IDR. 
Source: Bank Indonesia Shariah banking statistics, various issues and Harahap and Basri (2003).
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where IPI is industrial production index, IPI is being used 
as a proxy for economic output or GDP as the data is not 
available in the monthly form. Overnight interbank rate for a 
conventional bank is adopted as a proxy for the conventional 
monetary instrument (CONMONINST). Meanwhile, the 
Islamic overnight interbank rate is used as a proxy for the 
Islamic monetary policy (ISMONINST). All variables are in 
the natural logarithm form, except both monetary rates.
Nine economic sectors which are funded by conventional 
banks are agriculture, mining, manufacturing, electricity, 
construction, trade, transportation, finance, and service. 
Meanwhile, economic sectors funded by Islamic banks are 
ten, namely agriculture, mining, manufacturing, electricity, 
construction, trade, transportation, business service, social 
service and others. The period covered by this study started 
from June 2006 to February 2011 (58 observations). All 
data are sourced from the Bank Indonesia Website
Empirical framework
As in any time series estimation procedure, we undertake 
the pre-tests to determine the unit root properties as well 
as the degree of integration of the variables involved in 
the study before more rigorous investigation techniques 
are adopted. As such, the following steps are undertaken: 
first, the unit root and cointegration tests, followed by 
impulse response functions (IRF). The details of the tests 
are elaborated in the following sections.
Unit root tests
The unit root test is very important in the context of time 
series analysis so as to check the level of stationarity of the 
data. Utilizing non-stationary data in a model will result 
in a spurious regression, whereby the result show that the 
relationship between the variables of X and Y is significant, 
whereas a priori there should be none. In order to test 
for the order of integration of the variables, two types 
of unit root tests are employed in this study, namely the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), and Phillips-Peron (PP).
Cointegration tests
Cointegration is said to exist if two (or more) series are 
linked to form an equilibrium relationship spanning the 
long run, even though the series themselves may contain 
stochastic trends (non-stationary). They will nevertheless 
move closely together over time and the difference between 
them will be stable (Harris, 1995).
The above definition implies that even though examining 
non-stationary variables may result in spurious regression, 
if the residual of the model is found to be stationary, then 
the variables are said to have co-movement in the long run 
or they may have a long term equilibrium relationship. 
Hence the regression is meaningful. There are at least two 
types of cointegration tests, namely the Engle-Granger 
(EG) and Johansen and Juselius (JJ) tests. In this study, the 
Table 3. Direction of Islamic financing in Indonesia (in Million IDR).
Sectors 2005 2006 2007
Agriculture, Forestry and Agricultural Facilities 687,281 701,044 837,037
Mining 395,043 374,581 510,669
Manufacturing 933,295 939,713 1,371,254
Water, gas and Electricity 66,082 17,158 165,990
Construction 1,548,151 1,637,027 2,370,638
Trade, Restaurants and Hotels 1,715,810 3,041,050 4,151,785
Transport, Cargo Storage and Communication 1,261,178 1,165,429 1,568,781
Business Services 4,503,918 5,457,711 8,424,724
Social Services 1,208,165 1,456,391 1,904,390
Others 2,951,510 5,654,803 6,639,043
Total 15,270,433 20,444,907 27,944,311
Source: Bank Indonesia, Shariah banking statistics various issues.
Table 4. Islamic bank financing by type of contracts (in Million IDR).
Type of Contract 2000 2001 2003 2005 2007
Musyarakah 31,739 53,593 305,997 1,898,389 4,406,360
Mudharabah 378,604 402,623 794,244 3,123,759 5,577,912
Murabahah 775,721 1,420,401 3,955,815 9,487,318 16,552,869
Istishna 74,583 167,893 295,960 281,676 350,995
Others 3700 3834 151246 440,800 1,056,175
Source: Bank Indonesia, Shariah banking development report, 2006 and 2007.
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JJ method is being adopted due to various weaknesses that 
are well-known in the EG testing.
The JJ procedure is able to prevent the use of two-step 
estimator and can test for the presence of multiple 
cointegrating vectors. The JJ procedure is nothing more 
than a multivariate generalization of the DF test. The key 
important thing in this procedure is the determination of the 
rank matrix (π). Rank π is equal to the number of independent 
cointegrating vectors. If rank π=0, then the matrix is 
null, hence the standard VAR model in first differences is 
employed. If rank π is of rank n (number of variables) then 
the vector is stationary. If rank of π=1, there is a single 
cointegrating vector and the component of πxt-p is the error 
correction factor (Enders,1995). In other cases whereby 1< 
rank π < n, there are multiple cointegrating vectors.
At this point in time, it is necessary to outline the VAR 
order selection or the selection of relevant lag length in the 
modelling of VAR. Some of the criteria used in selecting 
the VAR lag length for each variable are, among others, 
the Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz 
Criterion (SIC). The lag length used should be long enough 
to confine the dynamics of the system. However, it should 
not be too long to exhaust the degree of freedom.
Impulse response function
An IRF measures the time profile of the effect of shocks at 
a given point in time on the (expected) future values of 
variables in a dynamical system (Pesaran and Shin, 1998). 
The approach is well-suited because not only does it allow 
for the relative strength of various shocks to be quantified 
in terms of their contributions to variations in a particular 
variable of interest, but it also enables the pattern and 
direction of the transmission of shocks to be traced. In 
the context of this study, we are interested to analyze the 
responses of the objective variables, namely IPI, Islamic 
deposit and Islamic financing to a shock in the monetary 
policy variable which is the overnight rate. Meanwhile, 
Table 5. Unit root tests.
ADF PP
Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff
LL Trend & itcp LL Trend & itcp Trend & itcp Trend & itcp
AIC Itcp AIC Itcp Itcp Itcp
liconst 1 -1.88 0 -9.23*** -2.39 -9.25***
2 -0.69 0 -9.31*** -0.77 -9.33***
litrade 1 -2.82 0 -12.6 -3.4** -11.91***
1 -2.16 0 -12.4*** -2.09 -11.65***
libusserv 0 -2.3 0 -8.04*** -2.36 -8.05***
0 -0.31 0 -8.12*** -0.31 -8.13***
lisocserv 4 -1.46 3 -4.74*** -2.47 -9.72***
4 -1.02 3 -4.76*** -1.12 -9.76***
liothers 1 -1.29 0 -10.3*** -2.36 -10.2***
1 0.6 0 10.3*** 0.06 10.17***
lagri 0 -3.24* 0 -8.74 -3.23* -9.55***
0 -0.64 0 8.81*** 0.52 0.96***
lmanuf 6 -2.62 10 -3.20* -1.57 -8.63***
6 1.16 10 -2.87* 0.60 -8.65***
lconst 1 -2.28 9 -4.26 -1.70 -5.54***
4 -1.46 3 -4.99*** -1.57 -5.46***
ltrade 0 -3.13 1 -7.35*** -3.03 -8.98***
2 -0.97 1 -7.38*** -0.95 -9.02***
lfin 1 -1.3 0 -11.54*** -1.84 -11.18***
1 -1.62 0 -11.52*** -1.67 -11.1***
Conmoninst 6 -1.92 5 -3.28* -4.44*** -29.47***
6 -1.96 5 -3.28** -4.47*** -29.97***
ismoninst 0 -2.85 0 -8.51*** -2.82 -15.12***
0 -2.89** 0 -8.53*** 2.91** -10.72***
lipi 0 -5.43*** 10 6.51*** -5.44*** -16.61***
1 -1.70 10 6.63*** -2.48 -15.6***
*,**,*** are significant in 10%, 5%, 1% respectively.
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the VDC analysis shows the fraction of forecast error 
variance of a variable attributed to shocks in other variable 
particularly to make inferences about the relative strength 
of innovations in the variable of interest. It is a method of 
providing a literal breakdown of the change in the value of a 
variable in a given period arising from changes in the same 
variable and in other variables during previous periods. 
The VDC, which is termed as an out-of-sample causality 
tests, partitions the variance of forecast error of a certain 
variables into proportions attributable to innovations (or 
shocks), and each variable in the system including its own, 
can provide an indication of these relatives.
4. Empirical results and analysis
Unit root test results
In an attempt to examine the economic sectors, we found 
difficulty in a number of sectors as well as many optimal 
lags, while the number of observations are relatively small. 
To solve this problem, we narrow down the number of 
the economic sectors and select the five biggest economic 
sectors funded by Islamic bank as well as the conventional 
banks. Seven selected economic sectors funded by Islamic 
banks are business services, others, trade, hotel and 
restaurant, construction, social service, while those funded 
by conventional banks are trade, manufacturing, finance, 
agriculture and construction.
The results of the unit root tests are presented in Table 1. 
It was conducted in the log level and first difference, and 
in both cases it uses intercept, and trend and intercept. 
It can be seen that most of the variables are stationary in 
the first difference or simply are I(1) process. In the case 
of LIPI, both ADF and PP tests (using trend and intercept) 
show that it is I(0) process, while based on the intercept, 
the result shows that it is I(1). Other variables, such as 
Islamic monetary instruments, show I(1) in ADF and PP 
(with trend and intercept), while using intercept it is found 
to be stationary. All other variables are I(1) in ADF or PP, 
either in trend and intercept or intercept alone.
Based on these tests, in general, it can be concluded that 
all the variables are I(1) process. Confirming the data 
suitability by unit root test for VAR approach, we continue to 
examine whether there exists long-run equilibrium among 
the variables by conducting the JJ cointegration test.
Cointegration test results
The lag length used in conducting the cointegration test 
was based on criteria that is commonly used in many 
empirical studies such as AIC. Based on the optimal lag 
length selection criteria, the chosen lag length is four. The 
results of cointegration tests based on lag four are shown 
in Table  6. The cointegration test results (for the Islamic 
monetary instrument) suggest that there exist long-run 
co-movement among the variables. Based on the Trace 
statistics, there exist four cointegrating equations as shown 
by the value of Trace statistics, which are greater than the 
5 percent critical value (248.3  >  124.4, 169.8  >  94.15, 
102.3  >  68.5, 52.19  >  47.21). Similarly, the Max-Eigen 
statistics show that there are three cointegrating equations 
Table 6. Cointegration test for Islamic monetary instrument.
Model
Null
Hypothesis
Trace
Statistic
5 % Critical
value
Max Eigen
Statistic
5 % Critical
value
r ≤ 0 0.778988 248.3856 124.24 78.49606 45.28
r ≤ 1 0.727394 169.8896 94.15 67.58583 39.37
r ≤ 2 0.618479 102.3037 68.52 50.10664 33.46
r ≤ 3 0.381385 52.19711 47.21 24.97416 27.07
r ≤ 4 0.338632 27.22294 29.68 21.49909 20.97
r ≤ 5 0.100471 5.723849 15.41 5.505949 14.07
r ≤ 6 0.004182 0.2179 3.76 0.2179 3.76
Table 7. Cointegration test for Islamic monetary instrument.
Model
Null
Hypothesis
Trace
Statistic
5 % Critical
value
Max Eigen
Statistic
5 % Critical
value
r ≤ 0 0.795925 248.0378 124.24 82.64184 45.28
r ≤ 1 0.672521 165.3959 94.15 58.04928 39.37
r ≤ 2 0.609019 107.3466 68.52 48.83306 33.46
r ≤ 3 0.446335 58.51358 47.21 30.74216 27.07
r ≤ 4 0.292103 27.77142 29.68 17.96375 20.97
r ≤ 5 0.161689 9.807669 15.41 9.171054 14.07
r ≤ 6 0.012168 0.636614 3.76 0.636614 3.76
Eds. Hatem A. El-Karanshawy et al. 117
Economic sectors sensitivity to Islamic and conventional monetary instrument: Case study in Indonesia 
since the values are greater than the 5 percent critical 
value (78.49  >  45.28, 67.58  >  39.37, 50.1  >  33.46, 
21.49 > 20.97).
The normalized cointegration equation is represented as 
follows:
LIPI = -0.011 ISMONIST + 0.237 LIBUSSERV 
SE (0.00435) (0.117)
 – 0.14 LIOTHERS + 0.17 LITRADE
SE (0.04) (0.09)
 - 0.75 LICONST + 0.902 LISOCSERV
SE (0.136) (0.133)
From the model above, it can be inferred that there are 
associations between variables and the real output. The 
negative sign of ISMONINST would mean that when 
Islamic monetary instrument increases, the IPI would 
decrease. This can be explained by theory which says that 
in an attempt to slow down an economy, the central bank 
can raise the policy interest rate. trade, hotel and restaurant 
and social service shows positive significant to the IPI.
For the conventional monetary instrument, it shows that, 
based on the trace statistics, there are four integrating 
equations as shown by the value of trace statistics, 
which is greater than 5 percent critical value (248 > 124, 
165.3  >  94.15, 107.3  >  68.5, 58.5  >  47.21). max value 
reveals three co-integrating equations (82.6  >  45.28, 
58.04 > 39.37, 48.8 > 33.4, 30.7 > 27.07)
The normalized cointegration equation is represented as 
follows:
LIPI = 0.0003 CONMONINST - 0.037 LTRADE 
SE (0.002) (0.144)
 – 0.486 LMANUF - 0.089 LFIN
SE (0.100) (0.012)
 + 0.39 LAGRI + 0.22 LCONST
SE (0.13) (0.06)
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Figure 1. Impulse response function responses of IPI and economic sectors on the shock of Islamic monetary 
instrument.
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The model above shows that the conventional monetary 
instrument is not significant in explaining the LIPI. The 
coefficient of CONMONIST, which is 0.0003 and the 
standard error, which is 0.002, resulted to the t statistics of 
0.15. Certainly this is below even 10% critical value. Hence 
the CONMONINST is not significant.
Impulse response functions
The IRFs allow for the analysis of the impact of a shock of 
both monetary policy indicators on the respective variables. 
In the context of this study, the IRF shows the magnitude 
and timing of the responses of the objective variables 
which is the economic sectors to a shock in the monetary 
policy variables (ISMONINST and CONMONINST). This 
enables a comparison of the extent of responses of the 
objective variables to the policy shocks. In all cases, the 
IRFs are reported over the 50-month period. In determining 
whether the economic sectors are sensitive to the shocks 
of the monetary policy, we analyze the nexus of shocks 
originating from the monetary policy indicator to the real 
economy as well as the five respective economic sectors.
In the case of the shock of the Islamic monetary instrument 
(ISMONINST) to the output as represented by LIPI, as 
shown in Figure 1, it reveals that LIPI response is negative. 
This implies that if ISMONINST increases, the overall 
economic activity will decrease. This supports the theory 
that if the central bank adopts tight money policy (the 
increase in rate), it affects the ability of the firms to payback 
the financing. Hence firms are reluctant to renew or extend 
the financing from the Islamic banks.
Having known the relationship of the Islamic monetary 
policy to the output in general, it is interesting to see 
the response of the specific sector to the shock of the 
ISMONINST. The same figure reveals that the response 
of sector of others (LIOTHERS) is negative to the shock of 
the Islamic monetary policy (ISMONINST). It means that 
if central bank decides to decrease the Islamic monetary 
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Figure 2. Impulse response function responses of IPI and economic sectors on the shock of conventional monetary 
instrument.
Eds. Hatem A. El-Karanshawy et al. 119
Economic sectors sensitivity to Islamic and conventional monetary instrument: Case study in Indonesia 
rate, then the performance of this sector is increasing. 
Other sectors that respond significantly to the shocks of 
Islamic monetary rates are trade, hotel and restaurant 
sector (LITRADE). Similar to others (LIOTHERS), this 
sector responds negatively to the shock of ISMONINST. 
This implies that if central bank decides to increase the 
ISMONINST (tight monetary policy), then the trade sector 
will decrease. In contrast, we observe the insensitivities of 
social service, business service, and construction.
Having discussed the impulse response of the Islamic 
monetary instrument. It is interesting to see the response 
of the economic sectors on the shock of the conventional 
monetary instrument (CONMONIST). From Figure  2, we 
see that the shock of CONMONINST does not influence the 
IPI. This means that whenever the IPI increases or decreases, 
this does not affect the performance of the overall economy 
as indicated by the IPI. In the case of the specific sector, 
Figure  2  reveals that only the manufacturing sector has 
responded positively to the shock of the CONMONINST. 
This means that if CONMONINST is increasing, it is 
followed by an increase in the manufacturing sector. The 
probable explanation can be seen from the argument by 
Miranda (2007, p269). She mentioned that:
“In addition, the appreciation of the exchange rate 
could generate higher GDP growth through indirect 
pass-through, as the appreciation will encourage 
consumption and investment. Indeed, at a certain level, 
exchange rate appreciation would support export of 
manufacturing products with high import content.”
This implies that if rupiah depreciate to the US dollar it 
discourages the consumption and investment. Demand 
of loan by manufacturing companies certainly will drop. 
Central banks would not let rupiah depreciate even further 
as this will affect the other firm, which has different 
characteristics. In order to do so, central bank will increase 
the policy rate so as to encourage the consumption and 
investment by companies. The objective is to strengthen 
the rupiah against the US dollar. By increasing the policy 
rate, investment is expected to increase particularly for the 
manufacturing sector with high import content. In other 
word, for this type of manufacturing, they prefer to have 
appreciation in rupiah as opposed to its depreciation. In 
the case of rupiah deteriorating, the central bank tends to 
increase the policy rate so as to reduce the capital flight that 
leads to the strengthening of the rupiah. When the rupiah 
strengthens, this firm is at an advantage and continues to 
borrow funds from banks. This may be the reason for most 
of the positive response by the manufacturing sector to the 
shock of the CONMONINST. Other sectors would not seem 
to significantly respond to it.
5. Conclusion
The present paper discusses the sensitivity between sectoral 
economics activities and the monetary policy rate in a 
multivariate framework in an attempt to seek the answer 
to an important question: Are monetary policy shocks 
affecting sectoral economics differently? This paper is 
important particularly for countries that are keen to adopt 
the dual banking system, as in the case of Indonesia.
Sectoral economic activities in this case refer to the sector 
which is funded by Islamic banks as well as conventional 
banks. The monetary policy rate adopted in this study is 
an Islamic monetary instrument (ISMONINST) as well as 
a conventional monetary instrument (CONMONINST). 
Technically, we would seek the response of the LIPI as 
representing the overall economic activities to the shock of 
ISMONINST and CONMONINST, and moreover, we extend 
the discussion by looking at the response of the specific 
sector on the shock of both monetary policy rates. This 
study adopts Vector AutoRegressive concepts whose data 
starts from June 2006 to February 2011 (58 observations).
The result of the sensitivity of the economic sector to the 
Islamic monetary instrument shows that generally LIPI 
responds negatively to the ISMONINST. This means that 
when ISMONINST increases, overall economic activities 
as represented by LIPI decrease. This is consistent with 
the previous findings by Sukmana and Kassim (2010) 
in the case of Malaysia – that Islamic banks play a role in 
transmitting the monetary policy to the real sector. Their 
study shows that monetary policy supports the real effects.
In the context of the specific economic sector funded 
by Islamic banks. Two sectors responded significantly, 
namely other sectors and trade, and the hotel and 
restaurant sector. Other sectors are defined as individual 
customers who are seeking financing from Islamic banks 
for their own consumptive purposes, such as housing and 
motor vehicle financing. The result above implies that 
individual customers are very sensitive to the Islamic rate. 
Whenever Islamic monetary rate is high, customer may 
Table 8. Islamic financing based on type of contracts (%).
Type of Contract 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Musyarakah 0.025 0.026 0.018 0.055 0.111 0.125 0.114 0.158
Mudharabah 0.298 0.196 0.152 0.144 0.179 0.205 0.199 0.200
Murabahah 0.610 0.693 0.709 0.715 0.665 0.623 0.617 0.592
Salam 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Istishna 0.059 0.082 0.067 0.054 0.027 0.018 0.016 0.013
Qardh 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.008 0.000 0.000
Others 0.008 0.002 0.053 0.032 0.009 0.021 0.053 0.038
Source: Bank Indonesia, Shariah banking development report, various issues.
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alter their financing from Islamic banks to borrowing from 
conventional banks. They tend to look for a cheaper price. 
In actual fact, this is happening.1 The unloyal customers 
can also be found in the case of liability side of the Islamic 
banks. This is called displacement commercial risk. It is 
a risk whereby depositors will choose banks which offer 
attractive rates of return. For instance, when interest rates 
increase, Islamic bank customers will withdraw their funds 
and deposit into conventional banks. A study done by 
Sukmana and Kassim (2010) reveals that displacement risk 
in Malaysian Islamic banks really exists. They argue that 
in the case where interest rates on deposits are relatively 
attractive as compared to the profit rates given to Islamic 
bank depositors, one would likely see a significant deposit 
migration from Islamic banks to conventional banks. This 
suggests that the Islamic bank depositors, whether Muslims 
or non-Muslims, tend to have profit motive in their saving 
behavior.
The second sector which demands attention is the trade, 
hotel and restaurant sector. This sector responded 
negatively to the shock of the Islamic monetary instruments 
(ISMONINST). This means that if ISMONINST increases, 
this sector decreases. It is argued that among three 
subsectors of trade, hotel and restaurant, we believe that 
trade is the dominant among them. Moreover, given the 
consistent highest proportion of murabahah (see table 8), 
there is high probability that the subsector of trade is using 
the contract of murabahah.
If this is the case, then it implies that this sector is very 
volatile. It means that whenever Islamic monetary 
instrument increases (expensive), traders would seek 
other, cheaper loans that are from conventional banks.
Given this fact, it is necessary to start with equity based 
contracts such as mudharabah, and musyarakah, as 
compared to the debt-based contract, such as murabaha. 
Equity based contracts are believed to give fairness not only 
to the trader but also to the Islamic bankers. Whenever 
the customer gains a lot of profit, the customer has to also 
share this profit with the Islamic banker according to the 
pre-agreed ratio. Conversely, if customer is in loss, he 
has to also share with the Islamic bank according to the 
contributed capital. This is typical of musyarakah (equity 
based contract). For the case of conventional monetary 
instruments, it is shown that the manufacturing sector is 
sensitive to the movement of the conventional monetary 
instrument.
The general conclusion is that, as the central bank, it is 
necessary to look into the characteristic of the economic 
sector. The sensitivity of the economic sector responds 
differently on the shock of ISMONINST and CONMONINST. 
For the sector that produces exported products, central 
banks should consider the movement of the exchange 
rate before imposing a certain level monetary rate. For the 
companies in this sector, appreciation of the rupiah should 
be maintained at the level (by monetary rate) that does not 
significantly affect other manufacturing companies that 
have a lot of imported products.
Moreover, sectors that are financing others demand greater 
attention. This is because the individual is believed to be 
dis-loyal to the Islamic banks. They are still looking at the 
best rate for financing (profit motive). Long term projects 
need to be undertaken in order to shift from the profit-
motivated individual to religiously-motivated individual.
Note
1. Discussion held between the author and some Islamic 
bankers reveal that Islamic banking customers are 
not very loyal.
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Abstract - Despite the huge amount of wealth in the hands of Muslims, most countries with a Muslim 
majority population fall in the category of developing nations. The development of infrastructure has 
been proved an effective means for economic growth and poverty reduction. Usually governments 
have recourse to conventional debt financing to undertake infrastructure projects. However, this 
form of financing is unsuitable in an Islamic framework due to the prohibition of interest. Moreover, 
the recurrence of sovereign debt crises over the last few decades stresses the importance of debt 
management that helps avoid the high costs of these forms of catastrophe. Debt indexation to some 
indicators from the real economy (like GDP or commodity price) has been identified as an effective 
means for the reduction of sovereign default. Such an idea has the property of strengthening the 
linkage between the real and the financial sectors of the economy, and allows risk-sharing between 
the parties involved in the transaction. In spite of the convergence of such an idea with the spirit 
of Islamic finance, the sukuk market has not yet taken advantage of it. The objective of this paper 
is, therefore, to propose an innovative model of sukuk for financing non revenue generating public 
sector projects whose return is linked to the GDP development of the issuing country. The paper 
examines the potential benefits and obstacles of the GDP-Linked Sukuk (GLS) model, which is 
based on forward ijarah, as well as its risk-return profile. Furthermore, a framework for pricing GLS 
is proposed. Based on a sample of countries from five regions of the Muslim world, the theoretical 
properties of the GLS are validated through a backtesting method. The model is shown to be a new 
asset class between the traditional debt and equity instruments and offers interesting diversification 
opportunities. Besides its theoretical contribution, the model proposed in this paper addresses 
in an effective way the issue of debt management, in an interest-free context, and the issue of 
benchmarking sovereign sukuk against the interest rate.
Keywords: GDP-linked sukuk, forward Ijarah, backtesting
1. Introduction
Despite the huge amount of wealth in the hands of Muslims, 
most countries with a Muslim majority population fall 
in the category of developing nations. The development 
of infrastructure has been proved an effective means for 
economic progress (Estache and Fay 2007). Thus, it has been 
shown that the quantity and quality of infrastructure have 
a positive impact on economic growth and are negatively 
correlated to income inequality. As an implication, the 
development of infrastructure is seen to be an effective way 
to combat poverty (Calderon and Serven 2004). Usually 
governments have recourse to conventional debt financing 
to undertake infrastructure projects. However, this mode 
of financing is unsuitable in an Islamic framework due to 
the prohibition of interest.
Over the last decade, sukuk (sing. sakk) have been seen as 
an alternative to interest-based financing, in the Islamic 
capital market. Sukuk represent proportionate beneficial 
ownership of an asset or a pool of assets for a defined 
period when the risk and return associated with the cash 
flows generated by the underlying assets are passed to 
the sukuk holders (Iqbal and Mirakhor 2007, 177). The 
euphoria which accompanied the phenomenal growth 
of the sukuk market over the recent years is, however, 
tarnished by various criticisms raised about the Shariah 
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compliance and/or the economic efficiency of many of the 
current sukuk structures. This led to the famous AAOIFI’s 
statement in 2008.
On the other hand, the recurrence of sovereign debt crises 
during the last few decades stresses the importance of debt 
management that helps avoids the high costs of these forms 
of catastrophe. Borensztein and Panizza (2009) document 
short-lived but significant sovereign default costs which 
can take various forms. Thus, in addition to its negative 
effect on GDP growth, sovereign default is shown to cause 
reputational costs,1 international trade exclusion costs,2 
costs to the domestic financial system,3 and political costs 
to the authorities.
Debt indexation to some indicators from the real economy 
(like GDP or commodity price) has been identified 
as an effective means for the reduction of sovereign 
default. Despite the potential benefits of indexed-bonds, 
acknowledged in the literature, little work is being done 
to investigate their adaptability in the context of Islamic 
finance. The objective of this paper is, therefore, to show 
the pertinence of this indexation within the framework 
of Islamic finance and to propose a design of GDP-Linked 
Sukuk. To this end, selected literature pertaining to 
the potentials of sukuk for the public sector and some 
relevant issues are reviewed; the potential benefits and 
shortcomings of GDP-linked bonds are investigated, and 
the possibility of their adoption in the Islamic finance 
industry is examined; the design, the pricing and the 
Shariah justification of GDP-Linked Sukuk is explored, 
and the theoretical characteristics of the proposed model 
of sukuk are tested empirically using the backtest method.
2. Literature review
The principal message of this section is to point out the 
potentials of the sukuk for the public sector and to discuss 
the issues that could impede their realization. We have 
argued that to address these issues and take full advantage 
of the potential benefit we need to be innovative. Wisdom 
can be taken from anywhere, and conventional finance has 
some good aspects that can be useful to Islamic finance. 
In this regard, the idea of a GDP-linked bond is explored. 
This idea presents opportunities for risk-sharing and 
for integrating the financial sector to the real sector of 
the economy. Both of them fit well with the principles of 
Islamic finance.
Potentials of Sukuk for the public sector
As developing countries, Muslim nations have a large 
demand for infrastructure projects, such as schools, 
hospitals, roads, water, electricity etc. However, in most 
cases the governments in the developing countries do not 
have sufficient revenues to fund these types of projects, 
which are vital for sustainable development. To meet 
this form of demand, Iqbal and Khan (2004) suggest 
the utilization of Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) and 
its variants along with the sukuk structures as a better 
alternative to  conventional financing which is based on 
interest. The reason for this is, at least, twofold: first, given 
that sukuk and Islamic financing in general are based on 
real assets, they are expected to enhance the stability of 
the financial institutions and markets. This feature ensures 
a stronger connection between the financial sector and 
the real sector of the economy and renders the system 
less prone to speculative activities, which are the cause of 
many crises. Second, such a policy consisting of financing 
government expenditure through Islamic financial 
instruments is expected to discipline public expenditure 
as availability of finance without an asset will be very 
limited. As a result, greater prudence will be introduced 
in the overall macroeconomic management as well as in 
the efficiency of microeconomic units operating in an 
economy.
Indeed, sukuk have already been used as a tool for 
macroeconomic management in some Muslim countries. 
Referring to the Sudanese experience, Eltegani (2005) 
mentions that sukuk can be used by governments as well 
as the central banks for monetary policy and for liquidity 
control. Thus, when sukuk are sold to the public money 
is withdrawn from the market, and this has its effect on 
money supply. Money withdrawn will be kept by the 
central bank. On the other hand, when need arises such 
money or part of it will be poured again into the market by 
buying sukuk.
In addition to its function as tool for macroeconomic policy, 
it is claimed that sukuk thus enhances the efficiency of the 
financial system, through linking the credit supply with real 
assets (Siddiqi 2006), and improving the equity within the 
system by allowing many small savers to invest and benefit 
from the true profits resulting from investments that 
conform with Shariah principles (Usmani 2007). However, 
many writers have questioned the validity of such claims 
based on the current practice in the sukuk market. The 
issues raised against many of the sukuk structures relate 
to different aspects encompassing Shariah compliance, 
economics, and the regulatory and legal frameworks. Here 
we shall focus on the Shariah compliance and the economic 
aspects only as the legal and the regulatory aspects may be 
too variable from one jurisdiction to another, and from one 
period to another.
Shariah issues
Oh et al. (2009) discuss two forms of product efficiency: 
technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. In the price-
quality space, a product is technically efficient if it has 
higher quality for lower price. However, an efficient 
product may not be selected by consumers, even when 
it has the highest quality and lowest price. The reason is 
not the absolute level of quality, but the mix of qualities 
which does not match the consumer’s preference structure. 
The allocative efficiency refers to the degree of match of 
quality mix with the preference structure. Adopting these 
definitions and applying them to a financial product, 
we can say that a sukuk product is technically efficient if 
it provides a higher return compared to other financial 
instruments with the same level of risk. Furthermore, we 
consider that tradability in addition to Shariah compliance 
are essential constituents of the “allocative efficiency” in 
the sukuk market.
Haneef (2009) identifies three hallmarks in the development 
of the sukuk. He showed that sukuk evolved from the 
asset-backed model, whereby the Sukukholders have 
ownership rights over the underlying asset, as per Shariah 
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requirements, to the asset-based model. With the latter 
model, the Sukukholders rank pari passu with unsecured 
creditors. Indeed, for all international bonds there is a 
negative pledge which restricts the borrowing entity from 
issuing any bond in the future that is not in pari passu with 
existing unsecured bonds. The third stage of evolution 
of the sukuk structure was marked by the emergence of 
models that were based mainly on partnership contracts 
but violate some of the basic Shariah requirements. These 
structures in particular have drawn various criticisms that 
culminate with Sheikh Taqi Usmani’s declaration that 85% 
of the sukuk were not Shariah-compliant. This led to the 
AAOIFI’s statement in 2008.
Al-Amine (2008) points out the controversy among Muslim 
scholars over the permissibility of one of the musharakah 
partners giving an undertaking to purchase the shares 
or units from other partners at a predetermined price. 
The rationale for the objection is that the very nature 
of a musharakah is the sharing of profit and loss among 
the partners. The undertaking to purchase the share of 
a partner at a predetermined price defeats the spirit of 
musharakah as one partner will have a guaranteed return 
whatever the outcome of the venture.
The combination of many Shariah-endorsed contracts 
to produce a sukuk structure with a desired cash flow is 
common in the current Islamic finance industry. Al-Amine 
(2008) analysed the structure of many of these combined 
contracts in the light of baial-wafa, baial-istighlal and 
bai al-inah. It was found that all these transactions are 
controversial and accepted by only a minority of Muslim 
jurists. Those who reject them consider these forms 
of transaction to be mere hiyal (legal tricks) meant to 
circumvent the prohibition of interest-based lending. Thus, 
even though the form may adhere to the requirements 
of  Shariah in exchange contract, the substance does not 
(Al-Zuhayli 2003; Al-Amine 2008).
Another issue which has drawn the attention of the 
scholars is the third party guarantee present in many sukuk 
structures. Al-Amine (2008) argues that, theoretically, 
a benevolent third party guarantee without fee or 
consideration can be acceptable in Islamic law. However, in 
practice, guaranteeing the principal in sukuk musharakah, 
sukuk mudharabah, or sukuk ijarah is problematic. This 
is due to the fact that if the guarantee is provided by a 
government it shall be declared non-permissible to use the 
property of the whole community for the benefit of private 
entities. Likewise, it is hardly conceivable for a private 
entity to provide a benevolent guarantee to another entity 
without a consideration.
Economic issues
The discussion of the economics of sukuk will focus on 
a few issues, such as the efficiency, the tradability and 
the pricing mechanism of sukuk that have drawn most 
attention among the players. Another aspect which needs 
consideration in this context is the equity and fairness 
of the transaction. This equity aspect, as reflected in the 
pricing mechanism, has been addressed in various ways in 
the literature. Even though all these issues have a Shariah 
dimension, here we will focus mainly on their economic 
aspects.
Ali (2008) holds that the combined contracts in the sukuk 
structures attempt to replicate conventional financial 
products while trying to remain within Shariah bounds. 
The end results are complicated products which are hard to 
understand, costly to construct and implement, and which 
may contradict the objectives of Shariah.
It can be argued that the complexity of a structure increases 
costs stemming from the need for more sophisticated 
legal documentation and the increased efforts required 
for advertisement of the strange new product; as a result 
the sukuk become less profitable for the investors, for the 
issuers, or for both, which means a loss of efficiency in the 
technical sense.
The tradability in the secondary market of some categories 
of sukuk is a subject of concern for many players in the 
Islamic capital markets as it constrains drastically the 
liquidity in the sukuk market. According to AAOIFI Shariah 
Standard the sukuk structures based on sale contracts are 
not tradable as this would be tantamount to debt trading, 
which is prohibited by the majority of Muslim jurists, unless 
it is at par. However, this stance is challenged by a minority 
of scholars, particularly in Malaysia, who allow the sale 
of debt at discount (Rosly and Sanusi 1999). Their stand 
is based on the view of some classical jurists who allowed 
the sale of debt under some conditions. To these Malaysian 
scholars the required conditions are met when there is a 
transparent regulatory system safeguarding the interests 
of the market participants. Furthermore, they invoke the 
concept of dhawa taajjal4 to strengthen their argument5. 
However, both arguments fail to address the main issue in 
the transaction, which is the involvement of riba, as there is 
a contractual increase of the amount to be repaid later in a 
loan contract. Moreover, maslahah is not a valid argument 
when the transaction in question violates a clear-cut text. 
In this case, the text prohibiting riba is decisive in nature. 
Similarly, the majority of the Muslim scholars reject the 
concept of dhawa taajjal particularly when it is a condition 
in the contract.
The use of interest rate benchmarks such as LIBOR for 
pricing purposes, although not desirable, is deemed 
acceptable from a Shariah perspective as long as the pillars 
and conditions of the contract in question are present 
(Usmani 1999a). Thus, the use of these conventional 
benchmarks can be seen as a transitory step towards the 
establishment of a mature Islamic finance industry with 
its own benchmarks. El-Gamal (2006), while recognizing 
the potential benefit of using additional benchmarks 
related to the underlying assets to reflect the spirit of 
Islamic commercial law, argues against the replacement 
of conventional benchmarks by Islamic ones. He considers 
such a move unnecessary, impractical and dangerous. This 
is because there is no reason to be embarrassed about using 
conventional benchmarks and, more importantly, there is a 
lack of depth and liquidity of homogenous Islamic financial 
assets.
However, the majority of those who have written on the 
subject consider it aberrant to use a tool that Islamic finance 
was supposed to have removed since its very beginning. 
Furthermore, it is remarked that by using money market rate 
as benchmark, the return to the Sukukholders will reflect the 
prevalent rate of interest instead of the actual performance 
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of the underlying asset of the sukuk (Al-Amine 2008; Jabeen 
and Khan 2008; Siddiqi 2006). This could defeat what is 
thought to be one of the features of Islamic finance, that is, 
the integration of the real and the financial sectors. In the 
same vein, Siddiqi (2006) maintains that the disconnection 
between the two sectors occurs mostly with the over-reliance 
on debt instruments as is the case in conventional finance, 
while it is admitted that the greater the role of debt the 
lesser will be the ability of the financial system to absorb real 
shocks. It also limits the ability of the monetary authorities 
to take corrective actions because of fear of instigating 
widespread defaults. He further proposes linking the returns 
to sukuk to the actual productivity, as with this arrangement 
justice and fairness will be ensured. The rationale is 
that fairness requires that uncertainties attending upon 
productive enterprise be shared. At the same time, justice 
and fairness require that losses, if and when they occur due 
to the uncertainties in the business environment, be borne 
by those who claim the profits when there are profits.
An analysis of all these issues shows that this incongruence 
observed in the sukuk structures emanates from the 
desire to reconcile two different paradigms in financing. 
In the conventional setting, the traditional debt financing 
allows the issuer to get funds without getting rid of some 
of its assets. On the other side, the investors get tradable 
securities whose return is determined ex ante. With the 
prohibition of interest in the Islamic framework, this form 
of financing (bonds) is not acceptable. Instead, methods 
endorsed by Shariah entail either a profit and loss sharing 
scheme or a transfer of assets with all the rights and 
obligations. The incongruity arises when Shariah contracts 
are combined to reproduce the substance of a financial 
instrument which is repugnant to their nature and to the 
Islamic paradigm in finance. The literature that we have 
examined reveals that the innovation in the sukuk market 
has been more legal than financial i.e. the forms and the 
legal documentations of the sukuk may be different from 
the existing instruments; however, they are very much like 
the conventional debt instruments in terms of cash flow 
and risk return profile and may contradict some of the 
principles of Islamic finance.
Thus, sukuk comport numerous potential benefits. 
However these potential benefits could be hampered by 
the increasing controversies over the Shariah compliance 
of many of the sukuk structures in the market. These 
controversies negatively affect the allocative efficiency of 
the sukuk in the long term, as many pious Muslim investors 
would prefer to put their funds in other investment vehicles. 
A result of such a move would be less of an investor base 
for sukuk that leads to a higher required rate of return for 
the suppliers of funds, or a higher cost of capital for issuers, 
which translates into less efficiency in the technical sense.
Therefore, for sustainable growth, we argue that financial 
innovation is necessary as advocated by many Muslim 
economists who consider financial engineering a vital area 
for Islamic finance.
GDP-linked bonds: Potential benefits, obstacles 
and adaptability
In the bond pricing literature there seems to be a 
growing interest in indexation whereby either coupon or 
principal payment or both are linked to a given indicator 
such as inflation, GDP or a commodity price. Though 
the popularization of indexed bonds is quite recent, 
distinguished economists like Marshall, Irving Fisher, 
Keynes, and Milton Friedman have been strong proponents 
of such an instrument (Price 1997).
A number of reasons have been put forward in favor of 
indexed bonds. First, a GDP-linked bond has been shown 
to improve debt sustainability for sovereigns in times 
of economic downturn, and allows countries to avoid a 
pro-cyclical fiscal policy (Borensztein and Mauro 2004). 
This is because a GDP-linked bond matches the payment 
obligation to the economic performance. Government 
revenues, which mainly constitute tax income, increase 
with good economic performance. Thus, with this scheme, 
the economic growth risk is shared between the borrowing 
country and its creditors as the latter will receive more 
cash flow in times of good economic performance, and less 
when the economy is bad. Notwithstanding the higher risk 
that the creditors face with this instrument as compared to 
straight bond, these indexed bonds provide the opportunity 
to take advantage of the benefits of investing in growing 
economies. Furthermore, these bonds are of nature to 
lower the likelihood of defaults and financial crises that 
could result in costly litigation and sometimes in outright 
losses6 (Borensztein, and Mauro 2002; Miyajima 2006; 
Griffith-Jones and Sharma 2006).
Another argument in favor of indexed bond is market 
completeness. With the development of financial markets 
around the world, there exist many institutional investors 
with varying risk appetites who would be willing to invest 
in these securities to diversify their portfolios. This is 
particularly relevant if we take into consideration the fact 
that available financial instruments represent a relatively 
small portion of the real wealth of the nation, so making the 
supply of instruments indexed to GDP an opportunities for 
greater diversification (Price 1997; Schroder, Heinemann 
and Kruse 2004; Kamstra and Shiller 2009).
Quite a few concerns have been raised about some potential 
risks to investors for the implementation of GDP-linked 
bonds. These can be in the form of GDP data misreporting 
or moral hazard where the issuing country may lose 
incentives for promoting growth policies.
However, it is unlikely for a government to lower economic 
growth as the political and social consequences would be 
undesirable. On the other hand, under-reporting economic 
growth would make new fund-raising more costly. Thus, 
the parties involved in these GDP-linked bonds may seek 
the involvement of international financial institutions, such 
as International Monetary Fund and World Bank to ensure 
the accuracy of the data (Miyajima 2006; Griffith-Jones 
and Sharma 2006).
Although the indexed bonds constitute debt instruments 
with interest payments we argue that the rationale behind 
the design of these securities can be acceptable even in an 
Islamic framework. The reason for this argument can be 
twofold:
1. The design of these bonds permits integration of the 
real sector of the economy with the financial sector, 
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since the return to the bondholders is contingent 
with the performance of some economic indicators; 
an element that does not necessarily exist with 
straight bonds.
2. The indexed bonds allow co-operation between the 
parties involved as there is sharing of the upsides 
and downsides of some real economic activities. 
Both elements are consonant with the principles of 
Islamic finance. Indeed, Chapra (2007) argues that 
risk-sharing contributes to the promotion of justice 
and enhances the stability of the financial system; 
thus, benefits from the transactions are potentially 
fairly distributed, and the burden of losses is not 
shifted to only one party. Furthermore, Mirakhor 
and Zaidi (2007) point out the role of risk-sharing 
in establishing a strong link between the financial 
sector and the real sector, an aspect that is missing in 
the interest-based financial system.
Besides these benefits, the Islamic finance industry can 
take advantage of this innovative pricing mechanism as a 
second best solution to address one of the major criticisms 
against sukuk ijarah, that is, benchmarking against the 
interest rate.
Wilson (2008) simulated the pricing of sukuk ijarah, based 
on GDP, for two countries, and compared it with the pricing 
based on an interest rate benchmark. Wilson’s results are 
inconclusive as the returns to investors would have been 
more stable had Saudi Arabia priced the sovereign sukuk 
based on non-oil GDP. For the other country, Malaysia, 
the opposite would be true. However, Wilson’s study has 
several limitations. First, his sample was too small (only 
two countries). His time frame (seven years) did not allow 
for assessment of the performance of sukuk over a whole 
economic cycle. Thus, the period he considered does not 
cover any major economic crisis that would help assess 
the effectiveness of the model in terms of its declared 
rationale.
Despite the potential benefits of GDP-linked securities that 
are acknowledged within the context of Islamic economics, 
very little work is being undertaken to investigate their 
adaptability. This study aims to fill that gap by proposing 
an innovative model of sukuk to raise fund for non revenue 
generating public sector projects which, at the same time, 
could help with the better management of sovereign debt.
3. GDP-linked Sukuk: Theoretical analysis
The theoretical analysis of the GDP-Linked Sukuk comprises 
two main phases:
1. Economics of the model.
2. Justification from Shariah perspective.
Economics and mathematical formulation
The literature reviewed in the previous section presented 
some of the potential benefits and obstacles to a successful 
introduction of GDP-linked bonds. In this sub-section other 
aspects of these instruments pertaining to risk and return 
are discussed. The discussion concerns, in particular, the 
design and the pricing. The design reflects the desired risk 
return profile, whereas discussion on the pricing is meant 
to provide a framework for valuation of the bonds in the 
secondary market.
The importance of this step lies in the fact that risk and 
return are key elements for both investors and issuers. 
Investors look for assets that provide good returns or offer 
diversification opportunities when included in a portfolio. 
On the other hand, the main objective of an issuer is to get 
stable funding at lower cost (Kamstra and Shiller 2009). 
Satisfying the needs of these two parties is not necessarily 
an easy task. Unless the model is attractive, economically 
speaking, to the parties involved, it does not have any 
chance of being successful.
Design of the model
Schroder et al. (2004) identified various indexations of 
GDP-linked bonds. On the one hand, the instrument can 
be in the form of a forward on the economic performance 
of the issuing country, whereby the investors will share 
both the upsides and downsides of the GDP development. 
The indexation can also be in the form of options whereby 
a ceiling or a floor is applied to the payment obligations. 
On the other hand, the coupon and/or the principal can 
be linked to the development of the GDP over the period 
of the contract. Schroder et al. (2004) found that for short 
period (e.g. three years) the linkage of both coupon and 
capital could be suitable; however, for longer periods, the 
indexation of a coupon is preferable as otherwise there 
could be a big divergence between the face value and the 
redemption value.
Besides these forms of GDP indexation, Kamstra and 
Shiller (2009) suggest another form, very much like a 
company share, which would be long term in maturity 
or even perpetual. The instruments thus designed would 
annually pay a fraction of the “earnings” (i.e. GDP) of the 
issuing country to investors as a dividend.7
The indexation method chosen for GDP-Linked Sukuk 
(GLS) in this study consists of linking the profit portion 
to the GDP development of the issuing country. Such an 
indexation takes into account the findings of Schroder et al. 
(2004) and confines the sukuk model within less risky asset 
classes that fit the needs of some specific types of investor.
We assume that the GLS is issued in US dollars. This is 
consistent with the finding of Ruban et al. (2008), which 
suggest that issuance in the local currency is much more 
expensive than in foreign currency.8
The flow of the transaction can be briefly described as 
follows:
A country plans to build a non revenue generating project 
that requires a capital K. The required fund can be raised 
in a Shariah-compliant way through the issuance of GLS. 
The two counterparts in the contracts (i.e. the government 
and the Sukukholders) agree to link the return to the GDP 
development of the country, with an initial profit rate of 
xo %. For simplicity of analysis, an annual periodic payment 
of the profit is assumed. For a given year k, the profit rate 
xk % is variable, and depends on the GDP development (i.e. 
the economic performance of the country) and on the GDP 
growth rate chosen as baseline.
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With this background information, the annual return in 
year k (ARk) on the GLS can be written as follows:
 AR x I xk k k o= = ×% %  (1)
And
 I
G
G
k
k
=
0
 (2)
Where:
- xo% is the initial rate of profit agreed upon by the 
parties at the beginning of the contract.
- xk% is the rate of return at the kth year, after issuance.
- Go is the growth rate of the GDP agreed upon by the 
contracting parties as baseline in year 0, i.e. at the 
beginning of the contract.
- Gk is the growth rate of the GDP at year k.
- Ik is an index that measures an increase or a decrease 
of the growth rate of the GDP in year k, as compared 
to that of the baseline.
It may happen that the issuing country experiences a 
negative growth rate; in that case Ik will be negative 
which would result in a negative payment. To avoid such a 
scenario, the contracting parties may agree on a minimum 
rate to be paid if the growth is to be negative. In this study 
the minimum rate is assumed to be 0. With this additional 
condition, equation (1) becomes:
 AR xk k= [ ]max % ; 0  (3)
It is clear that the minimum return of 0 is just for the purpose 
of the simulation to see the extreme cases as it would not be 
fair to the Sukukholders whose money would have already 
been put for good use regardless of the economic situation 
of the issuing country.
Two cash flow structures for the GLS are possible:
1. The principal K is divided into n equal shares and 
paid along with the annual profit over the tenor. In 
this case, the Sukukholders receive, in year k, an 
Annual Payment APk of:
 AP
K
n
AR K K
n
ARk k k= + × = × +( )
1
 (4)
2. The principal K is paid at maturity in year n, and 
every year only the profit portion is paid:
 AP K ARk k= ×  (5)
The payment can be annual or semi-annual as agreed upon 
by the parties. The amount to be paid is calculated based on 
the GDP figure of the previous year or half a year.
With this design, the profit rate is variable, as the case 
would be if the returns to the sukuk were linked to another 
indicator like LIBOR and the principal is protected. Thus, 
the GLS provides an avenue for addressing the issue of 
benchmarking the return on some Shariah-compliant 
financial instruments against interest rate.
Pricing the GLS
The assumption made for this valuation as well as for the 
simulations is that the investors have a long term horizon 
and their intention is to “buy-and-hold” the sukuk. They 
liquidate their position only when some unforeseen 
circumstances force them to do so. This assumption, which 
is consistent with the behavior prevalent in the sukuk 
market, implies that only the future cash flows, in the form 
of periodic profit and principal payment at maturity, matter 
for the Sukukholders. It has the advantage of isolating 
the negative impact that speculators would have on the 
sukuk price, meaning that only the real performance of 
the economy imports for the yield. The assumption is 
theoretically well-grounded. The prominent economist 
Keynes (1936) severely charged the speculative activities 
which consist of forecasting the psychology of the market 
that he distinguished from enterprise, defined as the 
activity of forecasting the prospective yield of assets over 
their whole life. He further maintained that:
“Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady 
stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when 
enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of 
speculation. When the capital development of a country 
becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the 
job is likely to be ill-done” (Keynes 1936, 102–106).
With this in mind, the valuation of the GLS in the secondary 
markets at any point of time before maturity follows the 
same logic as the valuation of bonds (and other financial 
instruments), and consists of calculating the present value 
of future cash flows.
To simplify the discussion, we consider the second scenario 
presented above whereby the periodic payment constitutes 
only the profit portion APk, while the principal K will be 
paid at maturity. The price of GLS at any point of time 
before maturity is given by:
 PV
AP
r
K
rk
n k
k n=
+( ) + +( )=∑1 1 1  (6)
Where:
PV = the present value of GLS;
n = the number of periods (e.g. years) from the date of 
valuation to the maturity date;
APk = the cash flow at period “k ” which represents the value 
of the share of profit at that period. APk is obtained based 
on equation (5).
K = is the principal that the Sukukholders disbursed for the 
development of the project.
r = is the required rate of return to the Sukukholders.
There are two unknowns that need to be estimated for 
the determination of PV, that is, the fair price of GLS, the 
periodic cash flow APk, and the required rate of return r. 
It is worth remarking that the required rate of return is 
positively related to the uncertainty or risk associated with 
APk. Therefore, the key point in the pricing exercise resides 
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in the accurate estimation of the risk associated to APk, 
which depends on the economic performance of the issuing 
country in year k.
According to Costa et al. (2008), who studied the price 
behavior of the Argentina-indexed warrant after its 
successful introduction to the market, the yield at which 
these new instruments were implicitly discounted can be 
broken down in three components:
1. The risk free rate which represents an opportunity 
cost.
2. A default premium.
3. A residual premium, identified as novelty premium.
For the GLS, all these components would be relevant beside 
the economic growth risk premium that would compensate 
the investors for bearing the country growth risk.
An issue that may arise is the determination of a proxy 
for the risk-free rate knowing that in an Islamic finance 
framework interest is banned and any gain should be 
associated with risk as stipulated by the famous legal 
maxim ‘al ghunm bil ghurm’. However, for simplicity of 
analysis, we consider the return on mudharabah deposits 
as proxy for opportunity cost. Mudharabah deposits carry, 
in practice, a return similar to conventional fixed deposits, 
although they are very different in theory (Rosly and Zaini 
2008; Diaw and Mbow, 2011). Hence, the risk-free rate 
component, which is a proxy for opportunity cost, would be 
replaced by the return to mudharabah deposits, assuming 
that the Sukukholders would be able to put their money in 
a mudharabah account if they wish.
Default risk
The Sukukholders will be exposed to the default risk. 
However, the risk would be lower than the credit risk 
carried by a plain vanilla bond, or a sukuk linked to a 
variable interest rate benchmark. This stems from the 
construction of the GLS, which matches the payment 
obligations to the payment ability. When GDP growth is 
low, government revenues decline proportionally but the 
payment to the Sukukholders declines too. This feature 
makes the probability of default for GLS lower than for the 
conventional bond and it is translated into a lower default 
premium (Ruban et al. 2008).
Growth risk
This is another element that needs to be accounted for 
in the determination of the discount rate for the GLS. As 
indicated by equation (1), xk % is a function of xo % and Ik. 
The latter variable depends on the baseline growth rate 
and the rate of growth in year k. While Go is a matter of 
agreement between the parties, Gk rather is determined 
by the economic conditions of the issuing country, and it 
represents the key variable meant to capture the economic 
rationale of GLS. This is because the annual return will vary 
in function of the variations of Gk.
Novelty premium
Lastly, Costa et al. (2008) show that investors require a 
premium for new financial instrument termed the “novelty 
premium”. The findings of the authors, nonetheless, 
suggest that this type of premium is likely to decay fast over 
time, as the market participants became familiar with the 
instrument. This is confirmed by the results of the study 
carried out by Borensztein and Mauro (2004), as well as 
that of Kamstra and Shiller (2009) who found that the 
premium would be relatively small.
In sum, the forgoing analysis points out that the components 
of the discount rate r for the determination of the present 
value of the GLS at any point of time before maturity are 
as follows:
r =  rd + default premium + growth risk premium + 
novelty premium.
Since the GLS are assumed to be issued in US dollars, 
the exchange rate risk is relatively negligible for foreign 
investors.
This discussion shows that the GLS are likely to be priced 
higher than conventional debt instruments, particularly in 
the first stage of their introduction to the market. However, 
the opportunities that they offer for better management 
of a country debt make paying for the additional costs 
worthwhile. The current debt crisis in some countries of 
the European Union proves that, when they do occur, debt 
crises are costly not only for the country in question, but 
also for investors and the international community.
Analysis of Model from Shariah Perspective: 
Justification of GLS
Shariah compliance is a necessary condition for any product 
to be acceptable in Islamic finance. Two main aspects of 
Shariah compliance can be identified:
1. Conformity to the key Shariah rulings pertaining 
to commercial transactions, such as the principle 
of mutual consent, the prohibition of riba, gharar, 
maysir, and illicit goods.
2. Upholding maqasid al-Shariah (the objectives 
of Shariah) in transactions which consist of the 
realization of maslahah in the outcome and the 
achievement fairness in the terms of the contract.9
Therefore, to demonstrate Shariah compliance, the GLS 
will need to be tested against these two aspects.
Analysis of the conformity of a product to Shariah 
principles in the light of the first aspect (i.e. key Shariah 
rulings in commercial transactions) can be carried out in 
two equivalent ways. The analysis can be done indirectly, 
by showing that the product is in conformity with each of 
the five elements mentioned under that aspect. The analysis 
can also be done directly by proving that the underlying 
transaction fits one or a combination of Shariah nominate 
contracts. We adopt the latter method as it appears more 
convenient.
Istisna would certainly be the most appropriate concept 
for the development of a non-revenue generating project. 
However, the non-tradability of sukuk istisna makes them 
less attractive as a fund-raising instrument in the capital 
market. On the other hand, a simple ijarah would require the 
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delivery of the asset to justify the rental payment. Forward 
ijarah (ijarah al-mawsufah fi al-dzimah) overcomes this 
shortcoming and can be taken as the underlying fiqh 
concept for GLS. This structure allows the Sukukholders, 
through their representative, to undertake the construction 
of the project, lease it to the government, and receive the 
payments (principal + profit), over the tenor of the project.
Forward lease is a sale of future benefits or usufructs for 
a price which can be paid in advance or deferred. The 
concept may be used for infrastructure projects whereby 
the government fully describes the specifications of the 
infrastructure to be delivered in the future. Thus, a SPV can 
enter into a contract of forward lease with the government 
for the usufruct of an asset to be delivered, and then issues 
sukuk for the required amount. This method is stronger 
than a mere promise to rent which is not binding and 
its  non-fulfillment only implies compensation for actual 
damage (Lahsasna 2010; Abu Ghuddah, (n.d.)). According 
to Nasar (2009, [2]), forward lease is endorsed by the 
majority of Muslim jurists (Malikis, Shafiis and Hanbalis) 
who consider it a form of salam contract. Thus, the legality 
of forward ijarah is derived from that of two basic contracts 
which are salam and ijarah.
Once the contract is concluded in this stage, delivery of the 
project as specified is at the liability of the Sukukholders 
whereas the government is liable to pay the price K+P 
(i.e. invested capital plus profit). With the forward lease 
contract, the sukuk will be tradable in the secondary 
market once the project starts.
If the first mode of payment (as in equation (4)) is adopted, 
then the transfer can be done for free at the end of the 
contract. But if the second mode is adopted (as in equation 
(5)), then the sukuk are to be redeemed at their nominal 
value, for instance. AAOIFI (2004a) and the Islamic Fiqh 
Academy, in its Resolution No. 110(4/12), have accepted 
the transfer of ownership through a separate contract of 
gift. In its 2008 statement, AAOIFI has also endorsed the 
redemption of sukuk ijarah for nominal value.
Since ijarah is a sale of usufruct, the price should be 
known at the beginning, for otherwise there will be 
gharar. Nevertheless, having different lease contracts for 
subsequent periods with different rentals agreed upon at 
the beginning of each contract is permissible. For instance, 
a country X may issue GLS in March 2010, with tenor of 
five years and a rental payable annually in June, every 
year. This contract can be considered as a succession of 
five lease contracts: at the beginning of each period, i.e. in 
March, the contracting parties sign the new contract which 
lasts for one year. The first annual payment would occur 
in June 2010, based on the GDP figure of 2009. Such an 
arrangement would allow the usual lag for publishing GDP 
data and the collection of the taxes to be taken into account.
As for the second aspect of Shariah compliance, i.e. 
upholding the objectives of Shariah in transactions, the 
GLS clearly constitutes a maslahah. This is because, not 
only do they allow deals that benefit the contracting 
parties, but also they do it in a way that is better than in 
many traditional investments. Investment is supposed to 
support productive activities; however, it is not evident that 
many investments in the stock market and mutual funds do 
serve the real economy. The GLS, as designed above, will 
do so. The proceeds from the sukuk issuance are normally 
used by the issuer for developing infrastructure projects 
that ultimately add value to the economy. Hence, the GLS 
constitute a maslahah in that their outcomes are beneficial 
to the society.
The terms of the contracts in the GLS model are balanced. 
This is evidenced by its risk-sharing characteristics. By 
accepting exposure to the economic performance of the 
issuing country, the Sukukholders share with it the upsides 
and downsides of its economy. Thus, the interests of the 
contracting parties move in the same direction, and this 
constitutes a form of fairness in the terms of the contract.
The issue of indexation
The issue of indexation has long drawn the attention 
of contemporary Muslim scholars as evidenced by the 
numerous seminars held under the auspices of the Islamic 
Fiqh Academy to discuss the issue. One of the reasons for 
this particular attention is the fact that with the prohibition 
of riba in all its forms, the amount of a debt should remain 
unchanged even though the purchasing power of the 
currency falls for one reason or another. This could put a 
creditor in an uncomfortable situation. Thus, based on 
experts’ research on the matter, the Islamic Fiqh Academy 
Resolution No. 115 (9/12), states that:
“In principle debts that have already been created in 
terms of a certain currency should be repaid in terms 
of that same currency and not in terms of an equivalent 
value, because a debt has always to be settled with its 
exact similar. It is therefore impermissible to link the 
already existing debts, whatever their source might be, 
to price level.”
Further in the same resolution, the Academy emphasizes 
that it is impermissible from a Shariah viewpoint to link, 
at the time of concluding a debt, the repayable amount 
to a variable, such as gold and silver, growth rate of gross 
national product (GNP), interest rate, or price of a basket 
of commodities. The prohibition is due to the existence of 
a great deal of gharar and uncertainty in that indexation, 
since neither of the parties knows what will be the 
commitment at the end.
The indexation in the GLS model is, however, different 
from the one dealt with in the resolution. In the resolution 
the condition of the variability of the amount to be repaid is 
contained in the same contract that creates the debt. But in 
the context of GLS, there is a succession of ijarah contracts, 
and the rental of each is known at the beginning. It is the 
same procedure that is used to link the return in sukuk 
ijarah to LIBOR. It follows from this basic difference that 
the prohibition in the Resolution does not concern the form 
of indexation practiced with GLS.
4. GDP-linked Sukuk: Empirical analysis
The GLS are a new model which has not yet been introduced 
to the market. Therefore, it is not possible to observe the 
behavior of their returns. Thus, to test the effectiveness of 
the model we look into the characteristics of the returns by 
applying the backtesting method.
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The simulations permit study of the behavior of the proposed 
models under various scenarios in order to reveal their risk-
return profiles; it is also possible to compare hypothetical 
returns with those of some standard benchmarks for debt 
and equity instruments. The simulations results are also 
used to examine the diversification opportunities offered 
by the models.
Backtesting GLS: Method and data
Backtesting is a method that permits the comparison of 
the ex ante forecast from a model to the actual or ex post 
realization of the variable of interest (Christoffersen 2008).
Backtesting has been used in academia as well as in the 
finance industry to detect possible flaws in a model and 
to check the consistency of predicted properties. In risk 
management backtesting has been employed systematically 
to test the accuracy and efficiency of the Value-at-Risk 
(VaR) models, which are used extensively to manage 
market risk. The Basel Committee on banking Supervision 
(BCBS) has endorsed the use of backtesting in conjunction 
with the internal models approach to determine market 
risk capital requirements. Thus, the backtest helps evaluate 
and validate the model being used internationally by 
banks in agreement with the regulatory body (BCBS 1996; 
Lehikinen 2007, 24).
The objective of backtesting here is to see what would have 
happened if the GLS had been issued in some selected 
developing countries a few years back. Thus, five countries 
from different regions of the Muslim world are chosen: 
Algeria, Bahrain, Malaysia, Senegal, and Uzbekistan. Some 
useful insights are expected from this diversity, given the 
relative integration of economies from the same region: 
each of these five countries comes from a different region 
of the Muslim world. Table 1 shows the correlations 
coefficients between the GDP growth of the selected 
countries and that of their respective regions from 1990 
to 2009.
For each of the selected countries, except Bahrain, the 
correlation coefficient of the GDP growth rate with that 
of its corresponding region is greater than 0.5. This 
strong correlation suggests that the results of the backtest 
obtained from the sample would be valid for the vast 
majority of Muslim countries, which are the potential 
issuers of the GLS.
The real GDP values for the selected countries from 1969 to 
2009, in 2005 US dollars, are obtained from the Economic 
Research Service of the United States Department of 
Agriculture. The choice of real GDP is explained by the fact 
that it isolates the effect of inflation on GDP figures and, 
thus, constitutes a more accurate measure of economic 
performance than the nominal. We retrieved the 6-Month 
LIBOR rates for the specified period from the internet,12 and 
then computed the annual average. The annual returns for the 
MSCI World are also collected from DataStream. MSCI World 
is a stock market index of 1500 stocks from 23 developed 
countries. LIBOR and MSCI World can be considered as 
global benchmarks for two asset classes (i.e. debt and equity). 
The correlation coefficients between the countries indices 
and the annual rates of return for LIBOR and MSCI are 
computed to examine the diversification opportunities that 
the introduction of GLS would provide to those portfolios 
which are highly correlated to these two benchmarks.
The construction of the annual returns for each country is 
as follows:
1. The Index I, as in equation (2), is first constructed 
using the GDP data:
I
G
G
k
k
=
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Where:
Go is the growth rate of the GDP agreed upon by the 
contracting parties as baseline in year 0. For this backtest, 
1995 is taken as year 0 and Go represents the moving 
average of the growth rate of the country from 1970 to year 
kth. Where 1 ≤ k ≤ 11, i.e. from 1996 to 2006. The moving 
average is of the nature to reduce the volatility of the index 
as compared to the normal average, since it also captures 
the most recent development of the GDP.
Gk is the growth rate of the GDP at year kth.
Ik is an index that measures an increase or a decrease of the 
growth rate of the GDP in year kth, as compared to that of 
the baseline.
Thus, I5 represents the value of the index in the 5th year, 
i.e. in 2000, and G0 the average rate of growth from 1970 
to 2000.
Table 1. Correlation Coefficients between GDP Growth rate of the Selected Countries and 
that of their respective regions from 1990 to 2009.
World
North 
Africa
Middle  
East
South 
East Asia
Sub 
Saharan 
Africa10
Former 
Soviet 
Union11
Algeria  0.228  0.607 0.231 -0.324  0.740  0.642
Bahrain -0.012 -0.241 0.443  0.248 -0.087 -0.028
Malaysia  0.449 -0.304 0.403  0.969 -0.157 -0.339
Senegal  0.585  0.506 0.245 -0.094  0.591  0.496
Uzbekistan  0.204  0.463 0.255 -0.288  0.768  0.909
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2. The following step is the computation of the annual 
return, based on equation (3):
AR x I xk k k= [ ] = × °[ ]max % ; max % ;0 0
xo % is the initial rate of profit agreed upon by the parties at 
the beginning of the contract.
For the sake of comparability xo % is set at 5%, which is 
close to that of 6-Month LIBOR rate in January 1996.
xk % is the rate of return at the kth year, after issuance.
5. Analysis of results
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the annual values 
of the indices and the annual rates of returns of the GLS 
over the 11 years.
For three countries (Bahrain, Senegal, Uzbekistan), the 
average value of the index would have been greater than 
1 implying higher costs for the issuing countries (but 
higher return for the investors). The highest increase was 
recorded with Uzbekistan, for which the average payment 
obligation would have increased by 179%. On the other 
hand, the lowest average index is that of Malaysia, with a 
value of 0.76, implying a decrease of 24% of the average 
payment obligation as compared to its initial value. Except 
for Uzbekistan, the average returns and the standard 
deviations of the GLS are less than those of the MSCI index.
A closer investigation of the reasons for the contrast 
between the Malaysian scenario and that of Uzbekistan 
corroborates a point made earlier pertaining to the variables 
that would have a greater impact on the value of the index 
or the annual return. By considering the average growth 
rate of these two countries in the two sub-periods before 
the issuance (i.e. 1970–1995) and after the issuance (i.e. 
1996–2006), it appears that the two economies evolved in 
a contrasting fashion. For the first sub-period, the average 
growth rate is 7.4% and 1.6% for Malaysia and Uzbekistan, 
respectively, whereas the figures are 4.84% and 4.88% in 
the second sub-period. It is worth noting that Malaysia was 
hit by a severe financial crisis in 1997 that badly affected 
the economic performance of the country in subsequent 
years; Uzbekistan, however, experienced an economic 
improvement following dislocation from the Soviet Union. 
Thus, if the changes in the index for Malaysia are within 
acceptable limits - as they are in line with the economic 
rationale of the GLS - that is not the case for Uzbekistan 
which would have been overburdened due to poor design 
of the instrument. It follows from this point that some 
precautions should be taken when designing the GLS. First, 
a reasonable forecast of the growth prospects of the issuing 
country is key element for the choice of the baseline growth 
and, hence, avoidance of sharp fluctuations. Second, the 
setting of a ceiling and floor for maximum and minimum 
payments is also important to avoid the deleterious effects 
of incorrect forecasts or inaccurate estimations that may 
lead to extreme fluctuations.
For the sake of comparison, the five-year Malaysian sovereign 
bonds over the same period (i.e. 1996–2006) had an average 
yield of 4.9%, while the average return on the Malaysian 
global sukuk, issued in 2002, is 3.93%. Both figures are 
higher than the average return on GLS over the period of 
the study, this being 3.8%. These results substantiate the 
point that GLS is not necessarily more expensive than the 
traditional instruments already in the market.
The results of the backtest show that, as they are 
designed, the GLS would satisfy the main purpose of 
their introduction. Thus, Algeria and Malaysia, which had 
economic difficulties during the period, would have made 
lower payments and the contrary is true for the other 
countries.
Table  2. Summary Statistics for GLS for the period 
1996–2006.
Index 
(I)
Average 
Return
Annual 
average 
6-Month 
LIBOR
MS WRLD$ 
Index 
Average 
Return
Algeria
Average 0.97  4.87 4.28  8.01
Std Dev. 0.44  2.19 1.90 17.53
Bahrain
Average 1.51  7.57 4.28  8.01
Std Dev. 0.34  1.69 1.90 17.53
Malaysia
Average 0.76  3.80 4.28  8.01
Std Dev. 0.40  1.99 1.90 17.53
Senegal
Average 1.53  7.66 4.28  8.01
Std Dev. 0.59  2.96 1.90 17.53
Uzbekistan
Average 2.79 13.95 4.28  8.01
Std Dev. 0.83  4.16 1.90 17.53
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Algeria Bahrain Malaysia Senegal
Uzbekistan Annual average 6-Month LIBOR
Graph 1. GLS (hypothetical) Annual Returns for the 
period 1996–2006.
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Graph 1 shows the evolution of the GLS annual returns over 
the period of study. Uzbekistan recorded the highest and 
most volatile annual return for the whole period, whereas 
Malaysia is the only country which would have made no 
payment on one occasion (i.e. in 1998, after the Asian crisis).
Between these two extremes the remaining GLS annual 
returns exhibit different behaviors, with values that vary 
within the range of 1% to 11%.
From the investor perspective, the choice to include 
the GLS in a portfolio would depend very much on the 
diversification opportunities they provide. To analyze this 
aspect, we follow Schroder et al. (2004) by considering 
a method of portfolio optimization in the Markowitz 
mean–variance framework. This method indicates that to 
include a new financial asset A in a portfolio P the following 
equation should hold:
 
R r R rA
A
P
P
A P
-
>
-
s s
r. ,  (7)
Where:
RA and RP are the average returns of A and P.
rA,P, sA, and sP represent, respectively, the correlation 
coefficient and standard deviation of A and P.
r is a risk free rate.
Within this framework, a financial asset is eligible for 
inclusion in the portfolio if its Sharpe Ratio (i.e. the left-
hand side of (7)) is greater than the Sharpe Ratio of the 
portfolio times the correlation coefficient of the two (i.e. the 
right-hand side of (7)). Thus, the value of the correlation 
coefficient is crucial as, for instance, if the Sharpe Ratio 
of the portfolio is two times greater than that of the new 
asset, the latter could be included in the portfolio if the 
correlation coefficient is less than 0.5.
Without the need for any detailed calculations, this intuitive 
approach shows that the GLS would provide a good avenue 
for diversification for all the portfolios that are highly 
correlated to LIBOR and the MSCI Index, as indicated by 
the results in Table 3. Indeed, all the correlation coefficients 
are less than 0.4, some even having negative values.
Hypothetical example
A Muslim Country X has an important program for 
infrastructure development in the next decade. Given 
the illiquidity in the credit market as a consequence of 
the global financial crisis, Country X wants to diversify its 
funding sources and tap the excess liquidity in the GCC 
region by issuing sukuk. On the other hand, the debt 
crisis in the Eurozone constituted a compelling argument 
for the  government authorities in Country X to fund an 
important share of these infrastructure projects through 
state-contingent sukuk (e.g. Commodity-Linked Sukuk and 
GDP-Linked Sukuk). An amount K = $1 billion is needed to 
build schools, universities and hospitals in different districts 
of Country X. Country X decides to raise the capital K= $1 
billion through the issuance of a 10-year GLS, in March 
2011 with initial annual profit rate of 8% (i.e. the amount 
of the first year rental = $80 million). As the owners of the 
projects, the Sukukholders will lease the assets (i.e. schools, 
universities and hospitals) to the government of Country X, 
which will buy them at maturity for $ 1 billion. Based on the 
forecast made by some international financial institutions, 
the Country X GDP growth rate over the next ten years has 
been estimated and the parties agreed on the baseline GDP 
growth rate. Further, the parties agreed to set a ceiling and 
a floor of 50% up and down of the Index (I).13 This means 
that with an initial value of I =1, the maximum and the 
minimum values that I can take are 1.5 and 0.5, respectively. 
Thus, the various estimated I and the corresponding cash 
flow (CFk)14 are as in the following table:
For this type of sukuk the investors currently require a 7% 
rate of return. Given that the face value of unit of GLS is 
$1,000, Country X needs to evaluate the present value (PV) 
of cash flows, to determine the number of units of sukuk to 
be issued. Thus we have:
PV
CF K
k
k
k= ( ) + ( ) ==∑1
10
10
1 07 1 07
1 042 92
. .
$ , . Million
To raise the needed fund, the government of Country X has 
to issue 958847 units of GLS at $1,042.92 per unit.
Table 3. Correlation Coefficients between the GLS Annual Returns and Selected 
Benchmarks.
Algeria Bahrain Malaysia Senegal Uzbekistan
Cor. Coef. (I, LIBOR) -0.67 -0.60 0.13 0.06 -0.04
Cor. Coef. 
(I, MSWRLD$)  0.34  0.02 0.10 0.38  0.21
Table 4. Hypothetical Values of I and CFk for Country X GLS.
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
I  1  1.08  0.96  0.79  0.68 0.5  0.73  1.03   1.44 1.5
CFk ($ Mil.) 80 86.4 76.8 63.2 54.4 40 58.4 82.4 115.2 120
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6. Conclusion
In this paper we made a case for GDP-Linked Sukuk as an 
effective tool for non revenue generating infrastructure 
projects financing in a Shariah-compliant way. The GLS 
allow synchronization of the payment obligation of the 
issuing government with its payment ability. With the GLS, 
the investors’ capital is guaranteed but the profit rate is a 
function of the performance of the economy. The theoretical 
analysis as well as the empirical evidence suggests that the 
returns on the GLS are higher than those on comparable 
straight bonds, as the risk is higher with the former. 
However, the results of the simulation suggest the presence 
of interesting diversification opportunities with the GLS. 
From the issuer perspective, GLS appear more expensive 
than the traditional debt instruments for fund raising, but 
GLS offer better opportunities for debt management. To 
prevent sharp fluctuations of the profit rate, we propose the 
setting of a ceiling and a floor for that rate.
In the sukuk literature, many writers have complained of 
the complexity of certain sukuk structures, the construction 
of which involves necessarily additional advisory fees 
compared to the standards financial instruments. We 
claim that the GLS model is simple by design as only one 
Shariah concept is involved. Therefore, the contracting 
parties do not need to disburse exorbitant advisory fees 
for the construction and endorsement of the structures. If 
we add to this characteristic the tradability of GLS and its 
adherence to Shariah principles, we reach the conclusion 
that the model is efficient in both the technical and 
allocative sense, as defined above.
Kamstra and Shiller (2009) maintained that there is a 
trade-off, in terms of debt management, between low cost 
but volatile short-term debt and higher cost but more stable 
long-term debt. A government will certainly be concerned 
about the risk of a sharp increase of the cost of debt 
servicing during an economic down-turn when its budget 
can least afford it. The authors, therefore, made a case for 
diversifying government obligations to reduce the budget 
crisis even though it would mean a higher average cost for 
fund raising. The current debt crisis in Europe gives credit to 
this argument. Financial instruments like GLS offer Muslim 
governments the opportunity to diversify their fund raising 
and to address the issue of benchmarking the sukuk against 
the interest rate. GLS would also be a suitable instrument to 
be used by institutions like the Islamic Development Bank, 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank to finance 
projects in Muslim countries.
Notes
1. Reputational costs can be in the form of full exclusion 
from capital market and credit rating downgrade 
that will result in higher borrowing costs later.
2. International trading costs could be in the form of 
net decrease of bilateral trade and decline of of the 
trade credit of the defaulted country.
3. This can take the form of an increase of the 
probability of banking crisis. (See Borensztein and 
Panizza, 2009, for more elaboration).
4. The concept is referred to when a creditor forfeits a 
part of debt when the debtor settles the balance of 
the debt earlier than scheduled.  
5. Syariah Advisory Council’s Resolution, accessed on 
14 March 2011 at http://www.sc.com.my/main.
asp?pageid=450&menuid=554&newsid=&linkid
=&type=.
6. The costs of sovereign default will not be born 
solely by the defaulted country and its creditors. 
Indeed, the international community will also bear 
its share as evidenced by the current European 
debt crisis whereby the bailout package to Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal advanced by IMF and EU 
amounts to € 110 billion,  € 85 billion, and € 78 
billion respectively.  
7. The authors named this new instrument ‘Trill’ 
referring to the value of the annual dividend 
payment which would be one – trillionth of the 
US GDP.
8. It is worth mentioning that other authors (e.g. 
Costa, et al. (2008)) are of different view as they 
consider that external liabilities denominated 
in foreign currency played a central role in many 
emerging countries crises.  
9. See Diaw and Boon Ka (2010) for elaboration.
10. Excluding South Africa.
11. Excluding Russia and Ukraine. 
12. www.wsjprimerate.us, accessed on July 11, 2010.
13. Based on equation (2).
14. Based on equations (5).
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Abstract - A study is made of the economic and financial crises of fifteenth-century Egypt, which 
was ruled by the Mamluk dynasty. During the fifteenth century, especially the first half, Egypt 
faced terrible economic crises caused sometimes by the ill-governance and corruption of rulers, 
and sometimes by natural catastrophes such as the flooding or drying up of the Nile, outbreaks of 
epidemics, crop diseases, etc. In many cases two or more factors existed simultaneously. Financial 
crises emanated mainly from monetary mismanagement. Two social thinkers of the time – al-Maqrizi 
at the beginning of the century and al-Asadi at the middle – addressed the situation. They analyzed 
the problem, pointed out the causes, and suggested remedies. For al-Maqrizi, the deterioration 
of Egypt’s monetary system was the single most important cause of its economic and financial 
difficulties. As a panacea, he prescribed a return to a gold and silver standard and restriction of 
copper coinage to petty transactions. Al-Maqrizi did not realize that the reason for the widespread 
use of copper money was Egypt’s dependence on the import of precious metals, especially silver, 
from Europe and this was adversely affected in the fifteenth century, being known as the “silver 
famine”. Al-Asadi divided the factors responsible for the economic and financial crises of his time 
into two main categories – socio-economic factors and monetary factors. In the former category 
he included neglect of agriculture, disturbances by Bedouins, oppression of farmers, and sale of 
government positions. As far as the monetary factor is concerned, he dealt with this separately and 
held the poor currency system to be the reason behind the high prices which were disturbing the 
whole economy. Al-Asadi did not confine his analysis to the monetary problem only. He advocated 
an overall reform and strict management of the whole economy, the monetary aspect being one 
aspect. He did not restrict money to gold and silver; to him, precious metals and copper all had their 
utility as money and all could be used at the same time. However, the issuing of money and minting 
of coins should be structured in such a way that counterfeiting and debasement is kept in check. The 
main financial problem, in his opinion, was debasement of the currency leading to an unrestricted 
supply of money, and not the dominance of copper coins. The paper concludes with an appraisal 
of this diagnosis of the problem, the solution suggested by the two social thinkers, and the lessons 
learned from them.
Keywords: economic and financial crises, return to gold and silver money, economic ideas of  
al-Maqrizi and al-Asadi, fifteenth-century Egypt, inflation in the history of Islam, monetary 
mismanagement, Mamluk economics
1. Introduction
The context of the present paper is the recent financial crisis 
which has drawn attention to the search for a parallel in the 
past at various stages in history. Some scholars have thrown 
a cursory glance at Muslim history and hurriedly concluded 
that it was a period when poverty was non-existent: the 
basic needs of everyone were met and no-one was “poor” 
enough to look forward to receiving charity; situations of 
worldwide famine were intelligently and successfully dealt 
with; and there was no evidence of financial and economic 
crises in the long history (of Islam) spread over about 1000 
years (Khan 2009, emphasis added). In fact, the economic 
history of Muslim states remains largely unexplored. 
Absence of knowledge does not mean lack of existence. 
There are instances of economic and financial crises even in 
Islamic history. But the causes and intensity and frequency 
have not been the same as those we experience currently. 
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136 Islamic economic: Theory, policy and social justice
The present paper aims to study the economic and financial 
crises of fifteenth-century (corresponding to ninth-century 
Hijrah) Egypt which was ruled by the Mamluk dynasty.1 In 
this respect, the paper especially attempts to examine the 
contributions of two social thinkers of the time – al-Maqrizi 
at the beginning of the century and al-Asadi at the middle 
– who analyzed the situation, pointed out the causes, and 
suggested remedies. It concludes with an appraisal of their 
diagnosis of the problem, the solution suggested by them, 
and checks the relevance to the present-day situation. 
As background, the paper begins with an overview of 
the political and socio-economic conditions of fifteenth-
century Egypt.
2. Fifteenth-Century Egypt: An overview
The Mamluk2 sultans established their rule in Egypt and in 
Syria, Cairo being their capital. They were originally troops 
of slave status enlisted to sustain Ayyubid power. After they 
took control of Egypt, the sultans achieved the re-conquest 
of the last of the crusader kingdoms in the Levant, and 
defeated the Mongols at the critical battle of Ayn Jalut in 
658/1260.
The Mamluk Sultan Zahir Baybars (1260–77) installed an 
Abbasid amir as caliph at Cairo, who survived the Mongol 
massacre in Baghdad in 1258. This made the Mamluk 
government the focus of the Islamic world. Even Indian 
kings obtained their titles of sovereignty from the Abbasid 
caliph in Egypt. Many European kings extended the hand 
of friendship towards the Egyptian sultans, and they 
exchanged ambassadors. Some of them signed treaties for 
defense and trading purposes (Lane-Poole 1925, 281; Muir 
1896, 38). Both Cairo and Damascus became the centre 
of Islamic culture and learning after the destruction of 
Baghdad by Mongols in 656/1258.
It seems that in the ninth/fifteenth century Muslim social 
thinking reached its peak when Egypt saw scholars like 
Ibn Khaldun (d. 808/1406), al-Maqrizi (d. 845/1442), 
al-Asadi (9th/15th century), Ibn al-Azraq (d. 896/1489), 
and al-Syuti (d. 911/1506). There has been no intellectual 
scholarship of such stature in such numbers in the 
succeeding centuries.
Fifteenth-century Egypt falls under the dynasty of Burji 
or Circassian Mamluks (784–923/1382–1517).3 Mamluk 
society was stratified into four distinct classes:
1. The ruling class.
2. Public administrators, educators and scholars, who 
represented the link between the rulers and the 
general public.
3. The rich class of traders and merchants.
4. The farmers, labourers, craftsmen, small shopkeepers 
and the poor masses.
As outlined below, al-Maqrizi divides the population into 
seven categories to examine the effects of economic and 
financial crises on the Egyptian people. The fallahin (plural 
of fallah, farmers or land tillers) were in the majority and 
in probably the worst economic position as they were 
subject to multiple taxes (Ibn Iyas 1960, 30). Al-Maqrizi 
saw the  detrimental effect of excessive taxation and 
decline in collection – an idea that came to be known as the 
“Laffer Curve” in the twentieth century. When inhabitants 
are overburdened by rising taxes, revenue collection 
will decrease because people abandon cultivation, leave 
farming and migrate away from the area (al-Maqrizi, 
al-Suluk 4, 791–95; idem. Ighathah, 44).
Fifteenth-century Egypt saw a number of outbreaks of 
plague which led to demographic crisis. De-population 
led to decreased economic productivity (Shoshan 1982, 
97); while demand for health care during the epidemics 
increased, the fee of physicians being augmented many 
fold (al-Maqriz, Ighathah, 35). Plague, which began in 
1403, lasted for three years and destroyed forty villages. 
The death toll is estimated variously as one-third, one-half, 
two-thirds or even 60% of the population. On average, 
plague occurred every 1.7 years. Most destructive were 
those which spread during 809/1406, 822/1419, and 
833/1429 (Nasir 2003, 91). For some writers “the complex 
economic problem of the later Mamluk period remains 
largely a population problem” (Shoshan 1982, 98). In the 
opinion of Udovitch also, demographic decline due to the 
frequent occurrence of plague was the main factor behind 
the serious decline of all the economic sectors, agriculture, 
industry and commerce (Lopez et al. 1970, 115, 121).
The size of the population is undoubtedly a major 
determinant of the level of prices, but there are other 
factors which also play a part, including the amount of 
money in the nation and, as the economists put it, the 
velocity of its circulation. The period after the onslaught of 
the Black Death witnessed an increase in workers’ wages 
of more than 100% – both skilled and unskilled – due to 
a shortage of man power (al-Maqrizi, Ighathah 1957, 75). 
This must have affected the prices of their products.
Egypt’s agriculture has been based traditionally on the 
rise of the Nile. Whenever this was delayed, a famine-like 
situation arose. Ibn Iyas never fails to report the level of the 
Nile’s rise each season and its consequences on economic 
life. There was no technique for management and use of 
rain water. Whenever it rained heavily, this caused more 
damage than benefit. Historians of the period note many 
such occasions when rain created havoc, closure of markets, 
and destruction of crops (Ibn Iyas, 4: 193, 198, 199, 206; 
Ibn Tulun, 348). The rise and fall of the Nile level was a 
matter of great speculation. Whenever the Nile was delayed 
in rising to its level of plentitude in Egypt, or rainfall did not 
come in time in other part of the sultanate, then producers, 
sellers, and middlemen all started hoarding for the coming 
difficult days, this exacerbating the shortage and suffering. 
In contrast, a small change in the Nile’s water level and the 
rainfall hope for by people, brought ease and a decrease in 
prices (al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk 4, 318, 330).
In some years of famine, farmers could not cultivate 
their land as they were unable to plant seeds (al-Maqrizi, 
Ighathah, 41–42; 44–45). The evil of lending seeds to 
farmers at 11% interest rates are also reported (al-Nuwayry, 
Nihayat 8, 252). Al-Asadi also writes that when farmers 
came from the villages to the city to deposit agricultural 
taxes, bankers or goldsmiths checked and evaluated their 
money in a deceitful manner so that it fell short of required 
amounts to such an extent that farmers were forced to 
borrow money with interest in order to meet their taxation 
obligations (al-Asadi 1967, 122.).
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Long ago, in the early Mamluk period, Ibn al-Qayyim 
(d.751/1350) wrote: “Some people try to practice interest: 
they use the term “al-muamalah” (business or transaction) 
instead of interest, and change its form by introducing a 
middleman or a pretended sale and repurchase transaction” 
(Ibn al-Qayyim 1320, 191). He meant inah and tawarruq 
and denounced this legal fiction.
Since Egypt and Syria were located at the centre of the 
world’s trading route, international trade and commerce 
always existed there. However, this was adversely affected 
by frequent currency changes and debasement (al-Maqrizi, 
al-Suluk 3, 281; 4, 437). Merchandise was sent through 
Makkah from India to Alexandria and thence to Europe. 
However, during the fifteenth century, monopolization 
of major trade articles by some of the Mamluk sultans hit 
the foreign trade hard. This discouraged private traders 
and retailers. The fifteenth-century also saw the end of the 
Karimi merchants who could have proved a contending 
force against European mercantilists had they received 
state patronage (Islahi 2009, 91–92).
Mamluk history is full of instances of monetary 
mismanagement. As early as the eighth/fourteenth century, 
Mamluk rulers used debasement and unrestricted money 
expansion to meet the deficit in their spending. The great 
scholar of the early Mamluk period, Ibn Taymiyah (663–
728/1261–1328), who witnessed the turmoil resulting 
from the debasement practiced by the Mamluk rulers of his 
time suggested that, “the authority should mint the coins 
(other than gold and silver) according to the just value of 
people’s transactions without any injustice to them” (Ibn 
Taymiyah 1963, 469). Ibn Taymiyah advised the ruler not to 
start business in money by purchasing copper and minting 
coins and thus doing business with them … He should mint 
coins of real value without aiming at any profit by so doing 
(Islahi 1988, 141). This story has been repeated during our 
study period also.
Generally, three kinds of monetary units were circulated:
1. Dinar (gold).
2. Dirham (silver).
3. Fals (copper coins, plural “fulus”).
While the dinar was very scarce, the fals was the 
predominant coin. Circulation of dirhams always fluctuated. 
At the beginning of the Mamluk era the dirham contained 
two-thirds silver and one third copper, ut in the course of 
time the proportions were reversed (al-Qalqshandi 1913, 
443).
One of the reasons why the Mamluk sultans resorted to 
copper money was a lack of their own source of precious 
metals, this also being the reason for the spread and 
dominance of European gold money in Egypt. Shoshan, a 
specialist of the Mamluk monetary system, observes that 
the reason for the wide spread use of copper money was 
Egypt’s dependence on the import of precious metals, 
especially silver, from Europe and this was adversely 
affected in the fifteenth century, being known as the “silver 
famine” (Shoshan 1982, 98–103).
As with currency during the Mamluk regime, prices were 
also highly unstable. The first half of the fifteenth century 
saw frequent increases in the price of grain, especially 
during the years 1403–1405, 1415, 1419–1421, 1425, 
1428, and 1449–53 (Nasir 2003, 254). Apart from 
monetary expansion, decrease in agricultural products 
was the major factor underlying the increase in the price 
of foodstuffs. For example, when the Nile did not rise to 
the desired level in 1403 and in 1415, and all the grain 
stores were emptied, prices increased to a very high 
level (al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk 4, 338). In many cases, the 
reason for the rise in prices was hoarding and speculative 
practices by traders, which created artificial shortages; 
monopolization of trade by elites and rulers also worsened 
the situation many-fold (al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk 4, 691, 
711, 782–83). Examples of efforts by some sultans to fix 
the prices of essential goods and to subject offenders to 
punishments are not unusual (al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk 3, 818; 
4, 334–35).
In the Mamluk period the scope of hisbah (market 
supervision) was widened and collection of certain duties 
was included in its functions. Due to corruption on a grand 
scale in the government and its institutions, the hisbah 
also became a profit-earning office for the muhtasib (the 
person in charge of hisbah). Instances are reported of a 
person offering bribery to obtain the position of muhtasib; 
in such a situation, the office was generally held by those 
who lacked the basic qualities for that position. Sometimes 
the muhtasib accepted bribery to ignore his duty of price-
checking (Ibn Iyas 4, 378; Ibn Tulun, 216; al-Jaziri, 1000, 
1144). Whenever an honest market officer was appointed 
the situation improved and the objective was achieved. 
Examples are also found when price control resulted 
in black marketing or further shortage (al-Jaziri, 978). 
Subsidy and rationing was adopted to solve the problem 
of shortages arising from administrative price fixing 
(al-Jaziri, 1164).
Al-Maqrizi notes the extravagance and misappropriation 
of the public treasury by the rulers. Silk carpets were 
laid down for the sultan to walk over from his residence 
to the fort while people were suffering from hard living 
(al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk 3, 1016). Deficit was also met by 
debasement of the currency, the issue of copper money 
(al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk 4, 27), and through the auction of 
government offices (al-Maqriz, Ighthah, 43).
3. Economic and financial crises
During the fifteenth century, especially during the first half, 
Egypt faced terrible economic crises caused sometimes by 
the ill-governance and corruption of rulers, and otherwise 
through natural catastrophes, such as the flooding or 
drying up of the Nile, the outbreak of epidemics, or crop 
diseases, as noted above. In many cases, two or more factors 
existed simultaneously. Financial crises emanated mainly 
from monetary mismanagement, which adversely affected 
people’s lending and borrowing, saving and investment, 
trade and commerce, production and consumption, and 
exchange and distribution. From such situations both 
the ruling class and the common man suffered, but the 
suffering of the latter was many-fold greater as the rulers 
could recoup resources by the imposition of regressive 
taxes, monopolization of business, and the hoarding of 
foodstuffs. The class most affected was that of the small 
farmers, laborers, and artisans.
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The profound change in Egypt’s monetary system affected 
the Egyptian economy throughout the larger part of the 
fifteen century. It was manifested at around the year 1400 in 
the form of the emergence of copper money instead of the 
two precious metals, gold and silver, as the country’s basic 
currency. Copper money no more remained the poor man’s 
money (al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, 165, 205, 280, 306; idem. 
Ighathah, 71). The situation worsened so much that the chief 
justice of Cairo was forced to make the decree that money 
quoted in deeds and contracts should be specified in terms 
of copper fulus (al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk 3, 1117). It became 
almost the only means of payment for domestic transactions. 
However, foreign trade required gold or silver coins.
In 1403 it was officially announced that fulus were to be dealt 
in by weight only. This was because of the decreasing weight 
of fulus due to cutting and shedding. In the fourteenth 
century the fulus weighed 4.25 grams; in the early fifteenth 
century it ranged between 1.5 and 3  grams. Not only the 
weight but the quality of the metallic content declined due 
to mixing with iron and lead (al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk 4, 549, 
623–30). One clear reason for this malpractice was a decline 
in the quantity of copper, which was caused due to wear and 
tear, its increasing use for utensils, and its outflow to other 
countries (Shoshan 1982, 110–111). “The copper dirham 
of account”4 was substantially devalued between 1402 and 
1404, but later remained stable until 1423. Thereafter, until 
1450, debasement was accelerated again. Thus, in 1429 
and 1435 the money of account was devalued by about 
50%, and in 1448 by 30% (Shoshan 1983, 59).
Al-Suyuti, the great scholar of late Mamluk period, notes 
that during the year 821/1414, the fulus became expensive 
after being abundant and cheap. It became very difficult 
for those who were indebted to repay their loans in term of 
fulus. Earlier, the fulus had an exchange rate of 8:1 or 9:1 
to the dirham; an exchange rate with aflori dinar of 260:1; 
with the harjah, 280:1; with the nasira, 210:1; and with the 
Egyptian qintar, 600:1 (1 qintar fulus = 100 Egyptian ratl). 
After the fulus became expensive, the exchange rate with 
the dirham became 7:1. As far as the dinar is concerned, 
all kinds – aflori, harjah, nasiri, and Egyptian qintar – lost 
fifty fulus in exchange. That is, an exchange rate with the 
aflori dinar of 210:1, with the harjah of 230:1, with the 
nasiri of 160:1, and with the Egyptian qintar of 550:1. The 
situation was reversed at the end of the century when it was 
announced that 30 dirham would be exchanged for one ratl 
(450 grams) fulus, while earlier 36 dirhams were exchanged 
for a ratl fulus (al-Suyuti 2000, 96). This seems to be due to 
an improvement in the metallic content of the copper coin.
As noted above, debasement severely affected lending 
and borrowing relations. It benefited the debtors to the 
detriment of the lender as it diminished the value of the 
dirham of account (dirham min al-fulus). This let to 
frequent controversies. For example, in 1429, following 
one of the periodic changes in the value of the dirham 
of account, its value declined to one-third of its value in 
1403. Debtors tried to return their loans according to 
the newly-established value of dirham to ratl of fulus, 
which meant paying less than they would have had to pay 
earlier. Creditors insisted that the debts should be settled 
according to the value at the time of the contract. The 
problem generated a debate among legal scholars, which 
was finally resolved in an opinion given by Cairo’s chief 
justice. He decreed that in every document sums of money 
had to be specified in gold or silver terms only (al-Maqrizi, 
al-Suluk 4, 795). In this way, he abrogated the decree 
issued in 1403, noted above, which had recognized copper 
money as the basis for all kinds of contracts.
Increasing costs and falling profits discouraged investment 
(al-Maqrizi, Ighathah, 47). For example, the cost of 
collection of flowers exceeded the revenue obtained by 
selling them. This adversely affected horticulture (al-
Maqrizi, Khitat 2, 24). In many cases ripe crops could not be 
harvested due to high wages (al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk 4, 179); 
both al-Maqrizi (al-Suluk 4, 225) and al-Asadi (al-Taysir, 
p. 92) blame the Sultan for negligence of land development 
and irrigation facilities which badly affected farming and 
agricultural production. A major portion of arable lands 
was granted to the army and ruling elites who exploited the 
tenants (al-Qalqashandi, Subh al-Asha 3, 451).
4. Al-Maqrizi5 on causes and remedy of the 
crises
Distressed by Egypt’s acute economic and financial crises, 
in the early years of fifteenth century, al-Maqrizi wrote his 
famous work “Ighathat al-Ummah bi Kashf al-Ghummah” 
(Ighathah)6 in the year 808/1405. The main theme 
of the book is the high price (al-ghala) and economic 
fluctuations of the early 15th century in Egypt arising out 
of the incorrect political, economic and monetary policies 
of the Mamluk Sultan. He criticized the excessive coinage 
of copper fulus, the cessation of gold and silver coinage, 
and the adoption in 806/1403 of the dirham of fulus as 
a unit of account. He believed that the Egyptian ruler 
deliberately stopped the minting of silver (al-Maqrizi, al-
Suluk 4, 28–29).
5. Differences between past and present 
crises
While describing the economic crisis of his time, al-Maqrizi 
gives an account of the past periods of inflation and bygone 
disastrous years. He considers that the difference between 
past incidences of high prices, famine and starvation and the 
present ordeals is that in the past these generally occurred 
due to natural calamities, such as paucity of rain, failure of 
the Nile to reach its plentitude-level, spread of epidemics, 
etc. Government intervention could have diminished 
the impact of those crises through forcing hoarders and 
speculators to release grains, or by imposing price controls, 
or importing grain from unaffected areas. But the ordeals 
being faced Egypt in 808/1405 were considered due to 
human fault (al-Maqrizi, Ighathah 4, 41).
As al-Maqrizi himself writes, his intention in his book was to 
discuss the factors behind the prevailing worst situation of 
the Egyptian economy, its ruinous effects, and to prescribe 
the remedy (al-Maqrizi, Ighathah, 3–4). He says: “Anyone 
who takes the stock of the situation will realize that the 
people’s suffering is due to malfeasance of the rulers and 
the leaders and their negligence of people’s welfare. This is 
not like what dearth and destruction occurred in the past” 
(al-Maqrizi, Ighathah, 4).
According to al-Maqrizi, there were three main factors 
behind this sad situation – political, economic, and monetary 
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instability. He gives a brief account of those factors: 
first, government, judiciary and administrative posts are 
obtained through bribery; second, the high cost of land and, 
consequently, very high costs of production, rent having 
increased by ten times compared to level before the relevant 
events; third, debasement of the currency and unrestricted 
supply of fulus (copper coins) (al-Maqrizi, Ighathah, 43, 45, 
47). Perhaps, to him the most important of all these three 
factors was the last one which he dealt most extensively. He 
concentrates on coinage in Islam and records its detailed 
history up to his own time in order to point out how deviant 
coinage system of his own age was and he advocates for 
reform in the existing monetary structure.
Al-Maqrizi claims that gold had been the only money in 
Egypt in pre-Islamic period as well as in Islam. It was the 
Europeans7 who introduced dirhams after their occupation 
(al-Maqrizi, Ighathah, 23). The situation worsened when 
copper coins became the main currency during the early 
Circassian Mamluk regime. In Al-Maqrizi’s opinion, this 
unrestricted expansion of copper money resulted into high 
inflation. He seems to have an idea of the relation between 
the quantity of money and prices. In the events of 806/1404 
he writes that gold coins have been cancelled. The price of 
gold increased from 20 dirham a mithqal to 240 dirhams 
(al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk 4, 27, 306).
The monetary situation improved during the time of 
Sultan al-Muayyad Shaykh (d. 824/1421) who carried 
out monetary reform at the suggestion of al-Maqrizi, to 
whom the latter presented his treatise on money “Shudhur 
al-Uqud”. Sultan al-Muayyad minted dirham of silver and 
after a gap of thirty years first time in Egypt dirham of pure 
silver circulated (al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, 289). Al-Maqrizi 
praises the Sultan for this reform. However, the worsening 
situation of money continued, fulus dominating the scene, 
and the value of al-Muayyad’s silver dirham was still 
mentioned in terms of copper fulus. Al-Maqrizi suggested 
to the Sultan certain measures for correcting this shameful 
situation (al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, 31–36).
Al-Maqrizi considers gold and silver as real and natural 
money. He supports his stand by the fact that every nation 
used them as money. The Prophet mentioned zakah 
in terms of silver dirhams (al-Maqrizi, Ighathah, 51). 
Al-Maqrizi claims that, since the known history of mankind, 
only gold and silver were used as money and the system 
worked smoothly. This does not mean that al-Maqrizi is 
unaware of the evolution of money. He accepts that various 
nations have used different commodities as a medium of 
exchange, such as eggs, loaves of bread, leaves, skins of 
trees, and cowries, but to him all these substances of money 
were for petty sales and purchases. They never assumed the 
status of legal tender or fiat money. The situation changed 
completely in the year 806/1403 when copper coins 
became the dominant form of money. Even the value of the 
gold dinar was expressed in terms of copper dirham being 
used as unit of account.
Impact of financial crisis on various sections of 
society
Al-Maqrizi examines the impact of the crisis on different 
sections of society. For this purpose he classifies the entire 
population into seven categories. Al-Maqrizi has a very 
clear concept of money income and real income when he 
says that, although the rulers, rich merchants, and small 
shopkeepers (in the first, second and third categories, 
respectively) receive a much greater amount, their position 
was no better than before because they could only buy 
smaller quantities. The fourth category, the cultivators and 
land tillers, who could irrigate their crops during the years 
of drought, enjoyed increased fortunes. Al-Maqrizi has the 
idea that during inflation, groups of people who have a 
fixed income are hard hit, as is the case of fifth category that 
consists of jurists, scholars, and the circle army. The sixth 
category, which consists of manufacturers, artisans and 
wage earners, will benefit because their income is not fixed. 
They enjoy enhanced wages especially as the majority of 
the population of this group has died from plague. Finally, 
the poor and needy (the seventh category) have already 
perished and the remaining few are near to annihilation 
(al-Maqrizi, Ighathah, 73–75). At the end, al-Maqrizi 
presents his proposal to redress the situation. His solution 
is to revert to silver coinage and to base the currency on 
gold and silver only (al-Maqrizi, Ighathah, 80–81).
To sum up, for al-Maqrizi, the deterioration of the 
monetary system was the single most important cause of 
Egypt’s economic and financial difficulties. As a panacea, 
he prescribed a return to a gold and silver standard, and 
the relegation of copper coinage to the role that God and 
custom had ordained for it, that is, estricting it to petty 
transactions (al-Maqrizi, Ighathah, 47).
6. Al-Asadi on causes and remedy of the 
crisis
After the second decade of the fifteenth century, the 
economic condition stabilized for the next two decades 
before experiencing a similar crisis around the middle of the 
century. The intensity of this economic crisis can be imagined 
as the basis of the fact that, in Ramadan 855/1452, meat 
and cheese disappeared from the markets and the wheat 
price reached seven ashrafi per irdabb (about 70 kilograms). 
This situation continued for four years before returning to 
the normalcy (Ibn Iyas, 2, 291). The economic and financial 
crisis distressed the population. Due to high grain prices, it 
became difficult for farmers to get seeds (Ibn Iyas, 2, 435). 
People looted shopkeepers in the market (Ibn Iyas, 2, 411). 
At that time another scholar, Muhammad b. Khalil al-Asadi8, 
a contemporary of al-Maqrizi from Syria, addressed the 
economic and financial crisis and the prevailing inflation in 
the year 855/1451. It is not known whether he was aware of 
and influenced by al-Maqrizi’s work. He studied the decayed 
economic condition of his time arising out of the decrease 
in production, rise in prices, widening gap in the income of 
various sections of the society, drought and starvation, and 
flight of peasants and workers. Al-Asadi laments the terrible 
economic conditions and divides the factors responsible for 
the existing economic and financial crises into two main 
categories: socio-economic factors and monetary factors. 
In the former category, he includes neglect of agriculture, 
disturbances of Bedouins, oppression of farmers, and sales 
of government positions (al-Asadi, al-Taysir 1967, 92–
96). He considers the existence of coercion, tyranny and 
oppression as the most damaging factors in development 
activities and exhorts elimination of them (al-Asadi, 
al-Taysir 1967, 93). Foreign trade was also adversely affected 
because of various custom duties charged to merchants 
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(al-Asadi, al-Taysir 1967, 83–84). The sale and purchase 
of positions was a common source of corruption. For those 
who obtained a position through bribery, their first and 
main concern was to get back their money and then earn an 
additional amount. Al-Asadi recommends formulation of a 
just wages policy (al-Asadi, al-Taysir 1967, 182–83).
As far the monetary factor is concerned, al-Asadi deals with 
this separately, and holds that the poor currency system is 
the reason behind the high prices (al-ghala). In addition to 
the monetary factor, al-Asadi notes the irresponsible role of 
hisbah, un-standardized weights and measures, hoarding 
and monopoly, and middlemanship. His proposals for 
solving these issues include the correction of weights and 
measures, monetary reform, rationing of foodstuffs, and 
increase in production (al-Asadi, al-Taysir 1967, 115–146).
According to al-Asadi, at the government level the 
corruption emanates, on the one hand, from ignorance of 
Shariah sources of income such as zakah, kharaj, jizyah, 
ushr, and khumus and, on the other hand, the resorting 
to various non-Shariah taxes (al-Asadi, al-Taysir, 78–79). 
Apparently, income derived in this way is considered as 
supporting and beneficial to the ruler but in fact it  is not. 
It weakens the foundation of the sultanate (al-Asadi, 
al-Taysir, 78–79). Over and above this is the fact that 
this public income is not spent on productive heads and 
building of infrastructure for the development of the 
economy. He cites an example: “A village belonging to 
bayt al-mal that could support ten military personnel and 
their families was granted by the authority to his relative 
with no return to the public treasury. Had it been retained 
by the government and that relative was provided with 
sustenance from the bayt al-mal according to Shariah rules, 
it would have proved better” (al-Asadi, al-Taysir 1967, 
81–82). Al-Asadi expresses his concern for development 
programs and emphasizes undertaking development 
activities like improvement of lands, excavation of canals 
and provision of water resources, removal of obstacles in 
cultivation of fields, building of irrigation systems and 
bridges, and management of drainage and floods in every 
region, as was the practice from the early Islamic period 
throughout until gradually corruption prevailed (al-Asadi, 
al-Taysir 1967, 93).
Al-Asadi’s measurement of inflation
Al-Asadi attempts to calculate the inflation rate. To him, 
if the wheat price is one dinar per irdabb (about 70 
kilograms) in Egypt, one ratl (450 g) of Egyptian bread is 
available at one copper dirham; this he considers a normal 
rate. If wheat is sold at two dinars per irdabb, the price 
of one ratl bread will be two dirham; this he considers 
as ghala9 (inflation), or a highly abnormal price. On the 
other hand, if the price goes below one dinar per irdabb, 
the rakha or low price will be at the same rate. He did not 
see the price of bread go below one ratl per dirham, even 
if the wheat price went below one dinar,10 as it happened 
during the Ashrafiyah11 and Zahiriyah12 regimes when 
one irdabb of wheat was sold at one hundred copper 
dihram of account (dirham min al-fulus), that is, 40% 
of dinar. Sometimes the wheat price decreased to three 
irdabbs per dinar (al-Asadi, al-Taysir, 143).13 In the year 
854/1450, when Al-Asadi started writing his treatise, 
the price of bread reached six dirham per ratl. Then it 
jumped to eight dirham per ratl of bread. This means a 
600–800% price rise (ghala). However, people got some 
relief when next year, Ramadan 855/1451, the price fell 
and ranged between four to five dirham per ratl of bread. 
This happened despite warehouses being full of grain due 
to hoarding and hiding.
It should be pointed out that al-Asadi measured the price 
rise by taking an important and essential commodity, 
bread. This perhaps represented other commodities also. 
Had al-Asadi included a basket of commodities, he would 
have been considered the first economist who guided the 
measurement of inflation.
Poverty into plenty
There were many reasons for the increasing prices despite 
the granaries being full, including men blocking the arrival 
of grain in the open market, hoarding and hiding grain 
by flour grinders and storekeepers, adulteration of grain, 
and monopolies enjoyed by certain sections of society 
(al-Asadi, al-Taysir, 143–44). Al-Asadi presented the case 
of foodstuffs, being a necessary good, just as an example; 
the same situation prevailed for all kind of commodities 
(al-Asadi, al-Taysir, 145).
Al-Asadi’s suggestions for monetary and economic 
reform
Al-Asadi recommends the issue of gold and silver coins of 
four denominations: a coin of full standard weight; half-
weight; quarter-weight; and one eighth-weight. This will 
facilitate all kind of transaction. Copper coins (fulus) may 
also be used for daily small purchases, but they should 
be issued by the sultan, to put a check on uncontrolled 
expansion. Al-Asadi believes that undue price increases 
(ghala) due to a debased currency will be controlled 
following monetary reforms he suggests (al-Asadi, al-
Taysir, 129–30). Al-Asadi does not insist on limiting 
money to precious metals; the other metals can work and 
should work as money, but they must be controlled by the 
government.
According to al-Asadi, attention should be paid to proper 
management of the non-monetary factors also. For 
example, to ensure supplies and to keep prices stable, 
the officials concerned must calculate what quantity of 
foodstuffs each city and village needs daily. Then, on the 
basis of that calculation, the requirement for a month 
and for the whole year can be established. When the 
crop is ready, the quantity calculated can be acquired, 
provision made for seeds, and the rest left to be sold in the 
free market. The stored grain must be brought to market 
whenever required. This would ensure a flow of supply 
that would keep prices at normal levels (al-Asadi, al-Taysir, 
141–42). To prove this point al-Asadi presents a statistical 
model of Egypt and Cairo. He says that, if calculated in 
this way, it appears that Egypt and Cairo need 360,000 
irdabb (one irdabb =  about 70 kilograms) of wheat each 
year, and this quantity can be obtained from one kurah 
(district) only, whereas in the Egyptian territory there 
were originally 103 such kurah; now only 84 remain (al-
Asadi, al-Taysir, 142–43). Due to this approach, al-Asadi 
may be considered the inventor of quantitative analysis in 
the history of Islamic economic thought. His quantitative 
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model, to the best of our knowledge, could not be further 
improved.
7. Comparison and appraisal
We have seen that fifteenth century Egypt passed through 
a period of economic difficulties. Especially during the 
beginning and the middle of the century there were severe 
economic and financial crises, which were addressed 
by al-Maqrizi and al-Asadi, respectively. In the opinions 
of both scholars, Egypt’s economic difficulties were due 
to incompetent and corrupt administration, oppressive 
taxation, increasing encroachment by Bedouins into 
agricultural areas, the flight of the rural population, the 
loss of cultivated lands to desertification, disruption of 
lucrative long distance trade, and to a debased monetary 
system in which copper coins predominated and coins of 
precious metals were exceedingly rare. In the opinion 
of al-Maqrizi, the deterioration of its monetary system 
was the single most important cause of Egypt’s economic 
difficulties. Therefore, he dealt extensively with this aspect 
of the economy and advocated a return to a gold and silver 
standard, restricting copper coinage to petty transactions 
only.
Many experts of the economic history of fifteenth-century 
Egypt do not agree with the analysis of al-Maqrizi. Udovitch, 
for example, observes: “What Maqrizi did not, and possibly 
could not, understand was that Egypt’s monetary problems 
were not the result of its unfortunate financial policy, 
but a manifestation of its unfavourable position in the 
international trade” (Lopez et al. 1970, 123–24). Thus, the 
issue of copper coins was not due to corruption but because 
of compulsion, as Egypt lost its stock of precious metals and 
was passing through a period of “silver famine”. Egypt did 
not have its own mines of silver. It depended for on external 
sources for the supply of precious metals: West Africa for 
gold, and Europe and Central Asia for silver (Ashtor 1976, 
291–92). A favourable balance of trade and arrival of 
pilgrims constituted two major streams of supply of these 
metals. Any disturbance in these two sources had drastic 
effects on the monetary matters of Egypt. Towards the 
year 1400 the flow of Western silver eastward is reported 
to have been only a trickle; there are some contemporary 
claims that the traditional direction of the movement of 
silver from west to east, was reversed, and that the ‘métal 
blanc’ started to flow westward instead (Shudhur al-Uqud 
1967, 39). Contraction of the sources of Egypt’s precious 
metals supply and its unfavourable balance of trade caused 
the loss of gold and silver during fifteenth century (Lopez 
et al. 1970, 126–28). It was “the shortage of gold and silver 
which led to the abundant monetization of copper” (Lopez 
et al. 1970, 125–26).
Al-Asadi experienced scarcity in plenty; prices rose in the 
face of granaries being full of foodstuffs. This means that it 
was not a time of famine or starvation. Nor was the corrupt 
monetary system the sole cause of inflation. Al-Asadi was 
not only against debasement, but also against leaving any 
chance for the public to play with the quality and quantity 
of money issued by the state. He foresaw the detrimental 
effects of such activities on the economy. It is on this basis, 
therefore, that he suggests the issue of coins of 100% 
purity, and a standardized shape and weight that could not 
be tampered with (al-Asadi, al-Taysir, 129–33).
Al-Maqrizi concentrated on the monetary phenomenon 
only. Measures to solve other socio-economic problems, 
and to increase production, did not receive his due 
attention. Al-Asadi does not confine his analysis to 
the monetary problem only. He advocated for overall 
reform and strict management of the whole economy, 
the monetary aspect being one factor. He stressed 
the maintenance of peace and security and a healthy 
environment conducive to efficient economic activities. 
He emphasized not only a proper distribution of the cake 
but also suggested measures for enlarging the size of cake 
and its equitable distribution. He does not restrict money 
to gold and silver. To al-Asadi, precious metals and copper 
all have their utility as money and all can be used at the 
same time. However, the issue of money and minting of 
coins should be structured in such a way that they cannot 
be copied and debasement is avoided. The main financial 
problem, in his opinion, was debasement of the currency 
leading to an unrestricted supply of money, and not the 
dominance of copper coins.
8. Concluding remarks
Al-Maqrizi believed that the major factor behind the 
economic and financial crises of fifteenth century Egypt 
was its corrupt monetary system and the ruler deliberately 
stopping minting coins of precious metals and calling for 
a return to a bi-metallic standard. But the history of the 
period shows that it is because of a short supply of silver that 
“copper emerged as Egypt’s most widely used currency”. 
This was the reason for the dominance of the copper fulus 
in the first half of the fifteenth century.
Being a champion advocate of a monetary system based 
on precious metals, al-Maqrizi has been quoted extensively 
during the present-day controversy over the gold dinar.14 
But, an empirical study of the past has shown that there 
is no guarantee that gold money will succeed in all 
circumstances. Reliance on the issue of copper money 
in al-Maqrizi’s time was due to a lack of precious metals. 
This made al-Maqrizi’s panacea irrelevant during his 
own times. Surely, it has no relevance in today’s complex 
situation of economy and finance.15 It may be noted that 
Sultan Mu’ayyad Shaykh, to whom al-Maqrizi presented 
his treatise on money “Shudhur al-Uqud fi Dhikr al-Nuqud”, 
implemented the latter’s recommendations and issued 
silver dirham in 818/1415, known as al-Mu’ayyadi.16 But 
the outcome was not as al-Maqrizi expected: he expresses 
his dismay and counts it a “shameful situation” that the 
value of the dirham is attributed to the copper fulus, not 
the other way round (al-Maqrizi, Shudhur, 35–39). In fact, 
there was insufficient silver coinage due to a shortage of 
silver in Egypt. Therefore, Shaykh’s initiative to restore the 
traditional role of silver did not succeed.17 People did not 
stop using copper in bulk. Since all their exchange needs 
were fulfilled by copper money, they did not bother with 
Mu’ayyadi dirhams. Copper coins predominated in internal 
circulation and on all levels of transactions. The result was 
that, in 826/1423, the successor of Mu’ayyad Shaykh had 
to renounce silver coins and return to a “copper standard” 
(al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk 4, 629–30).
It is also apparent that the economic and financial crises 
during fifteenth-century Egypt did not occur due to use of 
money based on non-precious metals, and that bimetallism 
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would have ensured price stability. There are instances 
of increases in prices even when gold and silver coins 
were in use.18 Al-Maqrizi, as a top historian and expert of 
traditions, must have been aware that prices increased 
at the time of the Prophet as well when gold dinars and 
silver dirhams were in use.19 Prices increased continuously 
during the period of the second caliph, Umar, and he had to 
adjust the blood money (diyah) at least three times because 
camels, fixed as compensation, became very expensive 
(al-Bayhaqi 1344, 8, 77).20 No doubt, money is the blood 
of economy. Consequently, there is a need to maintain a 
suitable quantity of it for the economy to avoid high or low 
pressure of it, as both cases are destructive for the health of 
an economy. Therefore, in all ages, it has been considered 
the prerogative and responsibility of the government to 
issue money and to supervise it (al-Nawawi n.d., 6, 10). 
This does not mean that other aspects of the economy have 
no significance. Al-Maqrizi recognized some other causes 
of economic and financial crises, but he gave importance to 
the monetary factor alone. The weakness of his prescription 
is that he sought the solution through adoption of an only 
gold, or gold and silver, standard of money and ignored the 
other causes.
There is no doubt that the gold standard had some 
advantages in practice. Its merits as compared to “a man-
made currency not tied to a metal” are admitted even by 
modern economists (The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Money and Finance 2, 265). According to Crowther, a gold 
standard ensures stability of exchange rate and provides 
built-in control on expansion of money supply (Crowther 
1967, 281, 284). But mankind has passed that standard 
as it passed through the earlier stages of the barter 
economy, commodity money, and metallic money. It is at 
the threshold of electronic money; now, after the fall of 
bimetallism, it is not practicable to take the economic world 
back into history.
Compared with al-Maqrizi, al-Asadi’s analysis of the situation 
is more pragmatic. He realized that the fundamental flaws 
of the economy cannot be cured by the simple introduction 
of dinar and dirham. The financial crisis was the product of 
debasement and counterfeiting, be it dinar, dirham or copper 
fulus. Therefore, al-Asadi insists on the standardization of 
money in such a way that others cannot imitate it, and the 
possibility of debasement is eliminated. In other words, 
he argues for efficient monetary management. He also 
pays attention to other factors responsible for economic 
crises and recommends measures that include not only 
monetary reform but also the elimination of corruption, 
removal of discrepancies in weights and measures leading 
to fraud and deception, the correct management of 
public distribution, enlargement of production through 
strengthening agricultural relations, and promotion of 
trade and commerce. This kind of comprehensive internal 
economic reform is fully relevant to present-day complex 
economic situations. It is a pity that al-Asadi and his work 
were ignored in his own time, and that it still misses the 
attention of researchers today.
Notes
1. The Mamluk dynasty was established in Egypt in 
mid-thirteenth century after abolishing the Ayyubid 
dynasty in 648/1250 and it came to an end in early 
16th century when Ottoman Sultan Salim First 
(d. 926/1520) defeated Mamluk Sultan Qansawh 
Ghawri in 1517 C.E.
2. In Egyptian history, Mamluks are divided into an 
earlier group called the Bahri Mamluks (684–784 
H./1250–1382 C.E.), and a later group, the Burji 
Mamluks (784–923 H./1382–1517 C.E.); the Bahri 
Mamluks were originally soldiers based on Roda 
Island by Cairo, on the Nile (Bahr), while the Burji 
Mamluks were associated with the Citadel (Burj). 
The Bahri Mamluks derived largely from Qipchaq 
tribesmen in what is now southern Russia, with 
Mongols and Kurds; the Burji Mamluks were mainly 
Circassians, from the Caucasus Mountains.
3. It was established by al-Zahir Barquq (d. 801/1399), 
a burji slave, in 784/1382, by overthrowing Bahri 
mamluk sultan al-Salih b. Sha’ban to whom the 
former was a body guard.
4. During the Mamluk period, a new monetary element 
“copper dirham of account” (dirham mia’l-fulus) was 
introduced. for example, see al-Suluk, 3:1059 in the 
events of 804/1401, and Suluk 4: 944. Some rendered 
it as ‘trade dirham’. It originally represented one real 
copper coin of a dirham weight (about 3  grams), 
but with the continuous debasement and decline of 
the weight of copper coinage the ‘copper dirham of 
account’ no longer stood for one single fals; instead 
it equaled a gradually increasing number of copper 
coins.
5. Taqi al-Din Ahmad b. ‘Ali al-Maqrizi, a prolific writer 
historiographer and economic historian, was born in 
last days of the Bahri Mamluk dynasty in the reign of 
al-Ashraf Sha’ban (d. 778/1377). Al-Maqrizi saw the 
fall of Bahri sultans. The last sultan of this dynasty 
was al-Salih b. Sha’ban who was overthrown by his 
body guard Barquq (d. 801/1399), a burji slave, in 
784/1382. At that time al-Maqrizi was 18 years old.
6. There is a misconception that al-Ighathah is a work 
on famine. No doubt, al-Maqrizi mentioned a few 
cases of famines in Egypt in the past that caused 
high prices and starvation. But the main theme of 
the book is the high price (al-ghala’) and economic 
and financial difficulties of the early 15th century in 
Egypt arising out of wrong political, economic and 
monetary policies of the Mamluk sultan. Generally 
a famine is accompanied by high prices but not the 
other way round. According to Allouche (1994, 13) 
the book is ‘a critique, if not an outright indictment, 
of the Circassian administration’s economic and 
monetary policy. It is a polemical work written by 
a former official of the hisbah that focuses on the 
etiology of a specific economic crisis’. The work is 
a valuable source of the economic history of Egypt 
in early 9th/15th century especially in the area of 
money and coinage. It has served for the author 
as a basis for another work entitled al-Nuqud al-
Islamiyah in which he retained some of the sections 
of al-Ighathah while making certain additions and 
improvements. In this way al-Maqrizi became the 
first who wrote an exclusive tract on money in Islam. 
It was presented to Mamluk Sultan al-Mu’ayyad 
Shaykh in 818/1415 with the hope that he would 
bring reform in the corrupt monetary system 
prevailing since more than a quarter century. The 
book succeeded in its objective to some extent.
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7. It seems that al-Maqrizi has referred to the later 
history of Egypt. Otherwise in early Islamic history 
both types of coins were in use. Byzantines had gold 
dinar and Iranian Kisra had silver dirham. Arabs 
used both. They did not have their own money.
8. Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Khalil al-Asadi’s 
birth, life and death remain obscured. He authored 
four valuable works on socio-economic problems 
of his time but only survived entitled al-Taysir 
wa’l-I‛tibar wa’l-Tahrir wa’l-Ikhtibar in 855/1451. 
His  work itself is the only source to know about 
him. He lived in Damascus. At that time Egypt and 
Syria were ruled by Circassian Mamluk. The Caliph 
was al-Qa’im bi-Amri’llah Hamzah b. Muhammad 
(d. 855/1451). A study of al-Asadi’s work would 
reveal that he occupied position of a muhtasib. His 
book is a rich source on economic thinking and 
economic history of Mamluk regime. In addition 
to some other useful information that it contains, 
it deals with burning issues of the time such as how 
to reform monetary situation, various economic 
transactions, abolition of oppressive taxes, 
cheating and fraud in weight and measures, and 
corruptions causing shrinkage of public money. 
It also consists of policy suggestions to rectify the 
situation and protect lives, property and dignities 
(al-Asadi, al-Taysir, p.180). It is surprising that 
in spite of its significance as a source material for 
economic history and Muslim economic thinking, 
the book has not received attention of researchers. 
In English language there is no work on Asadi’s 
economic thought, while in Arabic there are only a 
few articles).
9. It may be noted that in modern Arabic the term 
used for ‘inflation’ is ‘tadakhkhum’. In old days the 
ghala’ was used for all kind of high prices.
10. The reason may be the fact that in production of 
bread the value added at flour and at baking stage 
may have been the major constituent of the bread 
price.
11. Refers to the reign of Sultan al-Ashraf Barsbay 
(825–42/1422–38).
12. Refers to the reign of Sultan al-Zahir Jaqmaq (842–
57/1438–53).
13. During that period an average exchange rate of 
dinar to dirham was 1:250.
14. For example, see Haneef and Barakat (2006).
15. For details one may refer to Hasan (2008).
16. Comparing Shaykh’s dirham with that issued by 
Umayyad caliph Abd al-Malik (26–86/664–705), 
al-Maqrizi said that while Abd al-Malik’s dirham 
had three qualities, Shaykh’s dirham had six merits 
or even more (al-Maqrizi, Shudhur, pp. 33–34).
17. One of the strongest arguments against introduction 
of gold dinar in the present day Muslim countries is 
also the fact that they produce ‘annually less than 
10% of total output of the yellow metal’ (Hasan, 
2008, p. 20) and their stock of precious metals is 
not enough to fulfill the need of supply of money.
18. According to Hasan (2008, p. 11), “Paul Einzig, for 
example, had long back shown in the very opening 
chapter of his book Inflation that prices in the 
world have been rising over the past five thousand 
years: the upward legs of the cycles tended to grow 
longer, and downward turns sharper, while the 
bottoms were agonizingly broader, recovery being 
slow and painful.”
19. It is reported that prices soared in Madinah and 
people requested the Prophet (peace be upon him) 
to fix the price, but he did not agree and said: “Allah 
grants plenty or shortage; He is the sustainer and 
the real price maker (musa’ir). I wish to go to Him 
having done no injustice to any one in blood or in 
money” Abu Dawud, vol. 3, p. 286).
20. As the history of the period shows, the prices 
of other goods had also increased because of 
increasing income through spoils of war and other 
sources.
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Executive Summary - Due to the global financial crisis of 2008, the economic performance of 
OIC member states was adversely affected in 2009 in terms of decelerating economic growth and 
deteriorating current account balances. However, in the post-crisis period, the OIC member states 
have recovered rapidly. In the medium-term scenario (2011–2015), the economic recovery in OIC 
states is projected to be robust but real GDP growth and is likely to remain below the level achieved 
in the pre-crisis period (2000–2007). Among OIC regions, SSA and Asia are projected to achieve 
pre-crisis growth while MENA and CIT will take a relatively longer period to reach the pre-crisis 
level of growth. With regard to individual OIC member countries, it appears that 31 out of 57 OIC 
states are projected to achieve their pre-crisis growth during the medium-term period.
Current account balances of the OIC member states were also hit hard by the global economic crisis. 
Recovery in the current account balance of OIC states (as a group) remained modest in 2010. In 
the medium-term scenario, with the expected revival of the global economy and increase in oil and 
non-oil commodities prices, current account surplus of OIC member states is projected to improve, 
but it will not be able to achieve the pre-crisis level by 2015. In the medium-term, among four 
regions, current account balances of SSA and CIT are projected to improve much faster and they are 
expected to remain significantly above the pre-crisis levels while MENA and Asia will not be able to 
achieve the pre-crisis level of current account surpluses by 2015.
Due to excess capacity and slow economic recovery, the inflationary pressure is expected to remain 
moderate in OIC states in the medium-term. However, the recent rise in food prices is a source of 
concern, which is expected to build inflationary pressures in the coming years.
The major global factors that have affected economic performance of OIC member states during 
the financial crisis period are still major threats to sustainable economic recovery. They include 
fragile global economic recovery; slow recovery in world trade; highly volatile oil-and non-oil 
commodities prices; rising policy interest rates; and deteriorating debt situations in advanced 
economies. The adverse external factors have also been compounded by a number of domestic 
factors such as rising youth unemployment, weak economic integration among OIC states, and 
some fundamental weaknesses in macroeconomic policies, resulting in major threats to sustainable 
economic performance of OIC member states in the coming years.
Since inception, the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) Group is playing an active role in socio-
economic development of its 56 member countries (all OIC states except Guyana are IsDB member 
countries). To help member countries to consolidate their economic recovery, the IsDB has maintained 
its high level of development assistance through sharp scaling up of its operations. The cumulative net 
approvals of IsDB Group reached $74.2 billion since inception in its member countries. The current 
core areas of IsDB Group interventions in member countries are poverty alleviation, food security, 
infrastructure development, human development, Islamic finance and regional cooperation.
Iqbal
146 Islamic economic: Theory, policy and social justice
In the post-crisis era, the OIC member states need to adopt somewhat different policies to foster renewed 
growth and to deal with the structural issues to sustain economic recovery and achieve inclusive 
economic development. In particular, the OIC member states need to adopt speedy macro and micro 
reforms; do structural repairs of fiscal consolidation; promote private sector-led growth; adopt labor 
market reforms to create quality jobs, particularly for the youth; improve competitiveness; enhance 
regional integration; restore banking system health; and expand Islamic financial institutions.
exporting and non-oil exporting member states as well 
as four regions of OIC states. However, the economic 
performance improved significantly in 2010. The following 
sub-sections provide developments in key macroeconomic 
performance indicators, namely real GDP growth, current 
account balance, and inflation rate during the pre-crisis 
period (2000–2007), the first post-crisis year 2010, and 
medium-term period (2011–2015).
Real GDP growth
5. In the post-crisis period, the OIC member states (as a group) 
have recovered rapidly. The global financial and economic 
crisis adversely affected economic growth of OIC countries 
(as a group), which decelerated from 6.3 percent in 2007 
to 1.9 percent in the 2009. However, due to strong stimulus 
packages and wide-ranging policy reforms, OIC states 
experienced impressive real GDP growth of 5.3 percent 
in 2010, achieving almost the pre-crisis growth rate (i.e., 
average growth rate during 2000–2007 was 5.6 percent). 
Similarly, oil-exporting member states5 also showed strong 
recovery with the economic growth of 4.7 percent and 
non-oil exporting member states6 with the growth of 6.1 
percent in 2010, mainly due to global economic recovery 
and positive trends in oil and non-oil commodities prices. 
It appears that non-oil exporting countries recovered much 
faster and stronger than oil-exporting countries, thereby 
achieving above the pre-crisis growth (5.2 percent), while 
oil-exporting countries’ growth in 2010 remained below 
the pre-crisis growth rate of 6 percent. The relatively slow 
economic growth in oil-exporting countries is attributable 
to the weakening impact of oil exports on output growth in 
the post-crisis period (Figure 1).
6. In the medium-term scenario (2011–2015), the economic 
recovery in OIC states is projected to be robust but is likely 
to remain below the pre-crisis growth rate. The average 
real growth rate in the medium-term is projected to be 
5.1 percent in OIC states (as a group); 4.8 percent in oil-
exporting countries; and 5.4 percent in non-oil exporting 
countries. Strong public policies have supported OIC 
member states’ economic recovery in 2010, but the short-
term V-shaped recovery through economic painkillers (i.e., 
stimulus packages and money injections) faces a number 
of major risks associated with the medium-term recovery, 
which will depend upon developments in a number of 
underlying external and domestic factors.
7. Among various regions of OIC member states, MENA 
was hit hard by the economic crisis as its real GDP growth 
dropped from 5.7 percent in 2007 to 0.4 percent in 2009. 
The MENA region was adversely affected mainly due 
to collapse in oil and asset prices, significant decline in 
domestic demand, and sharp drop in FDI flows. However, 
I. Introduction
1. In line with the global economic recovery, 57  member 
states of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) (as a 
group) observed robust economic growth in 2010, achieving 
the pre-crisis level of growth. Similarly, the current account 
balances of OIC member states improved significantly 
in the post-crisis period. This recovery was due to wide-
ranging policy actions undertaken during 2008 and 2009 
at international, regional, and national levels. Recently, the 
main challenge facing the OIC states in the post-crisis era 
is to sustain robust economic recovery in the medium- to 
long-term. Looking ahead, the medium-term prospects for 
sustainable economic recovery in member states face some 
major downside risks. In particular, in the coming four to 
five years, the sustainability of economic recovery in OIC 
states will depend upon a number of external factors (i.e., 
fragile global economic recovery; slow recovery in world 
trade; highly volatile oil-and non-oil commodities prices; 
rising policy interest rates; and deteriorating debt situation 
in advanced economies) and domestic factors (i.e., 
rising youth unemployment, weak economic integration 
among OIC states, and some fundamental weaknesses in 
macroeconomic policies). Therefore, the shape of medium-
term recovery of OIC member states (whether U-shape or 
W-shape) is uncertain yet (Iqbal, 2009a and Iqbal 2009b).
2. The analysis of this paper focuses on 57 OIC member 
states (as a group) as well as oil-exporting and non-oil 
exporting member countries. Since the post-crisis economic 
recovery remained uneven across the regions, the analysis 
also distinguishes four regions of OIC member states, 
namely Middle East and North Africa (MENA),1 Asia,2 Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA),3 and Countries in Transition (CIT).4
3. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II provides 
recent macroeconomic performance (i.e., real GDP growth, 
current account balance, and inflation rate) and medium-
term outlook in OIC member states as a group as well as its 
four regions. Section III describes key external and domestic 
factors affecting sustainable economic recovery in OIC 
states. Section IV provides the role of the IsDB Group in 
economic recovery of OIC states. In the final Section V, the 
paper suggests a number of measures to be considered by 
OIC member states in order to achieve sustainable growth 
and inclusive economic development.
II. Recent economic performance and 
medium-term outlook of OIC member states
4. Due to the global financial and economic crisis of 2008, 
economic performance of OIC member states was adversely 
affected in 2009 in terms of decelerating economic growth 
and deteriorating current account balances of both oil-
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Figure 1. Rreal GDP Growth in OIC Member States, 2005–2015 (% per annum).
Source: Computed by IsDB based on data from the IMF World Economic Outlook database (April 2011).
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the region recovered with strong economic growth 
of 4.7 percent in 2010. In the medium-term scenario 
(2011–2015), the region’s real GDP is projected to grow 
by 4.4 percent and it will take a longer period to reach the 
pre-crisis level of growth (5.2 percent). The medium- to 
long-term economic performance of the MENA region will 
mainly depend upon the movements in oil prices.
8. The second region of OIC states affected badly by the 
economic crisis was CIT, whose output decelerated sharply 
from an average pre-crisis level of 10.1 percent to 4.7 percent 
in 2009. The fallout of the economic crisis on CIT member 
states has been immense mainly due to a sharp drop in 
demand, currency devaluations, decline in foreign capital 
inflows, workers’ remittances, and lower energy prices. 
However, in line with the global economic recovery, the 
region’s output accelerated by 6.6 percent in 2010. The 
medium-term growth is anticipated to be 5.5 percent during 
2011–2015, indicating slow and unsustainable economic 
recovery compared to other regions of OIC states.
9. Among OIC regions, the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region 
remained more resilient as its real GDP growth dropped 
marginally from the normal growth rate of 6.8 percent 
achieved during 2000–2007 to 5.3 percent in 2009, mainly 
due to collapse of global trade, decline in capital flows 
(FDI, ODA, and remittances), and sharp decline in oil- and 
non-oil commodities prices. However, the region showed 
impressive recovery with a growth rate of 6.4 percent 
in 2010. In the medium-term, the region is projected to 
recover with strong and sustainable economic growth of 
5.8 percent. The further recovery in the SSA region will 
depend on the extent of global economic recovery and 
movement in oil- and non-oil commodities prices in the 
coming years.
10. Economies of OIC member states in Asia were relatively 
less affected as their growth decelerated from the pre-crisis 
level of 5.3 percent to 3.4 percent in 2009. In particular, 
drop in global domestic demand for durable goods, and 
a decline in investment in the export-oriented emerging 
economies in the Asia region hurt the manufacturing 
exports. However, the expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies and rebound in the financial markets and capital 
inflows helped the region’s fast recovery with the growth 
rate of 6 percent in 2010. In the medium-term scenario, 
only the Asia region is projected to achieve above the 
pre-crisis growth of 6 by 2015 as the region appears 
to be more resilient and shock absorbant due to sound 
macroeconomic reforms adopted during the Asian crisis 
of late 1990s.
11. With regard to individual OIC member countries, it 
appears that 31 out of 57  states are projected to achieve 
their pre-crisis growth during the medium-term period 
(2011–2015), while the remaining 26 states will take longer 
take this period to achieve their pre-crisis growth (Table 1). 
The main challenge for those countries that have already 
achieved their pre-crisis growth rates is to sustain them 
in the post-crisis period. Those countries that will not be 
Figure 2. Rreal GDP Growth Regions of  IOC States, 2005–2015 (% per annum).
Source: Computed by IsDB based on data from the IMF World Economic Outlook database (April 2011).
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Table 1. Real GDP Growth of OIC Member States (% per annum)
OIC Member States
Pre-Crisis Period  
(2000–2007)
First Post-Crisis  
Year (2010)
Medium-Term Scenario  
(2011–2015)
Pre-crisis growth rate  
in medium-term period 
will achieve (A)/will  
not achieve (NA)
Afghanistan 8.0 8.2 8.1 A
Albania 6.0 3.5 4.1 NA
Algeria 4.0 3.3 3.3 NA
Azerbaijan 15.9 5.0 2.6 NA
Bahrain 6.4 4.1 4.9 NA
Bangladesh 5.8 6.0 6.8 A
Benin 4.2 2.5 4.5 A
Brunei 2.2 4.1 2.8 A
Burkina Faso 5.5 5.8 6.1 A
Cameroon 3.7 3.0 4.4 A
Chad 9.5 5.1 4.0 NA
Comoros 2.1 2.1 3.6 A
Côte D’Ivoire -0.3 2.6 3.3 A
Djibouti 3.1 4.5 5.6 A
Egypt 4.7 5.1 4.4 NA
Gabon 1.7 5.7 3.1 A
Gambia 4.0 5.7 5.5 A
Guinea 2.7 1.9 4.7 A
Guinea-Bissau 2.6 3.5 4.6 A
Guyana 1.7 3.6 4.6 A
Indonesia 5.1 6.1 6.7 A
Iran 5.9 1.0 3.0 NA
Iraq 2.3 0.8 10.1 A
Jordan 6.6 3.1 4.6 NA
Kazakhstan 10.2 7.0 6.0 NA
Kuwait 6.6 2.0 5.0 NA
Kyrgyz Republic 4.5 -1.4 5.6 A
Lebanon 3.6 7.5 3.9 A
Libya 5.0 4.2 .. ..
Malaysia 5.6 7.2 5.2 NA
Maldives 8.5 8.0 4.5 NA
Mali 4.8 4.5 5.2 A
Mauritania 4.3 4.7 5.7 A
Morocco 4.6 3.2 4.8 A
Mozambique 7.7 7.0 7.8 A
Niger 4.3 7.5 7.3 A
Nigeria 9.3 8.4 6.4 NA
Oman 4.0 4.2 4.5 A
Pakistan 5.1 4.8 4.7 NA
Palestine .. .. .. ..
Qatar 12.2 16.3 7.9 NA
Saudi Arabia 3.7 3.7 4.6 A
Senegal 4.3 4.2 5.0 A
Sierra Leone 10.9 5.0 5.7 NA
Somalia .. .. .. ..
 (Continued)
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able to achieve the pre-crisis level of growth will need to 
undertake crucial macroeconomic adjustments in their 
fiscal and monetary policies with an objective to fix the 
most binding constraints to their economic growth in the 
coming years.
ii Current account balance
12. Recovery in the current account balance (CAB) of OIC 
states (as a group) remained modest in 2010. The current 
account balance of OIC member states was hit hard by 
the economic crisis as their CAB surplus, which dropped 
from an average 5.9 percent of GDP during the pre-crisis 
period (2000–2007) to 2.3 percent in 2009. In particular, 
CAB surplus of oil-exporting member states dropped from 
the pre-crisis average level of 10.7 percent of GDP to 5 
percent in 2009, due to significant decline in oil prices 
(i.e., 36.3 percent decline in 2009 compared to 2008). The 
current account deficit of non-oil exporting member states 
further deteriorated from 0.5 percent to 1.3 percent of 
GDP during the same period, mainly due to a sharp decline 
of 15.8 percent in non-oil commodities prices in 2009. 
In 2010—in line with the global economic recovery and 
significant increase in oil prices by 27.9 percent and non-oil 
commodities prices by 26.3 percent along with 12.4 percent 
growth in international trade of goods and services—the 
current account surplus of OIC states improved to 3.3 
percent of GDP. In particular, the improvement in CAB of 
oil-exporting countries was significant, with a surplus of 
7.8 percent of GDP, while in contrast CAB deficit further 
deteriorated in the case of non-oil exporting countries, to 
2.5 percent in 2010 (Figure 3).
13. In the medium-term scenario (2011–2015), with the 
expected revival of the global economy and increase in oil and 
non-oil commodity prices, current account surpluses of OIC 
member states (as a group) are projected to improve (i.e., 5.1 
percent of GDP) but they will not be able to achieve the pre-
crisis level of CAB surplus (5.9 percent of GDP) by 2015. In 
the medium-term, improvement in CAB will mainly depend 
upon the movement in oil and non-oil commodities prices 
and movement in their exchange rates.
14. The post-crisis recovery in the current account balances 
is not uniform across four regions of the OIC member states. 
Due to the global economic crisis, the MENA region 
experienced a massive deterioration in their current 
account surpluses. In 2009, the highest deterioration was 
observed in the case of the MENA region from the average 
pre-crisis level of 7.4 percent to 1.6 percent of GDP, while 
Table 1. (Continued)
Sudan 7.5 5.1 5.6 NA
Suriname 4.4 4.4 5.8 A
Syria 4.2 3.2 4.9 A
Tajikistan 8.7 6.5 5.2 NA
Togo 1.4 3.4 3.9 A
Tunisia 4.8 3.7 5.0 A
Turkey 5.3 8.2 4.3 NA
Turkmenistan 15.2 9.2 7.1 NA
U.A.E. 8.0 3.2 4.0 NA
Uganda 7.3 5.2 6.7 NA
Uzbekistan 6.0 8.5 6.6 A
Yemen 4.2 8.0 4.1 NA
Source: IsDB calculation based on the IMF World Economic Outlook Database (April 2011).
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Figure 3. Current Account Balances of OIC States, 2005–2015.
Source: IDB estimates based on data from the IMF WEO database of April 2011.
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the Asia region’s CAB surplus declined from 4.7 percent to 
4.2 percent of GDP during the same period. In contrast, the 
CAB was improved in the case of SSA (from a surplus of 0.3 
percent to 2 percent of GDP) and CIT from a deficit of 0.2 
percent to a surplus of 2.3 percent in 2009.
15. In the medium-term scenario, among four regions, CAB 
surpluses of SSA and CIT are projected to improve much 
faster and they are expected to remain significantly above 
the pre-crisis levels. In particular, in the medium-term, the 
increasing trade links with the European Union, China, 
India and other emerging markets are likely to help the 
SSA and CIT regions in faster economic recovery and 
achieving sustainable growth. However, MENA and Asia 
will not be able to achieve the pre-crisis CAB surpluses 
by 2015. Medium-term recovery in their CAB surpluses 
will depend upon the movement in oil prices, global oil 
demand, and volume of trade (Figure 4).
Inflation rate
16. Inflationary pressure has been significantly released in 
OIC member states. The sharp decline in domestic economic 
activities and wide gap between actual and potential 
output in OIC member states have released inflationary 
pressures in both oil-exporting and non-oil exporting 
member states. At the OIC level, inflation slowed from 
the pre-crisis average rate of 9.1 percent to 7.2 percent in 
2010. The non-oil-exporting member states experienced 
a relatively sharp drop in inflation (from 12.1 percent to 
7.0 percent), while in oil-exporting member states, it rose 
slightly from 6.9 percent to 7.3 percent during the same 
period. In the medium-term, the inflation is projected to 
slow further to 4.9 percent in OIC states (as a group), 5.4 
percent in oil-exporting countries and 4.3 percent in non-
oil-exporting countries by 2015 (Figure 5).
17. The drop in inflation remained uneven across various 
regions. In the MENA region, inflation rate fell from the 
pre-crisis average rate of 10.7 percent to 7.2 percent in 
2010, followed by CIT from 9.9 percent to 7.0 percent, 
and Asia from 6.3 percent to 6.2 percent, while the SSA 
region observed a rise in inflation (from 8.1 percent to 
9.8 percent). Due to excess capacity and slow economic 
recovery, the inflationary pressure is expected to remain 
moderate in the medium-term. However, the recent rise 
in food prices is a source of concern in terms of building 
inflationary pressures in the coming years (Figure 6).
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Figure 4. Current Account Balances of OIC State by Regions, 2005–2015 (% of GDP).
Source: IsDB estimates based on data from the IMF WEO database of April 2011.
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
16.0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011p 2012p 2013p 2014p 2015p
OIC
Oil-Exporters
Non-Oil Exporters
Figure 5. Inlfation Rates in OIC States 2005–2015 (% per annum).
Source: IDB estimates based on data from the IMF WEO database of April 2011.
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Key external and domestic factors affecting 
sustainable economic recovery in OIC  
member states
Major external factors
18. The major global factors that have affected economic 
performance of OIC member states during the global financial 
and economic crisis and are still threats to sustainable 
economic recovery in the medium-term. They include fragile 
global economic recovery; slow recovery in world trade; 
highly volatile oil-and non-oil commodities prices; rising 
policy interest rates; and deteriorating debt situation in 
advanced economies.
Fragile global economic recovery
19. In the post-crisis period, the uneven economic recovery 
in various regions of the globe has been observed in 2010. 
For example, the global economy performed quite well in 
the first year of post crisis recovery as the world output 
accelerated by 5 percent in 2010, compared to negative 
growth of 0.5 percent in 2009 and pre-crisis average 
growth of 4.2 percent achieved during 2000–2007. 
Similarly, the real output in advanced economies was also 
accelerated by 3 percent compared to pre-crisis growth of 
2.6 and developing economies by 7.3 percent compared to 
pre-crisis growth of 6.5 percent (Figure 7).
20. The recent global economic recovery appears to be a 
fragile and is projected to decelerate in the medium-term. 
Over the next five years (2011–2015), the global economy 
is projected to grow, on average, by 4.5 percent, developed 
economies by 2.5 percent and developing economies by 
6.6 percent, thereby all achieving the pre-crisis level of 
growth. However, the global economy is not yet out of 
the crisis, particularly the Eurozone and the US economy. 
With regard to the biggest world economy, a recent 
Gallup Survey (20–23  April 2011) shows that more than 
50 percent of the US citizens believe that the USA is still 
in Recession or Depression. The medium-term global 
recovery will very much depend upon the movement in 
oil and non-commodity prices, exchange rates, cost and 
availability of external financing, and the policies adopted 
by the national authorities.7 Therefore, the sustainability of 
economic recovery of the OIC states in the medium-term 
will also depend upon the overall global recovery as well as 
recovery in developed and developing economies.
Slow recovery in world trade
21. In line with the global economic recovery, the recent 
expansion in global trade has been impressive. The adverse 
impact of the economic crisis on world trade was more 
pronounced but its recovery in the post-crisis period was 
also robust. The year 2008 and 2009 witnessed collapse in 
the volume of world trade as both advanced and developing 
economies were badly affected by the global financial and 
economic crises. The growth in volume of world trade 
declined from the pre-crisis average growth of 7.0 percent in 
2000–2007, to 3 percent in 2008, and negative 10.9 percent 
in 2009. Both imports and exports of advanced economies 
declined by 12.6 percent and 12.2 percent, respectively, in 
2009. Similarly, imports of developing economies dropped 
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Figure 6. Inflation Rates in OIC State by Regions, 2005–2015 (% per annum).
Source: IsDB estimates based on data from the IMF WEO database of April 2011.
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Figure 7. Real GDP Growth in World, Advanced and Developing Economies, 2005–2015 (% per annum).
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (various issues).
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by 8.3 percent and exports by 7.5 percent in 2009. However, 
in 2010, recovery in global trade appears to be robust with 
12.4 percent growth over 2009. Recovery in both exports 
and imports in developing countries was relatively faster 
with growth rates of 13.5 percent and 14.5 percent, 
respectively, compared to developed countries (11.2 
percent and 12.0 percent) (Figure 8).
22. In the coming few years, growth in global trade is 
projected to slowdown. The speed of recovery in world 
trade volume of goods and services is projected to 
slow to 7.4 percent in 2011 and 6.9 percent in 2012; 
however, achieving the pre-crisis growth (i.e. 7% 
achieved during 2000–2007). Advanced countries are 
projected to achieve pre-crisis growth faster in their 
imports (5.5 percent in 2012 compared to pre-crisis 
growth of 5.6 percent) than their exports (5.9 percent 
in 2012 compared to pre-crisis growth of 5.7 percent), 
while developing economies will not be able to achieve 
their pre-crisis growth in both imports (9.4 percent in 
2012 compared to pre-crisis growth of 11.5 percent) 
and exports (8.7 percent in 2012 compared to pre-crisis 
growth of 10.2 percent).
Highly fluctuating oil and non-oil commodities 
prices
23. Economic prospects of both oil-exporting and non-oil 
exporting OIC member states are closely linked to movements 
in oil and non-oil commodity prices. Given the close link 
between growth and the oil and non-oil commodity prices, 
the economic performance of oil-exporting and non-oil 
exporting member countries depends on the developments 
arising from these prices. The oil price, which increased by 
36.4 percent in 2008, was accompanied by real GDP growth 
of 5.0 percent in oil-exporting member countries. In 2009, 
oil prices declined by 36.3 percent, dropping their real GDP 
growth rate to 1.9 percent.
24. Similarly, non-oil commodity prices, which increased 
by 7.5 percent in 2008, fell by 15.8 percent in 2009; 
consequently GDP growth in non-oil exporting decelerated 
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Figure 8. Trade (good and services) Volume of  Wolrd, Advanced and Developing Countries, 2005–2012 (% change per 
annum).
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (various issues).
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from 4.0 percent to 1.9 percent. With the global economic 
recovery and increasing demand, the oil prices rose by 27.9 
percent and non-oil commodities prices by 26.3 percent in 
2010, which was accompanied by acceleration in output in 
oil-exporting member countries (4.7 percent) and non-oil 
exporting countries (6.1 percent) in 2010.
25. In the medium-term, sustainability of economic growth in 
oil- and non-oil exporting OIC member states will depend on 
the movement in oil- and non-oil commodities prices, which 
in turn, will depend on the speed and scale of global economic 
recovery. In 2011, the rising trend in oil- and non-oil 
commodity prices is projected to remain but later is likely 
to decelerate. In line with the continued recovery in global 
economy (i.e. 4.4 percent growth in 2011 and 4.5 percent 
in 2012), the oil prices are projected to jump further to 
35.6 percent and non-oil prices by 25.1 percent in 2011 as 
projected by the IMF (WEO, April 2011) (Figure 9).
Rising policy interest rates
26. Low policy interest rates helped recover global economy 
in the post-crisis year 2010. In order to stabilize economies 
in the face of global economic crisis, monetary authorities 
reacted quickly with exceptionally large interest rate cuts in 
2008 and 2009 as well as unconventional measures to inject 
liquidity and sustain credit. In particular, policy interest 
rates were brought down considerably in many advanced 
economies. For example, LIBOR on US$ deposits declined 
from 5.3 percent in 2007 to 0.5 percent in 2010. Similarly, 
LIBOR on euro deposits was reduced from 4.3 percent in 
2008 to 0.8 percent in 2010, while the LIBOR on Japanese 
yen deposits declined from 0.9 percent to 0.4 percent 
during the same period. In the short-term, policy interest 
rates are expected to rise i.e. LIBOR on US$ deposits to 0.9 
percent and LIBOR on euro deposits by 2.6 percent in 2012, 
while LIBOR on Japanese deposits is projected to decline 
slightly to 0.3 percent in 2012.
27. Rising policy interest is likely to affect global economic 
recovery as well as recovery in OIC member states. The large 
increases in fiscal deficits and public debt in advanced 
countries are likely to put further upward pressure on 
policy interest rates, thereby affecting global economic 
recovery as well as achieving sustainable economic growth 
in OIC member states (Figure 10).
Deteriorating debt situation in advanced countries
28. Worsening public debt burden and rising debt service 
payments in advanced economies are major threats to global 
financial stability as well as global economic recovery in the 
post-crisis period. According to IMF latest Fiscal Monitor 
(April 2011 and June 2011 Update) and World Economic 
Outlook (WEO,  April 2011 and June 2011 Update), the 
level of aggregate net government debt in the world rose 
from $21.9 trillion in 2007 to an expected $34.4 trillion in 
2011. IMF forecasts also indicate that the level is expected 
to reach $48.1 trillion in 2016. Similarly, the ratio of world 
net debt to world GDP rose from 42 percent in 2007 to 56.4 
percent in 2011, and is projected to reach 57.7 percent in 
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Figure 10. London Interbank Offered Rates (LIBOR), 2005–2012 (% per annum).
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (various issues).
Table 2. Net Debt Situation in Developed and Developing 
Economies
2007 2011 2016
(US$ trillion)
World 21.9 34.4 48.1
Advanced Economies 18.1 29.5 41.3
Emerging  
Economies
3.8 4.9 6.7
OIC Member States* 1.3 1.6 ..
(percent of GDP)
World 42.0 56.4 57.7
Advanced  
Economies
46.3 70.0 79.7
Emerging  
Economies
29.2 26.1 21.5
OIC Member  
States*
34.7 30.4 ..
(Per Capita in thousand US$)
World 4.3 6.5 8.7
Advanced  
Economies
18.6 29.6 40.4
Emerging  
Economies
0.9 1.1 1.5
Sources: Brookings, Global Economy and Development, 
*Islamic Development Bank (2010), Annual Report.
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2016. Another way to understand the burden of public 
debt is to examine it in terms of the level of debt per 
capita. The average per capita debt in advanced economies 
increased from $18.6 thousand to $29.6 thousand in 2011 
and is expected to rise further to $40.4 thousand in 2016. 
In case of developing economies, the average per capita 
debt increased marginally from $0.9 thousand in 2007 to 
$1.1 thousand in 2011 and is projected to increase to $1.5 
thousand in 2016.
29. In order to support their own weak economic recoveries 
as well global economic recovery, the advanced economy 
governments need to bring down their rising debt burden in 
the medium- to long-term. Advanced economies need to 
learn the lessons of fiscal discipline that for so long they 
preached to the emerging markets.8 In particular, recent 
worsening debt situation in Greece, Ireland, Portugal in the 
Eurozone and the rise in ceiling in USA debt may jeopardize 
the global economy recovery, in turn, recovery in the OIC 
member states and other developing countries.
30. The OIC member states also need to curtail their rising 
external debt in order to sustain economic recovery. The level 
of external debt of OIC states rose from $1.3 trillion in 2007 
to $1.6 trillion in 2011, registering a 21 percent increase 
just in the last five years.
Major domestic factors
31. The adverse external factors described above have 
been compounded by a number of domestic factors such 
as rising youth unemployment, weak economic integration 
among OIC states, and some fundamental weaknesses in 
macroeconomic policies, resulting threats to sustainable 
economic performance of OIC member states. The major 
domestic factors are described in the following sub-
sections.
Rising youth unemployment
32. Rising Youth unemployment is posing a major challenge 
for OIC member states. The current speed of economic 
recovery is insufficient to decrease unemployment, 
particularly youth unemployment. The impact of global 
economic recession on unemployment varied across 
regions of the globe. The latest estimates by the ILO 
(2011) indicate that all regions experienced high youth 
unemployment rate in 2010. Region-wide unemployment 
trends show that Middle East experienced the highest rate 
of youth unemployment at 25.1 percent in 2010, followed 
by North Africa (23.6 percent); Southeast Asia and Pacific 
(14.2 percent); Sub-Saharan Africa (12.3 percent); and 
South Asia (9.5 percent) (Figure  11). Creation of jobs 
requires new investment, the pre-requisites of which 
include political and economic stability, existence of 
proper legal and regulatory framework, appropriate 
policy environment, existence of basic infrastructure, and 
adequate economic incentives.
33. The economic recession has further compounded the 
youth unemployment in a number of OIC states in the MENA 
region. Currently, a number of countries in the MENA 
region are facing major development challenges, including 
lack of social justice; poor access to public utilities; high 
levels of poverty and inequality; high unemployment 
especially among youth and women; and rising food and 
energy prices. All these factors have contributed to political 
discontent among the people. The most important issue is 
the high youth unemployment in the region (25.1 percent 
in the Middle East and 23.6 percent in North Africa), which 
is highest in the world, and economic loss to the region 
is estimated to be between $40–50 billion per year (IDB-
IFC, 2011). Further, 40 percent of the Middle East and 32 
percent of the North African working population live on less 
than US$2 a day. In order to tackle youth unemployment, 
the governments of a number of countries in the MENA 
region are implementing speedy reforms at the political, 
economic, and social fronts in order to improve the lives of 
ordinary citizens. They are implementing short-term and 
long-term reforms both on the political and socio-economic 
fronts. Particularly, the governments’ spending programs 
are focusing on providing unemployment benefits and 
insurance schemes; increasing public investment in 
infrastructure and the housing sector; providing jobs 
to youth; enhancing support to small- and medium-
enterprises; increasing social inclusion; improving quality 
and relevance of education; and adopting labor-intensive 
projects.
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Figure 11. Youth Unemployment Rates in Various Regions, 2007–2010 (%).
Source: ILO (2011), Global Employment Trends.
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Weak economic integration among OIC states
34. The OIC Ten-Year Program, adopted in December 2005, 
called on member countries to expand the scope of intra-trade 
in order to achieve greater economic integration by raising its 
level to 20 percent of the overall trade volume by 2015. The 
latest estimates show that the intra-trade performance 
of OIC member countries (as a group) has improved 
gradually from 15.3 percent in 2005 to 16.8 percent in 
2009 (Figure  12). However, the 20 percent intra-trade 
target can only be achieved through further strengthening 
and expanding the scope of Framework Agreement on OIC-
Trade Preferential System (TPS) in its full spirit. The global 
financial and economic crisis has created an opportunity 
for OIC states to reconsider their trade and investment 
strategies and learn how to cope with a dramatically 
transformed international financial landscape. For 
instance, member states need to enhance intra-trade 
through additional measures aimed at providing greater 
access to their markets. The OIC-TPS has been signed so 
far by thirty-four member states but ratified by twenty-five 
members, having the required number of ratifications for 
its enforcement (COMCEC 2009). Another opportunity is 
in the area of encouraging investments by the Sovereign 
Wealth Funds in long-term infrastructure projects in 
member countries with adequate and competitive risk-
return profile. Further, enhancing intra-trade and intra-
investment also require removal of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers, particularly free movement of labor and capital 
across regions.
Weaknesses in macroeconomic policies
35. The macroeconomic policies adopted in OIC states 
have certain flaws such as resistance to macro reforms (i.e., 
generalized subsidies instead of targeted subsidies) and 
micro reforms (i.e., poor business climate for firm-level 
investment); lack of focus on inclusive growth (i.e., lack 
of productive employment opportunities, unequal access 
to opportunities, and inadequate social safety nets); weak 
linkage between the financial sector and real sector; and 
weak corporate governance in the financial institutions. 
All these policy factors appear to be major impediments 
to achieving sustainable growth and inclusive economic 
development.
Role of the (IsDB) group in economic recovery of 
OIC member states
36. The Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) group is playing an 
active role in socio-economic development of the OIC States 
by scaling up of development assistance. The IsDB Group 
through all of its entities namely, the Islamic Corporation 
for the Development of the Private Sector (ICD), 
International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC), 
Islamic Corporation for the Insurance of Investment and 
Export Credit (ICIEC), and Islamic Research and Training 
Institute (IRTI), is helping its 56 member countries (out of 
57 OIC states)9 in their economic recovery process in the 
post-crisis era. The IsDB Group responded through various 
initiatives and activities at global, regional, national, 
and Bank levels to help its member countries to mitigate 
the adverse impacts of global financial and economic 
crisis and achieve post-crisis economic recovery. To help 
member countries to consolidate their economic recovery, 
IsDB maintained its high level of development assistance, 
attained through the sharp scaling up of its operations. 
Since inception, the cumulative net approvals of IsDB 
Group reached $74.2 billion for 7,087 operations. Trade 
financing accounted for 52.2 percent while the remaining 
48 percent included project financing, and technical and 
special assistance.
37. With regard to Region-wise, members countries in the 
MENA region received the lion’s share of the IsDB Group 
financing of $38.7 billion (52.1 percent), followed by 
Asia $21.5 billion (28.9 percent), SSA $8.5 billion (11.5 
percent), and CIT $3.6 billion (4.8 percent). The current 
core areas of IDB Group interventions in member countries 
are poverty alleviation, food security, infrastructure 
development, human development, Islamic finance, and 
regional cooperation.
38. With regard to sector-wise distribution of IsDB Ordinary 
Capital Resources (OCR), transportation received the 
largest share of 25 percent, followed by energy (23 
percent), water, sanitation and urban services (13 
percent), agriculture (11 percent), industry and mining 
(9 percent), education (9 percent), health (5 percent), 
finance (4 percent), and information and communication 
(1 percent) (Figure 13).
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Figure 12. Intra-OIC Trade, 2005–2009 (% of Total Trade Volume).
Source: Islamic Development Bank, Annual Report (various issues).
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39. In particular, in the immediate aftermath of the 
recent events in the MENA region, the IsDB Group’s recent 
interventions in the region include supporting youth 
employment generation and social safety nets, strengthening 
infrastructure and human development, promoting the SME 
sector and microfinance, and enhancing vocational training. 
In particular, in order to meet the infrastructure needs of 
the MENA region between $75 and $100 billion (Akhtar, 
S. 2010), the IsDB, World Bank, and the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) have recently launched a joint 
IsDB-WB-IFC Arab Financing Facility for Infrastructure 
(AFFI), which aims to raise up to $1 billion in new 
financing that will leverage infrastructure investment in 
Arab countries in an effort to drive inclusive economic 
growth and meet the needs of growing young population. 
In order to help member countries in tackling youth 
unemployment, recently the IsDB approved an additional 
financing package of $250  million targeting reduction 
of youth unemployment in the affected countries in the 
MENA region. Further, the IsDB and IFC have recently 
launched the Education for Employment (E4E) initiative 
in the Arab world, aiming to mobilize $1.5 - 2 billion to 
be invested in the region over the next five years, while 
engaging the private sector to create new job opportunities 
for employment-based education, and enhancing labour 
market skills for Arab youth and women for productive 
employment. Among the crisis-ridden countries, the IsDB 
Group announced its programs support to Egypt ($2.5 
billion) and Tunisia ($900  million) over 2011–2013. In 
order to help the governments of the region in their reform 
process, the IsDB is broadening and strengthening its 
partnership with Arab regional multilateral institutions 
especially the Arab Coordination Group.
40. In order to help its member countries in achieving 
sustainable economic growth in the medium-term, the IsDB 
Group launched Member Country Partnership Strategy 
(MCPS) in 2010. The MCPS is a Group-wide undertaking 
involving all entities. It forms the foundation and 
cornerstone of the IsDB Group’s dialogue with member 
countries, aligning with their development priorities and 
thematic priorites identified in the IsDB 1440H Vision.
The MCPS process includes extensive consultations, internally 
and externally with the governments of client countries, the 
civil society, the private sector, multilateral development 
banks, and other development partners active in the client 
country. Through the MCPS process, the instruments of 
IsDB Group support to member countries are not only 
direct financing and knowledge-based diagnostics, but also 
the mobilization of domestic resources, forging strategic 
partnerships with other development partners and more 
importantly, promoting fruitful partnerships among member 
countries through ‘Reverse Linkages’, (defined as IDB MCPS 
member country supporting other member countries), 
thereby promoting south-south cooperation. So far, the 
IsDB Group has completed MCPS exercise for five member 
countries (Turkey, Indonesia, Mali, Uganda, and Mauritania)10 
while MCPS exercises for Pakistan, Bahrain, Malaysia, Egypt, 
Kazakhstan, Morocco, and Niger are in progress.
Proposed measures to improve socio-economic 
outlook of OIC member states
41. In the post-crisis era, the OIC member states need to 
adopt somewhat different policies to foster renewed growth 
and to deal with the structural issues to sustain economic 
recovery and achieve inclusive economic development.
i. OIC states are required to do structural repairs 
of fiscal consolidation, promote private sector-
led growth, adopt labor market reforms to create 
quality jobs particularly for youth, and improve 
competitiveness and enhance regional integration.
ii. The policymakers in OIC states need to focus on 
the imperatives of structural healing of their socio-
economic policies, particularly, to help limit the 
impact of higher food and oil prices on the poor. 
Headline inflation has sharply risen in the OIC 
states. As per IMF projection (WEO, April 2011), 
global fuel prices and non-oil commodities prices are 
expected to rise by a 35.6 percent and 25.1 percent, 
respectively, in 2011, building inflationary pressures 
in the years ahead.
iii. Reducing regional imbalances of OIC member states 
is essential (i.e., shifting resources from resource- 
rich regions to resource-deficient regions through 
enhancing intra-trade and intra-investment).
iv. Restoring banking system health must be given 
key priority in government policies. In particular, 
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re-regulation of the financial sector in order to make 
it stable and respond to the needs of the priority 
economic sectors and support economic recovery. 
Also, not only to enhance regulations but also to 
enforce them effectively.
v. Expanding Islamic financial institutions would be a 
best alternate as Islamic financial structure creates 
clear links between the financial sector and real 
sector and contributes more to the development of 
an economy.
vi. The government needs to adopt macro reform (i.e., 
targeted subsidies instead of generalized subsidies) 
and micro reform (i.e., improve the efficiency of 
firm-level investment through improving business 
climate).
vii. Since the economic recession has fueled to rising 
youth unemployment and poverty in OIC member 
states, increasing employment opportunities, 
providing equal access to opportunities and adequate 
social safety nets will be essential in the coming 
years.
Notes
1. Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region includes 
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE, and Yemen.
2. The Asia region includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Pakistan, and 
Suriname.
3. The Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region includes Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, and 
Uganda.
4. Countries in Transition (CIT) region includes 
Albania, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
5. Oil-exporting member states include Algeria, 
Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, 
Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, 
Malaysia, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, 
Turkmenistan, U.A.E, Uzbekistan and Yemen.
6. Non-oil exporting member states include Afghanistan, 
Albania, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei, Burkina 
Faso, Comoros, Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Indonesia, Jordan, Kyrgyz, Lebanon, Maldives, 
Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Oman, 
Pakistan, Palestine, Senegal, Sierra-Leone, Somalia, 
Suriname, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey and Uganda.
7. A number of assumptions have been adopted for the 
projections presented in the World Economic Outlook 
(April 2011). It has been assumed that real effective 
exchange rates remained constant at their average 
levels during February 8–March 8, 2011, except for 
the currencies participating in the European exchange 
rate mechanism, which are assumed to have remained 
constant in nominal terms relative to the Euro; that 
established policies of national authorities will be 
maintained (for specific assumptions about fiscal 
and monetary policies for selected economies; that 
the average price of oil will be $107.16 a barrel in 
2011 and $108.00 a barrel in 2012 and will remain 
unchanged in real terms over the medium term; that 
the six-month London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) 
on U.S. dollar deposits will average 0.6 percent in 2011 
and 0.9 percent in 2012; that the three-month euro 
deposit rate will average 1.7 percent in 2011 and 2.6 
percent in 2012; and that the six-month Japanese yen 
deposit rate will yield on average 0.6 percent in 2011 
and 0.3 percent in 2012. The estimates and projections 
are based on statistical information available through 
late March 2011. 
8. Eswar Prasad (28 July 2011) Senior Fellow, Global 
Economy and Development, Mengjie Ding, Student, 
MIT, Financial Times. 
9. Fifty-six out of 57 OIC States are IsDB member 
countries (i.e. only Guyana is not IsDB member 
country). 
10. MCPS Reports of Turkey, Indonesia, Mali, Uganda, 
and Mauritatania are available on the IsDB website 
(www.isdb.org).
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Abstract - Standard economics and policy prescriptions adopt the modernization thesis as its 
base, which says that developing countries can modernize by undergoing secularization and 
westernization. However, Muslim countries, including Malaysia, have shown that more economic 
development and progress can take place together with a renewed manifestation of Islamic values 
and norms. This important departure from the modernization thesis reflects a potential alternative 
transformational development model. However, conceptual and theoretical frameworks of this 
alternative development model are still lacking. There is an urgent need for Muslim countries 
to develop this alternative model, which represents a more holistic and inclusive concept of 
development that integrates the physical/material, intellectual and spiritual dimensions of human 
beings. This study proposes to develop an integrated Islamic development framework and index 
based on, and representing, the Maqasid al-Shariah or noble objectives of the Shariah for OIC 
and non-OIC countries. The final expected outcome of this study is a Maqasid-based Integrated 
Development Index (I-Dex) that will better represent holistic development and well-being according 
to Islamic benchmarks, hence providing academics, students and policymakers in Muslim countries 
with an alternative measurement of progress.
Keywords: Islam, Maqasid al-Shariah, development index, integrated development, human 
development
1. Introduction
Over the decades, development has taken a much wider 
connotation than was first discussed. From the simple 
growth models of the 1950s and 1960s, there has been a 
growing acceptance that development has to be holistic. 
In 1999, the World Bank introduced the Comprehensive 
Development Framework (CDF), which very clearly stated 
that development should be viewed as a multi-dimensional 
process that covered social, structural, human, governance, 
environmental, economic and financial spheres if it was to 
be seen as a meaningful and sustainable process. This more 
holistic approach is congruent with the Islamic viewpoint 
on development. Islam encourages economic development 
that also establishes social justice and the well-being of 
human beings.
Muslim countries, Malaysia in particular, have shown 
seriousness in adopting an integrated and holistic 
approach to development. From Malaysia’s experience, it 
has been shown that economic development and progress 
Amin et al.
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can take place hand-in-hand with a renewed manifestation 
of Islamic values and norms. Despite the recognition of the 
importance of religion in the multi-dimensional approach 
to development, the conceptual and theoretical frameworks 
of this alternative development model is still lacking. 
There is an urgent need for Muslim countries to develop 
this alternative model that represents a more holistic 
and inclusive concept of development that integrates the 
physical/material, intellectual and spiritual dimensions of 
human beings.
Islam encourages economic development that also 
establishes social justice that concerns itself with the 
wellbeing of humans. Central to the Islamic view on 
development is the higher purposes of the Shariah or 
Maqasid al-Shari‘ah that has stated three fundamental 
goals, i.e., educating the individual, establishing justice 
and ensuring the well-being or Maslahah of all. The 
Shariah is much more than just law, it is a total guidance 
and constitutes values, norms and general guidelines 
for ensuring total well-being of man. In trying to discuss 
Islamic economics, the Maqasid al-Shariah provides a 
potentially comprehensive framework that can be used to 
measure development as represented by the concept of 
Maslahah.
The major focus of past literature on al-Maqasid was 
on developing the theory, and most of the discussions 
centered on its legal dimensions. The pioneering works 
emanated from scholars such as, Al-Juwayni (1979), Al-
Ghazali (1901), Al-Shatibi (n.d), Ibn ‘Ashur (1998) and Ibn 
Taymiyyah (al-Raysuni, 1992). Recently, the application of 
al-Maqasid in various disciplines including economics and 
finance has been gaining prominence. Among the leading 
economists who have written on the subject, to mention a 
few are Chapra (1985 and 2000), Siddiqi (2000), Ahmad 
(2000), Atiyah (2008), Hasan (2004) and Al-Najjar (2008). 
Their works however, relate al-Maqasid to the discipline 
of economics in a broad theoretical framework. Chapra 
(2008) came up with a model of human development 
from a Maqasid perspective. However, the study is still 
at a philosophical and theoretical level that needs to 
be cascaded at the operational level. Therefore, there 
is a need for extending the application of al-Maqasid to 
comprehensive development at macro level both in theory 
and application.
Several indices have been developed as variations or 
possible alternatives to the more commonly used HDI to 
measure human well-being in the process of development, 
such as the Quality of Life Index, the Happiness Index 
and the less known Meaning of Life Index, very few have 
attempted to integrate the religious aspect of development 
that reflects spiritual well-being which has been recognized 
as an important component in the construction of the 
indices. The Ethics-Augmented Human Development Index 
(E-HDI) by Dar (2004), the Islamic Human Development 
Index (I-HDI) by Anto (2009) and the Islamicity Index (I2)
by Rehman and Askari (2010) are three of such attempts.
The E-HDI is based on Maqasid al-Shariah and it 
conceptualizes social change and development for all 
countries. It encompasses more explicitly the ethical 
concerns in measuring development by incorporating 
freedom, faith, environmental concerns and family values 
in the HDI. However, the ranking of countries in the study is 
based on the ordinal measure using the Borda Rule instead 
of on the actual values of E-HDI computed for all countries. 
Hence, there is a need to develop a comprehensive 
development index based on Maqasid al-Shariah that can 
actually be computed for the ranking of countries’ level of 
development. Anto (2009) attempts to develop such an 
index with the I-HDI. The index is comprised of what is 
termed as Material Welfare Index (MWI) and Non-material 
Welfare Index (NWI) representing the five basic needs 
in Maqasid al-Shariah. In addition, it also includes the 
Freedom Index and the Environment Index.
The Islamicity Index (I2) was developed to measure the 
degree of “Islamicity” of Islamic and non-Islamic countries 
based on the principles of Islam. It aims at finding out 
whether or not Islam is an agent that enhances human 
development and its economic performance. It uses four 
sub-indices namely the Economic Islamicity Index (EI²), 
the Legal and Governance Islamicity Index (LGI²), the 
Human and Political Rights Islamicity Index (HPI²), and 
the International Relations Islamicity Index (IRI²). These 
indices, in a nutshell, measures government’s adherence 
to Islamic principles in their economics; legal integrity 
and governance environment; degree of civil and political 
rights; and relationship with the global community in 
regard to several keys areas of environmental contribution, 
globalization, military engagement, and overall country 
risk (Rehman and Askari, 2010). In this index, Islamic 
economic, financial, political, legal, and social principles 
were represented by 67 proxies that are the standard 
practice of good governance and good economics applicable 
to all countries regardless of their religious orientation. 
However, the Islamicity Index basically uses existing 
indicators that represent universal values, and therefore it 
is not really based on Maqasid al-Shariah.
In view of the limitations of existing development indices 
proposed, this study is aimed at the construction of an 
integrated Islamic development framework that culminates 
in the creation of the Integrated Development Index 
(I-Dex) as a new and more comprehensive alternative 
to the existing measures of living standards and human 
well-being. The I-Dex encompasses both the physical and 
spiritual dimensions of human development based on, and 
representing Maqasid al-Shariah, and is proposed to be an 
integrated and a more holistic alternative to the existing 
measures of living standards and human well-being.
Contemporary works on development indices
Real GDP per capita has often been used as a proxy for living 
standards, either to compare well-being in one country 
at various points in time or to compare well-being across 
many countries at a particular point in time. A higher GDP 
means a higher value of production of goods and services 
thus implying higher consumption and greater material 
well-being. However, GDP as a measure of well-being has 
often been criticized since it excludes consideration of 
non-material dimensions and non-market activities, and 
considers some consumption items as beneficial when 
they are actually harmful, such as negative environmental 
externalities associated with increased production. In 
addition, using the average measure of income ignores the 
distribution of income within a country (Kula et al., 2008).
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There have been several efforts to provide alternatives to 
GDP as a measure of well-being. Nordhaus and Tobin (1973) 
formulated a measure of economic welfare (MEW) that 
attempts to measure well-being through a quantification 
of consumption. Apart from GDP, they included costs of 
commuting and exclude costs for education, health, police, 
sanitation, road maintenance, defense, and health services. 
The major criticism to this measure is the somewhat 
arbitrary calculations of how non-market activities are 
measured. Others such as Opschoor (1991) and Mayo 
et al. (1997) provide indexes of sustainable economic 
welfare that consider the distribution of income within a 
population.
The United Nations Development Programme constructed 
the Human Development Index (HDI) to incorporate 
aspects other than income to measure human well-being. 
Human development is seen as creating an enabling 
environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative 
lives.1 It uses a slightly modified measure of GDP, along with 
measures of life expectancy at birth, the adult literacy rate, 
and the extent of school enrollment, to construct the index. 
The HDI is reported in the annual Human Development 
Report; the first was published in 1990.
Although the HDI attempts to measure human development 
as a multidimensional concept, it was only confined 
to three dimensions of Quality of Life (QoL), namely, 
longevity, educational attainment and standard of living. 
In addition, the HDI ignores the extent of inequality in QoL 
over the members of the population (Anand and Sen, 2000, 
and Chatterjee, 2005). Early recognition of this point has 
resulted in corrections in HDRs 1991–1993 for the adjusted 
per-capita income, usually in terms of the Gini coefficient 
of the income distribution. However, such distributional 
correction on the income component of HDI was no longer 
performed since 1995 onwards. In order to take into account 
the extent of inequality in the distribution of longevity, 
educational attainment and standard of living/income, 
Chatterjee (2005) proposed an alternative index of human 
development, which is defined as the simple average of 
the “uptilt” indices of the three constituents. The uptilt 
for longevity can be computed on the basis of an abridged 
lifetable for the population considered. For the level of 
education, a classification of the population into categories 
representing different levels of education on the basis of 
periodical educational surveys or censuses is required. For 
income (consumer expenditure), the distribution of the 
latter as derived from income/expenditure surveys also 
needs to be done.
Over the more recent years, sustainable development has 
been the focus with regards to the most important policy 
goals at the global level. Environment and natural resources 
should constitute a means to achieving better standards of 
living (Anand and Sen, 1995). Debates on how to measure 
the quality of life have been influenced by two issues, which 
are (i) the constituents versus the determinants of well-
being, and (ii) the temporal horizon of the development 
path, current or sustainability-oriented. Considering human 
development from a sustainable perspective, there was a need 
to build a more sustainable-oriented development index. 
Constantini and Monni (2004) constructed a numerical 
measure for this purpose to incorporate environmental 
protection and long-term sustainability. This requires the 
maintenance of capital stock to guarantee constant or 
growing welfare levels. They consider four components of 
development, which are: access to resources, education, 
social stability, and quality of natural environment and 
computed the index as the simple average of the four. Due 
to data availability, their study is limited to the European 
countries. Their findings indicate that an enlarged measure 
of development allowed differences among countries that 
seemed important to be emphasized.
Constructing the Integrated Development Index 
(I-Dex)
The conceptual framework
Al-Ghazali’s theoretical framework of maqasid  
al-shari’ah
Al-Ghazali (d.1111  A.D) refined al-Juwayni’s theory of 
Maqasid al-Shariah, and categorized Maslahah into three: 
necessities (Daruriyat), complements (Hajiyaat) and 
embellishments (Tahsiniyaat). According to al-Ghazali, 
necessities are those elements without which the system 
of a nation will run into chaos. Complements are elements 
that facilitate human lives. Meanwhile embellishments 
are articles that are related to moral and ethical conduct. 
He further refined necessities into the preservation of 
five essential elements (al-Dharuriyat al-Khams), namely 
religion (al-Din), life (al-Nafs), intellect (al-Aql), progeny 
(al-Nasl) and wealth (al-Mal). These five essential elements 
are given priority according to this order. The theoretical 
framework of al-Ghazali’s Maqasid is illustrated in the 
Figure below:
Figure 1. Al-Ghazali’s theoretical framework of maqasid al-shari’ah.
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Prominent scholars in the recent past who have greatly 
benefited from al-Ghazali’s theory include Ibn ‘Ashur, al-
Shatibi and Abu Zaharah. For example, al-Shatibi (n.d.) 
expanded the application of al-Ghazali’s three levels of 
Maslahah, referred to them as universal concepts and 
their classifications as final or Qaati’i (Nyazee, 1994). Abu 
Zaharah (1967) extended al-Ghazali’s theory to include 
justice and education. Modern scholars in the areas of 
economics and finance have also used al-Ghazali’s Maqasid 
theory as bases for their studies. For example Chapra (2008) 
has used al-Ghazali’s classification of the five essentials to 
develop a model of human development and well-being.
Abu Zaharah’s extended al-maqasid theory
Abu Zaharah (1997) sees the objectives of al-Shariah as 
mercy (rahmah) to mankind, as confirmed by the Qur’anic 
verse: “We have not sent thee but as mercy to the whole world 
(a’lamin)” (al-Qur’an, 21:107). The word a’lamin refers to 
all creations of Allah in the Universe, including mankind. 
Furthermore, Abu Zaharah has widened the scope of his 
specific objectives of al-Shariah beyond al-Ghazali’s three 
levels of Maslahah and beyond the scanty specific objectives 
suggested by other Muslim scholars of al-Maqasid. Abu 
Zaharah’s theory of al-Maqasid has three constructs, 
namely Tahdhib al-Fard (Education), al-‘Adl (Justice) and 
al-Maslahah (public interest). Regarding Education, Abu 
Zaharah was of the view that Islam primarily focuses on 
the individual as an important building block of the society. 
Proper education for the individual (knowledge, skills and 
values) will bring about a good society. He sees justice as a 
noble objective in Islam. He says justice should be defined 
in relation or according to the context of its application. 
Hence, there is judicial justice, social justice and economic 
justice. Similar to al-Ghazali, Abu Zaharah sees the aim of 
Maslahah primarily as the preservation of five essential 
elements (Al-Dharuriyat al-Khams), namely religion (al-
Din), life (al-Nafs), wealth (al-Mal), intellect (al-`Aql) and 
progeny (al-Nasl). These five elements constitute the basis 
for all the affairs of mankind
Hence, based on the discussions above, Maqasid al-Shariah 
provides a comprehensive framework that can be used to 
measure development. This framework is represented by 
the three levels of Maslahah and the five universal values or 
essential elements (al-Daruriyat al-Khams). As explained by 
earlier scholars, the three levels of Maslahah, in an ascending 
order, are Necessities (Daruriyat), Complements (Hajiyat) 
and Embellishments (tahsiniyat). While the five essential 
elements are al-Din (religion), al-Nafs (human life), al-Aql 
(Intellect), al-Nasl (family institution) and al-Mal (wealth).
The three levels of Maslahah represent a growth path and 
stages of development from a Maqasid perspective. The 
first level, Daruriyat or Necessities, represent the minimum 
level that every individual, institution and nation must 
achieve. This level embodies the preservation of the five 
universal values or essential elements aforementioned. 
The second level provides avenues for the growth of the 
five elements and the third level represents the stage for 
their sustainability. Therefore, the three levels of Maslahah 
and the five essential elements represent the Integrated 
Development Components (IDC), which are part of the 
comprehensive and multi-dimensional framework for 
producing the Integrated Development Index (I-Dex).
Operationalizing maqasid al-shari’ah – the behavioral 
science method
One of the behavioral science methods that can be adopted 
in operationalizing Maqasid al-Shariah is Sekaran’s (2000) 
operationalization method. It breaks down abstract notions 
or concepts (C) into observable characteristic behaviors, 
which she termed as dimensions (D). The dimensions are 
then further broken down into measurable behaviors that 
are called elements (E). She cited the example of thirst as a 
concept. The behavior of thirsty people is to drink a lot of fluid 
(Dimension). The degree of thirst can be measured by the 
number of glasses drunk by each thirsty individual (Element). 
Sekaran’s model can be illustrated in Figure 3 above.
Sekaran’s concept can be adopted to formulate the I-Dex 
conceptual framework, which is represented by the 6 
elements of I-Dex, and operationalized into the respective 
dimensions and, further broken down into elements. The 
Figure 2. Abu Zaharah’s theoretical framework of maqasid al-shari’ah.
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Figure 3. Sekaran’s operationalization method.
Note: D denotes Dimensions and E, Elements
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process of operationalizing I-Dex into measurable elements 
is based on content analysis of relevant works on the area.
Definition of the components of maqasid al-shari’ah
Only five components of Maqasid al-Shariah will be the 
focus of this study based on the definitions provided by 
earlier scholars. The sixth component, i.e., development 
of human dignity is excluded as there is no clear definition 
that can be obtained from earlier works.
Hifdh al-din (preservation of religion)
Al-Din is derived from the Arabic word “d-a-n-a,” which has 
several literal meanings, including judgment, governance, 
accountability, subjugation, authority, submission, 
surrender, obedience and peace. Technically, it carries a 
general meaning as “way of life.” Early scholars of al-Maqasid 
such as al-Juwayni (n.d.), al-Ghazali (1901) and ‘Izz Abd 
Salaam were more concerned on developing the theory, 
which was largely used to serve Usul al-Fiqh. Therefore, 
they discussed the preservation of the five Maqasid 
components, including al-Din, as a matter of example 
rather than a serious deliberation on their dimensions. 
The succeeding Fuqaha, Ibn Ashur (1998) defines Hifdh 
al-Din as salvaging the faith of every individual Muslim 
from being affected by anything that might undermine and 
confuse his or her beliefs and distort his or her behavior. 
As for the community as a whole, preserving al-Din means 
to prevent anything that might violate and destroy its 
fundamentals, which includes defending Muslim land and 
sovereignty and preserving the means of Islamic learning 
and education among the present and future generations of 
the Muslim Community (Ibn Ashur, 1998, p.116).
Contemporary Muslim scholars have expanded the 
dimensions of preserving al-Maqasid. For example, Attia 
uses the components of al-Maqasid differently in four realms 
and identifies the corresponding means of preserving 
them at the three levels, namely Daruriyyah, Hajiyyah 
and Tahsiniyyah. Hence, he discusses the preservation 
of al-Din at the three realms: Individual, family and 
the Ummah. At the individual realm, he uses the term 
“al-tadayyun” (personal piety), which can be preserved 
through individual’s effort in promoting religious piety 
within one’s self. He suggests that the following four means 
(dimensions) at the Daruriyyah level be used to preserve 
al-Din at the individual realm: strengthening the ‘Aqidah, 
performing obligatory ‘Ibadat, embracing good Akhlaq 
and performing obligatory acts of obedience. Al-Tadayyun 
at the family realm means preservation of personal piety 
within the family, which is achieved at Hajiyyah level by 
good choices of candidates for marriage. At the Ummah 
realm, Attia defines al-Din as “Preservation of Religion and 
Morals,” which can be preserved through two means at the 
level of Daruriyyah (performing communal prayers and 
performing other socio-religious activities) and two means 
at the Hajiyyah level, namely upholding moral values and 
curbing the spread of corruption.
Another contemporary scholar, Auda (2010) opines that 
the focus of the preservation of al-Din in al-Ghazali’s and al-
Shatibi’s terminology has its roots in al-Amiri’s punishment 
for giving up true faith. Auda argues that the same theory 
has been re-interpreted by modern scholars to mean 
“freedom of faiths” or “freedom of belief,” using Ibn Ashur’s 
term (Auda, p.24). Meanwhile Chapra (2008) sees al-Din in 
the context of al-Maqasid as providing religious worldview 
which potentially helps man to reform the human self to 
ensure the fulfillment of all his spiritual and material needs.
Based on the discussion above, the preservation/
development of al-Din can be operationalized from the 
following four broad dimensions, namely (i) philosophical 
dimension - providing worldview, (ii) spiritual dimension 
- strengthening the ‘Aqidah, (iii) moral dimension - 
embracing good Akhlaq, and (iv) practical dimension - 
performing obligatory ‘Ibadat and performing virtual acts.
Hifdh al-‘aql (preservation of the intellect)
Preservation of intellect has been defined by Muslim 
scholars beginning from al-Juwaini up until contemporary 
time in various ways. However, all of them agree on certain 
elements of the definition and the meaning of preservation 
of intellect. Chapra (2008) quotes Imam Al-Ghazali as 
saying that intellect is the fountainhead, starting point, 
and foundation of knowledge. Imam Al-Ghazali (n.d.) also 
believed that prohibition of wine by Shariah is the evidence 
for the necessity to protect the intellectual. Al-Shatibi 
(2004), for example, defines preservation of intellect, 
preventing it from anything that will spoil it. According 
Figure 4. The I-Dex conceptual framework based on 
Maqasid al-Shariah.
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to Ibn Ashur (2006), preservation of intellect means the 
protection of people’s minds from anything that would put 
them in disorder. He further elaborates on this definition 
by saying that it is because otherwise any type of disorder 
of the intellect will lead to serious corruption consisting of 
improper and perverted human conduct. Consequently, 
any defect affecting a mind of an individual leads to a 
partial corruption of the society while defects affecting 
the minds of the whole community will lead to total 
devastating corruption and evil. Chapra (2008) agrees 
with this view but he adds another point by saying that it 
is faith that provides that right direction to the intellect, 
otherwise intellect may lead to more and more deceptions 
and exploitations. At the same time, faith requires the 
service of intellect to maintain its dynamism to respond to 
changing socio-economic and intellectual environment.
Al-Zarkashi (1994) was in the opinion that the Shariah 
preserves the intellect by making legal punishment 
obligatory for drinking intoxicants, because the mind is 
the ground for any act related to Maslahah. Therefore, any 
disruption of the intellect leads to extreme Mafsadah.
Islam emphasizes the importance of reason and dignifies a 
human being by favoring him over the rest of the creatures 
and calling him upon the development of reason, physically 
and intellectually:
a. Physical development: one of the principles in 
Islamic Jurisprudence is that a judge should not 
judge when he is hungry, because otherwise he 
might come up with improper decree. Another fact 
that proves that the Shariah does pay attention to 
preservation of intellect is that the preference is given 
to the food if it is served at the time of the prayer. It 
is because the mind of the praying person must be 
free from any external effects that would prevent him 
from focusing on his prayer with peaceful mind.
b. Intellectual development: seeking knowledge and 
considering reason as the foundation of Iman; freeing 
reason from superstition and harmful knowledge 
such as black magic. This has a direct relationship 
with the proper education for human beings that 
would always keep them alert, sober and constantly 
on the right track in developing and preserving the 
intellect from any harm.
c. Punishing with legal punishment: Ibn Ashur (2006) 
explains the legal punishment for intoxication, it is 
because the Shariah needs to distinguish between 
the rationally sound people from those who are not. 
This, of course, will lead to a better social security 
and consequently to law and order in the society.
Hifdh al-nafs (Preservation of Life)
There are a number of definitions of hifdh al-nafs as provided 
by scholars. Al-Juwayni and Al-Ghazali in Al-Raysuni 
(2006), for instance, defines hifdh al-nafs as generally the 
preservation of human life through the law of retribution 
(in the event of murder). In order to describe hifdh 
al-nafs further, Al-Shatibi in Al-Raysuni (2006) explains 
that preservation of life can be achieved in three ways:
1. Establishing its foundation through the legitimacy 
of procreation—ensuring they enter into valid 
matrimony and have at their disposal whatever 
related measures needed, including divorce
2. Ensuring its survival through food and drink—
ensuring they do not receive nourishment which is 
harmful or lethal (survival from within)
3. Providing clothing and shelter—guaranteeing the 
provision of everything without which the things 
mentioned above would not be possible, including 
animals for slaughter, as sacrifices, hunting, the 
right to impose penalties for crimes (survival from 
without)
Along similar views, Al-Allaf (n.d.) says that preservation 
of life is secured by obtaining lawful means of sustenance 
such as food, marriage, medicine, shelter, etc. Ibn Ashur 
(1998) added another dimension to the definition of hifdh 
al-nafs by stating that preservation of human souls means 
to protect human lives from being ruined either individually 
or collectively by preventing harm and ruin before they 
happen, such as combating and eradicating epidemics. This 
can be considered to be falling under Al-Shatibi’s “survival 
from without,” but from non-human threats.
Applying the views of earlier scholars to the more 
contemporary context, Chapra (2008) states that hifdh 
al-nafs involves the achievement of the following:
 1. Dignity, self-respect, brotherhood and social 
equality
 2. Justice
 3. Spiritual and moral uplift
 4. Security of life, property and honor
 5. Freedom
 6. Education
 7. Good governance
 8. Removal of poverty and need fulfillment
 9. Employment and self-employment opportunities
10. Equitable distribution of income and wealth
11. Marriage and stable family life
12. Family and social solidarity
13. Minimization of crime and anomie
14. Mental peace and happiness
Hence, based on the views of the various scholars, hifdh 
al-nafs can be defined as the preservation of human life 
through three means. The first is survival from within, which 
includes (a) human sustenance through the fulfillment of 
human physical and biological needs in terms of food and 
drinks, (b) fulfillment of spiritual/psychological needs, 
which include moral and spiritual uplift, and (c) fulfillment 
of intellectual needs through education. The second way 
to achieve hifdh al-nafs is survival from without, i.e., 
(a) the general protection of human life from harm and 
danger in his natural environment through the provision 
of clothing and shelter, (b) the protection of human life 
from nonhuman threats such as diseases through medical 
treatments, preventive medicine and disease control 
mechanisms such as vaccinations, and (c) protection of 
life from human threats, either individually or collectively 
through the provision of public security to minimize 
the incidence of crime and a legal structure that serves 
as deterrence to life threatening crimes, such as capital 
punishment for murder. The third way to achieve hifdh al-
nafs is the fulfillment of social needs (based on Chapra’s 
definition) through the achievement of brotherhood, 
social equality, good governance, equitable distribution of 
income and wealth, and family and social solidarity. The 
definition can be summarized in Figure 5.
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Hifdh al-mal (preservation of property/wealth)
For hifdh al-mal, according to Ibn Ashur (2006), 
preservation of property means protecting the wealth of 
the community from being ruined and from shifting to the 
hands of others without compensation. Al-Juwayni and 
Al-Ghazali in Al-Raysuni (2006) describe this preservation 
as the protection of people’s possessions from thieves 
by cutting off their hands, while Al-Shatibi in Al-Raysuni 
(2006) states that it is the prohibition against injustice, 
depriving orphans of their property, wastefulness, envy, 
giving short measure and weight, corruption in the land.
Contemporary literature on hifdh al-mal views it in a more 
“holistic” manner, i.e., (i) protection of ownership and 
property; (ii) acquisition and development of property 
or wealth and (iii) preservation of wealth. This can be 
found in the writings by Hassan and Mahlknecht (2011); 
Ng (2008); Dusuki and Bouheraoua (2011); and Chapra 
(2008). Ng elaborates that preservation of wealth with 
regards to its availability as essentials or daruriyyah; 
circulation of wealth as complementariness or hajiyyah; 
while investment and growth of wealth as embellishment 
or tahsiniyyah. Hassan and Mahlknecht (2011) emphasize 
that there must be transparency in wealth and finance, and 
justice in the circulation of wealth.
Chapra (2008) stresses the importance of promoting 
equitable distribution of income and wealth in the 
development of and expansion of wealth. He provides the 
following suggestions to achieve this purpose:
i. Redistributive methods of zakah, sadaqat and awqaf
ii. Economic development to increase national income:
a. Strengthening of human resources – education, 
technological advance, work ethics, etc.
b. Proper monetary and fiscal policies to accelerate 
development
c. Access to capital for the poor – microfinance
d. Employment and self-employment opportunities – 
vocational training, etc.
He also states that the development and expansion of 
wealth can be realized through:
i. Education, research, and improvement in technology 
and management
ii. Security of life, property and honor
iii. Good governance
iv. Freedom of enterprise
v. Employment and self-employment opportunities
The discussions on hifdh al-mal can be consolidated and 
summarized in Figure 6.
Hifdh al-nasl or al-nasb (preservation of progeny or 
lineage)
The concept of hifdh al-nasl involves the protection, 
preservation and promotion of progeny (Kasule, 2004), 
it is essential in Islam for a healthy, productive and 
effective Islamic society. This is against the background 
that no civilization can endure if its future generations 
are spiritually, physically, and mentally inferior to the 
preceding ones and thus, unable to respond fruitfully to the 
challenges they face (Chapra, 2008). Moreover, the desire 
to have offspring is a very strong natural human instinct. 
This fact is recognized in the Holy Qur’an, where Allah 
PRESERVATION OF HUMAN LIFE
(HIFDH AL-NAFS) 
I. Fulfillment of basic
needs - physical &
spiritual
II. Fulfillment of basic needs
- moral & social
Fulfillment of social needs
- through the achievement of
brotherhood, social equality,
good governance, equitable
distribution of income and
wealth, and family and social
solidarity
(a) Human sustenance
- through the
fulfillment of human
physical and biological
needs in terms of food
and drinks
(b) Fulfilment of
spiritual/psychological
needs
- through moral and
spiritual upliftment
(c) fulfilment of
intellectual needs
through education
(a) The general protection of
human life from harm and
danger in his natural
environment
- through the provision of
clothing and shelter
(b) the protection of human life
from nonhuman threats such as
diseases
- through medical treatments,
preventive medicine and
disease control mechanisms
such as vaccinations
(c) protection of life from
human threats, either
individually or collectively
- through the provision of
public security to minimize the
incidence of crime and a legal
structure that serves as
deterrence to life threatening
crimes, such as capital
punishment for murder
Figure 5. Preservation of human life (hifdh al-nafs).
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(S.W.T) stated that wealth and progeny are the allurements 
of this world (Fadel, 2002). In a hadith, the Prophet (pbuh) 
called on the ummah to marry and have children so that he 
will be proud of it in the hereafter.
In Islam, Nasl is preserved by legitimizing marriage, 
prohibiting adultery and forbidding emasculation among 
others (Al Sari, n.d.). On the other hand Çizakça (2007) 
viewed hifdh al-nasl as the protection of future generations; 
in this regard he argued that the “Al-Ghazali Optimum” is 
reached only when it is no longer possible to improve one 
of the five components of maqasid al-Shariah without 
impairing any one of the remaining in the current or future 
generation.
Hifdh al-nasl takes many dimensions depending on the 
particular aspect of human life being considered. In 
everyday life this has taken the form of prohibiting zina, 
adultery, and the harsh hudud punishments mete out upon 
the violators (Çizakça, 2007; Kasule, 2005). Generally, 
the strict moral laws and the prohibition of fornication 
and adultery are part of the stress on the preservation 
of progeny or lineage (Fadel, 2002). Islam does not only 
prohibit adultery, but it also legalized and encouraged 
marriage, thus, hifdh al-nasl is ensured through marriage, 
child birth within the marital bond and proper child bond 
(Kasule, 2004). In Islam, the family is only based on 
marriage, which is controlled by rules and regulations. 
The marriage contract has legal consequence of joint rights 
and responsibilities of husband and wife in relation to one 
another and to their offspring; it is under this protective 
umbrella that children are to be born. In Islam, the right of 
legitimacy is a basic right, and every person has the right 
to be the legitimate child of his/her parents (Fadel, 2002).
In the same vein, Al Sari (n.d.) argued that the principle 
objective of marriage is to preserve posterity and 
continuity of mankind, other objectives that include all 
the benefits men and women gain as a result of marriage 
such as emotional, sexual or even materialistic benefits 
are subsidiary. Although nasl (posterity) may be achieved 
outside the framework of marriage, but such a benefit 
is considered rejected in Islam because it will result in to 
uncertainty as to the legitimacy of the offspring and thus 
jeopardizes their basic rights and thereby undermines the 
maqasid. Therefore, the basic rights of children in Islam 
at various stages of their life, right before conception or 
even marriage up to a certain stage of their life are aimed 
at ensuring protection of the progeny of Muslims’ ummah. 
These rights include, among others, choosing a good mother 
for them, feeding, shelter, education, proper upbringing 
and healthcare. In mu’amalat the law of inheritance ensure 
transfer of property rights from parents to children so that 
they can have a means of sustenance even after the demise 
of their parents (Kasule, 2005).
The elements of the dimensions of hifdh al-nasl are as 
follows:
Premarital level: Selection of right partner, by considering 
factors such as health, behavior, knowledge and even the 
nasl itself, in a hadith reported by Abu Dawud the Prophet 
(pbuh) said “Marry a loving, kind and reproducing female 
as I will take a special pride by you on the Day of Judgment”
Preconception level: Tampering with the reproductive 
process is an unlawful practice in Islam; these include; 
ceasing it in any form, tampering with it in any way or 
reducing it for no legitimate reason (Anonym, n.d.)
Preservation of Wealth (Hifdh al-Mal)
protection of
ownership and
property
from damage, harm
or theft or
exploitation or
injustice, rights and
protection of
ownership
acquisition and development of
property or wealth
preservation of
wealth
availability of wealth, circulation
of wealth and equitable
distribution, encouragement to
work and earn a living lawfully,
employment and self-employment
opportunities, transparency in
wealth and finance, education and
research, freedom of enterprise
value protection,
investment, good
governance
Lawful means for its
acquisition, and secures it
by defending the right of
ownership through
penalizing theft.
The duty of the state to
protect property rights.
Possibility to
acquire and
dispose
wealth or
property
freely.
•
•
•
•
Transparency, prevention of harm and hardship, and justice in circulation.
Must also take into account intergenerational dimension: optimality is reached
when it is no longer possible to improve of any one of the components without
harming any one of the remaining in the current or some other generations.2
Figure 6. Preservation of wealth (hifdh al-mal).
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Prenatal level: As the soul (spirit) is be blown in the foetus 
at the fourth month of pregnancy, Islam prohibits abortion 
after the fourth month of pregnancy; however, if there is a 
grave situation, which endangers the life of mother, there 
is no harm in performing abortion to the foetus (Anonym, 
n.d.)
Postnatal level: Offering adhan to the babies ears soon 
after birth set stage moral upbringing, breastfeeding for 
up to two years of age and care and protection of children 
ensures healthy children.
Childhood and adulthood: In Islam children’s rights are 
numerous; these include right to a decent and peaceful life, 
good and worthy names, protection against all possible 
vices and bad habits such as: lying, cheating, theft, jealousy, 
deception and unkind attitudes towards parents, certain 
necessities of life, including affordable house, lawful food, 
useful education and proper upbringing (Chapra, 2008).
Healthy environment and need fulfillment: Health care 
and good nutrition are the basis of this element, because if 
the children do not get proper nutrition along with a clean 
and healthy environment and suitable medical care, they 
may not grow up to be strong and fit adults and as result 
may not be able to contribute significantly to their societies 
even if they are of high moral standing and well educated 
(Kasule, 2005; Chapra, 2008). Moreover, good nutrition 
for children ensures that they grow as healthy boys and 
girls who are potential parents; also good nutrition for 
pregnant mothers ensures foetal growth and development 
as well as easy delivery (Kasule, 2004; 2005).
Moral and intellectual development: This is part of 
the right of children to good upbringing and education; 
it reinforces the maqasid of the preservation of religion; 
a morally bankrupt and illiterate child will not be the 
proud of his parents and the Muslim ummah at large, 
therefore, parents should inculcate into their children the 
necessary character ((khuluq hasan) and educate them. 
Chapra (2008) argued that in order to make children good 
Muslims, it is necessary to inculcate in them all the decent 
qualities of character (khuluq hasan) that Islam requires 
of its followers, these include honesty, truthfulness, 
conscientiousness, tolerant and able to get along with 
others peacefully, punctual, hardworking, thrifty, polite 
among others.
Freedom from fear, conflict and insecurity and debt 
burden: This underscore the need for a peaceful society 
devoid of chaos and all forms of crisis including economic 
and financial ones, these may jeopardize the welfare of 
future generation, thus the current generation should 
avoid living beyond their means and should create job 
opportunities for future generation (Chapra, 2008).
Operational definitions of maqasid components, 
dimensions and elements
Based on the content analysis of the various definitions of 
Maqasid components by different scholars, the operational 
definitions of the components can be derived as follows:
i. Hifdh al-Din is defined as the preservation and 
development of human faith through spiritual 
enrichment, embracing good moral standards and 
performing religious practices at the individual, 
family and ummatic level.
ii. Hifdh al-Aql is defined as utilizing and developing the 
intellect and safeguarding the mind from negative 
influences, such as drugs and superstitions.
iii. Hifdh al-Nafs is defined as ensuring the existence, 
sustenance and development of human life through 
the fulfillment of basic needs, both physical & 
spiritual, and moral & social needs, and its protection 
from threats, both human and non-human.
iv. Hifdh al-Mal is defined as the protection of ownership 
and property from damage, harm, theft, exploitation 
or injustice. In addition, it also encompasses the 
acquisition and development of wealth by making 
it available through circulation and equitable 
distribution, as well as preserving the wealth through 
investment and good governance.
v. Hifdh al-Nasl is defined as the protection of 
everything that would ensure the survival and 
progress of the family (in all dimensions – physical, 
material, spiritual, emotional) and the preservation 
and development of future generations.
From the operational definitions given above, the 
dimensions of each component of the Maqasid are identified 
and summarized in Table 1.
For hifdh al-din, only two of the three dimensions are 
selected, namely, spiritual enrichment, and embracing 
good moral standards. Due to the difficulty in measuring 
religious practices as a composite measure, it has been 
excluded.3 For hifdh al-aql, the dimension of developing 
the intellect is included as measured by primary and 
secondary school enrollment. Three dimensions are 
selected for hifdh al-nafs, namely fulfillment of basic needs 
(physical), fulfillment of moral needs, and protection from 
threats (human). The dimension of fulfillment of basic 
needs (spiritual) is in effect also included since its elements 
of religious and non-religious education has already been 
captured in the measurements of spiritual enrichment 
in hifdh al-din and developing the intellect in hifdh al-
aql. The Maqasid component hifdh al-mal is measured by 
two dimensions of protection of ownership and property 
and acquisition and development of property/wealth, 
measured by the readily available international property 
rights index and the inclusive wealth index, respectively. 
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP), that has been regularly 
used to reflect wealth/income in HDI and even E-HDI 
in Dar (2004) has been replaced by the inclusive wealth 
index. The last component, hifdh al-nasl, includes survival 
and progress of the family and protection of progeny, 
as measured by divorce rate and child mortality rates, 
respectively.
As illustrated above, the construction of the I-Dex is 
based on the dimensions identified from the conceptual 
definitions given by Muslim scholars on the components of 
Maqasid al-Shariah. This is the major difference from the 
E-HDI developed by Dar (2004) amd Anto (2009), where 
the applications of Maqasid al-Shariah do not explicitly 
take into account the various dimensions embedded in 
each Maqasid component. As such, the I-Dex is deemed to 
represent a more comprehensive approach in measuring 
development from the Islamic perspective.
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Conclusion
This study proposes to develop an integrated Islamic 
development framework and index based on, and 
representing, the Maqasid al-Shariah or noble objectives of 
the Shariah for OIC and non-OIC countries. The Integrated 
Development Framework based on Maqasid al-Shariah 
has been developed based on the works by al-Ghazali 
and Abu Zaharah. Using content analysis, the operational 
definitions of each component of Maqasid al-Shariah 
have been derived, and the dimensions identified based 
on the scope of the definitions. The elements have been 
selected for each dimension based on the relevant existing 
indicators. However, data availability still poses a major 
constraint in selecting more relevant indicators.
The Maqasid-based Integrated Development Index (I-Dex) 
will be computed in a follow-up study that willl involve data 
collection and empirical work. The I-Dex is hoped to better 
represent holistic development and well-being according to 
Islamic benchmarks, hence providing academics, students 
and policymakers in Muslim countries with an alternative 
measurement of progress.
Notes
1. http://hdr.undp.org/hd/
2. Cizakca (2007).
3. This is an area for future studies where a composite 
measure of religiosity may be developed and 
included in the I-Dex.
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Introduction
The effect of Islamic banks’ development on economic 
growth remains ambiguous at both the empirical and the 
theoretical levels. Theoretically, the analytical contributions 
of Chapra (1988 and 2003) and Hasan & Dridi (2010) 
have postulated that the integration of the Islamic legal 
framework (said Shariah) in finance and banking has 
enhanced the improvement of the economic activity. These 
authors, along with many others, such as Tag El-Din (2008) 
and Khan and Bashar (2008), have recommended the 
implementation and generalization of the Islamic finance 
principles. Indeed, they have considered these principles as 
necessary for the sake of improving contractual equity and 
economic efficiency. Conversely, Bjorvatn (1998), Kuran 
(1995 and 2004) as well as Yusof and Wilson (2005) have 
highlighted the fact that the Islamic finance principles have 
handicapped the development of the economic activity. 
Other economists such as Darrat (1988), Yousefi et al. 
(1997), Hasan (2008), Furqani and Mulyany (2009) and 
Ammar-Ayachi et al. (2011) have reached the result that 
the impact of the Islamic finance on the economic activity 
has turned out to be ambiguous and that there are no proofs 
of the superiority of the interest-free financial system over 
of the interest-based one.
In this paper we propose that the development of the 
Islamic banks, which are supposed to meet and respect a 
particular legal framework (in particular the prohibition of 
riba and the integration of PLS1 principle), does contribute 
to improving the economic activity. This research proposal 
is based on the works of Chapra (1988 and 2008), Tag 
El-Din (2008) and Khan and Bashar (2008). The first 
author thinks that the presence of the Islamic finance in 
the financial system allows more prosperous activity and 
sustainable growth through the reduction of poverty, 
which, according to him, is a necessary step for economic 
development. As for the second author, he considers that 
unlike conventional finance, the Islamic finance principles 
allow a fairer distribution of risks. Regarding Khan and 
Bashar (2008), they consider that implementing the risk 
sharing principle ensures economic efficiency.
The estimation of the impact of Islamic banking activity 
development has been the subject of very few empirical 
studies. Most of them compare the effectiveness of the 
interest-free monetary and financial system to the interest-
based one. In this respect, and by studying the Tunisian 
case over the period of 1960 to 1984, Darrat (1988) has 
examined the hypothesis stipulating that the financial 
and banking systems become more stable as the interest 
is paralyzed. He has come to the conclusion that the 
interest-free monetary system allows for more stability of 
the money velocity compared to the interest-based one. 
Furthermore, he has shown that the demand for money 
is structurally more stable in the absence of interest. He 
has also concluded that only the monetary and financial 
assets that do not bear interest may be used by the Tunisian 
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monetary authorities as an appropriate intermediate 
targets to reach its medium-term objectives.
Nine years later, Yousefi et al. (1997) published a paper 
in the same journal in which Darrat (1988) submitted his 
study, criticizing his choice of Tunisia as a study case despite 
the fact that this country has no significant experience in 
Islamic banking.2 However, they have proposed to replicate 
the study conducted by Darrat (1988) to the Iranian case 
over the period from 1967 to 1992 because, according to 
them, Iran has a more solid experience than Tunisia in 
terms of Islamic banking. Their empirical findings partially 
confirm the results of Darrat (1988) and, consequently, do 
not allow the validation of the hypothesis assuming the 
superiority of the Islamic banks.
Charles et al. (2011) have tested the hypothesis stating 
that Islamic finance is more resilient to shocks than the 
conventional finance. To test this hypothesis, they have 
examined the question of whether the Islamic stock indices 
are more or less affected by the changes in the volatility 
regimes than the conventional stock indices. They have 
found that the Islamic and the conventional indices were 
affected to the same degree by the volatility changes, and 
discovered no empirical evidence causing them to validate 
the hypothesis of the Islamic finance superiority. During their 
presentation in the Second Symposium of Computational 
Economics and Finance, Arouri et al. (2012) found that 
Islamic finance helps save investors from financial crises by 
comparing some Islamic stock indices to conventional ones.
Using cointegration and Granger causality tests, Furqani 
and Mulyany (2009) were the first researchers to examine 
the empirical relationship between Islamic finance and 
economic growth in Malaysia over the period from 1997Q1 
to 2005Q1. They have found that there is no causality 
between Islamic bank financing and economic growth in the 
short run. Nevertheless, they have found that the Islamic 
bank finance influences the short-term investment level 
positively. In the long term, they have found a reciprocal 
causal relationship between Islamic-bank financing and 
investments. As for the relationship between economic 
growth and Islamic finance development, the authors 
have revealed the existence of a “Robinsonian” long-term 
relationship. That is to say that the development of Islamic 
finance follows the development of the economic activities: 
the economic growth creates a demand for Islamic financial 
intermediation. Although the study of Furqani and Mulyany 
(2009) has permitted the explanation of the relationship 
between Islamic finance and economic growth, it remains 
based on limited observations, which are not adequate in 
econometrics of non-stationary variables.
By studying the impact of Islamic financial development 
on the economic growth in 15 countries over the period 
of 1990 to 2009 on a quarterly basis, Ammar et al. (2011) 
have discovered a prevalence of not only a weak correlation 
between economic growth and the variables measuring 
financial development but also a negative impact of 
Islamic finance on economic growth. Their results might 
be due to the use of inadequate indicators to measure the 
development of Islamic finance.3
In this respect, this paper provides empirical evidence of 
the Islamic finance development effect on the Malaysian 
economic growth over the period 2000Q1–2011Q4. 
We have chosen to study the case of Malaysia for four 
reasons. Firstly, and since its independence, it is one 
of the first countries to have made efforts to reform its 
financial systems in order to integrate Islamic finance. 
Secondly, the Malaysian financial system is a mixed system 
characterized by the simultaneous presence of Islamic and 
non-Islamic financial institutions. This allows us to obtain 
more indicators of Islamic financial development. Thirdly, 
Malaysia is the country where Islamic financial engineering 
is developed most. Finally, and relative to other countries 
that have integrated Islamic finance, Malaysia is one of 
the few countries having a powerful statistical system. 
This enables us to solve the problem of data unavailability 
characterizing the developing countries.
The contribution of our paper is twofold. On the one hand, 
it provides a further contribution to the rare empirical 
literature relative to the impact of Islamic finance on 
growth by determining the elasticity of economic growth 
with respect to Islamic bank financing in Malaysia. On the 
other hand, and to our knowledge, our paper remains the 
first to correctly resort to the Error-Correction Model in 
determining this elasticity.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section  2 
analyzes the Malaysian banking system reforms. Section 3 
analyzes the relationship between Islamic finance and 
economic activity. Section 4 presents the model’s theoretical 
specification. Section  5 outlines the econometric results 
and their economic and statistical interpretation. Finally, 
section 6 highlights the major conclusions to be drawn.
2. The Malaysian banking system reforms
After their independence, countries with Moslem traditions 
discovered that Islamic finance allows them to distance 
themselves from the colonial period. The oil shocks 
represented the main technical element that enticed the 
concretization of the Shariah compliant finance (Martens, 
2001). Respect of the precepts of Islam was the slogan 
of this new branch of finance. During the 1950s, and 
while preparing for its independence, the new Malaysian 
government had supported the idea of creating some 
investment institutions that met the needs of the Moslem 
majority in the Malaysian society. In 1956, the Malaysian 
government created Tabung Haji, a financial institution 
sponsored and supervised by the state. Its main aim was 
to collect the household savings for the pilgrimage (al-Haj) 
and invest in Shariah compliant projects.5
In July 1983, and under Islamic Banking Act (IBA), 
Malaysia established the first Islamic bank: Bank 
Islam  Malaysia Berhad. Since 2005, the Central Bank of 
Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia) has granted licenses 
to foreign Islamic banks to operate in Malaysia. In June 
2011, the Malaysian banking system contained 16 Islamic 
banks.6 In March 1993, a decade after the vote for the 
IBA, the Malaysian authorities, and in compliance with 
the Islamic Banking Scheme (Skim Perbankan Islam),7 
authorized some conventional banks8 to have separate 
Islamic windows in their branches. Under this scheme, the 
conventional banks must have a Shariah board for their 
Islamic banking activity. The international brilliance of 
this country was strengthened in 2002 when the Central 
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Banks and the National Monetary Authorities of some 
Islamic countries decided to implant the headquarters of 
the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) in Malaysia.9 
Since 2005, the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) has 
transformed the Islamic windows into Islamic subsidiaries. 
The removal of the commercialization constraints of the 
Shariah compliant products by the conventional banks 
enhanced the liberalization of the Islamic banking sector, 
which induced an increase in the number of participants 
in the sector. In June 2011, 15 conventional banks already 
offered Islamic banking services in Malaysia.
The political will to implement an adequate legal and 
technical infrastructure for Islamic finance has contributed 
to strengthen the weight of the Islamic banking system. 
Figure 1 illustrates this catch-up effect: over the period 
2007–2011, Islamic banking assets increased at a rate 
faster than the conventional ones. Assuming that, at 
the end of 2011, the growth rates (YOY) of Islamic and 
conventional banking assets remained constant (25.14% 
and 13.14% respectively), we find that the assets size of the 
two sub-systems (Islamic and conventional) will become 
equal in 2025.10 The postcolonial political orientations and 
financial reforms have not only facilitated the integration 
of Islamic bank finance in the Malaysian financial system 
but have also allowed Malaysia to become an international 
center for Islamic finance, indicate Furqani and Mulyany 
(2009).
As mentioned before, Malaysia has implemented financial 
reforms aiming at facilitating the integration of Islamic 
financial institutions in its financial system. The fast and 
remarkable growth of Islamic financial institutions’ weight 
compared to the conventional ones’ in Malaysia shows the 
success of its implementation strategy. The Islamic banking 
subsystem has grown more and more in importance in 
the Malaysian banking system in terms of both balance 
sheet size (see Figure 1) and participant number. This 
revitalization of the Malaysian banking sector may have an 
impact on the economic activity. For example, the annual 
average growth (6.3%) of Islamic banking finance over 
the period from 2000Q1 to 2011Q4 was accompanied by 
a 2.7% growth of the economic activity (measured by the 
GDP) over the same period. Although the trend of these two 
aggregates seems to confirm the analyses of Chapra (1988 
and 2008), Tag El-Din (2008) as well as those of Khan and 
Bashar (2008).11 Adequate statistical and econometric 
evaluations are necessary to examine the macroeconomic 
impact of Islamic banking financing development.
3. Islamic finance and economic activity
Islamic finance and economic opportunities
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2008) think that by excluding 
a large share of the population from access to finance, the 
financial system contributes significantly to the persistence 
of inequality and to the limitation of economic opportunities 
for the poor. Following the same logic, Thurow (1980) has 
argued that in a conventional banking system, the credits 
are granted to those who are lucky instead of financing the 
projects of the most intelligent or meritocratic (Thurow, 
1980 cited by Chapra in 1988 and in 1993). So, can a 
banking system governed by Shariah effectively reduce 
the exclusion of some population groups? Theoretically, 
the answer is yes. Islamic finance offers Shariah compliant 
financial products that are supposed to meet the financial 
needs of the population while being in harmony with the 
religious beliefs of some social groups. Some products 
offered by Islamic finance (including mudharaba and 
musharaka) are not based on the debtor’s creditworthiness 
but rather on the project’s economic viability and on the 
debtor’s entrepreneurial abilities. This encourages the 
entrepreneurs who have investment projects to seek 
funding from Islamic banks. Moreover, Islamic finance 
does not offer its services exclusively to the Muslims, 
but also to all the economic agents in the society. It is 
called “Islamic” just because it has to respect the Shariah 
principles when structuring its products. Consequently, 
from this perspective, Islamic finance can, theoretically, 
reduce the proportion of people excluded from having 
access to finance. This allows Islamic finance to contribute 
to reducing the inequalities and improving the economic 
opportunities for poor people who have a high potential to 
contribute to the creation of added value.12
Islamic-Bank functions and economic activity
It is worth highlighting that the Shariah prohibits the 
borrower-lender relationship as established by the 
traditional bank and introduces a new “participatory 
associative relationship” between the intervening parties 
in financial transactions. This legal framework considers 
that the sharing of profits and losses among the funds’ 
providers and those who provide labor as the just and fair 
alternative, which has to replace the interest rate practice. 
This structure of risk allocation makes the providers 
of funds more enticed to collect, ex ante, information 
about the project and about the agent in need of finance 
(entrepreneur), and to exercise, ex post, monitoring of the 
projects they fund.
Khan and Bashar (2008) think that the implementation 
of the PLS principle ensures the economic efficiency and 
leads to optimal levels of production, consumption and 
exchange. By implementing the PLS principle, Islamic 
finance is concerned with the economic viability of 
the projects rather than the personal solvency of the 
entrepreneur, because the most creditworthy entrepreneur 
may not carry the most viable projects. The financial 
instruments that implement the PLS principles effectively 
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are the mudharaba and musharaka contracts. Yet, the 
mudharaba contract represents various risks for agents 
with a financing capacity, such as the project selection risk, 
the risk of opportunistic behavior (adverse selection and/or 
moral hazard)13 from the user of funds (entrepreneur), etc. 
To reduce these risks, the agents with financing capacity 
(AFC) must actively monitor the entrepreneur’s funds. 
Nevertheless, this monitoring process can be so expensive 
(in terms of time and money) that some AFC choose not 
to provide funds for the entrepreneur. If a group of AFC 
forms a financial intermediary that collects the necessary 
information for the identification and funding of the most 
viable projects, then the “marginal cost of monitoring and 
transactions” will be decreasing for each additional AFC 
who decides to join this new institution. At the same time, 
the entrepreneurs will find the necessary funds they need 
thanks to the economies of scale realized by the financial 
intermediaries. The result will be an improvement of the 
loanable funds use rate, which induces a better utilization 
of the productive capacities in the economy. Although this 
theory is analytically convincing, it has not been verified 
empirically for Malaysia. Table 1 shows that the weight of 
the mudharaba financing is marginal (0.12% of the total 
Islamic bank financing in January 2012),14 unlike the mark-
up financial products (Bai Bithaman Ajil, Ijarah Thumma Al-
Bai and Murabaha) that are characterized by a significant 
share equal to 34, 25% and 15%, respectively.
Although the Islamic bank channels the deposits to the 
entrepreneurs having a financing need, it does not allow 
the qualitative transformation of the liabilities à la Gurley 
and Shaw (1960). Theoretically, Islamic banks’ liabilities 
are, contractually, less liquid than those of the traditional 
banks; the depositors in Profit Sharing Investment 
Account (PSIA) know that their deposits do not represent 
a stock of money strictly speaking. Their deposits are 
effectively correlated to the bank assets since Islamic bank 
investments are theoretically backed by a real assets. Any 
shocks occurring on the bank assets will be automatically 
transmitted to the liabilities, indicates Darrat (1988) and 
Yousefi et al. (1997). Moreover, the absence of an active 
Islamic Monetary Market puts Islamic banks in a critical 
situation to obtain their need of liquidity in the short run, 
added Khan and Mirakhor (1994).
Unlike the traditional banks, Islamic ones, at least 
theoretically, do not facilitate transactions in the short 
term, but, through the PLS principle, they are supposed 
to encourage medium and long-term investments. 
However, encouraging long-term investments requires an 
improvement of the short-term exchanges. The fact that 
the Islamic bank is perfectly correlated with the real activity 
is not enough, because this financial structure has to be 
sufficiently liquid to facilitate the short-term transactions, 
which stimulates the investments and the physical capital 
accumulation in the long run.
4. Theoretical model, measures and data
The theoretical specification of the Islamic finance economic 
growth relationship in Malaysia has been founded on the 
basis of the neoclassical production function augmented 
by some indicators of Islamic financing. Thus, the capital15 
and the labor force16 are used in this paper as the control 
variables of the economic growth. The construction Ta
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of Islamic finance indicators has been inspired by the 
analyses of Goldsmith (1969)17, King and Levine (1993a 
and 1993b), Levine (1993, 1997 and 2005)18 Galindo and 
Micco (2004), Ammar-Ayachi et al. (2011)19, Abu-Bader 
and Abu-Qarn (2008) and Furqani and Mulyany (2008).
To estimate Islamic bank contribution in financing the 
economy, we use the following indicators: “PRIVATE”, 
“PRIVIS” and “INVIS”. The latter are, respectively, defined 
as being the ratio of the outstanding loans granted by 
Islamic banks to the total outstanding bank loans (Islamic 
and non-Islamic) granted to the private sector,20 as the ratio 
of the bank loans granted to the private sector by Islamic 
banks to the GDP and as the ratio of the loans granted by 
the Islamic Financial Intermediaries to private investments. 
The “PRIVATE” ratio allows measuring Islamic banks’ 
contributions in financing the economy. The “PRIVIS” 
ratio, which approximates the “PRIVY” ratio proposed by 
Levine (1997),21 is used as a measure of Islamic banking 
sector development. Regarding the “INVIS” ratio, which 
enables us to complete the “PRIVIS” ratio, it allows to 
assess the contribution of Islamic financial intermediaries 
in the capital accumulation of the economy.
Concerning the case of the Malaysian economy, the 
dynamics of these indicators during the period 2000:1–
2011:4 are presented by the following graphs:
As standard practices, we use the real GDP (on Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP)) to measure the real income level. 
Several sources have been used for data collecting 
purposes, namely: the Department of Statistics Malaysia 
for the GFCF (Gross Fixed Capital Formation) and for the 
GDP, the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia) 
for the Islamic bank financing,22 the International Financial 
Statistics for the labor force, and the Oxford Economics (via 
Datastream) for the CPI (Consumer Price Index) and for the 
PPP-based real GDP. We have also used Thomson-Reuters 
to get the series of the MYR/USD exchange rates necessary 
to express all the aggregates in US Dollar. All the series are 
in quarterly frequency, ranging over the period extending 
from the first quarter of 2000 to the fourth quarter of 2011.
5. Econometric results and interpretation
To estimate the impact of Islamic bank finance on the 
economic growth in Malaysia, we use, as mentioned 
above, a neoclassical production function augmented by 
indicators of Islamic bank finance. This function is specified 
as follows:
 LY LX LW LK Ut t t t t= + + + +λ λ λ λ1 2 3 4  (1)
Where Y stands for the real income measured by the PPP-
based GDP, X is an indicator of Islamic bank financing depth 
measured by the ratios “PRIVATE”, “PRIVIS” or “INVIS”, 
W is the labor force, and K, replaced by the GFCF, is the 
variation of the physical capital stock. L denotes the natural 
logarithm of variables. U is a stochastic term.
The KPSS and the ADF tests show that all the variables 
of model (1) are integrated of order 1.23 This integration 
degree allows us to use the Johansen’s procedure to test the 
existence of potential cointegration vector(s) or long-run 
relationships between the variables of model (1). For each 
Islamic financing indicator, Table 2 shows the existence of 
a single long-run relationship between this indicator, GDP, 
investment and labor.
The econometric results in Table 2 show that the long-
term growth elasticity in Malaysia is not so sensitive to 
the different indicators of Islamic bank financing. In fact, 
a 1% increase of any Islamic financing indicator allows a 
growth increase in Malaysia by a percentage that varies 
between 0.148% and 0.206% only. This economic result 
can be explained by the fact that the non-participatory 
(Mark-up) Islamic bank financing, usually of short term, 
dominates (75%) the participatory (PLS) instruments 
(25%), generally of long term. Moreover, we believe that 
the elasticity of the Malaysian economic growth with 
respect to the capital stock is biased because the economy 
in question is not highly capital-intensive as it is the case 
with the industrialized countries.
The existence of a long-term relationship between the 
variables of model (1) allows us, in accordance with Engel 
and Granger representation theorem (1987), to formulate 
the following structural model with an error correction 
term as follows:
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The variable X expresses an indicator of Islamic bank 
financing which can be either “PRIVATE,” “PRIVIS” or 
“INVIS.” The variable ECTX expresses the residual terms or 
deviations from the GDP equilibrium calculated three times 
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Figure 2. Development Indicators of the Islamic Banking 
Sector in Malaysia.
Sources: BNM / IFS / Department of Economics-Malaysia 
/ Authors’ Calculations.
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by considering, firstly, the indicator “PRIVATE,” secondly, 
the indicator “INVIS” and thirdly the indicator “PRIVIS.”
Three error correction equations (equations A, B, and C, 
see table 3) have been estimated, each of them contains an 
Islamic financing indicator (PRIVATE in equation A, PRIVIS 
in equation B, and INVIS in equation C). Table 3 shows the 
econometric results.
In econometric terms, equations A, B and C reveal 
neither a problem of autocorrelation, as shown by the LM 
statistics, nor a problem of conditional heteroskedasticity, 
as evidenced by the ARCH test statistics, and not even a 
problem of linearity, as shown by the Ramsey test. These 
statistical results allow us to conclude that these estimators 
are efficient and, therefore, the t-statistics turn out to be 
reliable. The test of Jarque and Bera proves the normality of 
the shocks, which make possible the use of the student test.
Economically, the econometric results shown in Table 3 
enable us to draw several empirical remarks. First, we 
note that all the adjustment forces are negative, between 
0 and 1, in absolute value, and are statistically significant. 
This indicates the existence of an adjustment process 
towards the equilibrium of the GDP. Second, we notice 
that the estimated adjustment coefficient in equation “A” is 
significantly greater than those of equations “B” and “C.” 
This means that in equation “A,” 71% of the GDP deviations 
are corrected, which is not the case in equations “B” and 
“C,” where we observe a correction process estimated to 
31% and 43% respectively. Thus, we can conclude that the 
inclusion of Islamic indicator “PRIVATE” in equation “A” 
induces an adjustment process that is more significant than 
those observed in equations “B” and “C,” where “INVIS” and 
“PRIVIS” are used. This can be explained by the structure of 
Islamic bank finance indicators that we have constructed.
Indeed, the outstanding Islamic loans, appearing in the 
numerator, represent the common point for the entire 
Islamic bank finance development indicators proposed in 
this paper. The denominator, however, differs from one 
indicator to another. The indicator “PRIVATE” is deflated 
by the total of the bank loans while the ratios “PRIVIS” and 
“INVIS” are deflated by the GDP and GFCF respectively. The 
construction of these indicators indicate that the bank loans, 
as used in “PRIVATE,” have been more active in correcting 
the GDP equilibrium than the other variables considered in 
the denominators of “INVIS” and “PRIVIS.”24 The evolution 
of these bank loans is more important and volatile than the 
dynamics of the macroeconomic aggregates used in the 
other two indicators (GDP and the GFCF). This volatility of 
bank loans seems to give more dynamics to the “PRIVATE,” 
which explains the fact that the adjustment mechanism of 
the GDP to the equilibrium is more important in equation 
“A” than those in equations “B” and “C.”
Furthermore, we notice that the short-term effect of the 
different variables of Islamic bank finance seems to be more 
important than the long-term effect. This econometric 
result is in line with the economic reality in Malaysia, as 
Islamic banks engage much more in non-participatory 
activities (see Table 1) whose impact is, generally, of a short-
term nature.25 This has been confirmed by our econometric 
estimation since the GDP short-term elasticities are greater 
than those estimated in the long term. Table 3 shows that 
the estimated growth elasticity with respect to PRIVATE 
equals 0.365  much greater than the long-run one, which 
equals 0.187.
Table 2. Cointegration analysis between GDP, GFCF, labour and an indicator of Islamic financing.
ltrace test lmax test
Null hypothesis r=0 r≤1 r≤2 r≤3 r=0 r=1 r=2 r=3
Alternative hypothesis r≥1 r≥2 r≥3 r=4 r=1 r=2 r=3 r=4
The variable “PRIVATE” as an indicator of Islamic bank financing
LR statistic 54.98 20.17 9.68 3.29 24.81 15.48 8.39 3.29
Critical values 40.17 24.27 12.32 4.12 24.15 15.79 11.22 4.12
LY LK LW LPRIVATE
Long-term relationship -1 0.709 0.524 0.187
The variable “INVIS” as an indicator of Islamic bank financing
LR statistic 49.35 18.17 12.05 3.75 31.17 16.12 6.30 3.75
Critical values 40.17 24.27 12.32 4.12 24.15 15.79 11.22 4.12
LY LK LW LINVIS
Long-term relationship -1 0,758 0,423 0,148
The variable “PRIVIS” as an indicator of Islamic bank financing
LR statistic 57.66 20.40 10.82 3.60 27.26 14.57 10.21 3.60
Critical values 40.17 24.27 12.32 4.12 24.15 15.79 11.22 4.12
LY LK LW LPRIVIS
Long-term relationship -1 0,690 0,534 0,206
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6. Conclusion
In this paper we have attempted to estimate the impact of 
Islamic bank finance on the economic growth in Malaysia 
over the period from 2000Q1 to 2011Q4. A neoclassical 
production function augmented by some indicators of 
Islamic bank finance has been the theoretical framework 
for our empirical investigation. The unit root tests show 
that all the variables are integrated of order 1. The test 
of Johansen-Juselius (1990) has shown the existence of 
a single cointegrating relationship between the GDP, the 
investment, the labor force and the indicator of Islamic 
bank finance. Hence, an error correction model has been 
constructed to estimate the economic growth elasticity 
with respect to the different Islamic bank finance indicators. 
Based on the estimated long-term relationship, the 
elasticities of the GDP to the three Islamic finance indicators 
(PRIVATE, INVIS and PRIVIS) are equal to 0.187, 0.148 
and 0.206% respectively. These estimated elasticities show 
that, in the long-term, the GDP in Malaysia is not sensitive 
to Islamic financing. The presence of a cointegrating vector 
between the variables in question has enabled us to specify 
an error correction model whose estimation has allowed 
us to identify the short-term elasticity of economic growth 
with regard to Islamic finance indicators. The estimation 
of such a model shows short-term Islamic financing/
economic-growth elasticities which are more important 
than the long-term elasticities. With respect to the different 
Islamic financing indicators, these short run elasticities 
turn around 0.35. This economic result can be explained 
by the structure of Islamic bank financing that marginalizes 
the PLS-based instruments. This turns out to be consistent 
with the economic reality in Malaysia, since Islamic banks 
engage much more in non-participatory activities whose 
impact is, generally, of short-term. The estimated ECM 
model has also shown negative and statistically-significant 
adjustment forces for the different indicators of Islamic 
financing. This result allows us to confirm the presence of 
an adjustment process towards the equilibrium level of the 
GDP. This process is more important in the equation where 
the variable “PRIVATE” is used as an indicator of Islamic 
finance development.
Table 3. Equations of the Economic Growth (Dependant Variable: DY, Estimation by MCO: 2000Q1–2011Q4).
Regressors Coefficients of equation A Coefficients of equation B Coefficients of equation C
Intercept 0.0033 (0.580) 0.0100 (2.063) 0.0012 (0.233)
∆LYt-1 0.1922 (0.085) 0.0416 (0.437)
∆LKt-3 0.0840 (1.560)
∆LKt 0.3747 (8.880) 0.3376 (8.709) 0.6317 (7.546)
∆LWt-3 0.2251 (1.396)
∆LWt-2 0.2555 (1.460)
∆LWt-1 0.2182 (1.106)
∆LWt 0.2907 (1.730) 0.4041 (2.529) 0.2272 (1.479)
∆LPRIVATEt 0.3651 (3.023)
∆LPRIVISt-2 0.3553 (3.511)
∆LPRIVISt-1 -0.3736 (-3.817)
∆LINVISt-2 -0.0609 (-1.705)
∆LINVISt-1 -0.1449 (-2.954)
∆LINVISt 0.3355 (4.429)
Error Correction Term (ECT)
ECTXt-1 -0.7179 (-8.317) -0.3188 (-3.369) -0.4363 (-3.618)
Statistics and Residual Tests
R² 0.8268 0.8389 0.8399
DW 1.8576 2.4150 1.5850
LM (1) F-statistic 0.0233 [0.879] 6.2928 [0.016] 0.6560 [0.423]
LM (2) F-statistic 0.4638 [0.632] 3.0691 [0.059] 0.5881 [0.560]
ARCH (1) F-statistic 0.3362 [0.565] 3.1443 [0.083] 4.6510 [0.036]
ARCH (2) F-statistic 0.2674 [0.766] 1.4221 [0.253] 2.0005 [0.148]
RESET (1) F-statistic 1.1770 [0.285] 0.3931 [0.534] 4.0173 [0.052]
RESET (2) F-statistic 1.9686 [0.155] 0.8379 [0.441] 2.3852 [0.106]
Jarque-Bera test 1.3167 [0.517] 1.1710 [0.556] 0.8970 [0.638]
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Notes
1. PLS stands for Profit and Loss–Sharing.
2. It is worth mentioning that Darrat (1988) has 
clearly indicated, in his paper, that his choice 
for Tunisia as a study case was only due to the 
availability of data.
3. See footnote 18.
4. Although the paper of Furqani and Mulyany (2009) 
used an ECM model, their econometric results 
remain inconsistent since the statistical properties 
of this type of models are asymptotic as these 
authors used only 34 observations.
5. This fund which provides for pilgrimage enjoyed a 
legislative support. It is a non-financial institution 
charged by deposits collection from those wishing 
to make the pilgrimage, and it is committed to 
invest the funds collected in sectors that respect 
the Shariah. All Malaysian who wish to make the 
pilgrimage have to go through Tabung Haji.  For 
more details see Kahf, M., (2004) and Chong, B.S., 
and Liu, M.H., (2009).
6. Affin Islamic Bank Berhad, Al Rajhi Banking & 
Investment Corporation (Malaysia) Berhad, 
Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad, AmIslamic Bank 
Berhad, Asian Finance Bank Berhad, Bank Islam 
Malaysia Berhad, Bank Muamalat Malaysia 
Berhad, CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad, Hong Leong 
Islamic Bank Berhad, HSBC Amanah Malaysia 
Berhad, Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) Berhad, 
Maybank Islamic Berhad, RHB Islamic Bank 
Berhad, Standard Chartered Saadiq Berhad, Public 
Islamic Bank Berhad, OCBC Al-Amin Bank Berhad.
7. On November 12, 1998, the Central Bank of 
Malaysia (BNM) issued a circular to replace the 
SPTF term (Skim Perbankan Tanpa Faedah) used 
since 1993 by the term SPI (Skim Perbankan Islam). 
8. These Banks have had their license in accordance 
with the Banking and Financial Institutions Act 
(BAFIA) adopted by the parliament in 1989, as a 
substitution to the Finance Companies Act of 1969 
and the Banking Act of 1973.
9. The mandate of this authority is to ensure the 
stability and the solvency of the Islamic financial 
service industry by the development of new 
standards compliant with the Islamic Financial 
Institutions, and by the harmonization of the 
practices in the financial industry. Along with 
the revision of Basel in 2005, the IFSB issued two 
regulatory standards on capital adequacy and risk 
management by the Islamic Financial Institutions 
(See Hesse, et al., 2008:180 and Warde, 2000:130).
10. This projection has been made by the authors.
11. The authors consider that the development of the 
Islamic finance will have a positive impact on the 
economic activity.
12. Chapra (2008) argued that poverty reduction is a 
necessary step for economic development.
13. Despite the fact that moral hazard is among the 
most significant risks in the PLS contracts (Bacha, 
1997; Bjorvatn, 1998; al-Jarhi, 2007; Sugema et 
al., 2010), it does not explain, by itself, why the 
Islamic banks marginalize this type of contracts. 
Moral hazard is a general problem and it is not 
exclusively specific to the Islamic banks: banks, 
whether Islamic or Conventional, are exposed 
to such a risk. However, the problem [moral 
hazard] is particularly serious in the developing 
countries where the systematic holding of a regular 
accounting is rare and/or where companies, and 
for reasons of tax evasion, keep several accounts. 
As a result, the monitoring cost that the Islamic 
bank has to pay to verify the real profitability of 
the project is very high in comparison with the cost 
that traditional banks bear, said Bjorvatn (1998). 
The result is a decline in the share of the real asset-
backed long-term financing based on the PLS.
14. The obligation of backing by a real asset helps 
to eliminate most unproductive and speculative 
transactions that involve gharar (high uncertainty) 
and qimar (bet), indicates Chapra (2008). This 
favors the accumulation of physical capital which, 
in turn, stimulates the economic activity. Iqbal and 
Mirakhor (1987) indicate that this theory has not 
been empirically validated by the facts. In practice, 
Islamic banks are reluctant to invest in long-term 
projects and prefer to fund short-term projects. 
This can be explained by the fact that “the long-
term” is unknown and unpredictable (Chapra, 
2003). By focusing on financing the working 
capital and trade in the short-term, the Islamic 
banks marginalize the financing of the long-term 
investment projects, thus reducing the economic 
growth and development prospects. 
15. In theory, the Islamic finance is perfectly correlated 
with the real economy as any financial transaction 
must be backed by a real asset rather than by an 
imaginary or notional one (Chapra, 2008). This 
principle is of paramount importance for the 
structuring of certain products such as sukuk (the 
name given to the Shariah compliant Bonds). For 
this reason, we include, in the same way as Abu-
Bader and Abu-Qarn (2008) and Fuqani and 
Mulyany (2008), the ratio of investment to the GDP 
(denoted K in the econometric specification) in the 
economic growth specification.
16. As the labor force is the main factor that explains 
and justifies the wealth creation and capital 
accumulation by the individuals in Islam (Touba, 
2006; Martan, 2001), we include the labor force 
as an exogenous variable to explain the dynamic of 
the economic activity.
17. To measure the financial development, Goldsmith 
(1969) uses the assets value of the financial 
intermediaries divided by the Gross National 
Product (GNP), under the assumption that the 
financial system size is positively correlated with 
the quality of the supplied financial services. 
He found a strong correlation between financial 
development and economic growth for 35 countries 
studied over the period 1866-1963.
18. King and Levine (1993a; 1993b) and Levine (1997 
and 2005) have investigated the relationship 
between financial development and economic 
growth for a panel of 80 countries over the period 
1960-1989. They have used four measures of 
the financial development level. For instance, to 
measure the size of the financial intermediaries, 
they have used the “DEPTH” ratio, which is equal 
to the financial system’s liquid liabilities divided by 
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the GDP. They found a strong correlation between 
this ratio and the real GDP per capita.
19. Ammar-Ayachi et al. (2011) have used the ratio of 
broad money (M3) divided by the GDP to measure 
the size of the Islamic financial intermediaries. 
This is not adequate to measure the size of the 
Islamic finance because their sample, consisting of 
15 countries, has included 12 countries that have 
adopted the mixed system—i.e. countries with 
Islamic and “non-Islamic” financial intermediaries.
20. King and Levine (1993) and Levine (1997) have 
used the ratio of credits allocated to the private 
companies to the total of the domestic credits 
(while subtracting the loans granted to banks).
21. The purpose of the financial system is to finance 
the economic activity through the financing of the 
private economic agents. Galindo and Micco (2004) 
have found that the State led banks do not facilitate 
the growth of the manufacturing industries which 
depend on external financing. Levine (1993 and 
1997) also considers that if the raison d’être of a 
financial system is to fund the government, then 
it will be no more effective in the fulfillment of 
its functions, because the financial systems that 
grant more credits to the private firms are more 
active in the search for private information, in 
the monitoring of the funded projects, in the risk 
management, in the mobilization of savings and 
in facilitating transactions. For this reason, King 
and Levine (1993a,b) and Levine (1997) use the 
“PRIVY” ratio, which is equal to the credit granted to 
the private sector divided by the GDP, as a measure 
of the development of the financial system.
22. We gathered the data on the Islamic bank financing 
from Tables 1.18.1, 1.19.2 and 1.19.3 available on 
the website of the BNM.
23. The unit root test results are not submitted in the 
paper but can be provided by the authors upon 
request.
24. The exogeneity test has also shown that “PRIVATE” 
is weekly exogenous, which indicates that this 
indicator contributes to the GDP adjustment process 
but it does not undergo an adjustment process. This 
econometric result is available upon request.
25. As explained above, the engagement of the Islamic 
banks in the short-run activities is not conforming 
to the PLS principles of the Islamic finance.
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Abstract - This study examines the impact of globalization on cross-country inequality and poverty 
using a new comparable panel data for Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and non-OIC 
developing countries over a long period, 1970–2008. The major findings of the study are that, first, 
a non-monotonic relationship between income distribution and level of economic development 
holds in both samples of countries. However, this relationship is comparatively stronger in the case 
of non-OIC countries. Second, globalization causes adverse consequences on income inequalities 
in OIC countries while it does not exert adverse effects in non-OIC countries. Third, in the poverty 
model, openness to trade accentuates not ameliorates poverty in both sets of countries, while FDI 
affects only the poor of the non-OIC countries. Fourth, financial liberalization exerts a negative 
and significant influence on income distribution in OIC countries only. Fifth, inflation distorts 
income distribution and poverty in both sets of countries. Finally, the role of government is robustly 
significant in reducing inequalities and poverty in non-OIC countries, while the role of government 
is insignificant in the OIC world. The overall results of this study show that globalization exerts 
adverse distributional and poverty consequences and, comparatively, OIC countries suffer more 
from the adverse consequences of globalization. This study concludes that OIC countries are 
different from non-OIC countries in terms of their exposure with globalization.
Keywords: globalization, poverty, inequality, FDI, OIC countries
Introduction
Jeffrey Williamson (2002) points out that the current world 
has experienced two globalization booms and one bust over 
the past two centuries. The first wave of globalization started 
at the end of 18th century and lasted until the beginning of 
World War I, while the second wave of globalization started 
at the end of World War II and exists until the present. The 
inter-war period was one of an anti-global backlash because, 
during this period, countries followed inward-looking 
policies using trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas.
The first wave of globalization was driven mainly by 
technical improvements in transportation systems, massive 
migration, and long-term foreign direct investment in 
developing countries. The industrial revolution of the 
UK also played a key role in increasing the speed of 
globalization as it led to high productivity and inter-country 
trade flows. The second wave of globalization was driven 
mainly by short-term financial flows, a dramatic reduction 
in communication costs (referred to as “the death of 
distance”), and outward looking trade policies.
The world was homogeneously poor and agrarian at the 
beginning of the first wave of globalization. However, the 
world was sharply divided between rich industrial nations 
and poor primary producers at the beginning of second 
wave of globalization.
In the first episode of globalization, poverty decreased 
from 84% in 1820 to 66% in 1910. In the second episode 
of globalization, the poor benefitted more as poverty 
decreased from 55% in 1950 to 24% in 1992. The poverty 
rates probably remained stagnant during the inter-war 
period.
Recently, Sala-i-Martin (2002) found that poverty rates 
have reduced remarkably over the recent two decades. 
He shows that the numbers of poor, subsisting on $1/
day, decreased by 235  million between 1976 and 1998. 
However, the decline of poverty rates across regions has 
been far from uniform. In this period, Asia has undergone 
dramatic improvements, particularly after 1980. In Latin 
America, poverty reduced substantially in the 1970s but 
effectively stopped in the 1980s and 1990s. Africa has been 
a disaster area with respect to poverty as poverty rates in 
this region have increased substantially over the last thirty 
years. In Africa, the number of $1/day poor increased by 
175  million over the period 1970–1998. In 1960, 11% 
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of the world’s poor lived in Africa while by 1998 that 
proportion had risen to 66%.
Thus, a historical negative relationship between globa-
lization and poverty masks variations within and between 
countries in their experiences with globalization. Despite 
pro-poor globalization over the past two centuries, poverty 
is still a long-standing issue as one-sixth of the world 
population is still living below the poverty line. This is why 
many decades of increasing globalization could not silence 
the debate over the benefits of globalization. The fierce 
street protests surrounding the ministerial meeting of the 
WTO and similar protests at the World Bank and the IMF 
show that anti-globalization debate is getting stronger.
The arguments that globalization helps the poor and 
decreases inequality are that, according to the static 
argument, globalization in the form of trade liberalization 
enhances demand for exports. Since developing countries 
are abundant in low-skilled labour force, growth in labour-
intensive exports leads to high demand for low-skilled 
workers. This causes lower inequality and poverty because 
the high demand for workers increases real wages (see, 
e.g., Krueger 1983).
The other argument is dynamic, linking trade and poverty 
through growth. Where trade enhances growth, then 
growth, in turn, reduces poverty. Robertson (1940) 
characterized trade as an “engine of growth” while Smith 
(1776) argued that when society is “advancing to the 
further acquisition... the condition of the labouring poor, 
of the great body of the people, seems to be the happiest.”
The argument that globalization, in the form of trade 
openness, increases inequality and poverty is based on 
the concept of “skill premium”. Trade liberalization is 
also a source of technology diffusion from developed to 
developing countries. The technology diffusion generates 
a skill premium in favour of high-skilled labour. Thus, 
demand for labour increases and wage inequalities further 
widen (see, e.g., Berman et al. 1994; Autor et al. 1998).
Other theories on the distributional and poverty 
consequences of globalization can be classified into three 
categories (Wade, 2001):
1. According to the neoclassical growth theory, in the 
long run, income differences across nations are 
likely to converge because of increased international 
capital flows.
2. The endogenous growth theory predicts less 
convergence and more probable divergence because 
increasing returns to technological innovations tend 
to offset diminishing returns to capital.
3. The dependency theory predicts that globalization 
does not lead to absolute convergence. The argument 
is that developing countries have a narrow exports 
base, and relatively limited access to the markets of 
developed economies.
Another related issue is the change in inequality over the 
path of development. The Kuznets (1955) inverted-U 
hypothesis predicts that income inequality increases at 
lower levels of economic development while it tends to 
decline at higher levels of economic development because 
of trickle down effects. Does Kuznets curve hold? Do 
the poor benefit more from higher levels of economic 
development? The existing literature is not yet conclusive.
In the presence of such diverse and contradictory 
theoretical predictions, a deeper understanding of 
distributional and poverty consequences of globalization 
requires largely empirical evidence. The empirical 
literature ignores the relative contribution of globalization 
and other fundamental variables in OIC countries. In 
particular, a comparative analysis of OIC and non-OIC 
countries appears to be missing in the current empirical 
literature. This study, therefore, fills these gaps and 
attempts to provide a better understanding of distributive 
and poverty effects of globalization. Why is it important 
to investigate separate parameter estimates for OIC and 
non-OIC countries? According to the annual economic 
report on the OIC countries 2010, economic performance 
in developing OIC countries is substantially different from 
the rest of the developing countries. Therefore, a separate 
regression modelling to assess the inequality and poverty 
consequences of globalization in OIC countries is necessary 
as it will capture parameter differences.
This study, therefore, attempts to fill the gaps in the existing 
literature by addressing six key concerns:
1. Does economic development benefit different 
economic actors equally or it comes at the cost of 
increased inequality and poverty?
2. Is the effect perhaps different over the path of 
development in the long run?
3. Does high financial intermediation reduce inequality 
and poverty?
4. Do high inflation rates accentuate poverty incidence?
5. Does globalization spill over benefits equally?
6. What is the role of government in all this; does 
government spending reduce potentially existing 
inequality and poverty?
Literature review
The Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model shows that a nation 
specializes in a product which requires an intensive use of 
its abundant factors of production. Developing countries 
specialize in labour-intensive products as they are 
abundant in low-skilled labour. In the process of labour-
intensive product specialization, demand and wages for 
low-skilled labour tend to increase, thereby increasing 
the wage inequality gap. However, the lower inequality 
and poverty predicted by the HO model relies on the 
assumption of identical technologies across countries. 
If this assumption is dropped then distributional and 
poverty effects also depend on technology diffusion from 
developed countries to developing countries that will 
generate a skill premium and increase the demand and 
wages of high-skilled labour. Thus, wage distribution 
becomes more unequal in an open economy (see, e.g., 
Berman et al. 1994; Autor et al. 1998).
In an open economy, increased imports allow a developing 
economy to upgrade its technology through the imports of 
mature and second hand capital goods (see, e.g., Barba et al. 
2002). Acemoglu (2003) also argues that trade openness leads 
to technical upgrading by allowing a rise in the international 
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flows of capital goods. Robbins (2003) defines technological 
upgrading as “skill enhancing trade hypotheses”.
In addition, Perkins and Neumayer (2005) point out that 
a lagging developing country directly jumps on relatively 
new technology and therefore exploits the benefits of the 
late-comer. When the south rapidly adopted the modern 
skill-intensive technologies, the demand for and wages 
of skilled labour increased which, in turn, increased 
inequalities in developing countries. In an open economy, 
exports also create incentives for replacement of outdated 
technologies to have a better access in the markets of 
developed countries. Yeaple (2005) shows that exports 
based on updated technologies lead to high profits.
In a case of Mexico, Hanson and Harrison (1999) show that 
firms demand more white-collar workers in the exporting 
sectors than the non-exporting sectors of production. 
Therefore, exports widen inequalities. Moreover, Berman 
and Machine (2004) confirm this positive relationship 
between exports and inequality for developing countries. 
These studies build a positive link between exports and 
inequality but do not link exports to poverty. Some survey 
studies point out that the relationship between globalization 
and poverty has been assessed indirectly (Winters et al. 
2004; Goldberg and Povcnick 2006; Ravallion 2004). 
This study fills the gap by developing a direct link between 
globalization and poverty for OIC countries
In a case study of Brazil, Carneiro and Arbache (2003) 
found out that trade liberalization may not be sufficient 
to significantly reduce poverty. In another case study of 
Papua New Guinea, Gibson (2000) revealed that poverty 
increased during 1990s. In a recent study, Majeed (2010) 
established that trade accentuates, not ameliorates, and 
that it intensifies, rather than diminishing, poverty in the 
case of Pakistan.
Theory of inequality and poverty determinants
Levels of economic development affect inequalities in a non-
linear way, as predicted by Kuznets (1955). Inequalities 
tend to increase at lower levels of economic development 
but fall at higher levels of economic development due 
to trickle down effects. Paukerit (1973) and Ahluwalia 
(1976) support Kuznet’s point of view. However, some 
later studies (see e.g., Deininger and Squire 1998) do not 
provide evidence to support Kuznet’s Curve.
The role and importance of financial development in 
reducing income inequality can be traced back to the earlier 
theoretical papers of Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee 
and Newman (1993). These papers show the inequality-
narrowing effect of financial development. Nevertheless, 
Greenwood and Jovnovie (1990) predict an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between financial development and 
income distribution; they show that financial development 
initially favors the rich but over time it helps the poor also, 
when more people have access to the financial system.
Inflation can increase inequalities through its effect on 
individual income and can reduce inequalities in the 
presence of a progressive tax system. The inequality-
widening effect of inflation is more pronounced when 
wages fail to chase increasing price levels. In developing 
countries trade unions are weak and minimum wage laws 
are dysfunctional in the presence of weak institutions. 
Thus, workers are left with less or no rise in wages, while 
owners of the firms enjoy the benefits of rising prices and 
become increasingly rich (MacDonald and Majeed 2010).
Income inequality may increase or decrease with increase 
in government spending. If most redistribution through 
taxes and transfer system is towards the poor, government 
spending might result into lower inequality. Papanek and 
Kyn (1986) tested the impact of government intervention 
on inequality and the results of their study do not support 
the contention that government spending reduces 
inequality. They argue that government intervention 
often benefits the elite, such as the political, bureaucratic 
and military leadership, rather than poor. However, some 
cross-country studies (Boyd 1998; MacDonald and Majeed 
2010), found the size of the public sector to be significant 
in reducing income inequality.
Generally, it is believed that faster population growth 
is associated with higher income inequality. One of the 
reasons is that the dependency burden may be higher 
for the poor group. Deaton and Paxon (1997) argue that 
population growth increases the size of families in the 
poor stratum, thereby increasing inequality and poverty. 
Investment in human capital can be expected to reduce 
the income gap as higher education improves skills, 
productivity and labour income.
One of the most widely promoted hypotheses in social sciences 
is that economic growth reduces poverty. Economic growth 
is an important predictor of poverty. It is widely argued in the 
literature that growth is pro poor (see, e.g., Ravallion, 1995, 
1997). Population growth is another important determinant 
of poverty. In the literature, it is generally argued that 
population growth increases poverty. For instance (Deaton 
and Paxon, 1997) argue that population growth increases 
the size of families in the poor stratum, thereby increasing 
poverty. Becker, Glaeser and Murphy (1999) argue that 
population growth does not increase the labour force and 
high income in the presence of poor agricultural economies, 
limited human capital and outdated technology.
Methodology
In this section, a methodological frame work for inequality 
and poverty is introduced. Following the conventional 
wisdom of the literature on inequality, initially Kuznet’s 
curve has been modelled followed by some key control 
variables and, subsequently, proxies for globalization have 
been introduced.
Inequality Model
log log logGini Yit it it it it= + + +α γ γ ε1 2 2Y  (I)
( ,......... ; ,........ )i N t T= =1 1
log Giniit = natural logarithm of the Gini Index
log Yit =  natural logarithm of income per capita, adjusted 
with PPP
log Y2it =  square term controlling nonlinear conditional 
convergence across the countries
eit = disturbance term
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Equation (I) is conventionally used to test for Kuznets 
hypotheses (Randolph and Lot, 1993; Garbis, 2005). The 
expected signs for g1 and g2 are positive and negative 
respectively. Cross country inequality variation depends 
on other factors such as government size, education 
and population growth. Higher targeted government 
spending could reduce inequalities given that rent seeking 
activities are avoided and government spending enhances 
the possibilities and opportunities for the poor. A rise in 
human capital can be expected to narrow down the gap 
between poor and rich as higher education improves skills, 
productivity and labour income.
Equation (I) can be rewritten as:
log log log log
log
Gini Y Y G
HK Pop
it it it it it
it
= + + +
+ +
α γ γ γ
γ γ
1 2
2
3
4 5D it it+ ε  (II)
Git =  natural log of government spending as proxy for 
government spending on social sector
HKit = secondary school enrolment rate
DPopit = percentage change in total population
eit = disturbance term
Finally, globalization variables are included following the 
suggestions of Barro (2000) and Aisbett (2005).
According to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the expected 
sign for g6 depends on the comparative advantage of an 
economy relative to its trading partners. Similarly, the sign 
for g7 could be expected to be either positive or negative.
Poverty Model
This study follows a basic poverty-growth model suggested 
by Ravallion (1997), and Ravallion and Chen (1997). In the 
first step, I estimate the elasticity of poverty with respect 
to economic growth for OIC and non-OIC countries in 
separate regressions. In the next step, this study introduces 
measures for inequality and level of economic development 
in order to estimate their effects on existing poverty 
incidence. The incidence of poverty in this article, for data 
constraints, has been measured as headcount index defined 
as population living below US$1/day per capita, a standard 
measure used in the literature, and adjusted with PPP. The 
relationship for growth-poverty elasticity can be written as:
log P git it it= + +α β ε1  (1)
( ,......... ; ,........ )i N t T= =1 1
Where Pit indicates poverty in country i at time t and git 
measures annual growth rate. The coefficient b1 measures 
elasticity of poverty with respect to growth given by g 
and e is an error term. An estimated value of b1 gives 
the average growth elasticity of poverty in OIC and non-
OIC countries. However, this average measure could be 
misleading because b1 differs across countries and over 
time, depending upon other poverty determinants that 
explain poverty variation. For example, Bourguignon 
(2003) points out the importance of income distribution 
and initial level of development as additional controls of 
poverty while estimating the growth elasticity of poverty; 
he stresses the results whereby b1 is affected significantly 
by inequality changes during a growth spell and by initial 
inequality prevailing at the start of such a spell. The 
modified version of equation (1) that includes inequality 
elasticity of poverty and economic development can be 
written as:
log log( ) ( )P g ineq Xit it it it= + + + +α β β β ε1 2 3  (2)
Pit = natural logarithm of head count ratio
ineq = natural logarithm of Gini index
Xit =  a vector of control variable for poverty other than 
economic growth and income distribution
Apart from the initial distribution of income and level of 
economic development, poverty results from complex 
economic and social processes. For these reasons, this 
model is extended to include some other factors. Recent 
studies suggest that households with better profiles of 
human capital are less prone to poverty incidence compared 
to those with lower acquisition of human capital. This study 
measures human capital with average years of schooling.
Finally, the main factors related to globalization are put into 
the model. Conventionally, in the literature, two measures 
of globalization used are trade and capital flows. Winter 
et al. (2004) found that trade liberalization reduces poverty 
in the long run, while Carneiro and Arbache (2003) did not 
find a significant effect of trade on inequality and poverty 
using the CGE model.
log log( ) ( )
( / ) ( / )
P g ineq X
Trade Y FDI Y
it it it= + + +
+ + +
α β β β
β β ε
1 2 3
4 5 it
 (3)
Trade = ratio of exports plus imports to GDPs
FDI = ratio of FDI inflow to GDP
Data and estimation procedure
This study uses the Gini coefficient to measure 
income inequality, this being one of the most popular 
representations of income inequality. It is based on the 
Lorenz Curve, which plots the share of population against 
the share of income received and has a minimum value of 0 
(case of perfect equality) and maximum value of 1 (perfect 
inequality). Missing values in income inequality data are the 
major problem in cross-country analysis. Many developing 
countries have only one or two observations. Therefore, the 
existing database was expanded by including comparable 
data on inequality from recent household surveys included 
in the World Bank, UNDP, and IMF Staff reports.
To make the data more comparable, this study takes 
data on variables in the form of averages between two 
survey years. Per capita real GDP growth rates are annual 
averages between two survey years. Panel data for 22 
OIC and 43 Non OIC countries for the period 1970–2008 
have been assembled with the data averaged over periods 
of three to seven years, depending on the availability of 
inequality data. The minimum number of observations for 
each country is three and the maximum, nine. That is, only 
countries with observations for at least three consecutive 
periods are included. The description of variables is given 
in Table 1.
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Table 1. Description of variables.
Variable name Definitions and Sources
Per capita real GDP Per capita real GDP growth rates are annual averages between two survey years and are 
derived from the IMF, WDI and International Financial Statistics (IFS) databases.
Gini coefficient It is a measure of income inequality based on Lorenz curve, which plots the share of 
population against the share of income received and has a minimum value of zero 
(reflecting perfect equality) and a maximum value of one (reflecting total inequality). 
The inequality data (Gini coefficient) are derived from World Bank data, UNDP and the 
IMF staff reports.
Secondary school  
enrolment
The secondary school enrolment as % of age group is at the beginning of the period. 
It is used as a proxy of investment in human capital and derived from World Bank 
database.
Inflation Inflation rates, annual averages between two survey years, are calculated using the 
IFS’s CPI data.
Credit as % of GDP Credit as % of GDP represents Claims on the non-financial private sector/GDP and is 
derived from 32d line of the IFS.
M2 as % of GDP It represents Broad money/GDP, and is derived from lines 34 plus 35 of the IFS.
Trade Liberalization It is the sum of exports and imports as a share of real GDP. Data on exports, imports 
and real GDP are in the form of annual averages between survey years.
HFI The level of Financial Intermediation is determined by adding M2 as a % of GDP and 
credit to private sector as % of GDP.
FDI It is measured as net inflow of foreign direct investment as % of GDP and series have 
been derived from WDI.
Poverty It is measure as head count ratio and data has been derived from World Bank.
Estimation technique
Use of pooled time-series and cross-section data provides 
a large sample that is expected to yield efficient parameter 
estimates. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) has the problem 
of omitted variable bias. If a region, country or some 
group-specific factors affect inequality and poverty, 
explanatory variables would capture the effects of these 
factors and estimates would not represent the true effect of 
explanatory variables. Baltagi (2001) proposes fixed effect 
econometric techniques to estimate panel data, which 
could avoid the problem of omitted variable bias. However, 
in the case of lag-independent variable this technique gives 
biased parameter estimates. This analysis is based on the 
Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) technique of estimation. 
This technique addresses the issue of endogeniety, that is 
covariance between independent variables, and the error 
term is not equal to zero; it also addresses the problem 
of omitted variables bias. Alternative econometrics 
techniques such as Limited Information Maximum 
Likelihood (LIML) and Generalized Methods of Moments 
(GMM) are also used.
In this study, the focus is mainly on the Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) estimation technique that has been 
developed for dynamic panel data analysis. This technique 
was introduced Holtz-Eakin et al. (1990), Arellano and 
Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell 
and Bond (1997). GMM control for endogeneity of all the 
explanatory variables allows for the inclusion of lagged 
dependent variables, such as regressors, and accounts for 
unobserved country-specific effects. For GMM estimation 
sufficient instruments are required. Following the standard 
convention in the literature, the equations are estimated by 
using lagged first difference as instrument.
Results and discussion
The estimation strategy for this study is was as follows: first, 
parameter estimates were drawn for OIC countries. Then, 
following the empirical literature on cross-country studies, 
an OLS estimation technique was used to obtain the results, 
and subsequently other econometrics techniques were 
used. These alternative techniques helped to accommodate 
a possible endogeneity problem through using instruments, 
and also helped assess the robustness of results. Initially 
the study focused on the inequality consequences of 
globalization and then the poverty effects of globalization. 
The same estimation strategy was then used for non-OIC 
countries to assess comparative parameter differences.
The second column (2) of Table 5 shows that the estimated 
coefficient for Yit and Y2it are of the signs expected and 
significant. This finding supports the non-monotonic 
relationship between inequality and economic development, 
implying that inequality tends to increase at lower levels 
of economic development while it tends to fall at higher 
levels of economic development. The results reported in 
columns 3–4 show that financial liberalization significantly 
reduces inequality while inflation worsens inequality. Thus, 
financial liberalization helps the poor through credit facility 
while inflation hits the poor hard. It is noteworthy that the 
role of government turns out to be insignificant.
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Columns 5–7 of Table  5 report replication of benchmark 
results using alternative econometrics techniques. The 
estimated coefficient on linear term Yit is about 0.9, and 
-0.05 on the non-linear term Y2it, both being significant. 
This finding implies that the poor suffer in the short-
term at lower levels of economic development while they 
benefit from the development process in the long-run at 
higher levels of economic development. The coefficient 
on financial liberalization is significant and fluctuates 
around 0.11, implying that one standard deviation 
increase in financial liberalization explains 1.8% of income 
inequalities. The estimated coefficient on government 
spending is insignificant in all regressions implying that 
government does not seem to play a role in improving 
inequalities.
Table  6 reports the results of the bench mark model 
including the key variable of concern, openness to 
trade. The estimated coefficient on openness to trade is 
positive and significant at a 1% level of significance in all 
regressions.
The size of coefficient 0.001 remains robustly the same in all 
regressions implying that one standard deviation increase 
in openness to trade increases income inequality by 0.02%. 
This finding supports the views of anti-globalization 
theorists who argue that trade liberalization accentuates, 
not ameliorates, inequality. Other parameter estimates 
remain the same, while overall level of significance 
improves.
Table 7 shows the empirical estimates for the benchmark 
model including FDI inflows (a measure of globalization) 
while excluding openness to trade. A simple correlation 
matrix shows a correlation between openness to trade 
and FDI of around 37% that may create the problem 
of multicolinearity. In order to avoid this problem and 
to assess the independent effects of both measures of 
globalization, this study examines their role individually. 
The results reveal that the estimated coefficient on FDI 
is about 0.02 and positively significant in all cases (see 
Table 3). A one standard deviation increase in FDI explains 
0.33% of income inequalities dispersion in OIC countries.
The magnitude of the parameter estimate for inflation 
remains 0.003, implying that one standard deviation 
increase in inflation leads to 0.05% increase in income 
inequalities. It is noteworthy that the average inflation in 
OIC countries is 25%. Therefore, high inflation rates with 
adverse consequences for the poor in OIC countries call for 
anti-inflationary policy measures. In all estimations (see 
Tables  5–7) standard statistical tests such as F stat, Wald 
Test, Sargan Test and J stat support the estimated model.
The conclusive findings for OIC countries are:
1. Kuznets curve holds in OIC countries that necessitate 
the importance of policies that built a threshold level 
of economic development to pick the poor out from 
poverty traps.
2. Both openness to trade and FDI adversely affect 
income inequalities in Muslim countries.
3. Financial liberalization exerts a negative influence 
on income distribution while inflation exerts a 
positive influence.
4. Government does not appear an important character 
in reducing inequalities.
Table  8 reports the results for non-OIC countries. The 
estimated coefficients on Yit and Y2it are 1.9 and -0.11, 
respectively, these being of expected signs and significant. 
The size of the coefficients is almost double compared with 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics in OIC countries.
OIC-Countries Non-OIC Countries
Variables Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Economic 
Growth
2.05 3.22 -9 9.19 2.73 4.03 -10 13.19
Income 
Inequality
38.89 6.33 25.9 56 42.07 11 19.4 62.5
Human Capital 48.82 21.49 16 94.89 65.41 22.45 16 105.83
Population 2.13 0.82 -0.8 4.2 1.15 1.14 -1 3.3
Government 
Spending
21.08 7.58 5.18 36.5 21.33 9.56 6.29 56
Investment 21.23 5.98 7 38 23.04 5.98 11 45
Inflation 16.98 25 1.43 170 25.54 43.37 -1 310
GDP Per Capita 2731.48 2018.76 260 10023.17 5927.76 4524.11 412 25041.45
Poverty 31.84 18.89 1 72.1 25.58 19.8 0 74
High Financial. 
Int
67.95 42.85 11 250.37 63.58 36.43 10 211.33
Openness to 
Trade
68.36 39.48 10.8 228.88 72.73 38.34 13.05 174.4
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Table 3. Simple correlation matrix for OIC countries.
Grow Ineq HK Pop G Inv Inf PCY Pov Op HFI FDI
Grow 1
Ineq -0.12 1
HK -0.17 0.23 1
Pop 0.11 0.21 -0.42 1
G -0.03 0.11 0.3 -0.04 1
Inv 0.18 0.33 0.39 -0.05 0.3 1
Inf -0.53 0.09 0.21 -0.57 -0.15 -0.06 1
PCY 0.04 0.42 0.59 -0.05 0.34 0.7 -0.03 1
Pov -0.19 -0.27 -0.43 -0.12 -0.38 -0.54 0.23 -0.76 1
Op -0.02 0.41 0.39 0.03 0.28 0.52 -0.02 0.49 -0.18 1
HFI 0.06 0.16 0.23 0.28 0.4 0.61 -0.33 0.67 -0.64 0.51 1
FDI 0.01 0.18 0.21 -0.28 0.1 0.27 0.22 0.11 0.13 0.36 -0.05 1
Table 4. Simple correlation matrix for non-OIC countries
Grow Ineq HK Pop G Inv Inf PCY Pov Op HFI
Grow 1
Ineq 0.04 1
HK -0.01 -0.4 1
Pop 0.18 0.54 -0.72 1
G -0.43 -0.39 0.45 -0.59 1
Inv 0.52 -0.03 0.11 -0.04 -0.23 1
Inf -0.53 0.1 0.18 -0.23 0.19 -0.27 1
PCY -0.14 0 0.48 -0.41 0.43 -0.01 0.04 1
Pov -0.1 -0.05 -0.41 0.3 -0.26 -0.16 0.07 -0.73 1
Op -0.1 -0.01 0.17 -0.21 0.22 0.21 -0.2 0.12 -0.12 1
HFI 0.4 0.01 0.16 -0.13 -0.02 0.56 -0.31 0.3 -0.42 0.11 1
those of the OIC countries, implying that Kuznet’s curve is 
comparatively strong in this sample of countries. This is also 
evident from Figure 1, which shows that a number of OIC 
countries have surpassed the threshold level of economic 
development, while only few OIC countries did so.
The role of financial development is not robust, while the 
parameter estimate for inflation is 0.002, which is robust, 
and significant, implying that one standard deviation 
increase in inflation increases income inequalities by 
0.06%. It is also evident from the descriptive statistics 
(Table 2) that average inflation at 43.3% is much high in 
non-OIC countries.
The population growth rate in non-OIC countries is 
1.15%, which is almost half that in the 2.13% of the OIC 
countries; however, it is interesting to note that population 
growth widens inequalites more in non-OIC countries. One 
standard deviation increase in population growth explains 
4.2% of the inequalities in non-OIC countries, and 2.4 % of 
them in OIC countries.
A sharp contrast between OIC and non-OIC countries 
has been observed regarding the role of government. 
Government spending (a proxy for social spending) exerts 
a negative and significant influence in non-OIC countries. 
Higher targeted government spending can bridge the gap 
between the poor and rich, given that rent-seeking by 
privileged individuals or groups is avoided and bureaucrats 
focus on increasing the possibilities of the poor.
The results reported in Table  9  include the key variable 
of concern, openness to trade. Here, a sharp contrast can 
be observed with respect to the inequality impact of trade 
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Figure 1. Inequality and level of devlopment in OIC countries.
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Figure 2. Inequality and level of devlopment in non-OIC countries.
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Figure 3. Inequality and government spending in non-OIC countries.
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Figure 4. Inequality and government spending in OIC countries.
Table 5. Inequality in OIC countries using alternative econometrics techniques.
Independent 
Variables
Dependent Variable: Income Distribution
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS LIML GMM
Per Capita GDP 0.673  
(2.82)*
0.541  
(1.60)***
0.136  
(4.46)*
0.924  
(1.85)***
0.956  
(1.92)**
0.901  
(2.48)*
Per Capita GDP 
squared
-0.04  
(-2.56)*
-0.025  
(-1.15)
-0.049  
(-1.6)***
-0.049  
(-1.6)***
-0.047  
(-2.11)*
Human Capital 0.034  
(0.80)
0.084  
(1.31)
0.086  
(1.31)
0.099  
(1.61)***
High Financial 
Intermediation
-0.105  
(-3.67)*
-0.085  
(-2.96)*
-.110  
(-3.24)*
-.111  
(-3.26)*
-0.099  
(-3.18)*
Population 0.093  
(4.79)*
0.115  
(5.23)*
0.146  
(5.12)*
0.147  
(5.12)*
0.162  
(5.80)*
Government 
Expenditure
0.47  
(0.15)
0.016  
(0.50)
-0.021  
(-.45)
-0.023  
(-0.48)
-0.023  
(-0.55)
Inflation 0.002  
(2.55)*
0.001  
(0.88)
0.001  
(0.88)
0.002  
(1.18)
Constant 0.873  
(0.97)
1.15  
(0.90)
2.48  
(13.46)*
-0.71  
(-0.37)
-0.83  
(-0.43)
-0.73  
(-0.52)
F Stat 9.71  
(0.000)
9.18  
(0.000)
9.05  
(0.000)
Wald 51.11  
(0.000)
51.18  
(0.000)
82.49  
(0.000)
Sargan 1.92 
(0.59)
1.97 
(0.58)
Basmann 1.61 
(0.66)
0.55 
(0.65)
Hansen J 1.20  
(0.75)
R Square 0.12 0.38 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.39
Countries 22 22 22 22 22 22
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero.
The t-statistics given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.
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openness, as all columns indicate that trade improves 
income distribution in non-OIC countries. However, when 
the problem of endogeneity is controlled, the significance 
level and sign for the estimated coefficient on trade lost 
remain the same. This finding provides deeper insights 
into the relationship between trade and inequality. The 
existing literature ignores the differences between OIC 
and non-OIC countries, but empirical findings have clearly 
shown that the effects of trade openness are not uniform 
across different samples of developing countries. Strictly 
speaking, it is the poor of the OIC countries who suffer 
most from globalization. The results obtained are similar to 
the benchmark findings.
Table 10 excludes openness to trade while it includes FDI 
as another measure of globalization. The coefficient of FDI 
exerts a positive and significant influence on inequalities 
in non-OIC countries. The estimated coefficient on FDI is 
0.02, which implies that one standard deviation increase in 
FDI leads to a 0.6 % increase in income inequalities.
It is important to note that non-OIC countries receive, on 
average, 3.3% FDI compared to non-OIC countries that 
receive 2.08%, on average. The average high inflow of FDI 
explains the larger impact of FDI on income distribution in 
non-OIC countries. All other estimated parameters remain 
the same in terms of significance and direction of link.
The main findings for the non-OIC countries are:
1. Very strong and robust evidence has been found in 
favour of Kuznet’s hypotheses.
2. Openness to trade is not harmful.
3. FDI widens existing inequalities.
4. Inflation seems to distort income distribution.
5. The most important difference is that the government 
emerges as a major player in non-OIC countries, 
whereas its role is insignificant in the OIC world.
Columns 2–5  in Table  11 provide results for the poverty 
model for OIC countries. All columns of the Table indicate 
Table 6. Inequality and globalization (openness to trade) in OIC countries.
Independent 
Variables
Dependent Variable: Income Distribution
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS LIML GMM
Per Capita  
GDP
0.697  
(2.38)*
0.899  
(2.93)*
0.942  
(2.96)*
1.44  
(2.91)*
1.51  
(3.00)*
1.46  
(4.07)*
Per Capita  
GDP squared
-0.042  
(-2.18)**
-0.050  
(-2.50)*
-0.052  
(-2.55)*
-0.072  
(-2.65)*
-0.086  
(-2.74)*
-0.084  
(-3.67)*
Openness  
to Trade
0.0006  
(1.33)
0.001  
(4.17)*
0.001  
(4.12)*
0.001  
(2.93)*
0.0014  
(2.74)*
0.001  
(2.50)*
High Financial  
Intermediation
-0.105  
(-4.00)*
-0.106  
(-4.01)*
-0.119  
(-3.81)*
-0.121  
(-3.83)*
-0.107  
(-3.69)*
Population 0.113  
(6.35)*
0.109  
(5.44)*
0.131  
(4.97)*
0.133  
(4.94)*
0.150  
(5.72)*
Inflation 0.001  
(2.83)*
0.001  
(2.85)*
0.002  
(1.79)***
0.002  
(1.79)***
0.002  
(1.5)
Human  
Capital
-0.022  
(-0.55)
0.006  
(0.09)
-0.006  
(-0.10)
0.037  
(0.54)
Government  
Expenditure
-0.021  
(-0.67)
-0.023  
(-0.75)
-0.06  
(-1.26)
-0.06  
(-1.31)
-0.061  
(-1.26)
F Stat 6.39  
(0.000)
12.24  
(0.000)
10.65  
(0.000)
Wald 69.60  
(0.000)
65.50  
(0.000)
158.30  
(0.000)
Sargan 4.1  
(0.25)
4.36  
(0.23)
Basmann 3.52  
(0.32)
1.19  
(0.32)
Hansen J 3.76  
(0.29)
R square 0.16 0.54 0.54 0.50 0.49 0.47
Country 22 22 22 22 22 22
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero.
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) and indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.
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that economic growth is robustly and negatively associated 
with poverty, thus, growth is pro-poor. Income inequalities 
are positively and significantly associated with poverty 
incidence. The effect of inflation is positive and significant 
implying that inflation hits the poor hard. Once again, the 
government does not appear to play a role in reducing 
poverty.
The last four columns 6–9 of Table  10 report poverty 
estimates for non-OIC countries. The growth turns 
out to be good for the poor. The overall model does 
not fit better because most of the variables turn out 
to be insignificant. In order to overcome this problem 
and to sort out a more reliable comparative picture of 
poverty for both sets of countries, this study employs a 
parsimonious model that includes economic growth and 
income distribution as compulsory variables along with 
globalization variables.
Table 12 reports results on globalization and poverty in OIC 
countries. Economic growth elasticity of poverty turns out 
to be negative and significant, implying that growth is good 
for the poor. However, inequalities are positively associated 
with poverty but not significant. Inflation is significant with 
positive sign. A sharp contrast has been observed on the role of 
government in helping the poor. The estimated coefficient on 
government spending is insignificant. When comparison are 
made regarding the role of openness to trade, findings in terms 
of sign are similar to those for non-OIC countries; however, 
parameter estimates for openness to trade are insignificant, 
implying that trade is not harmful. A sharp contrast is observed 
when it comes to the role of FDI; it significantly helps the poor.
Table 13 shows the results obtained for the poverty model 
in non-OIC countries. The growth turns out to be good for 
the poor, while inequality and inflation are harmful for 
them. The major difference observed is on government 
Table 7. Inequality and globalization (FDI) in OIC countries.
Independent 
Variables
Dependent Variable: Income Distribution
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS LIML GMM
Per Capita  
GDP
0.605  
(1.94)**
0.61  
(1.95)***
0.555  
(1.60)***
0.993  
(1.84)**
1.05  
(1.89)**
1.003  
(2.70)**
Per Capita GDP 
squared
-0.030  
(-1.48)
-0.031  
(-1.54)
-0.027  
(-1.30)
-0.055  
(-1.62)***
-0.059  
(-1.69)***
-0.056  
(-2.40)*
FDI 0.007  
(1.65)***
0.006  
(1.60)***
0.006  
(1.6)***
0.021  
(2.67)*
0.023  
(2.77)*
0.020  
(1.76)***
High Financial 
Intermediation
-0.076  
(-2.65)*
-0.074  
(-2.56)*
-0.074  
(-2.53)*
-0.052  
(-1.23)
-0.048  
(-1.11)
-0.042  
(-1.03)
Population 0.112  
(6.46)*
0.13  
(5.80)*
0.124  
(5.50)*
0.166  
(5.00)*
0.169  
(4.94)*
0.201  
(4.97)*
Inflation 0.002  
(2.82)*
0.002  
(2.90)*
0.002  
(2.80)*
0.003  
(1.96)**
0.003  
(2.01)**
0.003  
(1.76)***
Human Capital 0.018  
(0.44)
0.024  
(0.57)
0.046  
(0.66)
0.045  
(0.62)
0.089  
(1.33)
Government 
Expenditure
0.004  
(0.12)
0.011  
(0.21)
0.012  
(0.23)
0.003  
(0.07)
Constant 0.78  
(0.65)
0.81  
(0.67)
0.90  
(0.72)
F Stat 10.16  
(0.000)
8.64  
(0.000)
7.45  
(0.000)
Wald 50.37  
(0.000)
49.30  
(0.000)
96.75  
(0.000)
Sargan 3.15  
(0.20)
3..24  
(0.20)
Basman 2.72  
(0.26)
1.35  
(0.27)
J Stat 1.21 
(0.54)
R 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.31 0.27 0.28
Country 22 22 22 22 22 22
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero.
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) and indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.
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Table 9. Inequality and globalization (openness to trade) in non-OIC countries.
Independent 
Variables
Dependent Variable: Income Distribution
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS LIML GMM
Per Capita  
GDP
1.54  
(5.49)*
1.75  
(6.95)*
1.69  
(6.72)*
1.85  
(5.54)*
1.84  
(5.46)*
1.84  
(6.02)*
Per Capita  
GDP squared 
-0.098  
(-5.64)*
-0.103  
(-6.71)*
-0.098  
(-6.45)*
-0.108  
(-5.45)***
-0.108  
(-5.37)*
-0.108  
(-5.89)*
Openness  
to Trade
-0.002  
(-3.78)*
-0.001  
(-1.7)***
-0.001  
(-1.61)***
-0.0006  
(-1.02)
-0.0005  
(-0.96)
-0.0006  
(-0.87)
High Financial 
Intermediation
-0.023  
(-0.94)
-0.012  
(-0.48)
-0.026  
(-0.78)
-0.027  
(-0.77)***
-0.025  
(-0.89)
Population 0.163  
(10.88)*
0.137  
(7.28)*
0.128  
(5.22)*
0.128  
(5.16)*
0.130  
(5.81)*
(Continued)
Table 8. Inequality in non-OIC countries using alternative econometrics techniques.
Independent 
Variables
Dependent Variable: Income Distribution
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS LIML GMM
Per Capita  
GDP
1.62  
(5.63)*
1.81  
(7.85)*
1.72  
(6.80)*
1.90  
(5.57)*
1.88  
(5.50)*
1.90  
(6.05)*
Per Capita  
GDP squared
-0.105  
(-5.90)*
-0.107  
(-7.02)
-0.101  
(-6.56)
-0.111  
(-5.51)***
-0.11  
(-5.44)***
-0.111  
(-5.97)*
High Financial 
Intermediation
-0.068  
(-1.35)
0.072  
(1.45)
-0.029  
(-0.86)
-0.028  
(-0.85)
-0.028  
(-1.00)
Population -0.031  
(-1.25)*
-0.01  
(-0.65)
0.138  
(5.86)*
0.137  
(5.81)*
0.143  
(6.55)*
Human Capital 0.147  
(8.21)*
0.147  
(8.25)*
0.06  
(0.88)
-0.063  
(-0.86)
-0.06  
(-1.11)
Government 
Expenditure
-0.080  
(-2.45)*
0.099  
(2.95)*
0.14  
(2.38)*
0.145  
(2.42)*
-0.139  
(-2.43)*
Inflation 0.002  
(1.92)**
0.002  
(2.11)**
0.002  
(2.15)**
0.002  
(1.99)**
Constant -2.45  
(-2.12)*
-3.42  
(3.31)*
-3.05  
(-2.92)*
F Stat 24.90  
(0.000)
39.93  
(0.000)
35.24  
(0.000)
Wald 191.38  
(0.000)
190.27  
(0.000)
250.05  
(0.000)
Sargan 2.51  
(0.47)
2.55  
(0.47)
Basman 2.36  
(0.50)
0.79  
(0.50)
J stat 2.43 
(0.54)
R 0.18 0.58 0.58 0.56 0.55 0.56
Country 43 43 43 43 43 43
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero.
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) and indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.
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spending, which significantly reduces poverty. The results 
show that one standard deviation increase in government 
spending reduces poverty by 2%. Overall, the results for 
non-OIC countries indicate that globalization accentuates 
and does not ameliorates poverty and, among the domestic 
factors, economic growth is good for the poor while both 
income inequality and inflation hurt poor people and 
increase their suffering.
Conclusion and policy implications
The purpose of this study has been to examine the 
distributional and poverty consequences of globalization 
for OIC countries in comparison to non-OIC countries over 
a long period, 1970 to 2008. This study is unique in the 
way that it disaggregates globalization consequences for 
two sets of developing countries and uses more comparable 
statistics on inequality and poverty. Furthermore, it 
explicitly controls for high financial intermediation and 
accommodates the endogeneity problem.
The main findings on the distributional consequences of 
globalization in OIC countries are:
• Kuznet’s curve holds in OIC countries and highlights 
the importance of policies building a threshold level 
of economic development to lift the poor out of 
poverty traps.
• Globalization causes an adverse effect on 
inequalities
• Financial liberalization has been found to exert a 
negative influence on income distribution, while 
inflation exerts a positive influence.
• The role of government is insignificant in improving 
income distribution.
In non-OIC countries the main findings are:
• The results reflect a strong presence of the Kuznets 
curve; a number of the countries have surpassed the 
threshold level of economic development, and many 
are close it.
• Openness to trade is not harmful.
• The government emerges as a major player in non-
OIC countries.
In a separate modelling for poverty consequences of 
globalization in the OIC world, the major findings are that 
the estimated coefficient on economic growth is robustly 
significant with negative sign that implies economic growth 
is good for the poor. Also, the impact of inflation turns out 
to be robustly bad for poor people. The role of government 
was found to be insignificant in reducing poverty, this study 
identifying strong evidence that government does not play 
a significant role in picking the poor out from poverty traps 
in OIC countries. The analysis exhibits a sharp contrast on 
the role of FDI, which appears to be good for the poor in 
OIC countries. In the case of non-OIC countries, a major 
contrast has been observed on the role of government in 
reducing poverty, the estimated coefficient being robustly 
significant with a negative sign in non-OIC countries. The 
evidence indicates that one standard deviation increase in 
government spending reduces poverty by 2%.
It is proposed that this analysis has the following policy 
implications:
1. OIC countries need to focus more on growth than 
trade openness as the evidence suggests that growth 
elasticity of poverty is high in this sample of countries 
and trade openness does not help in reducing poverty.
Table 9. (Continued)
Human Capital 0.0005  
(1.61)***
-0.081  
(-1.13)
-0.08  
(-1.10)
-0.084  
(-1.4)
Government 
Expenditure
-0.081  
(-1.62)***
0.134  
(2.31)*
-0.139  
(-2.35)*
-0.133  
(-2.38)*
Inflation -0.099  
(-2.92)*
0.002  
(1.88)***
0.002  
(1.94)**
0.002  
(1.83)***
Constant -2.11  
(-1.88)**
-3.66  
(-3.53)*
-2.88  
(-2.76)*
F Stat 22.32  
(0.000)
46.29  
(0.000)
31.44  
(0.000)
Wald 200.83  
(0.000)
199.10  
(0.000)
254.29  
(0.000)
Sargan 2.90  
(0.41)
2.96  
(0.46)
Basman 2.72  
(0.44)
0.91  
(0.44)
J Stat 2.94  
(0.40)
R 0.23 0.57 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.58
Country 43 43 43 43 43 43
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero.
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) and indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.
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Table 11. Poverty, growth, inequality and globalization in OIC countries.
Independent 
Variables
Dependent Variable: Poverty
OIC Countries Non-OIC Countries
2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM
Growth -1.56 
(-3.8)*
-0.98 
(-2.55)*
-1.67 
(-3.17)*
-1.42 
(-2.98)*
0.-74 
(-3.14)*
-0.69  
(-3.29)*
-0.71  
(-3.14)*
-0.69  
(-3.34)*
Inequality 1.24 
(2.26)*
1.29 
(4.12)*
1.16 
(1.23)
1.18 
(1.28)
1.13 
(-2.26)*
1.13  
(3.02)*
1.09  
(2.41)
1.12  
(3.02)
Inflation 0.109 
(2.17)*
0.095 
(2.93)*
0.108 
(1.75)**
0.088 
(1.92)**
-0.015 
(-0.49)
-0.011  
(-0.54)
-0.017  
(-0.61)
-0.014  
(-0.80)
Table 10. Inequality and globalization (FDI) in non-OIC countries.
Independent 
Variables
Dependent Variable: Income Distribution
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS LIML GMM
Per Capita  
GDP
1.65  
(5.75)*
1.85  
(7.37)*
1.75  
(6.95)*
2.05  
(5.45)*
2.06  
(5.29)*
20.6  
(5.52)*
Per Capita  
GDP squared 
-0.106  
(-5.98)*
-0.109  
(-7.16)*
-0.103  
(-6.73)*
-0.122  
(-5.42)***
-0.123  
(-5.26)***
-0.123  
(-5.5)***
FDI -0.004  
(-1.45)
0.009  
(2.36)*
0.008  
(2.19)*
0.022  
(1.72)***
0.024  
(1.76)***
0.021  
(1.94)**
High Financial 
Intermediation
-0.031  
(-1.28)
-0.017  
(-0.67)
-0.032  
(-0.93)
-0.033  
(-0.92)
-0.034  
(-1.15)
Population 0.175  
(12.4)*
0.155  
(8.61)*
0.163  
(5.78)*
0.166  
(5.59)*
0.165  
(6.34)*
Human Capital -0.058  
(-1.15)
0.020  
(0.24)
0.030  
(0.34)
0.014  
(0.20)
Government 
Expenditure
-0.090  
(-2.65)*
-0.134  
(-2.13)*
-0.136  
(-2.07)**
-0.143  
(2-
0.16)**
Inflation  0.0007  
(2.10)*
0.003  
(2.39)*
0.003  
(2.43)*
0.003  
(2.43)*
Constant -2.59  
(-2.24)**
-4.08  
(-3.95)*
-3.29  
(-3.15)*
F Stat 16.93  
(0.000)
46.45  
(0.000)
31.92  
(0.000)
Wald 178.79  
(0.000)
170.79  
(0.000)
235.44  
(0.000)
Sargan 2.84  
(0.42)
2.83  
(0.42)
Basman 2.65  
(0.45)
0.87  
(0.46)
J 2.79 
(0.43)
R 0.19 0.57 0.60 0.52 0.50 0.52
Country 43 43 43 43 43 43
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero.
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) and indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.
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Table 11. (Continued)
Population -1.45 
(-1.05)
-0.68 
(-0.73)
-1.85 
(-1.33)
-1.68 
(-1.55)
1.15 
(1.10)
1.11 
(1.29)
1.12  
(1.08)
0.998  
(1.23)
Human Capital 0.20 
(0.44)
-0.041 
(-0.97)
-0.01 
(-0.26)
-0.003 
(-0.09)
0.06 
(1.40)
0.070 
(1.73)
0.065  
(1.42)
0.069  
(1.74)***
Government 
Expenditure
-0.003 
(-0.02)
0.070 
(0.49)
-0.037 
(-0.28)
-0.02 
(-0.18)
0.044 
(0.035)
0.052 
(0.41)
0.059  
(0.51)
0.051  
(0.46)
High Fin. 
Intermediation
3.29 
(2.43)**
3.15 
(2.87)*
2.63 
(2.08)*
2.74 
(2.33)*
-0.62 
(-0.57)
-0.52 
(-0.65)
-0.73  
(-0.70)
-0.55  
(-0.68)
Openness to 
Trade
-0.031 
(-1.51)
-0.039 
(-2.94)*
-0.01 
(-0.30)
-0.002 
(-0.06)
FDI -0.166 
(-0.40)
-0.218 
(-0.58)
-0.42  
(-0.75)
-0.23  
(-0.73)
Wald 59.49  
(0.000)
160.06  
(0.000)
56.06  
(0.000)
70.54  
(0.000)
30.39  
(0.000)
49  
(0.000)
31.23  
(0.000)
70.54  
(0.000)
Sargan 4.32  
(0.23)
3.50 
(0.32)
1.04 
(0.79)
1.69 
(0.64)
Basman 3.41  
(0.33)
2.70 
(0.40)
0.86 
(0.83)
1.39 
(0.71)
J Stat 3.24  
(0.36)
3.89  
(0.27)
0.96  
(0.81)
1.26 
(0.73)
R 0.55 0.49 0.55 0.53 0.25 0.24 0.30 0.27
Country 22 22 22 22 43 24 43 43
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero.
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) and indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.
Table 12. Poverty, growth, inequality and globalization in OIC countries.
Independent  
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Poverty 
2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM
Growth -1.83 (-6.08)* -1.79 (-4.64)* -1.73 (-5.72)* -1.70 (-4.43)*
Inequality 0.25 (0.99) 0.24 (0.76) 0.21 (0.88) 0.34 (1.12)
Inflation 0.074 (1.69)*** 0.077 (2.71)* 0.097 (2.12)* 0.094 (3.18)*
Government  
Expenditure
0.044 (0.29) 0.055 (0.46) 0.11 (0.75) 0.064 (0.57)
Openness to Trade 0.023 (0.92) 0.022 (1.08) .
FDI -0.56 (-1.63)*** -0.52 (-2.43)*
Wald 77.05 (0.000) 155.68 (0.000) 82.37 (0.000) 178.21 
(0.000)
Sargan 0.33 (0.56) 2.12 (0.35)
Basman 0.29 (0.59) 1.90 (0.39)
J Stat 0.41 (0.52) 2.69 (0.26)
R 0.56 0.56 0.58 0.57
Country 23 23 23 23
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero.
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) and indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.
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2. OIC countries may increase government spending 
to help the poor, but it is in the non-OIC countries 
where the role of government is significant in 
reducing poverty.
3. OIC countries may focus more on the factors that 
attract FDI as the evidence clearly shows that, in 
this sample of countries, FDI inflows ameliorate 
poverty.
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